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ABSTRACT 
This is a history of the development of the manager in English football from 1880 
until the mid-1960s. It is predicated on two main arguments. First, that football 
management in England has largely reflected the practical tradition of British 
management where managers are employed more for their experience than any 
qualifications that they might hold. Second, that the management of players during 
this period mirrored prevailing attitudes within society towards the handling of 
young, working-class men and because they lacked any management training, 
managers imposed their personality and authority on them. The thesis has a 
chronological structure. The first chapter provides a broad overview of British 
management up to 1970. Its aim is to provide an overall context for the rest of the 
thesis by analysing the history of British management, its culture, and also the role 
of education. Chapter 2 charts the early development of football management in the 
years up to 1914. The following chapter examines the emergence of early football 
managers during the same period. It examines, first, the relationship between a 
manager and his directors and how this has developed in light of football's 
commercialisation process; second, how the training and background of managers has 
reflected trends within British management; and third, the manager's relationship 
with his workers, the players. This framework will be used throughout the thesis. 
Chapter 4 is a case study of Herbert Chapman. Chapter 5 deals with the inter-War 
period and Chapter 6 looks at the emergence of modem football management from 
1945 up to the Sixties. Chapter 7 assesses the socio-economic impact of a manager 
?lustract v 
on a team's performance during this period. The conclusion will briefly draw 
together the main themes and arguments of the thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Personality must be the key factor in managerial success. It is not a question of 
being a nice man or a nasty one, of being likeable or aloof, of being imaginative or 
cautious, hard or indulgent in discipline. All of these things are subordinate to the 
essential quality that, it seems, all the most successful managers have: the capacity 
to dominate. This is not just an overbearing manner, a thrusting of two fists at the 
world; it is not just arrogance. It is a steeliness in a man's make-up, the will to 
make his methods tell. He is the kind of man who will not permit interference by 
the amateurs, and the kind who will never be invited to work for a board not 
prepared to be overshadowed. The successful manager may have all kinds of talents, 
from charm to low cunning, but to stay successful he needs to be very close to 
indomitable. 
A. Hopcraft, The Football Man: People and Passions in Soccer (1968), pp. 84-85 
[T]here's a contradiction in football terms ... a great football man is not necessarily 
a great man. 
John Giles referring to Matt Busby, Reputations, BBC 2 (1999) 
I'm sure he didn't like me - and I certainly didn't like him. I'll tell you one thing, 
though. I respected him. I sat scores of times in the dressing-rooms while tough, fit 
professionals players waited nervously. And above the tramp, tramp of his steps .. . 
I could hear the flat Cullis voice chanting: 'I... will... not... have ... a ... coward .. . 
in ... my ... team.' 
Former Wolverhampton Wanderers' player, Eddie Clamp on former manager Stan 
Cullis quoted in J. Holden, Stan Cullis: The Iron Manager (Derby, 2000), pp. 78-
79 
Today, football managers are celebrities. Through the media-driven hyperbole that 
has engulfed the game, they have been portrayed as figureheads: men who embody 
the clubs that they manage. Not only are their salaries commensurate with this new 
celebrity status, some have perceived managers as possessing mystical powers. Yet 
the job of the football manager is a highly volatile one, and while they take the 
plaudits for any success, they are more likely to receive brickbats and ultimately the 
sack for failure. How have football managers become, apparently, so important? This 
study aims to answer this question by charting the shifts within the football 
manager's role, placing it in the context of football's history whilst also exploring 
how these changes have been reflected not only in the wider world of British 
management but also in society as a whole. 
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Although it is a history up to 1966, some material has been included in later 
chapters that is outside the timeframe of the thesis. Its purpose is to highlight not 
only how earlier developments had an impact on the role of more recent managers 
but also how the present has provided continuities with football management's past. 
The 1880-1966 period has been chosen because it marks, both at the start and the 
end, important changes within football and society in general. The late Victorian era 
ushered in the commercialisation of leisure. The 1880s signalled the beginning of 
modem football with the legalisation of professionalism and the birth of the Football 
League in 1888. By the Sixties, the modernisation of Britain had gathered momentum, 
and football was part of that process. More liberal attitudes ('Sexual intercourse was 
invented in 1963'!) and policies were adopted, characterising a change from a 
previously rigidly stratified society to one in which there was a decline in deference. 
In addition, the country's education system was beginning to expand as the first 
generation of working class students who had enjoyed a secondary education now 
graduated from universities in increasing numbers. At the same time as National 
Service was ending, football's antiquated labour regulations, the maximum wage and 
the retain and transfer system, were being overhauled, laying the foundations for the 
game's more rapid commercialisation during the decades that followed. 
With the current interest shown in them, it is perhaps surprising that football 
managers have been largely absent from English football's historiography. Tony 
Mason, for example, has commented on how the history of football has been written 
largely 'in terms of ... institutions, players and matches'. 1 There have been no 
IT. Mason, 'Football and the Historians', JJHS, Vol. 5,1 (May, 1988), p. 136 
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studies which have tried to make a link between the history of football management 
and other mainstream academic disciplines such as management studies or to 
compare the jobs of football managers with those of managers in other industries. 
Social histories of football have tended to analyse the importance of the game's rising 
popularity and its commercial growth in a national social and economic context. In 
their excellent studies, Tony Mason, Nicholas Fishwick and Dave Russell have each 
emphasised the development of club management but without focusing on the 
evolving and changing nature of the manager's role.2 Stephen Tischler, in his study of 
football before 1914, virtually ignores the day-to-day administration of clubs. 
Instead, he is more concerned with capital-labour relations that are analysed within a 
rigid Marxist framework. 3 
One of the few academic studies that has dealt with the manager's developing 
role in some depth is The Football World by the sociologist, Stephen Wagg. As its 
subtitle, A Contemporary Social History, suggests, it is only partly a work of history 
as it mainly concentrates on the period after the Second World War. Wagg attempted 
to blend a history, sociology and politics of football by focusing on the relationship 
between the media and the game's continuing commercialisation together with an 
account of controversies over the value of coaching. He argues that from the inter-
War period 'a mystique began to be woven around the figure of the team manager', 
and that this was desirable for directors, players and press alike.4 
2T. Mason, Association Football and English Society 1863-1915 (Brighton, 1980); N. Fishwick, 
English Football and Society 1910-50 (Manchester, 1989); D. Russell, Football and the English 
(Preston, 1997). Note: all works cited are published in London unless otherwise indicated. 
3S. Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen: The Origins of Professional Soccer in England (1981) 
4S. Wagg, The Football World: A Contemporary Social History (Brighton, 1984), p. xi 
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Other academic work based on regional case studies or examinations of 
particular clubs, have also paid some attention to the manager's role. In his study of 
West Ham, Charles Korr has shown how it employed fewer managers than any other 
club and how the motives of the directors were a determining factor in their 
relationship with the manager. Korr has also emphasised the importance of a 
manager's link with the supporters and the impact that this had on club identity. 
Tony Arnold's business history of professional football in Bradford mainly 
concentrates on the actions of the directors of the city's two clubs, City and Park 
Avenue. It clearly shows how, before 1930, directors were really the managers of the 
club, and that the manager had a subordinate role. 5 Amongst the recent economic 
literature on football, there has been a growing interest on the impact of the manager. 
Stefan Szymanski and Tim Kuypers, for example, have analysed the sport from both 
an economic and business perspective. Managers are looked upon as 'competitive 
advantages' who can make a difference to a team's performance but this must be seen 
in the light of a contemporary economic climate for football in which the gap 
between the rich and poor clubs has been rapidly increasing.6 
The importance of the manager's role has been recognised recently by a 
number of significant biographies. A pioneering study was Stephen Studd' s account 
of the career of Herbert Chapman who is perhaps the most emblematic managerial 
figure in the game's history, in terms of the impact he is thought to have had on the 
5 A.J. Arnold, A Game That Would Pay: A Business History of Professional Football in Bradford 
(1988) 
6S. Szymanski and T. Kuypers, Winners and Losers: The Business Strategy of Football (1999) 
--
Introduction 5 
evolution of the manager's role. 7 Studd could have perhaps been more critical of 
Chapman, although his interpretation may have been influenced by the fact that 
Chapman left behind little contemporary material. Two other notable biographies are 
Stephen F. Kelly's book on Bill Shankly and Eamon Dunphy's life of Matt Busby.8 
Unlike many books on sporting celebrities, these cannot be accused of hagiography. 
Both are written in a broadly historical context and their research benefits from their 
relative insider status; Dunphy as a former player and Kelly as Liverpool's official 
historian. 
The management of football clubs had begun to take on greater significance 
during the late nineteenth century when players started to be paid and the game 
became a commercial proposition. But how were clubs run in the age of limited 
liability? Did they model themselves on any particular form of management and what 
influenced the thinking and actions of committees and boards of directors? It will be 
one of the major themes of this thesis that football management emerged out of the 
English practical tradition in which knowledge was gathered and passed on through 
the generations by 'doing it' rather than by learning how to 'do it': managers went 
through the mill rather than having read John Stuart Mill! Early football clubs had 
been set-up for social and sporting reasons and were part of the British liberal 
voluntary tradition. Once footballing competition intensified however, money began 
to playa greater part in the running of clubs. There was no clear model available for 
clubs to use and at first they were run by elected committees with a quasi-democratic 
7 S. Studd, Herbert Chapman: Football Emperor (1998). A first edition was written in 1981. 
8S.F. Kelly, Bill Shankly, It's Much More Important Than That: A Biography (1996); E. Dunphy, A 
Strange Kind of Glory: Sir Matt Busby and Manchester United (1991) 
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ethos. Later, as commercialisation developed, a more business-like approach was 
needed and following the conversion to limited liability, directors began to 'manage' 
clubs. In a sense, they made it up as they went along but at the same time they drew 
upon their own business and professional experiences. From the mid-nineteenth 
century, cricket, horse-racing and professional athletics had also become 
commercialised sporting spectacles, and in one way, they provided examples of how 
to run a sports business.9 But despite the new commercial imperative, the Football 
Association's early administrators never considered football to be an industry, and 
the traditions of voluntarism, the values of amateurism, and later those of mutuality 
through the Football League, pervaded the management of clubs until well into the 
twentieth century. 
In conjunction with these voluntary and amateur traditions, of paramount 
importance to our understanding of the development of football management is the 
fact that football clubs were (and, in general, still are) very small companies. Unlike 
large organisations with their layers of management and extensive bureaucracies, 
football clubs by comparison, have traditionally employed only a handful of 
administrative staff. It meant that there was greater potential for individuals to shape 
significantly a club's direction through their own personality and charisma. Because 
of their small size, a greater emphasis was placed on the success of personal 
relationships, particularly that between chairman and manager. A certain chemistry 
between these two has been crucial to the successful operation of football clubs. If it 
9Sports grounds, for example, at the Aston Lower Grounds and Lillie Bridge, had also been built as 
commercial propositions. 
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has not been there, and the relationship breaks down, the manager has usually been 
sacked. 
Following the legalisation of professionalism in 1885 and the subsequent 
escalation in costs, clubs recruited men from the local business community who had 
experience of management and the raising of money to run them. Because of their 
size, many clubs were, and continued to be, dominated by powerful directors. As the 
demands of running a club increased however, the club secretary, at first, and later 
the manager would be given more responsibilities. Eventually, through gradual 
changes in the management of clubs, managers gained more powers, and 
consequently, more opportunities arose for them to bring their own personalities to 
bear on a club. Change however, was uneven and, in this thesis, any changes will be 
examined in a historical context in which there was much continuity. 
In addition to the importance of more careful financial management after 
1885, clubs also had the problem of how to manage the professional footballers 
themselves. Early football club directors usually had no experience of handling this 
new type of labour and the way that they managed them was, again, often based on 
their own social and professional background. The main feeling amongst them was 
that young men needed discipline and that an eye needed to be kept on them during 
training. Football was unlike other jobs however. Players only trained in the 
mornings and then spent much of their free time in the pub. Initially, clubs had 
employed trainers to look after the players but they lacked any real authority, often 
had little knowledge of football and their man-management skills were poor. By the 
Introduction 8 
early 1900s, a growing number of secretary-managers had been appointed III an 
attempt to improve the day-to-day running of clubs. 
In what terms however, can we understand the nature of the relationship 
between management and players? It will be an underlying tenet of this thesis that 
the management of footballers largely mirrored attitudes towards the handling of 
young, working-class men in general. As Arthur Hopcraft suggests in the opening 
quotation, by the 1960s, football managers essentially imposed their personalities 
and authority on players. There was not a particular model that managers 
regimentally followed though as the role of managers developed unevenly and also 
differed from club-to-club. Instead, there were a number of different styles that 
emerged and echoed managers' own life experiences. However, it can be argued that, 
in a number of ways, the management of footballers was not dissimilar to life in the 
army. Johnny Rogan, for example, has argued that the 'hierarchical structure of 
football clubs most closely resembles that of a military-style organisation'; it is the 
directors who represent the officer class, managers and trainers are the NCOs with 
the players forming the other ranks. 10 The military model is essentially authoritarian, 
based on respect for hierarchy and traditional notions of masculinity in which orders 
have to be obeyed usually without question, at all times. Of course, this is not a 
perfect mirror image of football management; rather it represents more of an analogy. 
This model aims to provide a context to show how the management of footballers 
has reflected prevailing trends and developments in industry and wider society as 
well as football. Because football managers have received little or no training for 
10J. Rogan, The Football Managers (1989), p. xii 
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management, they have adopted methods and a style of management, in addition to 
any military persona, which has echoed their own experience. 
But, in some respects, being a footballer can be compared to being in the 
army. Football, as a game, is comparable to warfare in that it is mostly tedious, 
punctuated by moments of intense excitement. The military historian, Richard 
Holmes, has suggested that sport is akin to serious fighting as it requires aggressive 
motivation and has several useful military functions. In particular, as a fast-moving 
team game, football requires the capacity to make quick decisions under pressure, 
and because of the level of physical contact, demands a certain capital of physical 
courage. I I Moreover, managers and players are publicly judged by results on a 
weekly basis, and experience intense, short-term pressures. As a result, players have 
been closely monitored both at training and even during their leisure time. It has been 
expected that they toe the line and if they do not, they have been shouted at, 
humiliated and disciplined. 
The basis for the worker-management relationship within football clubs 
initially reflected the strict hierarchy of Victorian class society, and stemmed from 
the belief that, even if people did not like it, everyone knew their place. I2 The 
education system, for example, mirrored, and has continued to reinforce, crude class 
hierarchies from this period where the upper-classes went to public schools, 
grammar schools educated an expanding middle-class while the working classes went 
to elementary and eventually secondary modern schools. The introduction of mass 
education in the late Victorian period was also accompanied by harsh measures for 
IIR. Holmes, Firing Line (1985), pp. 54-55 
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the disciplining of children, such as the cane. By the late 1880s, military drill had 
become established as part of the curriculum in both voluntary and board schools and 
was regarded as the linchpin in teaching social discipline to the children of the poor. 13 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, some of the ideas and 
attitudes concerned with the handling of workers had also been founded on military 
principles. In a number of industries and organisations, particularly those with 
uniformed workforces, a class based authoritarianism was prominent. Railway 
companies, for example, were the first organisations, apart from the army and navy, 
to have control over a substantial body of workers, and they ran their uniformed 
labour force with discipline and through a hierarchical structure. I4 Due to the nature 
of the work, underpinned by the 'tyranny of the clock', strict discipline was deemed 
essential to avoid accidents. This thinking partly emanated from the background and 
expectations of many of the early managers who came from the army and were 
recruited for their experience in controlling large groups of men. Railway uniforms 
further emphasised the military connection; guards, for example, would wear the 
company's own uniform which became the equivalent of army regimental colours. 15 
The language employed in the industry also had militaristic overtones. On joining the 
railway, men entered the 'service'; company officials were called 'officers' and 
'superior officers'; and workers went on 'duty' rather than to work. I6 This 
l2Cf. D. Cannadine, Class in Britain (1998) 
l3].S. Hurt, 'Drill, Discipline and the Elementary School Ethos' in P. McCann (ed.), Popular 
Education and Socialization in the Nineteenth Century (1977), pp. 167-91 
I4F.M.L. Thompson, The Rise of Respectable Society: A Social History of Victorian Britain, 1830-
1900 (1988), p. 47. By 1873 the permanent staff on Britain's railway companies numbered 275,000. 
F. McKenna, 'Victorian Railway Workers', History Workshop Journal, No.1 (Spring, 1976), p. 26 
15 'V" , 27 McKenna, lctonan, p. 
I6'b 'd 1 1 . 
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disciplined world trained railwaymen early on to accept fines or even dismissal for a 
range of misdemeanours. 17 The development of English provincial police forces 
during the mid-nineteenth century was also based on military and hierarchical 
principles. All early chief constables, for example, had had military experience, and 
police officers, like railwaymen, were also recruited from the lower classes. The 
largest group was drawn from farm workers who were accustomed to working in an 
environment which demanded obedience and a conscious identification with their 
masters. 18 By comparison, footballers were mainly young, cheeky, urban workers 
which created different problems for football clubs. 
These prevailing attitudes about the man-management of industrial workers 
were further complemented by Britain's wartime experience during the twentieth 
century. By 1900, 22 per cent of men aged between 17 and 40 had been subjected to 
military life and discipline. This increased throughout the century, notably during the 
world wars. In 1914 alone 1 million men volunteered for the army. Later, the 
National Service Act of 1948 demanded that men aged over 18 served in the armed 
forces, initially for eighteen months but from 1950, for two years. Between 1945 and 
1960, 2.3 million men were called Up.19 Many men therefore, including many players 
and future managers, had a taste of life in the armed forces and experienced its tough 
methods of handling men. Moreover, these experiences had a cultural impact. Some 
17McKenna, 'Victorian', p. 27; A. Sampson, Company Man: The Rise and Fall o/Corporate Life 
(1995), p. 26. Not that discipline prevented accidents happening. 
18C. Steedman, Policing the Victorian Community: The Formation of English Provincial Police 
Forces, 1856-80 (1984), pp. 1-63 
191. Bourke, Working-Class Cultures in Britain 1890-1960: Gender, Class and Ethnicity (1994), p. 
182; J. Hartigan, 'Volunteering for the Army in England, August 1914 to May 1915' (University of 
Warwick, MA Thesis, 1998), pp. 60-76 
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people not only recognised that management on military principles was a way of 
'doing things', but they also believed in it. 
Within the framework of a military model of management, many football 
managers would perform a role similar to that of a Sergeant-Major. The Regimental 
Sergeant-Major has overall responsibility for the lower ranks, and links up with the 
Commanding Officer. Similarly, the football manager coaches his lower ranks, the 
players, and is accountable to the board of directors. Many managers have shared 
similar characteristics to those of Sergeant-Majors. Both tend to be charismatic, 
autocratic and powerful figures who like to impose their personalities on others, and 
like to get their own way. Usually from working-class backgrounds, both have made 
their way 'through the ranks', Sergeant-Majors as privates and NCOs, and managers 
as players. Both have employed 'verbal authoritarianism', a mixture of violent and 
abusive language, direct personal castigation and scornful humour, as key disciplinary 
techniques in order to reinforce soldier/player subordination?O This 'management by 
fear' quickly became institutionalised throughout British professional football. The 
image of a manager throwing tea cups around the dressing room has almost become a 
cliche but in times of stress, managers, as a last resort, have continued to verbally 
abuse players, the abuse laced with industrial language. It should be noted that this is 
part temper and part performance as most managers are attempting to inspire 
20A. Parker, 'Chasing the 'Big-Time': Football Apprenticeship in the 1990s' (PhD Thesis, 
University of Warwick, 1996), pp. 72-74. For the 2000-01 season the Guardian produced an 
irreverent survey, but one which contained more than a hint of truth, of the 'fear factor' of 
Premiership managers. George Graham, for example, was given 1011 O. It was claimed that his fear 
factor was '[ e ]normous. Has a capacity for volcanic rage and random shouting almost unparalleled in 
the modem game'. Alex Ferguson, also known for his 'hairdryer' technique, was allocated 13/10 
which also referred to his fear factor over referees as his '[p]urple face and apoplectic puffing out of 
cheeks give him a huge advantage over rival managers in the intimidation stakes'. Guardian: The 
Season: A Supporter's Guide to the 2000-01 Football Season. 
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players to greater efforts.21 The Sergeant-Major image is further underlined by the 
fact that football managers are more likely to develop nodules on their vocal chords 
than most other working people due to constantly using their voice at full volume?2 
However, instead of the aloofness of the RSM, the relationship between manager and 
players has perhaps been more similar to that of a Sergeant and his platoon or a 
corporal and his section during wartime. Teamwork is essential to both situations, 
everyone 'mucks in' together, engendering group loyalty and there is a kind of 
intimacy and solidarity. 
But football is mostly not like the army. The similarities that have existed 
need to be tempered with an awareness of fundamental differences. For instance, 
once soldiers enter the army they are unable to leave of their own volition, and in 
their barracks they are subjected to military law. Footballers themselves were once 
subjected to the retain and transfer system which restricted their mobility but, in 
theory at least, they could leave at any time they wanted, and after games and 
training they could go home to their wives. 
A military model of management, therefore, represents more of an analogy 
than a systematic comparison with football. Football managers have adapted to their 
environment, and have been influenced by other male role-models. One of the most 
influential, for example, was probably that of the father-figure, especially given 
Britain's patriarchal society. Domineering as well as kindly fathers, or even 
grandfathers, have provided important role-models for generations of younger men 
21For examples of managers 'performing' during half-time see the Sunderland manager, Peter Reid in 
the series Premier Passions, BBC TV (1998). Even more explicit was Leyton Orient's John Sitton 
in a Channel 4 documentary about his club in 1995. 
22Guardian, 24 February 1998, p. 4 
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during their formative years. Like managers, fathers have tended to demand respect 
for their seniority and authority. In addition, because of the near universal experience 
of school, some managers may have seen their role like that of the schoolmaster. A 
teacher-pupil relationship is still an authoritarian one but its main purpose has been 
to impart knowledge and requires sensitivity, sympathy, understanding but also 
discipline which can be harsh. The vissicitudes of the relationship between footballer 
and manager needs to be seen in its historical context. No one model explains this 
developing new role. Managers comprised a myriad of different personalities who 
learned through personal and practical experience but the sty Ie tended to be 
authoritarian. 
In effect therefore, it seems not too far fetched to argue that the changes in 
the job from George Ramsay in the 1880s to Alf Ramsey in the 1960s, have been 
grafted on to the basic elements of the military model with its adherence to hierarchy 
and the need for obedience, plus the nineteenth century social model of rank and 
order. Some early managerial figures like George Ramsay at Aston Villa (see chapters 
2 and 3) had been clerks drawn from the lower-middle-classes. Their authority was 
class-based. They kept their distance from the players and identified more with the 
directors. Others such as Tom Watson (see Chapter 3) and Bob Kyle at Sunderland 
were more like workplace intermediaries, such as foremen or overlookers, reflecting 
nineteenth century labour management methods. By the Twenties and Thirties, 
managers were increasingly former players who had had no preparation for 
management apart from their own life-forming experiences. Their methods were 
somewhat crude and perpetuated a culture of authoritarianism and hierarchy which 
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was passed from one generation to the next. Not only was this reinforced by the 
restrictions placed on players by the maximum wage and the retain and transfer 
system but also by the game's increasing competitiveness. A number of managers 
subsequently gained reputations as autocrats. Major Frank Buckley (see Chapter 5) 
unsurprisingly typified the RSM figure and others such as Harry Storer and Charles 
Hewitt at Millwall were also noted for their autocratic styles. Other celebrated 
exponents however, like Fred Everiss at West Bromwich Albion, Sam Allen at 
Swindon and Charles Foweraker of Bolton Wanderers had clerical backgrounds and 
concentrated mainly on the administrative side, leaving the club trainer to handle the 
players. They, and others such as George Kay, were perhaps more schoolmasterly in 
their approach, and more sympathetic to some of the needs of players. At Arsenal, 
Herbert Chapman (see Chapter 4) broke the mould and was the game's first 
'modem' manager. He realised that results on the field could improve if he developed 
a closer relationship with the players. Yet Chapman was also a disciplinarian who 
demanded loyalty from them, and could be ruthless if they disobeyed his orders. 
Some managers, like Sergeants in charge of platoons, came to regard players 
as 'their boys'. In such circumstances, their management style was complemented by 
elements of both patriarchy and matriarchy. Not only did they think of themselves 
as father-figures but they also acted as mother-figures because, like mothers, they 
were always there to look after their players. Some post-Second World War 
managers, such as Matt Busby, Bill Shankly and Jock Stein, also took on this role of 
the patriarch, and often talked about their football club as a 'family'. It is an idea that 
is still prevalent within football. What they really meant however, and this was 
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probably reinforced by their own military experience, was that if a football club was 
a family, it was they, the manager, who was at its head. Because managers are older 
then the players, most feel that they are also wiser than them, and that this has to be 
reflected by strict obedience. It has often meant that managers want to influence all 
aspects the personal conduct of players, preferring them to be married and settled, 
for example, rather than single and able to 'play the field' .23 Although they may have 
seen their relationship with players in terms of loyalty, it was mostly one way as 
managers were in a position, not only to recruit players, but to leave them out of the 
team and transfer them to another club if necessary. 
Even if some managers adopted a more considered approach, they were still 
firmly based on ideas of who should wield power and who should not. Alan Brown, 
for example, had the reputation of a hardliner, perhaps reflecting his previous job as a 
policeman?4 At Wolverhampton Wanderers, Stan Cullis (see Chapter 6) had been a 
player under Frank Buckley. He had also been a Sergeant-Major in the War, and as 
manager he followed his mentor's ways. As the third of the opening quotations 
suggests, he could strike fear into his players, although, unlike Buckley, Cullis would 
develop closer relations with them. By the 1960s the role of the manager was 
becoming more narrowly defined. Increasingly, through the media, they became 
public figures and tried to cultivate a more professional, technocratic image. This was 
true of many, none more so than Alf Ramsey (see Chapter 6), whose close 
relationship with his players was symbolised by him wearing a tracksuit during the 
23M. Taylor, 'Work and Play: The Professional Footballer in England c.1900-c.1950', The Sports 
Historian, Vol. 22, I (May 2002), p. 31; E. Levy, 'The Manager as Surrogate Mother', in J. King 
and J. Kelly, The Cult o/the Manager: Do They Really Make A Difference? (1997), p. 100 
24 Hopcraft, Football Man, p. 96 
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World Cup Final of 1966. In tum they displayed fierce loyalty towards him. As we 
have seen, managers had had to combine secretarial duties with the playing side but 
now their responsibilities lay often much more with the players. Yet, like his 
managerial forebears, Ramsey, through his experience in football and life generally, 
rather than through any specialist management training, insisted on discipline and 
that he was in charge, and believed strongly that these were essential requirements 
for successful football management. 
The influence of the military on football management has also been 
complemented and reinforced by the game's occupational culture which is deeply 
rooted in the past. Ross McKibbin has argued that it 'lacks an organised 
intellectuality' due to an insufficient emphasis on education within the game?5 Like 
British management, football has been pervaded by anti-intellectualism. Instead, 
British football culture has generated authoritarian tendencies through an adherence 
to the values of hierarchy and traditional notions of masculinity. And as most 
managers were former players, they have been immersed in it, and players 
themselves do seem to respect 'experience', passed on from one generation to the 
next. 
As we have seen, class also provided a framework for management, creating a 
rigid hierarchy within clubs which cemented the structure of player-management 
relations and which has endured throughout the history of modem football. 26 Early 
Football League administrators and football club directors were predominantly from 
middle-class backgrounds whereas professional footballers came largely from the 
25 London Review of Books, 6 January 2000, p. 32 
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working-class. During the late Victorian era a growing intermediate social stratum 
sought to distinguish itself socially from manual workers. The main component of 
this increasing social division was an intense white collar status consciousness 
amongst the lower middle-classes.27 Within football clubs, directors increasingly 
regarded professional players as socially inferior and this was reinforced by the cult 
of nineteenth century amateurism. Professionalism was regarded as a necessary evil 
which had to be kept in its place. Increasingly, directors preferred the secretary to 
deal with the players. In addition to a recognition of the need for better man-
management, they found it socially unacceptable to haggle with players over 
something as vulgar as money. Football managers have subsequently imposed their 
own hierarchy of power by traditionally insisting that players address them as 
'Boss' or 'Gaffer' .28 Addressing the manager by a title has not been restricted to 
Britain. Since the 1930s all Italian professional footballers have called their manager 
by the term 'Mister' in recognition of that country's first professional manager, the 
Englishman, William Garbutt.29 
Clubs have also developed their own sub-cultures and hierarchies. In 
particular, a group mentality has developed because footballers have increasingly 
lived in a cocooned, insular world in which outsiders are distrusted and where 
players are expected to conform to a certain male type. Only one British footballer, 
26 Wagg, Football World, pp. 105-06 
27G. Crossick, 'The Emergence of the Lower Middle Class in Britain: A Discussion' in G. Crossick 
(ed.), The Lower Middle Class in Britain 1870-1914 (1977), p. 49 
28For example, in March 1953 Tim Ward was appointed manager of Bamsley. He had previously 
been a player at the club. On his appointment, Ward said that those who knew him as 'Tim' would 
now have to call him 'Boss'. A. Ward and I. Allister, Barnsley: A Study in Football 1953-59 
(Crowberry, 1981), pp. 9-11. 
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Justin Fashanu, has openly admitted that he was gay, for example, mainly because 
homosexuality is one of football's great taboos.3o Stan Collymore felt that he was 
persecuted by his manager, John Gregory, at Aston Villa for suffering from 
depression because it was felt that it was not 'normal' for a top footballer to be 
depressed.31 
These attitudes have been reinforced by the unusual nature of the football 
industry itself, as unlike most other businesses, football clubs have short-term 
objectives, thus creating a highly pressurised environment. Unsurprisingly, as Eamon 
Dunphy has argued, rather than taking pride in one's performance, the prime 
motivating factor in football has been fear. 32 As a result, older players, fearful of 
losing their place to younger ones, made sure that they conformed to certain 
standards, thus perpetuating a certain group ethos. When first taken on as a 
professional at Middlesbrough in 1937, future England captain, George Hardwick, 
had to address senior professionals as 'Mister'. The senior players also kept the 
juniors in their place by the lavatorial and vulgar stunts they pulled on them.33 It is a 
hierarchy still prevalent in the modem game, and has been extended to the trainees in 
today's clubs. As a reminder of their youth and subordinate position, not only do 
they have to refer to the first team manager as 'Boss' but they must also politely 
29p . Lanfranchi, "Mister' Garbutt: The First European Manager', The Sports Historian, Vol. 22, 1 
(May 2002), p. 51 
30Justin Fashanu later committed suicide. Guardian, 4 May 1998, p. 13, Obituary 
31Guardian (G2), 16 April 2001, pp. 2-4. Collymore somehow never fitted in at the clubs he played 
for and had the image of an outsider and a trouble-maker. 
32E. Dunphy, Only a Game?: The Diary of a Professional Footballer (1976), p. 113 
33G. Hardwick, Gentleman George (Liverpool, 1998), pp. 32-33 
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acknowledge professional players, coaches and directors.34 Alex Ferguson continues 
to demand a certain deference from his players. On one occasion at Manchester 
United, a young player called him 'Alex'. Ferguson replied, 'Were you at school with 
me?' The player replied, 'No.' 'Well call me Mr Ferguson or Boss', came the 
order.35 
It is a common saying that 'football is a man's game', and it emphasises the 
game's all-male exclusivity. John Tosh has defined masculinity as both a psychic and 
a social identity that can be found in three separate spheres; the home, at work, and 
through association. He has claimed that all-male associations such as sports clubs 
and public houses have the greatest appeal among young unmarried men and are 
integral to a notion of patriarchy beyond the household. These all-male arenas have 
sustained the myth that 'masculinity is about the exclusive company of men' .36 
Richard Holt has argued that amongst footballers the dominant masculine code in the 
early professional game was 'maleness' as opposed to 'manliness'. Instead of 
adopting middle-class and Christian manly ideals, the working-classes, imbued 
football with a masculine value-system of their own.37 Furthermore, football, as a 
form of work experience, has reflected a shop-floor culture in which 'manual labour 
is suffused with masculine qualities' of strength and pride due to the need for mental 
34parker, 'Big-Time', p. 55 
35 A. Ferguson, Managing My Life: My Autobiography (1999), p. 186. Football trainees had 
traditionally been assigned menial tasks such as cleaning the dressing rooms and the senior 
professionals' boots which further underlined their subordinate status. For example, see True Stories, 
lTV (1996), a documentary which focused on the players assigned to Chelsea's YTS scheme. By 
1998 however, through the introduction of the 'Football Scholarship', they no longer undertook 
menial tasks. D. Monk and D. Russell, 'Training Apprentices: Tradition versus Modernity in the 
Football Industry', Soccer and Society, Vol. 1,2 (Summer 2000), p. 66 
36J. Tosh, 'What Should Historians do with Masculinity? Reflections on Nineteenth-Century 
Britain', History Workshop Journal, No. 38 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 186-87 
37R. Holt, Sport and the British, (Oxford 1989), p. 173 
Introduction 21 
and physical bravery. 38 Playing through the pain, or when injured, is a central part of 
the professional footballer's culture. Players regularly carry or conceal injuries, and 
mask pain both to avoid losing their place in the side and to conform to the ethos of 
the group. Managers have characterised good professionals as those players who 
have been prepared to play while injured.39 
In addition, football's attitudes to women have sometimes bordered on the 
misogynistic because, like the armed forces and the culture of the shop-floor, it 
exhibits a strict male chauvinism.4o At an official level it was seen as an all-male 
domain, and from 1921 clubs registered with the FA were not allowed to stage 
matches on their own grounds between female teams. It was felt that 'the game of 
football [was] quite unsuitable for females and ought not to be encouraged,.41 In the 
1980s, during contract talks with Brian Clough at Nottingham Forest, Neil Webb's 
wife Shelley, tried to contribute but was met with the response, 'I wasn't talking to 
you, little Miss Busy' .42 
During the 1990s the influx of foreign players into the British game has 
exposed cultural differences between them and their home-grown team-mates. At 
Coventry City, the Norwegian, Trond Soltvedt, also from a middle-class background, 
recollected how his former team-mates at Rosenborg encouraged him on the pitch. In 
38p. Willis, 'Shop Floor Culture, Masculinity and the Wage Fonn' in J. Clarke, C. Critcher and R. 
Johnson (eds), Working Class Culture (1979), pp. 185-98 
39M. Roderick, I. Waddington and G. Parker, 'Professional Footballers and Their Injuries', Singer 
and Friedlander Review 1998-99 Season, p. 3 
40parker, 'Big-Time', p. 224 
41Albion News, 10 December 1921, p. 104; Green, Football Association, pp. 533-34. Again, in 
1946, the FA felt it necessary to send a reminder to County Associations to make them, 'see that 
clubs and officials do not loan their grounds or provide facilities for irregular football by woman 
participants' . 
42S. Webb, F ootballers' Wives (1998), pp. 14-15 
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England however, they, and in particular club captain, Gary McAllister, yelled and 
swore at him all the time. McAllister replied that he took worse when he was fifteen. 
But, as he said, 'I got over it. It doesn't do you any harm. Toughens you up' .43 The 
captain also plays an important role within a club's hierarchy. Dennis Bergkamp has 
observed that, in terms of motivation before games, in England there is music in the 
dressing room and everyone is shouting. The captain is 'very much the focal point 
and he will shout even more at everyone to get them motivated'. Bergkamp believed 
that, by contrast, the quieter nature of Dutch dressing rooms was attributable to the 
more democratic spirit which existed there.44 Another major element of football's 
masculine shop-floor culture has been its language and its intimidatory sense of 
humour which has revolved around the practical joke. McAllister believed that, 
'[t]easing and being teased shows you are one of the lads, that you can take it, and 
d· h . , 45 IS It out. 
Attitudes towards the game in Britain from schoolboy to professional level 
have also reflected a general feeling within working-class shop-floor culture that 
'practice is more important than theory' .46 As a result, British football can perhaps 
be best summed up in three words, 'Get Stuck In'. The British game has placed 
greater emphasis on the physical rather than the technical side, and has enshrined 
older forms of toughness and rudeness instead of notions of fair play and 
43R. Gekoski, Staying Up: A Fan Behind the Scenes in the Premiership (1998), pp. 113-14, 139-40 
44Guardian (Sport), 21 June 2000, p. 7. For an example of the role of the captain, see Kevin Ball, 
captain of Sunderland at the time of the making of the fly-on-the-wall programme, Premier Passions, 
BBe Television (1998). 
45 Gekoski, Staying Up, p. 176, 140 
46Willis, 'Shop Floor', p. 194 
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sportsmanship.47 A football team also came to symbolise the virtues of the men who 
supported it, mostly from the working-class. As a result, attributes such as hardness, 
stamina, courage and loyalty came to be regarded as more important then skill. 48 In 
comparison to European football, British soccer has been derided as 'kick and rush', 
unable to develop enough players capable of understanding tactics, constructive and 
intelligent movement and sophisticated ball control.49 As we shall see, the role of the 
football manager has not only developed within a deeply embedded culture 
dominated by the qualities of hierarchy, discipline and masculinity but one which 
places an emphasis on brawn over brain. 
In studying the evolution of the football manager, problems have arisen over 
the lack of primary sources available. None seem to have left diaries or many letters 
and this has made it difficult to construct profiles of them. Furthermore, unlike 
doctors, for example, football managers are not served by a professional organisation 
like the British Medical Association. A League Managers' Association does exist and 
has its headquarters in Leamington Spa but it has been more concerned in 
representing the interests of managers in the football industry rather than establishing 
their professional credentials. Football managers have not been required to undertake 
training courses or to have their knowledge examined, and the LMA has traditionally 
acted more as a friendly society. Attempts were made to trace some of the earlier 
minute books of the LMA but this proved unsuccessful. 
47 Holt, Sport, p. 173 
48'b 'd I I . 
49T. Mason, 'Kick and Rush or Revolt into Style? Football Playing Among the English 
Professionals from Great Power to Image of Decline', (Unpublished paper 1998) 
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In fact, the main sources for this study have been the archives of professional 
football clubs. The author wrote to approximately twenty-five clubs for permission 
to consult their records and received a variety of replies. As we noted earlier, within 
football there is a distrust of the' outsider' and some clubs denied that they had any 
records (even though there was evidence to suggest otherwise). Others just refused 
access. One club allowed the author access but it was to no avail as the records had 
been thrown away following stadium re-development! Furthermore, one club's 
records, the now defunct Leeds City, are still held by a firm of Leeds solicitors. 
Four clubs however, Arsenal, Charlton Athletic, Middlesbrough and 
W olverhampton Wanderers, were willing to allow varying degrees of access, all of 
which required a certain amount of negotiation. At one club almost complete access 
was given, at the others it was dependent on certain people employed by or attached 
to the club. One club only allowed access for two days in which the year of the 
records had to be carefully selected in case anything 'controversial' arose. The 
records, mainly the minutes of directors' meetings, also varied in terms of their 
longevity and detail. In general, the recording of these meetings has become 
increasingly less detailed over time. However, this was also a reflection of how a 
club's management was changing, especially with regard to the players. In addition, 
to their own records, Arsenal hold the cuttings and books of the journalist James 
Catton which includes folders of newspaper clippings, and a small amount of 
correspondence. Outside the clubs, local record offices have provided another source, 
again with varying degrees of usefulness. In addition to its library and the minutes of 
various committees, the Football Association hold a range of significant materials. 
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The usefulness of the sources changed as work on the thesis progressed. 
Initially, at least up to 1939, contemporary newspapers were very informative, 
reflecting the close relationship between football and the press. In the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century the annual general meetings of clubs were reported in great 
detail, and clubs often provided the main source of information for journalists. 
Furthermore, some football administrators, such as William McGregor, were 
journalists themselves and their writings provided inside knowledge. Another 
chairman of the Football League, John Bentley was editor of the Athletic News which 
became a mouthpiece for the Football League. By the 1930s however, one can detect 
a change as football clubs became increasingly aware of their position and status, and 
information began to be more restricted. After 1945 this process increased, and was 
reinforced at a local level where the need for the local paper to establish a good 
relationship with the local club often over-rode the desire to print anything 
controversial. Because of this, more autobiographical and oral evidence has been used 
for the post-War period. A number of interviews were conducted, although only one 
with a former manager, George Hardwick. The others were attempts to build up a 
picture of a manager's professional and family background. 
The study itself is based on a relatively straightforward chronological 
structure, beginning in the 1880s and ending in the 1960s. The thesis aims to 
incorporate elements, not just of social history but also of business and economic 
history. The first chapter provides a broad overview of British management in 
general up to 1914. Its aim is to provide an overall context for the rest of the thesis 
by analysing the history of British management and the culture in which it emerged. 
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Chapter 2 charts the emergence of football management in the years up to 1914. 
Rather than looking at individual managers, it will focus on how and by whom clubs 
were managed in the early years of the game, first when they were amateur and 
recreational, and then after professionalism was legalised. The chapter's main 
emphasis is to show how football clubs grew out of voluntary organisations and how 
their management continued to be part of that more democratic tradition. Its aim is to 
provide a picture of the environment from which the early football manager emerged 
- men like Tom Watson whose work will be examined in the following chapter. 
Chapter 3 attempts to place the development of the manager within a wider context 
by looking at three main areas: first, the relationship between a manager and his 
directors and how this developed in the light of football's commercialisation process; 
second, how the training and background of managers has reflected trends within 
British management in general, and third, the manager's relationship with his 
workers, the players. This framework will be used throughout the thesis. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to one manager, Herbert Chapman, whose career bridges 
the First World War and the 1930s when he helped to establish Arsenal as the 
biggest and most successful club in the country. Essentially, it is an attempt to 
emphasise the role of the individual in history because, it will be argued, Chapman 
was the most important figure in the development of modern football management. 
He was the first to realise that managers might 'organise victory', and marked the 
starting point for football management's move towards a more professional era. The 
fifth chapter deals with the inter-War period more generally. The purpose here is to 
show how, despite the increase in the number of managers, directors continued to run 
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clubs very much in the mould of their Victorian predecessors. But there were 
increasing exceptions, such as the scope Wolverhampton Wanderers allowed Frank 
Buckley and also the freedom given to Jimmy Seed at Charlton Athletic. Their roles 
are analysed in the light of the particular context in which they operated. 
Chapter 6 looks at the emergence of modem football management from 1945 
up to the mid-Sixties. It takes account of the changes within a society which was 
slowly shedding its deferential attitudes, and also the landmark decision in football to 
abolish the maximum wage in 1961. During this period, managers also developed 
closer relations with their players, and as the game began to move closer to business, 
directors gradually delegated more powers to their managers. Yet even by the Sixties, 
football management was still not a profession. Managers had usually been players 
and it was that form of practical experience which was thought to be the best 
preparation for the job. This remained a strong tradition within British management 
more widely which was reluctant to support any form of vocational training. Finally, 
Chapter 7 will explore the impact which a manager had on a team's performance 
during this period. Though there will be an analysis of some economic interpretations 
of this complex subject, it will be argued that it is the context in which the manager 
works which is the key to understanding both failure and success. 
iJritish Management 
CHAPTER! 
THE MAKING OF BRITISH MANAGEMENT 
[M]anagement is an arena for human behaviour at its most naked - under stress, but 
freed from many restraints of civilisation. 
R. Heller, The Naked Manager for the Nineties (1995), p. 18 
The conclusion that many British managers are uneducated in business and 
management terms is inescapable. It must also be true that management training in 
Britain is too little, too late, for too few. It is finally probably true that most 
management development is left to chance in a Darwinian belief that the fittest will 
survive. They probably will but it is a wasteful process. 
Charles Handy quoted in D. Aldcroft, 'The Missing Dimension: Management Education 
and Training in Postwar Britain' in D. Aldcroft and A. Slaven (eds), Enterprise and 
Management: Essays in Honour of Peter Payne (1995), p. 107 
Nothing illustrates more precisely the peculiar weaknesses of football than the 
recent history of club management. Indeed, the history of management in this one 
small and rather unimportant industry is a telling insight into the broader story of 
British attitudes towards business management in general. 
1 J. Walvin, Football and the Decline of Britain (1986), p. 27 
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In the Introduction it was noted how British management has been characterised by a 
practical tradition where knowledge has been gained through experience rather than, 
as Charles Handy has indicated above, because of any management education or 
training. Handy's views on management in general have been echoed by those of 
James W al vin' s on football management, and it is intended that this chapter will 
provide the historical background of how the management of football clubs 
developed. By charting the development of British management from the mid-
nineteenth century up to about 1970, we will be able to see how the management 
culture of British industry has evolved, and explore its consequences for the actual 
management of firms. This will also allow us to examine the social and educational 
backgrounds of managers themselves. 
The culture of British management has generally been resistant to change but 
from the late nineteenth century a few large businesses adopted more sophisticated 
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management practices. However, despite a steady decline in the number of owner-
manager businesses throughout the period, most British firms have remained small in 
size, and included in this number were football clubs. It is not intended to argue that 
developments in management were instantly reflected in smaller companies. In fact, 
the effects of any changes within the management of major companies filtered down 
very slowly. Furthermore, as we noted in the Introduction, without the chain of 
command of big corporations, the management of small firms was more easily 
influenced by personalities and the actions of a few individuals. The changes and 
continuities within the management of football clubs therefore, were similar to those 
within the vast majority of British firms, although these changes need to be 
considered in the context of football's history. 
Before looking more closely at the history of management, it would be 
beneficial to offer a definition of the terms, 'management' and 'manager' to 
understand how they have been applied in everyday language. Both, for example, can 
be expressed as economic and social relationships. 1 On one level, management is a 
process which involves the relationship between employers and workers. It can also 
be defined as persons managing an organisation such as the governing body, board of 
directors, or the administration of business concerns or public undertakings. A 
manager is a person conducting a business or one who controls activities or a team in 
sports or an entertainment. Management is also a cognitive process in which people 
make arbitrary decisions based on their own judgement. Robert Heller claims that 
management is unquantifiable, as 'there are only actions - intelligent, not so bright 
lR. Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary o/Culture and Society (1983), pp. 189-92 
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and stupid'; and that 'management is not a scientific and objective activity, but a 
subjective historical process full ofifs and buts'? In his more academic study, Tony 
Watson defines management as, 'simply a matter of running an organisation so that 
the variety of people who want something out of it will go on supporting it in such a 
way that it is able to continue its existence into the future'? Whether it is a science 
or merely a subjective process, the work of a manager may also involve human and 
social dimensions. The modem day manager has been described as 'a fallible human 
being, trying with the help of others, who are equally fallible, to cope with 
circumstances that are constantly changing'. 4 Managers of the modern work 
organisation have also been described as 'creators and manipulators of mini human 
societies' who 'devise social structures and cultures within which people relate to 
each other'. 5 
The concept of a manager has never been very clear and during the past it has 
had no fixed meaning. 6 The actual origins of the words, 'management' and 'manager', 
stem from the sixteenth century. An early English definition of the word 'manage' 
referred to the handling of horses and then from the early sixteenth century it came to 
mean taking control and directing in general. 'Manage' later overlapped with the 
French word 'menage', which meant household, and a 'menager' was defined as a 
housekeeper. In 1861, for example, Isabella Beeton wrote the Book of Household 
Management. In the eighteenth century, a manager had been used to describe 
2 Heller, Naked Manager, p. 16, 19,22 
3T. Watson, In Search of Management: Culture, Chaos and Control in Managerial Work (1994), p. 
10 
4 Heller, Naked Manager, p. 15 
5 Watson, Management, p. 32 
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someone in charge of public institutions such as schools.7 In the sixteenth century 
the word 'manage', had been extended to the operations of war. Military 
management techniques entailed the control of large numbers of men by enforcing 
discipline through several layers of authority. Management, in terms of a body of 
men directing an institution, first entered the language in the 1700s, and referred to 
the running of a theatre as opposed to industrial enterprises.8 The competition 
within London's theatre land produced a number of entrepreneurs. The finest actor of 
his day, David Garrick (1717-1779) also managed the Drury Lane theatre from 1747 
to 1776.9 In the nineteenth century, Henry Irving (1838-1905) also became an actor-
manager, taking over the Lyceum Theatre in 1879 and making it the most popular in 
London. 10 
Modern management, as a function and an occupation within a business 
organisation, can be divided into three specialisms: strategic, functional and 
operational. 11 At the strategic stage, managers are executives who plan for long-term 
goals, whereas at the functional and operational levels, lesser lights co-ordinate and 
implement the plans of the strategists. A football manager therefore, belongs among 
the 'lesser lights'; a middle manager. Henry Mintzberg has allocated the business 
manager a number of roles. They act as figureheads for their company and have a 
leader role which involves the hiring and firing, training and motivating of their staff. 
6S. Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management (1965), p. 104 
7Williams, Keywords, pp. 189-92 
8·b ·d I I . 
9p. Hartnoll, A Concise History of the Theatre (1968), pp. 121-25; G. Wickham, A History of the 
Theatre (Oxford, 1985), pp. 170-71 
lOHartnoll, Theatre, pp. 202-203; Wickham, Theatre, pp. 204-06. Irving was the fIrst actor to be 
knighted in 1895. 
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As the nerve centre for the unit, managers have an informational role due to the 
interpersonal contact with their employees and a network of contacts outside the 
organisation. The manager also plays a major role in the decision-making process of 
his unit which may include negotiations over contracts and salaries. 12 Decision-
making requires judgement and it is this quality that is perhaps more eagerly sought 
than any other. l3 Yet this also creates a paradox, because to assess someone's ability 
to judge is itself, largely a process of intuition. 
Since the Industrial Revolution there has been a progressive differentiation in 
the role and tasks of management and managers. This process has been underpinned 
by a 'divorce of ownership from control' where the management of organisations has 
evolved from one-man businesses to those under the control of specialised 
professionals, and as businesses have grown the degree to which the individual or 
small group has been responsible for its control and ownership has decreased. 14 This 
development can be divided into three stages. First, during the personal form of 
management, which is associated with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a 
single individual performed most of the functions. The entrepreneur/owner-manager 
undertook most of the management jobs, and controlled much of his business 
personally. Entrepreneurial management, the dominant form in Britain until the 
1940s, saw owners begin to delegate responsibility to professional managers, 
bringing in capital from sources unconnected with family or religious groups. There 
llJ. Wilson, British Business History 1720-1994 (Manchester, 1995), p. 11 
12H. Mintzberg, 'The Manager's Job: Folklore and Fact' in D. Pugh, Organization Theory (1984), 
pp.424-32 
130 . Vickers, 'The Art of Judgement' in Pugh, Organization Theory, p. 183 
14J. Child, British Management Thought: A Critical Analysis (1969), p. 14 
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was a growIng divorce between ownership and control which emphasised the 
increasing importance of functional management and the role of outside agencies such 
as the stock exchange. The dividing line between entrepreneur and manager however, 
was not very clear until the mid-nineteenth century, especially in small firms. 
Pollard's general rule has been that 'the broader, strategic decisions about a firm 
belong to the "entrepreneur" ... while the tactical decisions in carrying out the 
strategy are the tasks of management' .15 The nature of the entrepreneur-manager 
relationship changed as the structure of industry itself changed. It is the evolution of 
this relationship which, in terms of the allocation of tasks, shares similarities with 
that between the directors and a manager of a football club. 
Entrepreneurial management was the bridging point in the evolution of the 
final stage, managerial capitalism. In theory, there is a total divorce between 
ownership and control with all management tasks undertaken entirely by 
professionals with the bulk of the company's equity held by investors who have no 
role in the day-to-day running of the business. 16 In reality however, shareholders 
often interfere. In the nineteenth century, the railways had laid the basis for large-
scale industry in Britain by adopting joint stock status which led to an inevitable 
divorce between ownership and control. From the 1840s the expansion of the 
railway companies created an emergent class of professional salaried managers who 
were Britain's first group of corporation executives. As has already been mentioned, 
the new managers were often retired army officers as the unprecedented scale of 
ISS. Pollard, 'Entrepreneurship 1870-1914' in R. Floud and D. McCloskey (eds), The Economic 
History of Britain since 1700: Vol. 2: 1860 to the 1970s (Cambridge, 1981), p. 62; P. Payne, 
British Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth Century (1974), p. 15 
16Wilson, Business History, pp. 12-13 
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operations entailed the handling of large groups of men, and the only real model for 
railway companies was the army. 17 During the twentieth century, managers became 
increasingly set apart from other employees through the establishment of 
organisational hierarchies. The trend towards the development of an increasingly 
distinct managerial social stratum therefore, is associated with an increase in 
organisational size and administrative complexity .18 Modern football has also seen 
the emergence of a distinct managerial class. This process however, has taken place in 
light of the changes that football clubs have undergone, as small businesses, rather 
than in line with those in major corporations. 
British industrial management emerged from the First Industrial Revolution 
between 1780 and 1830.19 Some of the earliest enterprises had been agricultural 
estates owned by eighteenth-century landowners who employed agents and stewards 
to manage their properties?O However, there was little evidence of management in 
the burgeoning manufacturing sector. Early firms' ideas of management had been 
limited. With few models to emulate or principles to follow, it was a process of trial 
and error, and firms adapted to changing circumstances as they saw fit. Britain's 
prosperity during this period was due in no small measure to 'practical tinkerers'; 
men who used a pragmatic approach to solve problems. Few, if any, establishments 
existed which were capable of producing a scientific training in any subject.21 
17Sampson, Company Man, pp. 22-26; Kirby, 'Big Business', pp. 128-29 
18ChiId, Management Thought, p. 14 
19 Pollard, Modern Management, pp. 6-7 
20Pollard, Modern Management, pp. 27-29; Williams, Keywords, pp. 189-92 
21C. Hom, and P. Hom, 'English Management at the Onset of the Scientific Age', Management 
Services (May 1981), p. 6 
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Despite later developments within management, this practical legacy persisted well 
into the twentieth century. 
Initially, a manufacturing entrepreneur undertook most of the managerial 
functions and kept close control of the firm's direction?2 But as competition 
intensified, the organisational structure of firms began to change with the partnership 
becoming a common feature of British industry. Partnerships, a firm in which all the 
partners shared the risks and profits of business were often family firms. The family 
firm itself became the predominant business model during the nineteenth century and 
influenced business organisations well beyond that time. As the liability of partners 
was unlimited, a 'network of trust' had to be established between them and it 
gradually provided an internal market for skilled and managerial labour. Once 
established, the family firm tradition of personal capitalism, with its consequences 
fi d '1' 23 or management, prove very resl lent. 
Developments within management were precipitated by changes in 
manufacturing processes which were responding to improvements in technology and 
increases in competition. During the eighteenth century, most manufacturing 
production had been carried out using the putting-out form of organisation?4 Sub-
contracting was also adopted at this time when some industries began to grow and is 
a system which continues today in many sectors, such as civil engineering.25 As 
22Wilson, Business History, p. 21 
23M. W. Rose, 'The Family Firm in British business, 1780-1914', in Kirby and Rose, Business 
Enterprise, pp. 65-68 
24Here, the actual production of textile goods for merchants was undertaken in cottage workshops by 
domestic artisans. 
25W.R. Garside and H.F. Gospel, 'Employers and Managers: Their Organisational Structure and 
Changing Industrial Strategies' in C. Wrigley (ed.), A History of British Industrial Relations, 1875-
1914, 1982, p. 101; Pollard Modern Management, p. 38; Wilson, Business History, pp. 35-36 
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business grew in size and complexity from the end of the eighteenth century, there 
began a growing, if modest, demand for professional managers. Coal-viewers 
probably emerged during this period and by the late nineteenth century the coal 
mines later saw the creation of the first true professional class of skilled managers.26 
Most managers within the manufacturing industry however, were typically trained 
through the practical work of their firms. Managers were slow to make an 
appearance in industries where there was an absence of complex technology as the 
accumulated practical experience of workers was deemed sufficient. Furthermore, in 
the textile industry there were few large industrial units and this prevented managers 
establishing a professional identity as owners continued to be their own managers, 
usually assisted by an overseer-foreman.27 Formal education had a limited role during 
the Industrial Revolution and '[p ]ractical skill rather than academic aptitude was 
deemed to be the basis of business in many spheres'. 28 
By the early nineteenth century, industry had moved towards the factory 
system of production as it was able to accommodate more powerful technology and 
cut labour costS.29 Mills had initially been located in rural areas where there was 
access to a water supply but by the 1850s they had begun the move into the towns. 
The previous harshness of factory life was beginning to be ameliorated through the 
26 Pollard, Modern Management, pp. 126-28 
27 ibid., pp. 128-33 
28M.B. Rose, 'Investment in Human Capital and British Manufacturing Industry to 1990', in Kirby 
and Rose, Business Enterprise, p. 348 
29Pollard, Modern Management, pp. 30-37; S. Jones, 'The Origins of the Factory System in Great 
Britain: Technology, Transaction Costs or Exploitation?' in Kirby and Rose, Business Enterprise, p. 
32, 57 
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use by some employers of a form of industrial patemalism.30 Industrialists wished to 
generate greater co-operation between themselves and the workers. Because 
nineteenth century businesses were small, some industrialists, like Stanley Baldwin 
at his family's ironworks in Bewdley, knew the names of all the workers.31 Instead 
of conflict and coercion, the owners and workers both had a shared interest, as goods 
needed to be made and without them there would be neither profits nor wages.32 As 
the world's first and most completely developed example of a mechanised factory 
system, the Lancashire textile industry represented the clearest example of this 
change in employer-worker relations. Mills helped form distinct communities, not 
unlike pubs and churches, and were the basis for clubs and societies. From the 1850s, 
some large employers provided reading rooms or a library at the mill. Others paid for 
an annual works day to the seaside.33 During the second half of the nineteenth 
century, firms like Cadburys' would provide sporting facilities for their workers.34 
Industrial paternalism was still based on traditional forms of authority with 
the employers in charge. Mill owners treated the new industrial towns as squires 
treated their country estates. They formed themselves into local elites and ran for 
political office. Not only were the factories managed as family firms but the owners 
looked upon them as 'miniature kingdoms'. Within the Lancashire cotton area a 
'dynastic industrialism' emerged which inextricably linked civic and economic life. It 
was preserved by a high trust culture which consisted of a social network of marriage 
30Wilson, Business History, p. 33 
31Cannadine, Class, pp. 114-15 
32ibid., pp. 91-92 
33Thompson, Respectable Society, pp. 205-14 
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and business linkS.35 Employers also intended to pass the family business on to 
future generations. Family networks acted as the source for recruitment of future 
managers who were immersed in the practicalities of life at the mill by serving an 
apprenticeship.36 Interestingly, the bosses of football, particularly its managers, 
liked to use the language of the family, an many clubs were run like family firms. The 
Football League itself was based largely on the idea of mutuality (see Chapter 2). 
However, there was little overall evidence of any significant divorce of 
ownership from control before the twentieth century. Despite a growth in the size of 
the average firm, there was little dilution of proprietorial power.37 One general 
consequence for the management of smaller firms was that, without the checks of the 
managerial hierarchies of big companies, there was more potential for individuals to 
influence the direction of the business. Dominant personalities therefore, found it 
easier to impose their opinions and actions on company management. In this sense, 
football clubs were prime examples of this process. As well as directors, this 
situation, paradoxically, offered more opportunities for managers to have an 
influence on a club's development. 
There had been a move by organisations, started by the Companies Acts of 
1856 and 1862, towards limited liability but this further reinforced the prevailing 
management culture. In theory, the adoption of joint stock status should have created 
an extensive divorce of ownership from control because company equity could be 
34See J. Bromhead, 'George Cadbury's Contribution to Sport', The Sports Historian, Vol. 20, 1 
(May 2000), pp. 97-117 
35p. Joyce, Work, Society and Politics (1980), pp. 23-24; M. Savage and A. Miles, The Remaking of 
the British Working Class, 1840-1940 (1994), pp. 41-43 
36 Joyce, Work, pp. 24-33 
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sold to shareholders who had little interest in managing the enterprise.38 In Britain 
however, unlike in America, family firms were unwilling to relinquish control over 
any part of the company's management. Instead of becoming public companies, a 
form of private company evolved which was only legalised by the 1907 Companies 
Act. These companies kept the number of members small with the controlling 
ordinary share capital usually retained by the participating partners and their 
families. Between 1880 and 1914, about 132,000 companies were registered, the bulk 
being 'private'. In 1914, 77 per cent of the 63,000 registered companies were still of 
h· 39 t IS type. 
The culture of British management, with its deeply embedded resistance to 
change, has been criticised for its inefficiency and its role in retarding the growth of 
the economy. The period between 1860-1914 has been identified as a crucial one in 
Britain's economic development. Its position as the premier industrial nation was 
challenged by Germany and especially the United States. British industry however, 
found difficulty in responding. There was little capital investment in management 
and instead, its practical tradition persisted, so much so that in 1911, managers, 
administrators and higher professionals, made up only 4.4 per cent of Britain's 
occupied population, totalling 813,000.40 Coleman has identified how British 
businessmen were split into two categories: the 'gentleman' who was the educated 
amateur and the 'player', the practical man. Both had long-term implications for 
37payne, British Entrepreneurship, p. 21 
38Wilson, Business History, p. 120 
39T. Gourvish, 'British Business and the Transition to a Corporate Economy: Entrepreneurship and 
Management Structures', Business History, 29, 4 (1987), pp. 21-24 
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industry. 'Gentlemen' were usually the sons of owners and educated at public 
schools which offered a classical education rather than a practical one of direct 
usefulness to businessmen. Britain's business elite was represented by upper- and 
upper-middle-class families and this was reflected in their education. Graduates of 
this system went into business as amateurs with little or no management training. 
The same was also true of the 'players', the uneducated, self-made owners of family 
firms, who had gained their fortunes as practical tinkerers and this contributed to a 
'mystique of practical experience' .41 They then bought land and their sons, the next 
generation, became gentlemen. 
Because of the upsurge in foreign competition much attention was focused on 
the perceived deficiencies within the British education system. The education which 
graduates received at university, for example, was hardly relevant to a career in 
industry. By the end of the Edwardian years, both Oxford and Cambridge produced a 
similar output of future businessmen, 10-15 per cent. However, both were more 
concerned with developing leadership qualities for an elite. Graduates from Oxbridge 
had attended institutions which had little understanding or liking of business and 
instead, created an environment that valued success in the professions or government 
service. Education was based on the humanities which had little bearing on a business 
career.42 It was this sort of education which generally shaped the types and levels of 
expertise brought by industrialists to their businesses, and also their own notions of 
40s. Keeble, The Ability to Manage: A Study of British Management, 1890-1990 (Manchester, 
1992), p. 44 
41Coleman, D., 'Gentleman and Players', Economic History Review, Vol. 26,1 (February 1973), pp. 
92-116; Jeremy, Business History, pp. 382-86 
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what was adequate and appropriate for their needs.43 Furthermore, business had a 
preference for social values at the expense of expertise which was compounded by 
businessmen sending their sons to Oxbridge to gain social experience and status. This 
was a weakness in the formation of British industrial leadership and consequently 
comparatively few graduates became managers. 44 
Universities however, did provide some preparation for management. Even if 
future managers did not study a particular subject such as engineering, the skills 
acquired at university in analysis, critical thinking and self-appraisal, and in 
developing interpersonal relationships, would at least provide a basis for a managerial 
career. Moreover, one criteria for measuring how efficiently a society is preparing for 
its future is the extent to which a college education is available to its population. 
When compared to countries such as the United States, France and Germany 
however, Britain lagged until the 1960s.45 In 1885, England, with a population of 26 
million, supported only 5500 university students; Germany's population numbered 
45 million and had a student population of 24,187. Even by 1900 a much higher 
proportion of business leaders from foreign countries had attended university. In 
1900 in Britain, the percentage was 21 whereas in Germany it was 49.46 
In response to the increase in foreign competition there had been a rapid rate 
of growth in the British educational sector from 1890 to 1914. This development 
42Keeble, Ability to Manage, p. 48; R. Locke, 'Education and Entrepreneurship: An Historian's 
View' in J. Brown and M.B. Rose (eds), Entrepreneurship, Networks and Modern Business 
(Manchester, 1993), p. 61 
43M. Sanderson, Education and Economic Decline in Britain, 1870 to the 1990s (Cambridge, 1999), 
p. 40 
44 ibid., pp. 50-54 
45Jeremy, Business History, p. 398 
46Keeble, Ability to Manage: p. 40; Jeremy, Business History, pp. 393-95 
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however, was on a local level mainly due to regional industrial demand rather than as 
a result of central co-ordination from the government. Engineering professorships 
were established in some of the older universities such as Newcastle and the new 
civic, 'red brick' universities in Leeds, Sheffield and Manchester were essentially 
technical universities. Imperial College, London was founded in 1907.47 In addition, 
Britain had an extensive network of local technical colleges and Polytechnics which 
provided evening classes. There was also the highly developed City and Guilds 
examination system which began in London in 1879.48 At all levels however, 
scientific and technical education was patchy. The civic universities performed no 
better than Oxbridge in producing science and technology graduates, turning out only 
378 by 1900.49 Moreover, the changes within British education were likely to be 
prior to any economic development, and therefore, a lag developed. 
Other countries made greater educational provision for the new economIC 
conditions and exploited the increased demands in emerging industries like chemicals, 
precision tools, and metallurgy. Management education in France was supported by 
the grandes ecoles, a series of colleges specialising in engineering, which were 
founded in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In Germany, the state helped to 
provide an expanded education system which met the needs of industry. A string of 
business schools, Handelshochschulen, were set up around the tum of the century, 
the first in Leipzig in 1898.50 By 1900 Germany had eleven engineering schools plus 
three mining schools and by 1913 it had ten times as many engineering students in its 
47Pollard, 'Entrepreneurship', pp. 76-77 
48Pollard, 'Entrepreneurship', pp. 76-77; Sanderson, Education, see Chapter 3 
49Jeremy, Business History, p. 400 
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technical schools, Technische Hochschulen, as in England and Wales. 51 In 1881 
America's first university-level business education, the Wharton School, was 
established at the University of Pennsylvania. After the American merger mania 
between companies of the 1890s, higher education responded to a growing demand 
for better trained managers. The Harvard Business School opened in 1908 with thirty 
more established by 1914. By 1915 there were 10,000 students majoring in the 
commercial curricula of colleges and universities. 52 Japan's economic growth from 
the late nineteenth century was attributed to the 'Zaibatsu', very large and centrally 
controlled holding companies. They soon turned to education which was regarded as 
the servant of industry, to help them acquire skilled employees. In 1875 a business 
school was established in Japan and in 1877 a modern engineering college was 
opened. New graduates to a Zaibatsu were SUbjected to in-house training which 
involved work in all aspects of the company. 53 
At the turn of the century a collection of novel ideas about managing the 
business emerged which pushed the analysis of management itself in the direction of 
a science. F.W. Taylor advocated the scientific selection and training of men for 
management plus the replacement of 'rule of thumb' working methods with a more 
systematic approach. 54 Other new thinkers included Frank Bunker Gilbreth who 
pioneered time and motion studies. 55 Yet in Britain, time and motion studies were 
50 ibid., pp. 406-07 
51Locke, 'Education', pp. 58-59 
52Keeble, Ability to Manage, pp. 25-26 
53 ibid., pp. 29-32 
54L. Urwick, and E. Brech., The Making a/Scientific Management, Volume J: Thirteen Pioneers 
(1945), pp. 28-38; F.W. Taylor, 'Scientific Management' in Pugh, Organization Theory, pp. 158-59 
55Urwick and Brech, Scientific Management, pp. 126-47 
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even more neglected than scientific management. Innovations in industries like 
engineering and shipbuilding, were restricted to the introduction of new machine 
tools. Work practices within the workshop organisation remained structurally 
unchanged. Scientific management was largely rejected by British industry due to the 
persistence of traditional modes of production and the preference for a more personal 
sty Ie of management. 56 
Even with the limited numbers of science, technology and commercial 
graduates, British industry had little interest in a closer relationship with education. 
Trade unionists did not want the apprenticeship undermined as it reinforced their 
status and bargaining power. Employers, who were often not highly educated 
themselves, took little interest in the training and education of apprentices and 
preferred that they learned their skills through 'rule of thumb' methods. The typical 
university graduate was seen as inappropriate for British firms. They were regarded 
as too old when they left university as the right habits were understood to be formed 
during the early years in industry. Employers also suspected that graduates were too 
theoretical and had little knowledge of how industry worked. A degree therefore, was 
seen as a positive disadvantage for managerial employment in many industries with 
apprenticeships remaining the most popular form of training for work on the 
shopfloor and for aspiring managers. 57 Graduates themselves found industry 
unattractive as general levels of pay were low, and industry had a reputation for 
retaining poor quality managers and ageing directors which was a drawback for 
56Wilson, Business History, pp. 162-63 
57D. Aldcroft, 'The Entrepreneur and the British Economy, 1870-1914', Economic History Review, 
XVII (2), May 1964, p. 118; Keeble, Ability to Manage, see chapter 4; Rose, 'Investment', p. 354 
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ambitious young men. Businessmen, the 'players' as opposed to the 'gentlemen'. 
had low social status. Even engineers were not fully accepted as professional men in 
Britain because of a 'fundamental snobbery running through the whole social 
system' .58 All these factors made a career elsewhere, like the Civil Service for 
example, more attractive. 
The craft apprenticeship system therefore, continued to provide a major 
source for future managers until the 1960s. Instituted during the Middle Ages, 
apprentices received practical training controlled by craftsmen, foremen or 
overlookers within the firm as opposed to learning any theoretical analyses at 
academic institutions. 59 Some business leaders, including car manufacturers William 
Rootes and Herbert Austin, started out as apprentices but subsequently it caused 
problems in the running of the industry . William Morris began in a small bicycle 
shop as a mechanic before making cars on his own account at Cowley. Austin and 
Morris retained ultimate power over their companies, and continued to run them as 
private fiefdoms well into the twentieth century, although Austin's power was 
slightly diluted. Both were professional in the sense that they participated in top-
level decision-making but they lacked any professional managerial training.60 Roy 
Church has argued that because of his lack of managerial skills, Morris's direction of 
his company was to have deleterious effects on the whole of the British car industry. 
As his company expanded through amalgamations, Morris was unwilling to delegate 
58Keeble, Ability to Manage, pp. 78-80 
59Jeremy, Business History, pp. 394-96 
60R. Church, 'Family Firms and Managerial Capitalism: The Case of the International Motor 
Industry', Business History, Vol. 28, 1 (1986), pp. 165-77 
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to the professional managers he employed and persistently interfered in the running 
of the company.61 
The growth in foreign competition in the final quarter of the nineteenth 
century had hastened an increase in industrial concentration. Yet, it did not result in 
any major shift in management culture. Between 1890 and 1905 British textiles, 
brewing and tobacco firms had experimented with amalgamations and mergers.62 
Unlike mergers in America however, they were defensive in nature. There was rarely 
any intention of integrating production, distribution or management. These new 
organisations were holding companies which adopted a federal structure allowing 
former owners to continue running their own businesses without too much 
interference from headquarters.63 In America there was a more rapid transition from 
the personal to the entrepreneurial form of organisation by 1914, while in Britain, a 
'corporate lag' developed. Many American firms were still controlled by families 
who dominated the decision-making process but they were more willing to delegate 
responsibility to professional managers, unlike their British counterparts. 64 
During the inter-War years the family firm remained an important 
characteristic of British industry. In 1930,23 out of the 50 largest UK manufacturing 
companies were still owner-dominated. Even by 1950, a sample of 92 large 
manufacturers revealed that 50 were controlled by families. 65 British corporate 
development during these years was characterised by 'rationalisation' in terms of the 
61 R. Church, 'Deconstructing Nuffield: The Evolution of Managerial Culture in the British Motor 
Industry', Economic History Review, Vol. XLIX, 3 (1996), pp. 561-83 
62payne, British Entrepreneurship, p. 21 
63Wilson, Business History, pp. 102-03 
64ibid., p. 70 
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organisation of work, and also a merger boom. A number of new business entities 
emerged such as ICI in 1926 and Unilever in 1929, and in 1923 the government 
sponsored the merger of the railways into four large regional enterprises. ICI and 
Unilever established multi-divisional (,M-form') management structures, a 
decentralised form of management marking a shift from the old functional 
organisation. It was only the larger firms such as these which offered any in-house 
training.66 The 'M-form' had been pioneered in America and represented a move 
towards managerial capitalism. Conservative management practices still persisted 
however, as relatively few British firms moved towards the multi-divisional form. 
Instead, the holding company (,H-form') continued to be popular with British 
industrialists.67 Many company boardrooms also had a 'club' atmosphere which 
influenced attitudes to organisational change and there was a continuing ambivalence 
towards management training within the manufacturing sector. In 1950 there were 
still only 12 British multi-divisional companies as families maintained control of 
most firms.68 
By 1931 managers, administrators and higher professionals still accounted for 
only 4.8 per cent (1.01 million) of the total occupied population.69 The inter-War 
years however, witnessed a gradual if slow growth in the number of managers 
employed in British industry. With the continuing strength of the family firm, a 
prime recruitment method for potential managers remained patronage. This 
65Keeble, Ability to Manage, p. 45 
66Gourvish, 'British Business', pp. 26-34; J. Foreman-Peck, 'Industry and Industrial Organisation in 
the Inter-War Years' in Floud and McCloskey, Economic History: Vol. 2, p. 396 
67Foreman-Peck, 'Industry', p. 397 
68Gourvish, 'British Business', pp. 26-34 
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represented a strong continuity with practices from the 1890s. Patronage was 
actually widespread in all types of firms, at all levels, and continued well into the 
1950s. Until the 1960s the family influence was a major factor in promotion in most 
finns, except the largest companies.7o Nepotism was another characteristic of British 
management during this period and in 1942, it was cited by the Institute of Industrial 
Administration as one of the three curses of industry along with secretiveness and 
d·· l' 71 tra Ihona Ism. 
British management education continued to lag behind other leading industrial 
nations during this period and this created the perception of a lack of quality in its 
business leaders. In 1930 the percentage of Britain's business leaders who were 
university graduates had risen to only 23 per cent; in Gennany, it was now 62 per 
cent while in France, it was 96 per cent.72 Industry, in general, remained either 
hostile or apathetic to what education could offer. In 1918 the Manchester 
Municipal School of Technology set up a Department of Industrial Administration. 
Its aim was to provide training in all aspects of industrial management from foreman 
to director but it suffered from a lack of funding and widespread apathy on the part 
of local business. The LSE established a Department of Business Administration in 
1930 and instituted a diploma course aimed at students with two years' business 
experience, but numbers were fewer than expected, forcing the department to close 
between 1939 and 1945.73 In comparison, there was a great expansion of business 
69Keeble, Ability to Manage, p. 44 
70 ibid., p. 46 
71 ibid., p. 47 n27 
72Jeremy, Business History, pp. 393-95 
73Keeble, Ability to Manage, see Chapter 5 
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education in the United States between the Wars. In 1932, 400 colleges and 
universities had business courses, enrolling over 90,000 students a year. During the 
1920s, the Harvard Business School began to specialise in corporate administration. 
By the early 1930s, it was graduating 400 MBAs a year and just after the War 
employed 32 full-time professors.74 
The inter-War years however, did see the emergence of a professionalised 
core of top management. But it was accountants, rather than engineers or scientists, 
who began to predominate. The proportion of companies with qualified accountants 
among their directorates rose from 7.6 per cent in 1911 to 19.1 per cent in 1931. By 
1951 this had increased to 39.1 per cent. 75 There were (and still are) more managers 
in Britain with an accounting background than in other advanced countries. One of 
the reasons for this was that the accountancy sector creamed off some of the 
brightest recruits from public and grammar schools. As there had been such poor 
provision of training by business and British universities, a vacuum had been created 
which was partly filled by accountants. Accountancy was the most relevant and 
broadest management training available despite criticisms of its untheoretical 
approach and unsuitability as a preparation for general management. It did however, 
provide an element of meritocracy due to the stringent qualificatory standards which 
forced down pass rates.76 In this sense, they were trying to emulate other 
professions, like medicine, by controlling access. 
74 ibid., p. 26, 114 
75D. Matthews, M. Anderson, and J.R. Edwards, 'The Rise of the Professional Accountant in 
British Management', Economic History Review, Vol. L, 3 (August 1997), Table 4, p. 411 
76 ibid., Table 4, pp. 422-26 
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Britain's overall investment in human capital before 1939 compared 
unfavourably with both the United States and Germany, and this had ramifications 
for the economy. Rose has argued that the productivity gap between British and 
American manufacturing industry was partly caused by skill deficiencies. 
Furthermore, the low numbers of scientifically and managerially trained graduates 
provided a relatively small pool of specialist expertise. As a consequence, Britain 
was unable to fulfil its potential for a shift from the old staple industries towards 
k·ll .. 77 more s I -IntensIve sectors. 
Following the Second World War Britain underwent something of a 
managerial revolution. In 1951, 1.96 million people were categorised as managers, 
administrators or higher professionals. By 1971 this figure had increased by 70 per 
cent to 3.36 million, more than one in five of the male population in employment.78 
There were further structural and organisational changes within British industry due 
to another surge of industrial concentration through mergers. By 1957, the share in 
production of the largest 200 manufacturing firms was 73 per cent which by 1969 
had risen to 86 per cent. The numbers of traditional owner-managers were also 
declining and being replaced by career managers. By 1963, 29 per cent of the largest 
116 companies were controlled by family business men; 32 per cent by professional 
career managers; and 39 per cent by representatives of financial institutions.79 
Moreover, by 1970, 72 out of the 100 largest industrial enterprises had adopted a 
multi-divisional management structure. Nationalisation also generated a need for 
77Rose, 'Investment', p. 357 
78H. Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society (1989), p. 460 
79ibid., p. 437, 442 
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professional management of state industries as did the creation of the welfare state. 
In 1947 the British Institute of Management was founded as management 
increasingly displayed the traits of a profession. There were also initiatives in the 
field of management education. In 1965 the Manchester Business School commenced 
teaching, with its London equivalent starting the following year. Both offered 
Harvard-style MBAs.80 
Despite these developments British managers continued to lag behind the 
international competition in terms of educational qualifications and technical 
expertise. Post-War practices in many sectors were shaped by deeply entrenched 
work traditions and the scepticism of managers concerning the value of training and 
education for their specific firms. In addition, the general apprenticeship was deeply 
embedded in the psyche of unions and employers alike. 81 In the mid-1950s only one 
third of executives and a fifth of general managers of large British companies held 
degrees. Countries like Germany, the United States and Japan had surpassed these 
figures in the 1920s. The overall ratio of graduates in management who actually held 
degrees was only 10 per cent. In 1959 it was found that about fifty per cent of 
general managers had no qualifications of any kind, and over half of the directors in 
charge of production were without engineering or scientific qualifications. This 
situation did not change drastically during the next two decades.82 
80 Gourvish, 'British Business', pp. 34-40; M. W. Kirby, 'The Corporate Economy in Britain: Its 
Rise and Achievements since 1900', in Kirby and Rose, Business Enterprise, pp. 139-71; Jeremy, 
Business History, p. 407 
81Rose, 'Investment', p. 357 
82 Aldcroft, 'Missing Dimension', pp. 97-98 
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Many smaller and medium-sized companIes still relied upon the 
characteristics of the practical man solving problems on a pragmatic, rule-of-thumb 
basis. There was little expertise in smaller companies. In a survey carried out in 
1976, it was found that managers, in both large and small firms, were only marginally 
better qualified than the population as a whole. Over half the managers had no 
qualifications at all, with only 3 per cent holding a degree.83 Many of the degree 
holders were from large firms so the incidence of graduates in small firms was very 
low indeed.84 The increase in government expenditure on education following the 
War did not close the skills gap between the British worker and his foreign 
counterpart. Although a third of the chief executives of the UK's largest firms by the 
1970s were a product of state education, the 1944 Education Act did little to prepare 
the majority for work. It was a workforce ill-fitted to confront the rapidly 
industrialised world of the Fifties and Sixties.85 Universities neglected both 
technology and management training in the post-War period, and as a result, British 
managers were less well equipped than their American counterparts to cope with the 
challenges of big business. 86 
British managers still saw experience rather than a managerial education as the 
key to business success, a legacy of generations of industrial practice. Only a few 
large firms, like leI, valued expertise through their in-house, systematic training 
schemes. Rose has argued that Britain's twentieth century productivity gap was 
mainly due to a combination of a lack of technical expertise and the poor quality 
83This figure rose to only 11 per cent amongst general managers. 
84Aldcroft, 'Missing Dimension', pp. 99-100 
85Jeremy, Business History, p. 387; Rose, 'Investment', pp. 358-59 
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.. h . 87 trammg t at managers receIved. The probable root cause of the training lag has been 
the reluctance of directors to prioritise manpower issues at all levels, including the 
professionalisation of management. This is perhaps unsurprising as most of the men 
at the top were still basically amateurs. As they themselves had little or no training 
in the methods of management, the traditions of the practical man and of the 
gentleman were perpetuated within the boardrooms of British industry. 88 
Since the late nineteenth century, management has been a weak link within 
British industry. Neither systematic nor meritocratic enough in its selection, nor 
scientific enough in the application of its training, British management has lagged 
behind its foreign competitors in terms of quality. This is not to say that Britain did 
not produce high-quality managers but that it did not produce enough of them. 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, personal capitalism was a persistent 
feature of British industry. As a result, many firms continued to prefer their future 
managers to be grounded in their own methods as opposed to undertaking any 
training or possessing formal academic qualifications. Overall, the typical British 
manager in industry before 1970 was not part of a profession in the true sense of the 
word. If professions were created through the restriction of access by means of 
selective training, education and qualification then British management failed this 
. . 89 
cntenon. 
Similar criticisms have been expressed about the culture of football 
management. Writing about the 'decline' of football in 1986, James Walvin remarked 
86 Rose, 'Investment', pp. 359-62 
87'b 'd I I . 
88 Aldcroft, 'Missing Dimension:', p. 109; Keeble, Ability to Manage, p. 162 
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that 'football simply reflected the experience of wide areas of British management 
which specifically eschewed the concept of professional managerial training and 
vocational education. ,90 Football managers were, and are, generally ex-professional 
players whose knowledge of management was limited to the practical experience 
they gained when they were players. Like many of their counterparts in industry, 
the training they received as a manager was on-the-job. This was little preparation 
for their new role which demanded different qualities and abilities from those which 
enabled them to become players, such as fmancial acumen, skilled man-management, 
sensitivity to the media and fans, and a managerial flair.91 The following chapter will 
attempt to chart the origins of these developments by outlining how football became 
an industry and how clubs were managed between 1880 and the Great War. 
89perkin, Professional Society, p. 439 
90Walvin, Football, p. 28 
91 ibid., p. 27 
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CHAPTER 2 
RUNNING A FOOTBALL CLUB, 1880-1914 
In all our large towns, and most of the small ones, north of Birmingham to the 
Tweed, from September to April, Saturday is consecrated to football. Saturday 
evenings are devoted to football symposia, and newspapers issue special editions 
one after the other, with from three to four columns of reports and gossip about the 
results of the day's games and the players. 
C. Edwardes, 'The New Football Mania', The Nineteenth Century, Vol. 32 (July-
December 1892), p. 622 
"I do not like your up-to-date football - it is now like a business." 
An unnamed former public school boy quoted in 1.J. Bentley, 'Is Football a 
Business?', World's Work, Vol. 20, 118 (September, 1912), p. 383 
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Between 1880 and the Great War, football underwent radical changes. By 1914, from 
being purely a sporting activity, it had begun to display the characteristics of an 
industry, initially through the adoption of professionalism by elite clubs. Football 
however, developed into a very peculiar business. It was still a sport but it was also 
partly entertainment due to the game's increasing mass appeal. While money was 
important however, the pursuit of mammon did not characterise the game. This 
chapter will examine the transformation that football underwent during this period, 
its governance and the effect it had on the general management of clubs by looking at 
who ran them and their motives for doing so. Before embarking on an analysis of 
football management's historical development, the idea of football as an industry and 
what type of business it was by 1914, will be examined. 
1 Football had become a mass spectator sport by the turn of the century. The 
F A Cup Final had rapidly established itself as a national institution and in 1914 it 
was attended by a reigning monarch, George V, for the first time, giving the game the 
1 The first FA Cup Final in 1872 attracted two thousand people to the Kennington Oval; from 1895 
to 1914 the Cup Final was played at Crystal Palace where in 1901 the attendance exceeded 100,000 
for the first time. 
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establishment's stamp of approval. The game's growing popularity was also a 
reflection of the boom that took place in the service industries between 1870 and 
1914. In the second half of the nineteenth century, services had accounted for half 
the growth in national income? In the leisure sector there was a rise in the 
consumption of alcohol, and music halls were increasingly placed in the hands of 
entrepreneurs. With the expansion of the rail network, the railway excursion became 
a popular day-out for workers and cheaper newspapers were also published to cater 
for a wider market. 3 A burgeoning sports industry emerged as football and other 
sports such as boxing, cricket and horse-racing were increasingly commercialised. 
Changes in the nation's social and economic make-up were significant factors 
in this development. Modern football had regional origins in Scotland and in the 
English North and Midlands. East Lancashire, in particular, the cradle of the 
industrial revolution, was at the forefront of the commercialisation of leisure. As a 
result of increases in working-class spending power and leisure opportunities, 
commercialised spectator sports for the mass market, particularly football, became 
one of the economic success stories of late Victorian Britain.4 During this period the 
nation's standard of living steadily increased. Food prices in particular had begun to 
fall from the 1880s onwards and this gave the working-class greater spending 
power.5 From 1847 working men had increasingly gained the Saturday half-holiday 
2c. Lee, 'The Service Industries' in Floud and McCloskey, Economic History, Second Edition, 
Volume 2, p. 143 
3W. Vamplew, Pay Up and Play the Game: Professional Sport in Britain 1875-1914 (Cambridge, 
1988), p. 68 
4 ibid., p. 52 
5Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 53 In 1900 the service industries accounted for 21.2% of consumer spending, 
although only _ of this was attributed to the working-classes. Lee,' Service Industries', p. 126 
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at different times depending on job, employer and geographicallocation.6 Increased 
life expectancy further widened, and deepened the potential market for spectator 
sport. By 1901 Britain's population was over 45 million while the death rate had 
fallen to under 17 per 1000. British society was also very youthful with around 30 
per cent of the population under 15 years of age throughout the nineteenth century. 7 
Between 1871 and 1901 levels of urban density rose from 61.6 per cent to 77 per 
cent, producing further potential concentrated markets for recreational 
entrepreneurs.8 By 1915 the majority of spectators at professional football matches 
were from the working classes of major towns that had populations in excess of 
50,000.9 One result of these social and economic changes was that aggregate 
attendances in professional football rose from approximately 602,000 during the first 
Football League season in 1888-89 to nearly 9 million by 1913-14. 10 
Early football clubs however, particularly those formed during the 1870s, 
were purely amateur sporting bodies not businesses. They reflected the nineteenth 
century, middle-class voluntary tradition. Morris has stated that 'subscriber 
democracy' characterised voluntary societies where the members of the club paid an 
annual subscription entitling them to one vote in the election of a committee and 
officers at the annual general meeting. By the 1870s sports clubs were being 
organised with the same traditions of chairman, agendas, rules, subscriptions and 
6Mason, Association Football, pp. 2-3; Russell, Football, p. 13 
7 G. Williams, The Code War (Harefield, 1994), p. 50 
8 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 53 
9Mason, Association Football, p. 150 
10 Vamplew, Pay Up, Table 6.2, p. 63 
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members. II It is the persistence of some of these traditions, in particular amateurism, 
that have had a lasting impact on the development of football management. 
Football clubs owed their origins to various types of institutions already in 
existence. As a consequence, the reasons for establishing a football club ranged from 
the missionary, to the philanthropic, to the simple desire to spend leisure time 
playing football with friends. A number of clubs like Bolton Wanderers and Everton, 
had connections with local churches. 12 Some came from schools. Sunderland, for 
example, was born at a meeting of Sunderland school teachers in October 1879.13 
Places of work was another point of origin. Newton Heath (later Manchester United) 
originated from the depot and carriage works of the Lancashire and Yorkshire 
Railway in 1878.14 West Ham was first known as Thames Ironworks after London's 
largest surviving shipbuilding firm. The owner, Arnold F. Hills, formed a football 
club in 1895 as part of his strategy to develop better industrial relations with his 
workforce. 15 
lIR.J. Morris, 'Clubs, Societies and Associations', in F.M.L. Thompson (ed.), The Cambridge 
Social History o/Britain, 1750-1950, Vol. 3 (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 412-418 
12Bolton Wanderers, formed in 1874, were originally known as Christ Church FC. One ofthe church 
regulars was Thomas Ogden, master of the school attached to the church. On the instruction of the 
Reverent Wright, who was concerned with the welfare of his parishioners, Ogden collected together a 
band of young men to form a club. He also collected sixpence from each of them, in order to 
purchase a ball that cost five shillings. The name was changed in 1877 to Bolton Wanderers after the 
vicar refused the members permission to hold meetings at the church ifhe was not present. P.M. 
Young, Bolton Wanderers (1965), pp. 18-19. Everton was formed in 1878. It was originally known 
as St. Domingo's Church which was sited in Everton, Liverpool and had formed a football club to 
supplement its cricket section. The following year the football club's name was changed to Everton. 
P.M. Young, Football on Merseyside (1963), pp. 13-15 
13 A. Appleton, Hotbed o/Soccer (1961), p. 164. The club was originally called Sunderland and 
District Teachers' Association Football Club. James Allan, a Scot from Thomas Street Boys' 
School, called the meeting. He was made vice-captain. ibid. 
14Williams, Code War, p. 71. By 1880 a team was run by the depot's dining room committee. ibid. 
15Korr, West Ham, pp. 1-3; Mason, Association Football, pp. 29-30. The name of West Ham 
Football Club was established in 1900. 
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than others, although clerks, and their skills, were prominent in the formation of 
many clubs. 18 Blackburn Rovers' membership had originally consisted of the sons of 
local business and professional families who had attended grammar and public 
schools. 19 However, the roots of another local club, Blackburn Olympic, were more 
working-class. In 1883 'Olympic' became the first northern club to lift the FA Cup 
defeating Old Etonians 2-1 with a group of players who were mainly skilled workers. 
They included three weavers, two cotton spinners, a picture framer, an iron moulder, 
a dentist's assistant, a master plumber and a workman.20 
A closer look at the early history of Aston Villa illustrates how football clubs 
from this period emerged, the difficulties they encountered and who ran them. Up to 
1914 Villa was largely run on a collective basis, with responsibilities being shared 
amongst the members and later the directors. Some of the club's early committee 
members and players belonged to the middle classes. The club also had a strong 
Scottish connection and this proved important in its struggle to survive and prosper. 
This connection marked the club during its early years and was represented by the 
choice of the Scottish lion as the club's emblem?1 One long-serving member, Charles 
Johnstone, was a teacher who came from Scotland and was later headmaster at three 
171. Catton, The Rise of the Leaguers (Manchester, 1897), p. 105 
18Mason, Association Football, p. 30 
19ibid., p. 40. The club was originally founded by John Lewis and Arthur Constantine in December 
1874. Lewis had attended Market Drayton Grammar School but returned to his hometown to form a 
club and invited any other players to join who had also returned home from school. Catton, 
Leaguers, p. 24. 
20J. Catton, The Real Football (1900), pp. 123-126. The club had originally been formed by the 
amalgamation of two minor clubs, Black Star and James Street in January 1878. ibid. 
21 Catton Folders, A-B, p. 33 
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Aston Villa had its origins in the Aston Villa Wesleyan Chapel. In 1872 its 
bible class members had formed a cricket club with the leader of the class, H.H. 
Hartshorne, as its first President. W. Scattergood was elected the club captain and 
W.H. Price its first secretary. It was not until two years later that the club decided to 
form a football section after some members saw a club mate, W.B. Mason, play for 
Grasshoppers against Handsworth. Those who took up football subscribed a shilling 
a head after the first practice game in Aston Park. Their first game was at Wilson 
Road, against a rugby club, Aston St. Mary's. The first half was played under rugby 
rules and the second under the association code. 16 
Along with Villa and Everton, Sheffield Wednesday was another club that had 
a connection with a cricket club. A football section had been established in 1866 to 
keep the members together during the winter months. 17 This had certain advantages 
for clubs trying to establish themselves. First, clubs had a pool of members who 
wanted to play football, and there was already a mechanism in place where they 
could procure membership fees. Less visible but importantly, the name of the club as 
a sporting institution would have been established and would have built up a 
network of contacts within the local area. 
Mason has pointed out that there is insufficient evidence to say whether any 
particular industries or occupational groups were more likely to form football clubs 
16The scorer of the only goal of that game was a historian, Johannes (or Jack) Hughes who later 
detailed Aston Villa's origins in a book. (I have been unable to trace the book). Birmingham 
Sporting Mail, 20 March 1915, p. 1. Another account ofa club called Aston Villa but with no 
connection with its more famous predecessor was given by J.W. Brigham. He claimed that he became 
the first secretary of the club in 1868 and that HH Hartshorne was its first President. Hartshorne had 
proposed to members of his Sunday afternoon bible class that they form a cricket and football club. 
The cost of membership was initially a halfpenny per week that Brigham collected. Their first 
playing ground was a piece of waste land at the corner of Church Street and St. Silas's square before 
moving to St. Peter's Road, Hutton Road and then to Perry Barr. Catton Folders, A-B, p. 33. 
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local schools?2 Another prominent member was W. Margoschis, a local tobacconist 
who had the latest scores of away games relayed to his shop by pigeon.23 The main 
influence on Villa's early development however, was George Ramsey. He was the 
club secretary from 1884 to 1926 but before then he had been a player, captain, 
. d h . 24 R . commItteeman, an c aIrman. amsay, a natIve of Glasgow, was a commercially 
trained clerk who came to Birmingham in the early 1870s and took up a position 
with the iron merchants, Izon, in Stafford Road.25 His migration was a familiar tale: 
an example of the attraction that Birmingham held for people seeking employment as 
a result of the city's rapid economic growth into a major manufacturing centre during 
this period. Even in 1851 Birmingham's popUlation comprised of over 50% of 
migrants from most parts of the British Isles.26 
Ramsay's connection with Villa began when he saw them playing in a public 
park in Aston in the mid-1870s.27 Ramsay had previously played at a high standard 
in Glasgow with the 'Oxford' Football Club. Almost immediately he was elected 
captain and then began to coach the players who undertook exercises such as 
running, throwing the hammer and gymnastics.28 Ramsey also coached them in the 
nuances of passing and dribbling, a standard part of the game in Scotland, and under 
22 Birmingham Post, 1 October 1941, p. 4, 'Obituary'. He was also connected with Birmingham 
Volunteers. 
23Birmingham Central Library, LF25.1, George H. Osbourne Newscuttings, Notes on Aston Villa 
Football Club, 1874-1907 (hereafter to be referred to as 'Osbourne Newscuttings), p. 56, Birmingham 
Mail, 13 February 1886; p. 65, Dart, 4 February 1887 
24Aston Villa News and Record (AVNR), Vol. 2, No. 66, December 25-26 1907, p. 11. Even when 
he retired his services were retained by Villa in the capacity of a consultant. ibid., Vol. 17, No. 668, 
August 28-30 1926, p. 12-13 
25 AVNR., Vol. 2, No. 66, December 25-26 1907, p. 12; All Sports Weekly, 11 October 1924, p. 5 
26p . Joyce, 'Work', in Thompson, Cambridge Social History, Vol. 2, p. 139 
27Birmingham Daily Post, 8 October 1935, p. 16, 'Obituary' 
280sbourne Newscuttings, p. 170, Saturday Night, 'The Early Days of Aston Villa', 29 April 1893 
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his guidance Villa's play and results improved.29 From 1876 until 1880 Ramsay was 
club captain, and he also began to take control of the club's direction off the field. 
Villa's first games were played at the public park in Aston but on Ramsay's 
initiative they moved to their first ground at Wellington Road in Perry Barr in 
1876.30 
Ramsay was also keen to secure people who would assist Villa in any way 
and in 1877 he quickly persuaded William McGregor, another Scot, from Braco in 
Perthshire who had been previously connected with the Calthorpe club, to join. He 
was immediately elected vice-president.31 McGregor was an early football 
entrepreneur and he later founded the Football League in 1888. He came to 
Birmingham in 1870 where he and his brother, Peter, opened a linen draper's shop in 
32 Summer Lane, Newtown. A tee-totaller, McGregor was also a member of the local 
Liberal Association during the period when Joseph Chamberlain was its President.33 
Although he did occasionally play in goal during practice games, and was an umpire 
for the club, it was his talents as an organiser that Ramsay wanted to utilise.34 
McGregor later exploited his involvement in football by putting his name to 
products such as the 'McGregor football' and the 'McGregor lace-to-toe football 
29 AVNR, Vol. 2, No. 66, December 25-26 1907, p. 11 
30S. Inglis, Villa Park - 100 Years (Warley, 1997), p. 15. Ramsey had persuaded a farmer to sublet 
the club a field that bordered Birchfield and Perry Barr. It was a mile from Aston Park and Ramsay 
himself took on the lease for three years at a commencing rental of £5 per year. The club also rented a 
room at a coffee house in Aston High Street for the purpose of meetings and social gatherings. It later 
moved the clubroom to Lozells and then to Six Ways where it held music evenings. AVNR, 
December 25-26 1907, p. 11; Osbourne Newscuttings, p.40, Birmingham Mail, 24 October 1883, 
'The Rise and Progress of the Aston Villa Club'. 
31 Catton, Real Football, p. 71 
32 Dictionary of National Biography (forthcoming) 
33Birmingham Daily Post, 21 December 1911, p. 10, 'Obituary'; S. Inglis, League Football and the 
Men Who Made It (1988), p. 4 
/tunnlng a nmtrJall ClUb 63 
Boot', and his shop sold football shirts and shorts. He also wrote regular columns for 
Birmingham newspapers like the Sports Argus.35 
Another early football entrepreneur was William Sudell of Preston North End 
who, in contrast to the collective efforts at Aston Villa, had been the driving force 
behind Preston's emergence as the top team in the country during the 1880s. He was 
the chairman of Preston North End between 1874 and 1893 and has been described 
as 'football's first great professional manager' due to the direction he gave the club 
and the responsibilities he undertook.36 Sudell was already a management figure 
before he got involved in football as he was manager of a Preston cotton mill, John 
Goodair & Co. He was employed by the firm for over 25 years, and after the 
owner's death he ran the factory himself until 1893.37 Born around 1850, Sudell was 
a freeman of the town and claimed that an ancestor had been a Guild Mayor of 
Preston two hundred years previously. Sudell first joined Preston North End as a 
member in 1867 and was elected chairman in 1874. He had been a keen sportsman in 
his younger days, playing cricket and rugby for the club, and on occasions he later 
played in goal when the team took up football. 38 He was one of the first people to 
recognise the game's commercial potential, and in this sense, Sudell, along with 
34Sports Argus, 23 December 1911, 'Obituary', p. 3; Dictionary o/National Biography 
( forthcoming) 
35Birmingham Daily Mail, 23 December 1911; Dictionary o/National Biography (forthcoming) 
36E. Grayson, Corinthians and Cricketers (1957), p. 25. In 1888-89 Preston were the fIrst team to 
win the' double', the Football League and the FA Cup in the same season. They also won the League 
the following year. 
37 Preston Herald, 13 April 1895, p. 6. The factory was considered one of the largest in Preston. At 
one time it was worth £70,000 and had 64,000 spindles and 1300 looms. Preston Guardian, 13 
April 1895, p. 2 
38 Preston Herald, 24 March 1888, p. 5. When he was twelve he once skated 30 miles on the frozen 
Preston to Lancaster canal. 
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McGregor, were part of the entrepreneurial spirit that existed within other areas of 
the service and leisure industries in the 1880s. 
In the retail sector, for example, the late nineteenth century witnessed the rise 
of the department store. Many of its pioneers were non-conformist liberals who 
personified the 'Triumph of the Entrepreneurial Ideal'. Household names of the 
twentieth century, such as D.H. Evans, Owen Owen, Bainbridges' of Newcastle and 
the Binns family, emerged from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. Harrod's, 
which began as a butcher's shop in Cable Street, Stepney, only experienced real 
growth and success when the Harrod family had left the business and Richard 
Burbidge took over as general manager.39 Burbidge, a committed Anglican, was 
appointed in 1891 and aimed to attract a larger and better clientele in order to 
support the store's growth. He introduced new departments and services and by 
1894 the store had its own theatre ticket agency, restaurant, hairdressing salon and 
also operated one of London's first 24-hour telephone services. Burbidge also 
borrowed more aggressive American marketing techniques and was convinced of the 
value of good advertising. By 1913 Harrods' had been awarded its first Royal 
Warrant, assuming an exclusiveness that contrasted sharply with its previous co-
.. 40 
operatIve unage. 
The music hall was another institution that prospered under Victorian 
entrepreneurial verve. They had their origins in public house entertainment but by 
1870 London had 31 large music halls, although many smaller ones had been closed 
due to the strict implementation of fire precautions. Halls became larger and more 
39B. Lancaster, The Department Store: A Social History (1995), pp. 108-24 
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opulent as a result. By the end of the century, the music hall had become a mass 
entertainment as well as big business. In 1899, for example, the Moss Empires of 
Edward Moss had a capital of £ 1 million.41 
Cricket too underwent its own commercial revolution. In 1846 William Clarke 
had established the All England Eleven (AEE), the first example in England of a 
peripatetic team comprising professional sportsmen. Clarke capitalised on the 
growing interest in the game and the AEE played wherever there was a demand. 
Clarke, as manager, received a cut of the gate and paid his team on the strength of 
their performance in each game but he would always pocket the majority.42 Other 
cricketers like George Parr, Alfred Shaw and Arthur Shrewsbury followed Clarke's 
entrepreneurial lead. They all made handsome profits from arranging overseas tours 
that ultimately acted as forerunners for international cricket.43 Some, like the 
Lillywhites and William Gunn, later developed thriving businesses in the sale and 
manufacture of sporting goods.44 
Across the Atlantic, baseball had emerged as a professional sport during the 
1870s. The National League had been established in 1876 and the game had its own 
entrepreneur in Albert G. Spalding. He had been a pitcher with the National League's 
first winners, the Chicago White Stockings, and had actually drafted the League's 
40 Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 1, 'Sir Richard Burbidge', pp. 510-13 
41T. Mason, 'Sport and Recreation', in P. Johnson (ed.), Twentieth-Century Britain: Economic, 
Social and Cultural Change, 1994, p. 115. At 2000 prices £1 million converts to £65 million. 
42In 1852 however, a schism emerged within the AEE and a rival team, the United Eleven of 
England, was set up. In 1865 the United South of England XI was formed after the southern 
professionals withdrew from both the AEE and UEE. C. Brookes, English Cricket: The Game and 
its Players through the Ages (Newton Abbot, 1978), p. 112 
43The first tour to Canada and the USA took place in 1859 with the first visit to Australia in 1861. 
The latter was underwritten and managed by a firm of tea importers, Messrs. Spiers and Pond, who 
made a profit of £ 11 ,000. Brookes, English Cricket, pp. 101-19 
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constitution. On retirement he set up the Spalding Sporting Goods Company that 
supplied clubs with balls and other equipment making him wealthy enough to buy 
and own the White Stockings.45 
Sudell and McGregor were behind the formation of Britain's National 
Baseball League in 1890. Preston North End was one of the original four members 
along with Aston Villa, Stoke City and Derby County. Sudell and McGregor sat on 
the League's council, while George Ramsey was its honorary secretary. Deepdale 
was used as Preston's home and some of the footballers also played the game.46 The 
League only lasted a few seasons but in 1906 it was reincarnated in the form of the 
British Baseball Association, with John Cameron, the secretary-manager of 
Tottenham Hotspur, as its honorary secretary.47 
During the 1880s a football club's administration had been a relatively simple 
affair. For example, Bolton Wanderers' committee consisted of the club's officers: 
president and vice-presidents, captains and vice-captains, treasurer and secretaries 
plus eight non-playing members. All were elected at the annual meeting. Their duties 
included the arrangement of each season's fixtures, the selection of players for all 
matches and the transaction of business on the club's behalf. The secretary, who by 
1882 had an assistant, arranged the dates for the fixtures and was responsible for 
44 S. Rae, w.G. Grace (1998), p. 24, 46 
45D.H. Martinez, The Book of Baseball Literacy (1996), pp. 139-40. For a biography of Spalding 
see P. Levine, A.G. Spalding and the Rise of Baseball: The Promise of American Sport (Oxford, 
1985) 
46Football Field, 3 May 1890, p. 3; 21 June 1890, p. 5. Sunderland and Middlesbrough had been 
originally included. but dropped out before the season started, probably for fmancial reasons. ibid. 
Derby's ground was actually called the Baseball Ground. 
47Spurs Monthly, January 1995. I am grateful to Andy Porter for supplying me with this 
information. 
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collecting money owed to the club. His assistant took sole charge of collecting gate 
receipts. 48 
Table 2.1: Blackburn Rovers Balance Sheet, 1875-76 
Receipts £sd Expenditure £sd 
T. Greenwood 0 3 0 Football o 15 0 
W. Baguley 0 3 0 Haworth Bros. for Book 0 1 0 
W. Waugh 0 3 0 Cloth for Flags 020 
T. Dean 0 3 0 Receipt Book 006 
A. Thomas 0 3 0 Thornbers for Rules 080 
J. Lewis 0 3 0 Paid Man, Allowance 006 
J. Baguley 0 3 0 Goal Posts 0 8 10 
H. Greenwood 0 3 0 Umpire's Expenses to 
W. Duckworth 0 3 0 Darwen 0 0 7 
A. Constantine 0 3 0 Expenses to Church 0 2 0 
H.Cottam 0 3 0 Expenses to Cob Wall 0 1 0 
Alfred Birtwistle 0 3 0 Post Cards and Stamps 0 5 2 
Richard Birtwistle 0 3 0 Paid for Sundry Ex.'s 0 3 5 
John Baldwin 0 3 0 
Jas. Thompson 0 3 0 
M. Brothers 0 3 0 
2 8 0 2 8 0 
Source: Aston Villa News and Record, Vol. IV, (154), 29 January 1910, p. 380 
During these early years a football club's finances reflected its humble 
origins. In 1875-76 the balance sheet of Blackbum Rovers (Table 2.1) showed that 
the club had an income of £2 8s Od, entirely made up of members' subscriptions; 
they received no gate receipts and, unsurprisingly, paid out no wages to players.49 In 
1882, and in addition to their subscriptions, the players of Bolton Wanderers had to 
pay for the cost of their equipment and railway fares. The club also operated a fines 
system. For example, anyone using bad language on the field would be fined two 
pence. Failure to notify the secretary of the inability to play was a sixpence 
48 Young, Bolton Wanderers, p. 169 
49In fact, their major expense was a football that cost 15s - and that had to last the whole season or 
they would have been in debt. AVNR, 29 January 1910, p. 380 
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50 penalty. As the number of clubs grew, more teams travelled further away from 
their home towns. In East Lancashire this was easier than in most places because of 
the close proximity of a large number of football-playing towns. The increase in 
travelling however, forced Bolton to subsidise the railway fares of their players as 
many were unable to afford them. 51 When clubs acquired a ground, and because of 
football's growing appeal, they began to charge spectators for entry. Aston Villa's 
landlord took note of their popularity and hiked up the rent to £8 after the first 
season. 52 The rise in crowds forced the club into improving and enclosing the ground. 
A hedge originally encircled the field but gaps in it had allowed fans a free view. In 
1878 the hedge was cut down and replaced by boardings, and to keep spectators 
back from the pitch, ropes were fastened around trees bordering it. 53 
Clubs' incomes began to rise as did the array of their expenses. In 1879 
Villa's gate receipts amounted to £42 17s 10d.54 For the 1879-80 season Villa's 
income totalled £235 lIs 9d.55 By 1883 gross receipts had increased to £1720 Is 6d. 
From this, £443 was deducted for the away team's share. Costs included those for 
entertainment, £ 1 04; travelling expenses to Scotland, Wales and Lancashire, £ 186; 
and sundries such as printing and advertising amounted to £142. It was said, with 
perhaps more than a hint of irony, that 'so large are the sums of money involved ... 
50 Young, Bolton Wanderers, pp. 19-20 
51 ibid., p. 20 
52Inglis, Villa Park, p. 15. The first gate versus Wednesbury had amounted to 5s 3d but on 
occasions receipts exceeded £ 1 O. Aston Villa News and Record, October 12 1935, p. 81; A VNR, 
December 25-26 1907, p. 12 
53 Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 178, Saturday Night, 'The Early Days of Aston Villa', 24 June 1893. 
Games were played on a sloping meadow that was dotted with trees. Later, the trees were cut down, 
and the remaining stumps were blown up with dynamite in the middle of the night by Ramsay and 
an accomplice. ibid. 
54 ibid., p. 178, Saturday Night, 'The Early Days of Aston Villa', 24 June 1893. See Appendix 1 
ltunnmg a r ootball Club 69 
that the club has assumed the proportions of a large business affair'. 56 Some clubs 
also found patrons from the local community. Peter Parkinson, a manager of a Bolton 
mill, sponsored the 'Wanderers' from 1878. During this period Villa also acquired 
one of its first patrons. George Kynoch, again a native from north of the border, 
owned a local munitions factory, the Lion works at Witton that, at one time, 
employed 2000 people.57 
Yet, the most important ingredient in a club's success and, at this stage, 
survival, was its players. Archie Hunter was Aston Villa's most famous player 
during the 1880s and another example of Villa's young, male, Scottish connection. 
Hunter was not actually recruited through any inducement of remuneration as was 
often the case, but instead by accident. He had met the Calthorpe club when they 
were touring Scotland, and when he came to Birmingham in 1878 as an apprentice in 
the hardware trade, he tried to locate them but was unable to find their ground. 58 A 
55 ibid., p. 180, Saturday Night, 'The Early Days of Aston Villa', 8 July 1893. See Appendix 2 
56ibid., p. 39, Midland Echo, 25 May 1883 
57 Birmingham Daily Gazette, 2 March 1891, 'Obituary'. In 1886 Kynoch became Conservative M.P 
for Aston Manor. His involvement with Villa initially began when he donated some wooden railings 
to erect barriers at the Perry Barr ground. Kynoch was also an early visitor to Villa games where he 
and his wife would ride around the ground on horseback while the match was in progress. Following 
a game against the Edinburgh team, Heart of Midlothian, he held a dinner for the club and 120 guests 
at his factory's dining room. Later, the 'Kynoch Wagon' was a regular fixture at Perry Barr where he 
entertained his guests. Kynoch was also one of the three guarantors of the ground's rent from 1880 to 
1887, along with McGregor and J. Clements. He was the club President between 1886 and 1887 
where he succeeded W.M. Ellis and was later succeeded himself by James Hinks. Kynoch however, 
proved unpopular with McGregor and other committee members because of the autocratic way he 
wanted to run the club. In 1887 Kynoch disposed of his interest in the munitions factory. He left for 
South Africa the following year, remaining there until he died, although he was still an MP at the 
time. Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 178, Saturday Night, 'The Early Days of Aston Villa', 24 June 
1893, p. 68 Birmingham Gazette, 16 June 1887; Birmingham Daily Gazette, 2 March 1891, 
'Obituary'; Birmingham Sporting Mail, 23 December 1911, p. 1 
58 Birmingham Daily Gazette, 30 November 1894, p. 3 
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colleague at work who was a Villa enthusiast then suggested that he contact George 
Ramsay.59 
The lifespan of many fledgling clubs however, was short-lived. A club's 
survival depended on a number of factors. These included money to finance itself as 
well as the historical accident of location because rapid urbanisation during the 
nineteenth century was swallowing up the potential space for clubs to play. 
Birmingham's first association football club, Calthorpe, was formed in 1873 by two 
Scots, J. Campbell Orr and John Carson who were previously linked with Queen's 
Park.60 Originally called Birmingham Clerks, they renamed themselves after their 
ground at Calthorpe Park. 61 Calthorpe later left the park bearing its name and rented 
a private ground owned by Lord Calthorpe on the Bristol Road. However, the club 
could not charge gate money for their matches due to the terms of their tenancy. As 
their income diminished, so their natural growth declined due to the competition of 
other clubs that were emerging in Birmingham and its surrounding area.62 By the 
1886-87 season, when Aston Villa won the FA Cup for the first time, Calthorpe had 
scratched from the main local competition, the Birmingham County FA Challenge 
63 Cup. 
Football was fast becoming a mania, and by 1884 some of Villa's crowds had 
reached 15,000. They also took some of their fans to away games. In 1883 Villa had 
59 A. Gibson and W. Pickford, Association Football and the Men Who Made It, Vol. 2 (1906), p. 54 
60p. Morris, Aston Villa: The History of a Great Football Club, 1874-1961 (1962), p. 4; A. 
Rippon, The Aston Villa Story (Derby, 1993), p. 8-9 
61S.W. Clives, The Centenary Book of the Birmingham County Football Association, 1875-1974 
(1974), p. 84 
62Morris, Aston Villa, p. 7 
63Birmingham City Archives, MS51911, p. 288 
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played Queen's Park in Glasgow and such was the interest generated in the game the 
London and North Western Railway Company ran two trains and the Midland 
Railway one special train from Birmingham.64 In addition to the struggle to keep 
pace with the rise in football's popularity, clubs began to compete with each other 
for the attentions of football enthusiasts by advertising themselves to a wider 
audience. At first, Aston Villa used large wall posters but from 1886 all the club's 
games were advertised in the Friday edition of the Birmingham Mail and local 
sporting papers.65 Newspapers however, had been used early on by the club for 
important games. In 1881, for a game against Blackburn Rovers, an advert had been 
placed in the Birmingham Mail which announced that' [t]he committee of the Villa 
club has deemed it necessary to provide tickets for admission, in order to avoid 
excessive crushing at the gate'. Tickets were sold in the establishments of some club 
members including McGregor's drapery.66 Another outlet for tickets was the Crown 
and Cushion public house which was adjacent to the ground in Perry Barr. Ticket 
prices ranged from 3d for general admission to 6d for the reserved section.67 
Admission to football games then was not just restricted to standing or seats. When 
Villa played Aston Unity in a cup-tie at the Aston Lower Grounds in 1883, general 
admission was 6d and the reserved grounds or stands cost 6d extra. But if you were 
in possession of a two-wheel carriage admission that would cost 1 s 6d while the cost 
640sbourne Newscuttings, p. 48, Birmingham Gazette, 25 October 1884 
65 ibid., Saturday Night, p. 56, 23 January 1886 
66 ibid., p. 36, Birmingham Mail, 28 January 1881 
67 ibid., p. 36, Birmingham Mail, 18 February 1881 
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of a four-wheeler was 2s 6d, a kind of corporate hospitality of its day for the richer 
supporters.68 
As crowds increased, they became more socially stratified. The majority of 
the spectators, who were working-class, paid the minimum admission price and 
stood to watch the game. Clubs however, began to recognise that they also had to 
cater for wealthier patrons. In 1887 Villa built a new pavilion and new stand with a 
seating capacity for 700. A refreshment stand was also erected and an unreserved 
portion was set aside for more carriages to enter the Perry Barr ground. Similar to 
county cricket clubs, the club's pavilion was designated a reserved area for 
members.69 Another stand was built in 1892 that accommodated an extra 1000 
spectators.70 The increase in working-class spectators changed the nature of the 
crowd. In 1889 there had been complaints about gambling and the use of foul 
language at Perry Barr and the club brought in extra police to try and curb it. 71 
Accompanying the rise in the game's popularity was its increased 
competitiveness. Established in 1871, by the game's governing body, the Football 
Association, it was the FA Cup that did most to stimulate competition. The national 
competition was also supplemented by local cup competitions: both the Sheffield 
and Birmingham FA's challenge cup competitions began in 1876-77 and the first fmal 
of the Lancashire Cup was played in 1880.72 The institution of cup competitions 
68Albion News, 2 December 1922, p. 112. Persons on horseback however, were prohibited. ibid. See 
Appendix 6 
690sboume Newscuttings, p. 68, Birmingham Times, 20 August 1887. The new stand and pavilion 
was designed by an architect, Daniel Arkell. 
70ibid., p. 85, Birmingham Mail, 23 January 1892 
71 ibid., p. 76, Birmingham Mail, 22 November 1889; Birmingham Mail, 6 December 1889 
72Mason, Association Football, p. 78, n. 8; Russell, Football, p. 12 
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became known as 'pot-hunting' and generated interest through a combination of their 
competitive edge allied to the expression of local pride and hostility towards rival 
local communities.73 Walvin has commented how later Victorian local rivalries were 
becoming less physical and aggressive. Instead, 
[b ]rass band contests, football games, choral festivities - these and others absorbed 
and re-channelled the old traditions of local pride and imposed on them a peaceable 
style more in keeping with the social tone oflate Victorian life. 74 
As a result, association football, rather than rugby football, began to emerge as the 
dominant code by the 1880s. Up to this period many football clubs had played by 
different sets of rules.75 In areas such as Lancashire and the North East, rugby had 
initially been the more popular sport before 1880.76 As the Lancashire Rugby Union 
refused to sanction a county cup competition, rugby's popularity in that county was 
superseded by the association code. In Yorkshire however, where a rugby cup 
competition was established in 1876, soccer, particularly in the West Riding, 
remained a poor relation until the twentieth century. 77 The diffusion of association 
football also spread to other major cities such as Newcastle, Liverpool and 
Manchester by 1890.78 Consequently, there had been a rapid growth in the numbers 
of football clubs from the 1880s, especially in the Midlands and the North. The 
Lancashire Football Association was formed in 1878 by 30 clubs: by 1886 it had 
73 Russell, Football, p. 19 
74J. Walvin, Victorian Values (1987), p. 109 
75Williams, Code War, p. 51 
76M. Huggins, 'The Spread of Association Football in North-East England, 1876-1890: The Pattern 
of Diffusion', IJHS, Vol. 6, 3 (December 1989), pp. 299-318 
77Russell, Football, p. 19; A.J. Arnold, 'The Belated Entry of Professional Soccer into the West 
Riding Textile District of Northern England: Commercial Imperatives and Problems', IJHS, Vol. 6, 
3 (December 1989), pp. 319-334 
78Huggins, ' Spread of Association Football', p. 300; Arnold, 'Belated Entry', p. 330 
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114. In 1882 the Birmingham FA had 52 clubs.79 By 1912 it was estimated that there 
were 13,000 amateur football clubs and three-quarters of a million amateur players.8o 
The growth of the game, particularly in the North, and the increase in 
competition had caused clubs to look outside the local area for better players, some 
of whom had been enticed by the promise of work and better wages. This was in 
direct contravention of the southern-dominated FA's amateur ethos that forbade any 
form of professionalism. In the 1870s the FA had been dominated by either leisured 
gentlemen or by professionally or commercially employed products of public and 
grammar schools. They regarded football as fun, not work and therefore, were hostile 
to the idea of players being paid.81 By the 1880s however, the payment of players 
amongst northern clubs was widespread, particularly for the services of Scottish 
players. Scottish players attained the title of 'professors' because the game north of 
the border was technically more advanced than in England in the skills of dribbling 
d . . I . 82 an ,m partlCU ar, passmg. 
In line with this entrepreneurial tendency, William Sudell was a pnme 
advocate of professionalism, convinced as he was that the public wanted to watch 
the best players. In 1887 he argued that, 
Professionalism has, in my opinion, benefited football. I consider football is 
played more scientifically now then ever it was and that is solely due to the fact 
that in a professional team the men are under the control of the management and are 
79Mason, Association Football, p. 31 
8oBentley, 'Is Football a Business?', p. 383 
81Mason, Association Football, p. 69 
82Scottish footballers continued to make-up a considerable element of English club's playing staffs. 
See Appendix 7. In 1910 and 1925 the percentage of English players playing in the Football.League 
was, in both cases, approximately 77 per cent. In the same two years the percentage of Scottish 
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constantly playing together. Professionalism must improve football because men 
who devote their entire attention to the game are more likely to become good 
players than the amateur who is worried by business cares. No; purely amateur 
clubs will never be able to hold their own against a professional team.83 
75 
He considered that, '[football] will be played more scientifically and with less 
roughness and dash in the future. In short, professionalism will make such strides 
that football will become a science'. 84 The emphasis on science was used to show 
that football could be seen as a respectable activity, and not the rough and uncouth 
spectacle it was proclaimed in some quarters. 
Sudell, unsurprisingly, had been the mam instigator behind the FA's 
legalisation of professionalism, thus igniting football's commercialisation process. 
Preston North End had been one of a number of Lancashire clubs that had made 
payments to players since the early 1880s. But in 1884 Preston's opponents in an 
F A Cup tie, Upton Park, lodged a complaint with the FA claiming that they had 
been playing against a team of professionals. Though the charge was upheld and 
Preston were expelled from the competition, it opened up the debate over 
professionalism, plus the transferring of players. In October 1884 thirty-six northern 
and Birmingham clubs had threatened to resign from the governing body and form 
their own British Football Association but this was averted. Following protracted 
arguments, professionalism was finally legalised by the FA at a special general 
players fell from 19.3 to 15.5. M. Taylor, "Proud Preston': A History of the Football League 1900-
1939' (PhD thesis, De Montfort University, 1997), p. 289, Tables 8.1 and 8.2 
83Glasgow Evening News and Star, 22 January 1887, p. 4 
84'b 'd I I . 
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meeting In July 1885.85 Certain rules and restrictions however, were initially 
imposed on the freedom of professionals similar to those in cricket. 86 
Professionalism was never accepted by some members of the FA and there 
was a long period of struggle between the amateur and professional ethos that 
persisted well into the twentieth century, affecting the administration of the game, 
and ultimately the management of clubs. In 1894 the FA Amateur Cup was 
established due to the dominance of professional clubs in the FA Cup. In 1907 a 
group of die-hard clubs, mainly from the South, broke away to form the Amateur 
Football Association, complaining that the FA was only interested in the business of 
football and that the professionalism had infected the game. They returned to the 
fold in 1914.87 
Three years after professionalism was legalised, on the initiative of William 
McGregor, the Football League was formed by twelve clubs, six from the Midlands 
and six from Lancashire.88 From 1888 onwards, the sport operated on a more 
organised, commercial footing. Initially, the League's objectives were limited: 'its 
creation was essentially a practical response to a number of difficulties in the 
85Football Association Minutes, 26 January 1884,28 February 1884,23 March 1885, General 
Meeting, 20 July 1885; Williams, Code War, Chapter 10; Mason, Association Football, p. 74; 
Russell, Football, p. 25 
86Williams, Code War, p. 93. For example, they could only play for one club per season but for cup 
matches they needed to have a two year residence qualification within six miles of the club; and they 
could not serve on FA Committees. 
87T. Mason, 'Football' in T. Mason (ed.), Sport in Britain: A Social History (Cambridge, 1989), 
pp. 147-48. Despite professionalism being brought out into the open, professional players continued 
to encounter a certain hostility from some quarters. On one occasion, Sudell threatened not to allow 
any of Preston's professionals to play internationals again unless they were accorded the same 
treatment that amateurs received. Football Field, 14 April 1888, p. 6 
88McGregor had originally written a letter to Bolton Wanderers, Blackburn Rovers, Preston North 
End, West Bromwich Albion and Aston Villa suggesting that they arrange home and away fixtures. 
An initial meeting took place at Anderton's Hotel in Fleet Street, London, 22 March 1888 and then a 
second one at the Royal Hotel, Manchester on 17 April. Twelve clubs were formally invited: six 
from Lancashire were; Accrington, Blackburn, Bolton, Burnley, Everton, Preston, and six from the 
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management of clubs that had arisen following the legalisation of professionalism' .89 
These difficulties revolved around the erratic and unreliable nature of clubs' seasonal 
fixture lists that mainly consisted of friendlies. Some games would be one-sided, 
drawing small crowds. On other occasions the opposition failed to tum up, and if a 
club was knocked out of the cup competitions in the early rounds it could have had 
serious financial implications.9o In essence, competitive football was the aim: leagues 
were supposed to decrease the number of one-sided fixtures as well as providing a 
regular product. Thus, the Football League would provide a pre-arranged and 
permanent schedule of games that could attract large crowds and subsequently, 
provide a more reliable source of income.91 The institution of the Football League 
and other leagues, such as the Football Alliance, in 1889, and the Southern League in 
1894, established the principle of annual, pre-arranged fixtures as the most reliable 
method to generate revenue.92 By 1912 the number of professional clubs had risen to 
400, and there were also 7000 professional players.93 
Professionalism increased the rivalry between clubs from the same town or 
city, both on and off the pitch. With no regulation, a process of economic 
'cannibalisation' took place as clubs competed for the same market of fans, reflecting 
contemporary laissez-faire economics. As costs from paying players rose, it was 
Midlands: Aston Villa, Derby County, Notts. County, Stoke, West Brom, Wolverhampton 
Wanderers. B. Butler, The Football League 1888-1988 (1987), p. 11 
89 Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 18 
90 An earlier attempt to rationalise fixture lists was made in June 1886 when a conference of football 
secretaries in Blackburn was called by T. Hindle ofDarwen. Here, fixtures were arranged for the 
forthcoming season using an exchange method Football Field, 29 May 1886, p. 6; 26 June 1886, p. 
9 
91Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 18 
92ibid., p. 26. Professionalism in Scotland was not legalised until 1893, two years after the Scottish 
League was established. Mason, 'Football', p. 147 
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only one or two clubs in each town or city that survived and prospered. For 
example, Blackburn Olympic, FA Cup winners in 1883, had folded by the end of the 
decade, as Blackburn Rovers emerged as the town's dominant team.94 During the 
1880s Preston North End had been England's premier team, and in seven seasons 
between 1883-84 to 1889-90 they dominated English football. 95 Initially however, 
North End had had to compete for the town's loyalties with another local team, 
Preston Zingari.96 In the 1880s, the two main rivals on Merseyside were Everton and 
Bootie. Everton was one of the founding members of the Football League in 1888 but 
Bootie's application for the following year was rejected. It was accepted in 1892 but 
by then Liverpool Football Club had been established. Liverpool joined the Football 
League the following year whilst at the same time Bootie resigned from the League as 
Merseyside could only sustain two major clubs.97 One of the more interesting 
examples was the situation at Middlesbrough. In 1889, it was an amateur club but 
some members wanted it to tum professional. The majority refused but a minority of 
Middlesbrough members broke away to form a professional club, Middlesbrough 
Ironopolis. Middlesbrough responded by turning professional itself. In 1892 both 
clubs agreed to amalgamate if their application to join the Football League was 
successful. It was rejected however, and the amalgamation was cancelled with the 
93Bentley, 'Is Football a Business?', p. 383 
94 Catton, Real Football, p. 128 
95preston North End played 466 games, winning 394, drawing 37 and losing only 35. In that period 
Preston scored 1502 goals and conceded 385. Athletic News, 1 May 1922, p. 4 
96In 1884 Zingari won the Preston challenge cup and claimed to have the finest ground in 
Lancashire. In that year Zingari also imported four players from Scotland in an attempt to compete 
with North End Scottish Umpire, 21 August 1884, p. 5; H. Berry and G. Allman, One Hundred 
Years at Deepdale 1881-1981 (Preston, 1982), p. 28 
97D. Tywdell, 'Ghosts of the League ... No.5 Bootie', The Footballer, Vol. 1,5 (January/February 
1989), pp. 12-13 
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two clubs again going their separate ways. Ironopolis eventually joined the League in 
1893 but the following year, unable to sustain itself financially, it was voluntarily 
wound up. Two competing teams in the same town had not helped Middlesbrough 
either, and they reverted back to amateurism that same year.98 The impact of 
competition within football reflected more general patterns within industry as a 
whole. During the 1890s, in the face of competition from the United States and 
Germany, there was an increase in business amalgamations and consolidations. In one 
way, the institution of the Football League in 1888 mirrored this development as it 
provided 'a framework for [the] greater rationalisation and centralisation of 
professional football' .99 
Table 2.2: Professional Football Clubs' Total Income, Wage Payments and Dividends, 1908 
Gross Income (£) Payment to Players (£) Dividends and Payments (£) 
Division One FCs 
Division Two FCs 
Southern League 
FCs 
TOTAL 
224,906 
147,602 
98,524 
107,107 
77,511 
64,411 
471,032 249,029 
Source: Sports Argus, 16 October 1909, p. 1 
98 Appleton, Hotbed of Soccer, pp. 81-84; http://members.aol.com/ironopolis/mihistory.htm. 
Middlesbrough eventually joined the Football League in 1899. 
99Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 62 
1,551 
318 
1,869 
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Table 2.3: Summary of Aston Villa's Balance Sheets, 1879-1914 
Year Position in Revenue (£) Revenue (£) Wages Pre-tax Profits 
1879 
1880 
1883 
1885 
1888 
1897 
1907 
1908 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
Football 2000 Prices 
League* 
(£) (£) 
73 2,224 
235 12,400 19 
1,720 93,500 242 
1,913 116,000 11 
2,739 175,000 908 9 
1 10,935 722,000 3,999 1,299 
5 13,797 846,000 6,782 1,274 
2 11,457 685,000 5,719 443 
2 16,141 947,000 4,324 5,924 
6 12,946 757,000 5,538 1,579 
2 20,408 1,146,000 7,719 5,617 
2 20,167 1,122,000 6,726 6,777 
80 
Sources: Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 39, Birmingham Gazette, 22 May 1883; Osbourne 
Newscuttings, p. 53, Birmingham Mail, 4 July 1885; Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 178, 180, Saturday 
Night; Birmingham Gazette, 1 June 1888, p. 3; Aston Villa News and Record; Szymanski and 
Kuypers, Winners and Losers, pp. 340-78; Butler, Football League; R. Roberts, Schroders: 
Merchants and Bankers (1992), Appendix VIOO 
* Aston Villa only played in Division One during this period 
By 1914 the finances of English league clubs had been transformed and the 
professional game had developed into a not insignificant industry. Table 2.2 shows 
how that in 1908 the gross income of all professional clubs in the Football League 
and the Southern League was nearly £_ million (£28 million at 2000 prices) and just 
under £ _ million was spent by clubs on players' wages. Increases in turnover grew 
significantly throughout the period as illustrated by Aston Villa's finances in Table 
2.3. As early as 1885 the club had generated a revenue of £1913. But by the end of 
the period its income was the modern day equivalent of £1 million. 101 Spectator 
sports in general were thriving and during this period Scottish football clubs and 
county cricket clubs also generated similar amounts of revenue, yet as in English 
football, some did better than others. For example, the average income of Glasgow 
100 . hr h hh' Roberts's book has been used for all monetary converSIOns t oug out t e t eSlS. 
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Rangers before 1914 was £ 14, 164 and for Hearts the figure was £7361. St. 
Johnstone's average income however was only £818. There were similar differences 
of revenue in cricket's county championship. Between 1890 and 1914 Surrey 
generated an average income of over £ 14,000 per year whereas for Derbyshire it was 
£2348. 102 
Table 2.4: Professional Football Clubs' Average Income and Wages, 1908 
Average Income Income (£) 2000 Average Wages (£) 
(£) Prices 
Division One FCs 11,245 673,000 5,355 
Division Two FCs 7,380 441,000 3,875 
Southern League FCs 4,691 281,000 3,067 
Source: Sports Argus, 16 October 1909, p. 1; Roberts, Schroders, Appendix V 
Table 2.5: Sample of Professional Football Clubs' Wages and Revenue, 1905-06 
Club Division Position Gates (£) Gates (£) 2000 Wages (£) 
Prices 
Newcastle United 1 4 18,522 1,133,000 4,066 
Aston Villa 1 8 18,384 1,124,000 6,883 
Everton 1 11 15,476 946,000 5,270 
Liverpool 1 I 12,486 76.1,000 4,440 
Tottenham *SL 12,075 738,000 5,114 
Hotspur 
Fulham SL 11,615 710,000 4,400 
Manchester City 5 10,747 657,000 5,297 
Woolwich Arsenal 12 10,682 653,000 3,843 
Birmingham 7 9,426 576,000 4,905 
Sunderland 14 8,828 540,000 4,529 
Sheffield United 13 8,696 532,000 4,691 
Sheffield 3 8,220 503,000 4,889 
Wednesday 
Blackburn Rovers 1 9 8,000 489,000 4,200 
Derby County 1 15 6,772 414,000 3,663 
Preston North End 1 2 7,894 483,000 4,338 
Notts. County I 16 5,169 316,000 3,103 
Bury I 17 5,529 338,000 3,785 
Norwich City SL 4,930 301,000 2,577 
Stoke 1 10 4,283 262,000 3,607 
Bristol Rovers SL 4,142 253,000 3,115 
WestHam I SL 2,646 162,000 2,125 
Source: Aston Villa News and Record, Vol. 1, (1), September 1st 1906, p. 5; Butler, Football 
League; Roberts, Schroders, Appendix Y 
* SL - Southern League 
101 At 2000 prices this equated to over £ 100,000. 
I02Yamplew, Pay Up, Table 8.1, p. 83; Table 8.5, p. 94 
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The turnover of the average Football League club in 1908, shown in Table 
2.4, was perhaps similar to a small local fIrm.103 By 1914 some of the leading clubs 
had annual turnovers of over £20,000. 104 In terms of generating income, an elite 
group of clubs emerged from the major urban areas, reflecting the advantages of a 
metropolitan location with its large pool of potential supporters and a modem 
transport network. It was these clubs that made up the majority of clubs in Division 
One and also included London teams from the Southern League such as Tottenham 
Hotspur (Table 2.5). In general, these clubs also paid the most wages (Table 2.4). 
Table 2.5 shows how in 1906 Villa, along with Newcastle United, had generated 
revenue through the gate, at the equivalent of over £1 million at 2000 prices. lOS 
The increase in football's competition after 1885 revolved around the 
players. Players' wages, as shown in Table 2.4, took up most of a club's costs, 
approximately 50 per cent. 106 They were a club's main assets and players quickly 
began to realise their market place potential by selling their labour to the highest 
bidder. During the 1880s, a free market existed where some players were able to 
command a comparatively high weekly wage and move freely to other clubs. 
103 A department store, Broadbents, of middle-class Southport, had a turnover of £27,570 by 1901. 
lH. Porter, 'The Development of a Provincial Department Store 1870-1939', Business History, Vol. 
13,1 (1971), pp. 65-71. However, the business included more than one store. By 1910 there were 
between 150 and 200 department stores in Britain. One third of these were public companies with an 
aggregate turnover of £20 million. 
104Bentley, 'Is Football a Business?', p. 393. Today, this equates to £1.1 million. 
10SIt should be acknowledged that there appears to be a large discrepancy between the gate money 
Aston Villa received in 1905-06 (Table 2.4) to what it received in subsequent years (Table 2.2). 
Using the balance sheets of Aston Villa between 1878-79 and 1913-14 as an example, Appendices 1-
5 show however, the growing complexity of a football club's fmances during this period. 
106This proportion remained relatively steady up to the 1960s. 
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Sunderland, for example, allegedly paid a player £5 a week in 1889. 107 By 1893, it 
was claimed that the average weekly wage of professional footballers was £3 during 
the season and £2 in the summer. 108 Wages plus transfer fees continued to rise as the 
footballing competition intensified. In 1898, Everton bought Johnnie Holt from 
Rangers for £300 and paid him wages of £6 lOs per week all the year round. 109 Alf 
Common became the first player to be transferred for £ 1 000 when he moved from 
Sunderland to Middlesbrough in 1905.110 
In order to regulate football's labour market, the game's governing bodies 
introduced two highly restrictive acts of football legislation. Both had the aim of 
preventing the poaching of players between clubs as this had created undue 
competition. 1 1 1 From the late Victorian period, industrial labour markets had been 
increasingly bureaucratised and regulated, and during this period football became part 
of this trend. 112 At the same time, these measures had the effect of curtailing a 
player's freedom of movement and his earning capacity. First, the retain and transfer 
system was adopted as Rule 18 of the Football League's constitution in 1890. 113 
Under the transfer system, once a player registered with a Football League club he 
could be retained by that club for the entirety of his career unless the club decided 
when, or if, to transfer him. The length of the contract between club and player was 
for one year only with the club deciding whether or not to sign him on for the 
l07Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 61 n52. At 2000 prices this was £312. 
l08Mason, Association Football, p. 97 
109 Liverpool Review, 27 August 1898, p. 9 
llOAt 2000 prices it equates to £61,155. 
III Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 112 
112Savage and Miles, British Working Class, pp. 48-56 
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following year, and if a player was offered the maximum wage he could not ask for a 
transfer. I 14 Accordingly, the transfer of a player from one club to another was only 
possible through the purchase of a player's contract. A player, or the buying club, 
required the permission of the player's club for an approach to be made. liS 
Furthermore, clubs could place a transfer fee on a player who had not been offered a 
contract for the following season as they still retained his registration. 116 The second 
piece of legislation was the maximum wage which was Rule 32 of the FA's 
constitution and came into effect in 1901.117 Initially, a limit was imposed on players 
of £4 per week that also included bonuses. Similar to soldiers accepting the King's or 
Queen's Shilling when they enlisted in order to gain their loyalty, players were also 
entitled to a £ 1 0 signing-on fee when they joined a new club. 118 The purpose of the 
transfer system was to prevent the rich clubs from buying up the best talent because 
if a small club could afford to pay a player the maximum, there was little incentive 
for that player to move. In 1901 players were allowed benefit matches at the end of 
their career or after five years' continuous service that guaranteed them a certain 
II3Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 61 
114Mason, Association Football, p. 104. Relations between clubs and players were placed on a more 
formal basis with the introduction of contracts. Players were also required to register with both the 
Football League and the Football Association before being allowed to play competitively. From 
1912 it was technically the League rather than the club who owned players' registrations. Taylor, 
'Proud Preston', p. 169 
IISTischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 61 
116Mason, Association Football, p. 105. The Southern League, established in 1894, did not 
recognise the contracts of players from the Football League until 1909. They were then able to switch 
leagues without the fear of being penalised. Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 136 
I I 7ibid. , pp. 98-99 
118The £10 signing-on fee was set by the Football League in 1891 and the amount was not changed 
until 1958. S. Inglis, Soccer in the Dock (1985), p. 11 
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sum.
1l9 
Players later received extra benefits together with periodic rises in the level 
of the maximum wage. 
The imposition of a maximum wage however, did not prevent clubs from 
b h· . 120 B reac mg It. etween 1901 and 1911, the FA and the League investigated and 
punished at least seven clubs for fmancial irregularities. 121 The most notorious cases 
were Middlesbrough and Manchester City. After an inspection of Middlesbrough's 
books in 1905, the FA found the club guilty of making irregular payments to players. 
A £250 fine was imposed and eleven of the club's twelve directors were suspended 
for two years.122 Billy Meredith, Manchester City's star player, was to admit that 
the club had paid him £6 per week from 1902, and that when City won the FA Cup 
in 1904 he had received an extra £53 in bonuses. Later, in 1905, Meredith was found 
guilty by the footballing authorities of offering a bribe to an Aston Villa player and 
was suspended for one season. In May 1906, the FA launched a further investigation 
into the club's affairs when Meredith admitted his guilt on all charges, thus 
implicating the club. The FA reacted by fining seventeen past and present City 
players who were forbidden from playing for the club again. Two directors were also 
suspended and the manager, Tom Maley, was banned from football for life. 123 
The pressure to meet rising wage demands, either by fair means or foul, had 
caused professional clubs to look for other means of raising finance. One of the most 
119 Taylor, 'Proud Preston', Chapter 5 
120Initially, in 1901 clubs such as Aston Villa and Liverpool had attempted to rescind the rule but 
the maximum wage was increasingly accepted as a necessity. In 1908 an attempt by the FA Council 
to abolish it was defeated. Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 129 
121Inglis, Soccer, p. 10. The clubs were Queen's Park Rangers, Sunderland, Manchester City, 
Glossop, Coventry City, Manchester United and Middlesbrough. 
122 Appleton, Hotbed of Soccer, p. 90 
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popular methods was the adoption of limited liability status. During the 1890s a rash 
of clubs formed themselves into limited companies. The fact that football clubs were 
increasingly becoming financial concerns was shown by the Athletic News urging all 
clubs with an annual turnover of over £ 1000 to take advantage of the legislation. By 
converting themselves into limited liability companies, football clubs could sue and 
be sued, the individual responsibility of directors would also be limited, and a club's 
new status would reassure its creditors. 124 As a members' club, the committee could 
have been made responsible for a club's debts. Nearly all professional football clubs 
became private limited liability companies with Small Heath being the first in 
1888. 125 By 1912 the leading clubs were capitalised at over £2 million!26 Members 
of some clubs were resistant to change and did not want to cede their influence 
through incorporation. Aston Villa had earlier tried to register the club under the 
Friendly Societies Act but this was found to be impracticable. 127 At a special 
meeting in 1889 William McGregor submitted details of a scheme to convert Villa 
into a limited liability company but his motion was thwarted by 71 votes to 67. 128 
The club was eventually incorporated in 1896. 
Aston Villa's initial capital was £10,000 and was offered in the form of 2000 
£5 shares. The club used this money to fund the move to its new ground at the 
123Inglis, Soccer, pp. 12-18 
124Mason, Association Football, p. 37 
125 A. Fabian and G. Green (eds), Association Football, Vol. 3 (1960), p. 242. The last club to 
convert to limited liability status was Nottingham Forest in 1997. Up to then, the club's directors 
were elected from its 200 paid-up members. When Saturday Comes, June 2001, p. 17 
126Bentley, 'Is Football a Business?', p. 384. The equivalent of £117 million in 2000. 
127 Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 74, Birmingham Mail, 30 January 1889 
128Athletic News, 4 February 1889, p. 1 
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Aston Lower Grounds in 1897. 129 The decision to wind-up the old club and form a 
limited liability company had been deemed essential if the club was to move because 
it quickly generated enough capital to guarantee the project. From the 1890s 
onwards, football's popularity was expanding and clubs were looking to relocate to 
grounds with larger capacities that would then generate more income. To find a 
favourable location, one factor clubs had to take into consideration was the local 
transport network, and subsequently, many grounds were situated near to a railway 
station and tram lines to give supporters better access to grounds. Villa Park, for 
example, was serviced by stations at Witton and Aston. The first purpose-built 
football stadium was Goodison Park, the home of Everton. It was opened in August 
1892 and cost £3000. 130 Many clubs moved from ground to ground before finding a 
suitable long-term site: Sunderland moved from their ground at Newcastle Road 
before settling at Roker Park in 1898;131 and before moving to Old Trafford in 1910, 
Manchester United played at Bank Street, Clayton. The capacity at Old Trafford 
was projected to be 100,000.132 Some grounds in Scotland also had large capacities. 
Hampden Park, home of Queen's Park and the venue of Scotland's home games 
totalled nearly 120,000 in 1909, and the ground of Third Lanark could hold over 
133 110,000 spectators. 
129Morris, Aston Villa, p. 58. Villa's move to its new ground was almost a homecoming as it was 
situated adjacent to the park where the club ftrst played. It was not until 1911 that Villa actually 
owned the freehold of Villa Park. Until then, it had been leased to the club by Edgar Flowers of the 
brewery, Flowers and Sons. See Inglis, Villa Park, pp. 64-95 
130Young, Football on Merseyside, pp. 173-76. At 2000 prices this converts to £ 188,000. 
131 Sunderland Daily Echo, 10 Sept. 1898, p. 3 
132T. Tyrrell and D. Meek, The Hamlyn Illustrated History of Manchester United (1994), p. 110 
133 Vamplew, Pay Up, Table 6.4, p. 65 
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In 1914 Aston Villa had plans to increase Villa Park's capacity to 104,000. It 
was hoped to more than double the club's earning capacity from £1650 per match to 
£4000:34 Standing spectators formed the vast majority of the crowd and paid a 
minimum admission fee of 6d that had been set by the Football League in 1890. 135 
Only 11,000 seats were to be provided with the vast majority of spectators found on 
the uncovered terraces. The club had wanted to provide better covered facilities to 
cater for supporters who, via the expanding railway network, came from nearby 
Coventry, Worcester, Walsall, Kidderminster and different parts of the Black 
Country. These spectators were probably attracted by Villa's success and also by 
watching first division football. A local railway company had estimated that a Villa 
home game brought in approximately 1000 spectators from Coventry alone. 136 
Table 2.6: Finances of a Sample of Clubs, 1908-14 
Club Year Division Position Revenue Wages (£) Pre-tax 
(£) Profits (£) 
Bamsley 1910 2 9 10,320 2,792 4,943 
Bradford City 1914 1 9 10,680 6,985 -580 
Bradford Park A venue 1914 1 2 9,505 4,485 2,210 
Bristol City 1910 1 16 6,964 4,067 -78 
Bury 1908 7 8,669 4,135 1,095 
Derby County 1914 20 9,740 3,982 -2,043 
Manchester City 1909 1 19 12,038 6,098 -1,614 
Preston North End 1914 1 19 7,546 4,581 -1,697 
Sheffield United 1909 1 12 8,606 5,806 -1,912 
Sheffield Wednesday 1914 18 17,035 5,414 3,367 
Tottenham Hotspur 1914 1 17 20,551 5,906 5,087 
West Bromwich Albn. 1910 2 1 1 5,976 4,995 -1,381 
Source: Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, pp. 340-78 
134AVNR, 8 August 1914, pp. 668-69. Re-development of the ground took place but due to the First 
World War and other reasons the ground's capacity did not reach 104,000. See Inglis, Villa Park. 
135Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 133 
136 AVNR, 8 August 1914, pp. 668-69 
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To what extent were football clubs like 'normal' businesses, and did they 
seek to capitalise on the increase in revenue? As Table 2.6 illustrates, some clubs did 
make profits. Moreover, Everton made a profit in every year, between 1890 and 
1915, except 1907, and the club nearly always paid a dividend. 13? But others also 
made losses. Before entering receivership in 1902, Newton Heath had been kept 
solvent only by loans and had never paid a dividend. 138 A football club's commercial 
potential was in fact constrained by the Football Association. In order to maintain a 
degree of equality within the professional game between clubs, its constitution 
effectively restricted a club's capital base from which it could expand as a 
business. 139 Rule 45 of the Football Association dealt with football club companies. 
Initially, all affiliated clubs' articles of association had to contain certain measures. 140 
One of these, from 1896, limited the payment of dividends to shareholders to 5 per 
cent, rising to 7_ per cent after 1918.141 Furthermore, and importantly, directors 
could not be paid. 142 In effect, they were still, and continued to be up until the 
1980s, a part of the voluntary, amateur tradition. The main aim of football clubs was 
to win football matches. As a consequence, there is a strong school of thought that 
states that many clubs did not obey strict economic rules; and could be classified as 
13?T. Mason, 'The Blues and the Reds: A History of the Liverpool and Everton Football Clubs', 
History Society of Lancashire and Cheshire (1985), p. 7 
138Mason, Association Football, p. 46 
139 See Chapter 7 of this thesis for a wider discussion on the economics of English professional 
football. 
1400 . Keeton, The Football Revolution (Newton Abbot, 1972), p. 52 
141Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 86; Mason, Association Football, p. 56 n108. The maximum dividend on 
preference shares was also set at 7_ per cent, and a company was not allowed to issue more preference 
shares than subscribed shares. A company was unable to make a mortgage or charge upon its assets at 
a rate no higher than 7_ per cent and was also unable to borrow at a rate higher than 7_ per cent - not 
unless these measures received the FA Council's written consent. Keeton, Football Revolution, p. 
52, 55 
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'utility-maximisers' as opposed to 'profit-maximisers', willing to sacrifice profits for 
the sake of winning games and championships.143 Losses, at least before the 
introduction of the maximum wage in 1901, were probably the result of bad 
management as clubs paid more than they could afford. Profits on the other hand, 
were mostly ploughed back into the club for buying new players or investing in the 
ground. 
To what extent then were commercial considerations a motive for 
shareholders and directors to get involved in football? Shareholders in English 
football clubs before 1914 were predominantly drawn from the local population, the 
majority being middle-class, although the largest occupational group that held a stake 
in their clubs was skilled labour, consisting of 28.6 per cent. 144 To a certain extent, 
shareholders in football clubs reflected the local economy and its socio-occupational 
structure. When Middlesbrough Ironopolis was formed in 1889 its first chairman, 
James H. Boolds, was the manager of a local shipyard, Cleveland Dock. A large 
number of shareholders were rivetters and platers who probably worked at the 
shipyard. 145 Most working-class shareholders only held one or two shares, as their 
reason for purchasing them can be attributed to identification with their team. 146 In 
this respect, football was one of the few, if not the only industry that had working-
class shareholders. 
142Mason, Association Football, p. 162 
143 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 13 
144Mason, Association Football, p. 41; Vamplew, W., Pay Up, p. 159, Table 10.2, p. 160 
145Teesside Archives DIS 1489, The Middlesbrough Ironopolis Football Company Ltd., Register of 
Members, c. 1894; http://members.aol.com/ironopolis/mihistory.htm 
146Mason, Association Football, p. 38 
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Football club directorates however, mirrored shareholdings rather than the 
make-up of its shareholders. I47 The next highest group of shareholders, in socio-
occupational terms, were proprietors and employers with 26 per cent, including 6.9 
per cent associated with the drink trade, but in terms of shareholdings, they 
accounted for 46 per cent compared to 13.7 per cent for skilled labour. I48 Before 
1915 approximately 50 per cent of football club directors belonged to the proprietor 
and employer category, and the proportion of professionals and managers on club 
boards considerably exceeded that of skilled workers. 149 Tischler has shown how the 
make-up of Middlesbrough's directorate changed between 1892 from being 
predominately working-class to one during the 1901-1914 period that was dominated 
by industrialists and proprietors from the alcohol and tobacco trades. ISO 
Collins and Vamplew have argued that the drinks trade used football to 
market its product, and was an important stage in the commercialisation of sport. 
Players, past and present were given houses to increase custom, products were 
advertised at grounds and financial support was given to teams to boost awareness 
and sales of beer. lSI Manchester City, for example, was known as a 'brewers' club 
during the Edwardian period. Its chairman, John Chapman, owned half a dozen 
public houses and the club secretary, Joshua Parlby was a publican. The club's chief 
benefactor was Stephen Chester Thompson who was the managing director of 
Chester's Brewery. It was one of Manchester's biggest brewers and controlled many 
147 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 166 
148ibid., p. 160, Table 10.2 
149ibid., p. 168, Table 10.6 
ISOTischler, Footballers and Businessmen, pp. 75-76 
J(unnmg a rootbatt Club' 92 
pubs in the Ardwick and Gorton areas of the city. Furthermore, the club's 
headquarters was the Hyde Road Hotel in Ardwick.152 In 1899 however, 
Middlesbrough was in more need of the drinks trade than it was of the club as it had 
to raise the necessary capital to finance their entry into the Football League. The club 
decided to assign volunteers to various parts of the town to canvass tradesmen and 
licensed victuallers to buy the required 1000 £ 1 shares. Alf Mattison of the Zetland 
Hotel took up 20 shares which gained him a directorship. 153 
With an increasing proportion of businessmen and professional people 
becoming directors, it can be assumed their motives were different to working-class 
shareholders; but what were these? A survey of the literature on the subject reveals a 
great variety. Robert Lewis, in his study of the early development of football in 
Lancashire, has argued that 'football as a leisure industry although organised as a 
business to cater for a mass audience, seldom created any profits and can hardly be 
viewed as a normal commercial enterprise' .154 On the other hand, Tischler proffers 
the view that 'directorial participation in football was in most cases characterised by 
the implementation of many of the same income-producing methods outside of 
sports' .155 However, he is unable to substantiate his claim that, despite the limit of a 
151T. Collins and W. Vamplew, 'The Pub, The Drinks Trade and the Early Years of Modern 
Football', The Sports Historian, Vol. 20,1 (May 2000), pp. 1-17 
152J. Harding, Football Wizard: The Story of Billy Meredith (Derby, 1985), p. 29,34 
153Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 20, 27 February; 6, 13 March 1899. The club also lobbied some of 
the town's dignitaries for support, including Sir Joseph Pease, the local MP, and chairman of the 
North Eastern Railway Company. ibid. The number of shares that had been promised by March was 
850. ibid., 17 March 1899 
154R. Lewis, 'The Development of Football in Lancashire, c.1860-1914' (PhD Thesis, University of 
Lancaster, 1994), p. 14 
155Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 86 
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5 per cent dividend, directors were able to get round this and conceal extra income 
due to their familiarity with business techniques. 156 
One notable opportunist though, was John Houlding. As president of 
Everton, he was also landlord of their Anfield ground. In 1891 he increased the rent 
and following a complex dispute, the club's members were outraged enough to leave 
Anfield and make a new home for the club at Goodison Park in 1892. With a stadium 
and no team, Houlding decided instead to form his own football club, Liverpool. The 
outcome was that Houlding's Sandon Hotel next to Anfield was still frequented by 
football spectators for every home game and being chairman of the football club, 
complemented his position as a leading local Conservative. 157 
The formation of a small number of clubs also differed from those that had 
evolved from amateur roots, and showed that money could be made out of football. 
Sheffield United's formation, for example, also owed something to fmancial 
opportunism. They played at Bramall Lane, home of Sheffield United Cricket Club 
which was formed in 1854. In 1889 it had been decided to form a football section 
following the financial success of an FA Cup semi-final played there earlier that 
year. 158 The club had a share issue in 1899 the same year they won the FA Cup. The 
cost of an ordinary share however, was £20 and out of the fmancial reach of working 
people. 159 Chelsea, formed in 1905, was established by Henry Mears as a 
commercial concern. In 1896 he became owner of Stamford Bridge, the home of the 
London Athletic Club. Mears, a large contractor from South West London, 
156"b"d 70 
I I "' p" 
157Mason, Association Football, p. 38,45 
158Catton, Rise o/the Leaguers, pp. 114-115; Catton, Real Football, pp. 168-169 
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redeveloped it as a football ground using his own company. Mears owned the 
catering company that supplied the large crowds of Stamford Bridge between 1905 
and 1915. Mears was also the landlord and charged the football club an annual rental 
of £2000. 160 
In 1903 Bradford City was formed after originally being a rugby club, 
Manningham. The club's committee had decided that the association code was more 
profitable after the club's failings on the rugby field. Manningham had joined the 
Second Division of the Northern Union League in 1902 but it failed to obtain 
promotion despite spending heavily on players' wages, and, as a result, liabilities 
exceeded assets. A campaign was then started by some club members, the Football 
League, the Bradford FA and local schools to establish a first-class team in the local 
area that culminated in Bradford City'S formation. By 1906 the gate receipts of the 
new club were five times higher than in the last three seasons of rugby combined. 161 
Some directors therefore, did benefit from the game financially, from 
secondary profits and modest share dividends. Others used their position on the 
board to award them and their companies contracts to undertake the club's catering 
and to build new stands. But as Table 2.6 shows there was also money to be lost. 
Many directors also acted as guarantors. In 1900 Middlesbrough's directors had to 
place a personal security of £40 with the bank if the club was to receive an 
overdraft. 162 The chairman of Manchester United, the brewer, J.R. Davies, spent 
159Mason, Association Football, p. 38 
160R. Day, 'The Motivation of Some Football Club Directors: An Aspect of the Social History of 
Association Football 1890-1914' (MA Thesis, University of Warwick, 1976), pp. 69-80 
161 Arnold, Game, pp. 23-49 
162Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 23 April 1900 
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£20,000 on financing the club without receiving any reward. 163 In general, the reasons 
for becoming a football club director were multifarious but generally not of a profit-
orientated nature. Russell has introduced the notion that serving on a club board was 
akin to a civic duty and has argued that, 'profit-maximisation ... was not a major 
consideration for the football club directors of Victorian and Edwardian England' .164 
Mason has suggested that a professional football club can be looked upon as 'a 
family firm with both shares and directorships passed down [the] generations' rather 
h fi ki 1~ t an a pro It-rna ng concern. 
The analogy with family firms requires closer examination as the management 
of a football club shared similarities with small nineteenth century businesses. 166 A 
football club however, was a peculiar type of business. Former President of the 
Football League, 1.J. Bentley argued that for a club to be successful it had to work on 
business lines, and because of the large amounts of money involved business 
principles were required, but not commercialism. 167 In one sense, football 
management reflected the prevailing business culture of personal capitalism, despite 
the general absence of a profit-motive in football. In Chapter 1 it was shown how 
management in British industry was built on a practical tradition that largely 
eschewed the hiring of professional management, and although directors delegated 
some of their authority to others, there was still a close relationship between the 
163Bentley, 'Is Football a Business?', p. 389 
164 Russell, Football, pp. 42-44 
165Mason, Association Football, p. 49 
166There have been examples of families sitting on the boards of football clubs for generations such 
as the Ceams family at West Ham and at Chelsea, the Mears. 
167Bentley, Is Football a Business?', p. 393 
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control of a firm and its ownership.168 Football directors, many of whom were small 
businessmen, based their ideas of managing football clubs on their own social and 
business experiences. As a result, clubs were mainly run by directors who also 
wanted to enjoy the privileges of ownership, and regarded selecting the team as a 
perk of the job. Yet, they were also part of the voluntary tradition and spent much 
of their time working on behalf of the club travelling many miles up and down the 
country. Furthermore, they were unwilling to hand more responsibilities over to 
salaried officials. Directors regarded them as socially inferior and tainted by earning a 
wage, attitudes rooted in the cult of amateurism. 
There were notable differences however, between clubs and local firms that 
stemmed from the markets that they operated in. For their income, football clubs 
relied on supporters for whom 'the supreme appeal of football lay almost certainly 
in its expression of a sense of civic pride and identity', and this was very unlikely to 
change. 169 Clubs also represented a institution within a local community whereas the 
people who owned family firms were responsible only to themselves. Attempts to 
amalgamate Bradford City and Bradford Park Avenue in 1907, for example, failed as 
members were more interested in maintaining control over their club's direction and 
identity. 170 Directors of local firms also shared similar motivations with football club 
administrators. Jonathan Boswell has argued that from 1880 to 1939 informal social 
control was exercised over local businessmen in general, and this diverted firms from 
a simple pursuit of maximum short-term profit. Their motivations were instead 
168Wilson, Business History, p. 22 
169 Holt, Sport, p. 166 
170 Arnold, Game, p. 48 
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influenced by vanous socio-institutional factors such as ethical convictions, 
sentiments of patriotism and local pride, and ambitions for public approval and 
status. 171 These attitudes were compounded as many directors of football clubs came 
from the local business community. In his study of West Ham United, Charles Korr 
states that the directors' primafacie freedom was an illusion, '[t]he club had become 
almost a captive of the community in which it existed and which the directors 
purported to serve', and where one of their hallmarks was a belief in their role of 
public service to the club. l72 Moreover, football clubs were also part of the 
Victorian philanthropic tradition, and this continued into the twentieth century. 
During this period, '[ c ]haritable activity became a characteristic feature of propertied 
life: to be broadcast aloud, emblazoned in the press, and chiselled onto the side of 
public places and monuments' .173 Football League clubs made donations to a number 
of causes that cemented their standing in the local community. 174 
Despite converting to limited liability status, the management of many clubs 
continued to be rooted in the voluntary tradition. Many football club directors were 
former members of clubs whose main interest was in the welfare of that club. 
Initially, Aston Villa had been run by just one general committee. In 1887 this 
numbered nine plus the officers of the club, the President, vice-Presidents, treasurer 
1711. Boswell, 'The Infonnal Social Control of Business in Britain: 1880-1939', Business History 
Review, Vol. LVII, 2 (Summer 1983), pp. 237-57 
172 Korr, West Ham, p. 27,43 
173Walvin, Victorian Values, p. 96 
174Aston Villa, for example, in 1899 donated £100 to Binningham University's Endowment Fund. 
The fund's secretary was Joseph Chamberlain who wrote back to the club saying that 'the evidences 
which have been given that the cultivation of athletics does not destroy interest in intellectual 
pursuits'. Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 142, Birmingham Mail, 5 July 1899. Following the 1902 
Ibrox Disaster where 66 spectators died, Football League clubs raised £24,000. For pre-season 
friendlies, clubs distributed the proceeds amongst local charities and causes. Football also donated to 
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and the secretary.175 Efforts by William McGregor to rationalise the club's 
management structure had floundered on the resistance of other committee members 
who did not want their authority undermined. Eventually in 1893, there was a re-
structuring of the committee after it resigned en bloc. The running of the club had 
been criticised by members for its mis-management and it was alleged that this had 
affected the team's perfonnance. 176 When Villa did become a company in 1896 it 
was run by a five man board of directors. Despite the adoption of limited liability 
status, most clubs continued to be run by committees. As the business of football 
increased however, so did the work of committees. For the 1892-93 season, 
Wolverhampton Wanderers' board of directors numbered 12, with a players' and a 
finance committee. l77 Before embarking on their first season in the Football League, 
Middlesbrough had three committees: finance and emergency, players' and ground. 
The players' committee had five elected members, the other two committees had 
three while the chainnan and the vice-chainnan were appointed to all three as ex-
offico members. 178 For the following season the player's committee was reduced to 
three. 179 The workload and enthusiasm of the directors was reflected in their 
attendance at directors' meetings. In 1906-07 for example, Aston Villa's directors 
held 41 meetings. 180 When Middlesbrough decided to tum professional and join the 
national tragedies. For the Bolton Colliery Disaster Fund £1200 was raised and £700 went to the 
Titanic Fund. Bentley, Is Football a Business?', p. 390 
175 Birmingham Daily Gazette, 9 June 1887, p. 7 
176 Birmingham Daily Gazette, 25 February 1893, p. 5 
177 See Appendix 8 
178Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 27 June 1899 
179Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 19 April 1900 
180AVNR, 3 August 1907, p. 8. Fred Rinder attended all 41 meetings. Other directors and the 
number of meetings they attended were Howard Toney, 40; John Devey, 39; P.W.M. Bate, 36; and 
Councillor Jack Jones, 40. 
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Football League in 1899, the increase in financial responsibilities brought with it an 
escalation in management duties. The workload of the club's directors increased 
dramatically and during the summer before the new professional season began, 
meetings were held two or three times a week. 181 
Management however, differed from club to club. At Preston North End 
there was a reverse in style where William Sudell, once the dominant figure in the 
club, lost overall control when it became a limited liability company in 1893. North 
End had initially been run by a general committee but in 1886 the number of 
committee members was reduced from 12 to 4 with Sudell as chairman. 182 Sudell 
probably wanted the executive to be streamlined so that he could run the club the 
way he managed the cotton mill. And because of the success of the team, his sty Ie 
did not elicit any criticism from the members. 183 It is not inconceivable however, that 
vanity began to cloud his judgement because after the 1889 AGM there was not to 
be another one for four years. As the 1880s came to a close, the club was 
experiencing greater financial pressures, and suffered a steady decline in the 1890s. 
Between 1889 to 1893 it ran up a deficit of £752. This precipitated Sudell's request 
at the 1893 AGM that the club become a limited liability company.184 
The direction of clubs however, could still be heavily influenced by 
individuals. Football clubs like other firms, are 'organic institutions' in the way that 
they evolve. Roy Church has argued that the success or failure of a firm is dependent 
181Middlesbrough Fe Minutes, 1899, passim. 
182 Preston Herald, 24 March 1888, p. 5 
183Football Field, 23 January 1886, p. 4; Berry and Allman, One Hundred Years, p. 72 
184Football Field, 22 July 1893, p. 8. Its initial capital was 5000 £1 shares but by 1894 only 1947 
had been taken up. Lewis, 'Football in Lancashire', pp. 326-27 
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on the ability of individuals as 'owners, managers and individuals [have] the potential 
for affecting corporate structure and strategy in important, yet indeterminate 
ways' .185 Moreover, football clubs were, and continue to be, relatively small firms 
where the potential for an individual to influence its direction is much greater than in 
larger companies. Fred Rinder, for example, was the dominant personality on Aston 
Villa's executive for over 30 years. He was known for his austere manner and had a 
reputation for being brusque with people. Yet, he probably found being a football 
club director more interesting than his other line of work (see below). Football also 
represented a chance to climb and mix in higher social circles, including royalty.186 It 
perhaps had a touch of glamour as well as improving the perception of a director's 
own status. Together with his work for the Villa, Rinder also held senior positions 
on F A committees such as the International Selection Committee and was also on the 
Football League Management Committee. Only a few months before he died he had 
travelled 1000 miles in a week on football matters. 187 Like other football 
administrators such as Arthur Oakley at Wolverhampton Wanderers, Charles 
Sutcliffe from Burnley and John Bentley, but, admittedly, unlike most other 
directors, football became a way of life for Rinder, 'almost a surrogate profession in 
. If 188 ltse . 
It was noted earlier that some directors had had a long connection with their 
club from a time when members paid subscriptions. Rinder, for example, was elected 
185Church, 'Deconstructing Nuffield', p. 565 
186Football club directors usually met members of the Royal Family at the FA Cup Final. The 
opening of Villa Park's new Trinity Road Stand in January 1924 was also attended by the Duke of 
York, the future George VI. Inglis, Villa Park, pp. 116-17 
187 Birmingham Mail, 27 December 1938, p. 7, 'Obituary' 
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a member of Aston Villa in 1881. He became a member of its committee in 1893 and 
eventually chairman of the board in 1899.189 Rinder, who succeeded another long-
serving member, J.E. Margoschis, was a surveyor with Birmingham corporation. 
Coming from a non-conformist background, it was ironic that as a tee-totaller, he was 
a technical adviser to the Licensing Justices and in 1912 he was appointed surveyor 
of licensed premises. 190 Rinder gave the club free advice on the building of the 
grandstand at Perry Barr in 1887, and laid out the designs for Villa Park when the 
club moved there. 191 Unusually, Villa had two former players, John Devey and 
Howard Spencer, who sat on the board. Both had required special dispensation from 
the FA to become directors as professional players had previously been barred from 
serving on club executives. After finishing his playing career, Devey entered the 
cinematography industry with another former Villa player, Harry Hampton, forming 
the Winson Green Picture House Company.192 Spencer entered the coal trade and 
was managing director for a Birmingham coal and coke manufacturer. 193 
The make-up of many club boards reflected a unitary civic culture. William 
Sudell represented the traditions of both civic duty and pride within Preston that 
were well-established within the town during the Victorian and Edwardian periods. 
In Lancashire the scope of local government grew during the nineteenth century and 
councils became increasingly dominated by new industrial elites that replaced the 
188 Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 49 
189AVNR, 23 April 1913, pp. 545-547; 31 December 1938, pp. 221-222 
190ibid.,3 September 1910, p. 6; Birmingham Mail, 27 December 1938, p. 7, 'Obituary' 
191Inglis, Villa Park, p. 24 
192Mason, Association Football, p. 120 
193 Birmingham Gazette, 15 January 1940, p. 3, 'Obituary' 
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landed gentry ,194 Moreover, 'many among the industrial bourgeoisie were to hold 
firmly to a vision of themselves as the custodians of a unique industrial 
"1' , ,195 L h' CIvIIsatIon , ancas Ire towns also became pioneers of a kind of municipal 
socialism that involved local government controlling local gas and water supplies,I96 
In the late nineteenth century Preston was characterised by the active presence of a 
central urban elite, Whereas a suburban elite would have had no interest in the town, 
residents of Preston still relied on the town itself as a place of recreation and of day-
to-day living, This meant that powerful families showed an active concern for their 
neighbourhood,I97 By contrast, those in the urban middle ranks involved themselves 
at less prestigious levels of local government such as members of health boards and 
Poor Law administrators!98 In a sense, Sudell's role with Preston North End 
reflected one of these lesser lights as the football club grew in importance as a local 
social institution, As football's popularity increased however, so did his popularity, 
elevating Sudell to the status of local celebrity, 
Sudell had also joined his local Volunteer Force in 1874, rising to the rank of 
Major by 1895,199 The Volunteers had a reputation for primarily being an excuse for 
its members to enjoy social and recreational activities, and some regiments, most 
194J.K. Walton, Lancashire: A Social History, 1558-1939 (1987), p. 221. Although by the 1880s 
the influence of big business on Lancashire's borough councils began to wane. ibid., p. 231 
195Joyce, Work, Society, p. 1 
196Walton, Lancashire, pp. 228-29 
197M. Savage, The Dynamics of Working-Class Politics: The Labour Movement in Preston, 1880-
1940 (Cambridge, 1987), p. 103. Preston's urban elite resided in the old Georgian area of Preston 
that was based around Winckley Square and A venham. 
198Walton, Lancashire, p. 230 
199preston Herald, 24 March 1888, p. 5; H. Cunningham, The Volunteer Force (1975), p. 104; p. 
119. In 1881 he was a Lieutenant of the 522 strong 11th Lancashire Rifle Volunteers. By 1888 he 
was a captain of the 1 st Vol. Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. Preston Herald, 9 
November 1881, p. 5; 24 March 1888, p. 5 
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famously the Third Lanark Rifle Volunteers, had established football clubs. One of 
Liverpool's original directors John McKenna, also joined the Volunteers and became 
a Sergeant-Major in the South Lancashire Artillery Volunteers. In 1883 a rugby club, 
connected to the battery, was formed and McKenna acted as its chairman.2oo Frank 
Watt, later secretary at Newcastle United, had helped form a football club with the 
3rd Edinburgh Rifle Volunteers in 1874.201 Because of his connection with the 
football club, Sudell also held positions with other sporting institutions which 
included being vice-president of the Preston Bicycle Club and the Preston Swimming 
Club plus an array of cricket and football clubs.202 
Many directors were also involved in local public life as town councillors or 
magistrates. For example, two prominent Villa directors, James Lees and Jack Jones 
were members of local councils. Lees, a Conservative, was a member of Aston Urban 
District Council for three years.203 Some football club directors also tried to exploit 
their connections to gain election to public office. At Manchester City, John 
Chapman and John Allison attempted to become Conservative councillors by using 
the alleged support of the club's players?04 Another Manchester City director, 
Chester Thompson was a local politician. He was also agent for A.J. Balfour, the 
Conservative Prime Minister between 1902-05, whom Thompson persuaded to 
become patron of the club.2oS The most notorious connection between football and 
politics occurred in 1910 and concerned the Middlesbrough chairman, Lieutenant-
200 Liverpool Daily Post, 23 March 1936, p. 5 
201Catton Folders V-W, p.1897, Athletic News 28 November 1927 
202 Preston Herald, 24 March 1888, p. 5 
203 Birmingham Daily Post, 16 December 1905, p. 10, 'Obituary' 
204Harding, Football Wizard, p. 94. Meredith himself was a Liberal supporter. 
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Colonel T. Gibson Poole. He was found guilty of offering a bribe to Sunderland 
before a game because he felt if Middlesbrough won that particular game it would be 
crucial to his chances of becoming the Conservative and Unionist MP for the town. 
Middlesbrough won the game but the Liberals won the election. Poole was later 
banned from football for life.206 
By 1914 therefore, professional football had emerged as a form of mass 
entertainment. Football entrepreneurs had exploited widespread socio-economic 
changes, although football was unlike conventional industries. Not only did clubs set 
out to defeat each other but part of the game's popularity relied on a contest 
between equally-matched teams. By 1914 football clubs were still small 
organisations despite the game's increasing commercialisation and competitiveness, 
and this was reflected by how clubs were run and by whom. Football clubs came to 
be regarded as local social institutions and as such they were to be managed for the 
benefit of the local community. Directors were part of the British voluntary tradition 
and regarded their positions as one of the perks of civic life. The management of a 
club was reflected by the professional, commercial and social experience of its 
directors. In general, they preferred to manage the club themselves rather than 
delegate. Club bureaucracies usually consisted of a secretary and perhaps an assistant 
who handled the day-to-day running of the club. Secretaries however, generally had 
minimal influence and were subservient to the directors' whims. The next chapter 
will examine football management in more detail during this period, including the 
205 'b'd 29 I I ., p. 
206 Appleton, Hotbed of Soccer, pp. 95-97 
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developments that took place, how they took root in the game's management culture, 
and, in particular, the emergence of early football managers. 
The PlOneers~~-
CHAPTER 3 
THE PIONEERS, 1880-1914 
Uncom?'l0n qualities are '" distinctly needful in the average secretary to the modem 
professional football team. He must be a strategist like Von Moltke, and he must 
be a practised logician, to prove to his victim how paltry are the silken fetters of 
domesticity compared to that self-advancement which it is the chief aim and object 
of every proper man to seek, and especially a young Scotchman. 
Edwardes, , New Football Mania', p. 627 
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Whereas the previous chapter considered the more general aspects of running a 
football club, this chapter will examine more closely the process of football 
management. In particular, it will focus on the relationship between directors and the 
game's emerging managers, and how it reflected those in business and in society as a 
whole. Football managers mirrored the increasing role of intermediaries within British 
industry during the late nineteenth century, mainly due to developments in the 
organisation of authority within industrial enterprises. In essence, industry's 
problem had been how to control the human element, its workforce, and as a result, 
certain forms of 'delegated authority' emerged during this period. l Changes in 
workplace relations were reflected by late Victorian England society. This period had 
witnessed growing class conflict and class prejudice as an increase in living standards 
created greater competition for status between the divided middle-classes. One 
hallmark of the middle-class was that at every level there was segregation both within 
occupations and pastimes. The lower middle classes consequently sought to remove 
themselves from the working-class in terms of income, status, geography, education 
and physical appearance, in order to aspire to a higher social standing. 2 
lR. Coopey, 'Supervision and Industrial Change: The Engineering Industry in Britain 1900-1950' 
(MA Thesis, University of Warwick, 1985), p. 1 
2perkin, Professional Society, p. 78, 94, 100 
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Football club directors also regarded professional, working-class players as 
their social inferiors, and became increasingly reluctant to deal directly with them on 
a day-to-day basis. Instead, it became preferable for an intermediary to be used in 
this capacity and this role was usually split between the trainer and club secretary. 3 
Relationships within the workplace changed gradually during the nineteenth century. 
In 1875 the Employers and Workmen Act began the slow process of changing the 
law of Master and Servants to that of employers and workmen.4 In theory, future 
contractual relationships were now based on the market place where the employer 
paid the workman according to the worth of his labour. Previously, status was the 
basis of workplace relations in the form of the master's authority and servants' 
subordination but this was now replaced by a free and equal contractual agreement. 5 
The historical process of these changes however, was much more complex and 
uneven as the language and notion of master and servants pervaded workplace culture 
well into the twentieth century. 6 
3 S. Wagg, 'Organising Victory? A Social History of the Football Manager', in J. King and 1. Kelly 
(Des), The Cult of the Manager (1997), p. 22 
4Master and Servant statutes, designed to regulate contracts between employers and workers, had 
dated back to the 14th century, denying the labourer the right to withhold his service or to bargain 
his wages. The 1823 Masters and Servant Act had made it a criminal offence for a worker to break his 
contract, and was punishable by a fine or a maximum sentence of three months hard labour. Any 
breach by an employer however, was deemed only a civil offence. 
\V. Orth, Combination and Conspiracy: A Legal History of Trade Unionism, 1721-1906 (Oxford, 
1991), pp. 144-45; D.C. Woods, 'The Operation of the Master and Servants Act in the Black 
Country, 1858-1875', Midland History, Vol. 7 (1982), p. 93; K. Foster, 'From Status to Contract: 
Legal Form and Work Relations, 1750-1850', Warwick Law Working Papers, Vol. 3,1 (May 1979), 
p. 8 
6Changes in workplace relationships during this period can be placed in the wider debate over the 
idea of free labour and the extent of people's freedom to sell it. Robert Steinfeld, for example, has 
suggested that the notion of free labour was invented in the USA during the nineteenth-century. 
Stanley Engerman however, has argued that employers have, from the days of slavery, believed that 
labour can never be given freely, and that it has to be coerced in some form or another. RJ. 
Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labour: The Employment Relation in English and American Law 
and Culture 1350-1870 (1991); S.L. Engerman (ed.) Terms of Labour: Slavery, Serfdom and 
Freedom Labour (Stanford, California, 1999) 
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Intermediaries and their role therefore, were subject to the prevailing social 
and cultural environment. One such development was foreman supervision. From the 
late nineteenth century, for example, the foreman began to take over many of the 
functions once held by sub-contractors, occupying an important position between 
capital and labour, particularly in the staple industries.7 He controlled production 
functions as well as being responsible for labour management, making him a master of 
the shopfloor.8 His responsibilities often included the planning of production, the 
hiring and firing of workers, allocation of work, labour discipline and the fixing of 
wages.9 Such was the importance of some shipyard foremen that ships were named 
after them. 
The manufacturing sector also employed intermediaries. At George Kynoch's 
munitions factory in Witton, for example, a form of internal contract operated that 
allowed foremen to hire their own labour. lO In Preston's weaving industry 
overlookers held similar responsibilities. Employers relied on them to police the 
labour market due to the problem of retaining mobile, skilled, low paid workers. 
Overlookers were usually male weavers in their late twenties when they were 
promoted by their employers. To achieve promotion from the low-paid weaving 
sector they spent time involving themselves in church or chapel activities that 
brought them to the attention of their employers. A Preston Overlookers Union had 
been formed in 1875 that both reflected and encouraged notions of craft autonomy. 
7Garside and Gospel, 'Employers and Managers', p. 102; J. Melling, "Non-commissioned Officer': 
British employers and their supervisory workers, 1880-1920', Social History, Vol. 5, 2 (May 1980), 
p. 191 
8 Joyce, 'Work', pp. 157-8 
9Garside and Gospel, 'Employers and Managers' p. 102, 
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By 1900 it had successfully campaigned to replace the employer's hold over 
promotion with a structured career path for overlookers determined through their 
own self-regulation. II 
After 1918 the role and status of the foreman began to wane. The impact of 
an intense period of technological change had increased the necessity for 
mechanisation plus turbulent trade union activity leading up to and beyond the First 
World War, such as the emergence of shop stewards, had had a deleterious effect on 
the foreman's powers.12 Moreover, as the operations of some firms increased, 
specialist personnel departments were established for such functions as selection and 
dismissal, further reducing the foreman's independent initiative. 13 
Managers, who were employed in industry, worked according to the 
traditions of their firm rather than to the rules of any association or profession. 
Between the years 1860 and 1900 many traditional professions had established new 
protective organisations, and there was also a concomitant rise in educational and 
training initiatives. In 1880 the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and 
Wales had been established with a set of rules for admission that included 
compulsory examinations and a code of conduct. 14 Many firms employed managers 
as they saw fit rather than as a professional who had acquired qualifications. 
Managers generally had their autonomy restricted and were given little training and 
IODictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 3., p. 631 
I I Savage and Miles, Working-Class, pp. 79-82 
12C 'S .., 8 oopey, upervlslOn, p. 
13Coopey, 'Supervision'., p. 9; Garside and Gospel, 'Employers and Managers', p. 102 
14T. Gourvish, 'The Rise of the Professions', in T. Gourvish and A. Q'Day (eds.), Later Victorian 
Britain, 1867-1900 (1988) pp. 31-2 
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this was one reason that prevented them from establishing themselves as a 
profession. 
Despite these general constraints, there were still some innovative, 
professional managers from the nineteenth century who were able to improvise 
within their industry. 15 In Chapter 1 it was demonstrated how the railways had led 
the way during the nineteenth century. One such innovator had been Captain Mark 
Huish, general manager of the London and North Western Railway from 1846 to 
1858. There had been a rapid growth in the size and scope of certain railways in the 
1840s due to the speculative 'mania' in 1845-46 that created innate difficulties for 
large-scale operations. Huish, in addition to using his military experience in handling 
men, prepared the railways for modem management by emphasising a more scientific 
approach, particularly through the use of accounting methods and statistical 
I . 16 ana YSIS. 
Another example illustrates not only developments within management but 
also differences in approach between American managers and their British 
counterparts. James C. Stewart was an American who, early in the twentieth 
century, worked as a supervising engineer and general manager on a number of large 
construction undertakings in Britain that had been financed by American capital. 
Stewart, for example, implemented time-and-motion studies to improve the output 
of bricklayers. He also used a more 'hands-on' style of management that compared 
15Wilson, Business History, p. 22, 27 
16T. Gourvish, 'Captain Mark Huish: A Pioneer in the Development of Railway Management', 
Business History, 12, 1 (1970), pp. 46-53 
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favourably with British contractors and architects who were criticised for being too 
aloof and too reliant on their foremen. An article in World's Work asked , 
Is it not again the old trouble that labour is a disgrace to a gentleman in England, 
whereas it is an honour in America? Or, to go further still, is there not a crying 
need in British construction generally for a strenuous middle man, a manager, 
between the architect and the labourer, to see that the one properly and promptly 
carries out the plans ofthe other?17 
The actual term, managers, has been used very generally to describe those 
responsible for the running of an organisation or operation. In football, manager, and 
its function, have held a number of different meanings. It is difficult therefore, to 
define what or who constituted a football manager up to 1914. Early references to 
football management were usually in the context of the financial affairs of a club, and 
managers were regarded as committee members or directors. Former Football League 
President, John 1. Bentley commented that, '[i]n the early eighties ... club managers 
realised the fact that it was necessary to have a "star'" .18 Football managers were 
still associated with a club's finances later in this period. In 1906, for example, Aston 
Villa's programme reported that, '[fJootball managers have found it exceedingly 
difficult to persuade any player of average merit that he is not worth the maximum of 
£4 per week ... ' .19 Yet the other side of football management concerned a club's most 
valuable assets, its players, and clubs began to realise that they needed some form of 
supervision. On away trips, Bentley remarked that, '[t]he manager takes full charge 
of him from leaving home until he returns ... That is part of the business of 
17Anon., 'A Yankee Boss in England', World's Work, Vol. 1, 1 (December 1902), pp. 53-57 
18Bentley, 'Is Football a Business?', p. 383 
19 A VNR, 1 September 1906, p. 5 
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football' .20 Like many clubs, the directors of Aston Villa and Middlesbrough carried 
out this task, and perhaps they were the managers. 
Moreover, many of football's paid officials carried the title of secretary or 
secretary-manager. However, perhaps it can be claimed that George Ramsey, 
generally regarded as a secretary of Aston Villa, was football's first manager. In 1886 
the club placed an advertisement in the Birmingham Daily Gazette, 
WANTED, MANAGER FOR ASTON VILLA FOOTBALL CLUB who will be 
required to devote his whole time under direction of Committee. Salary £ 1 00 per 
annum. Applications with reference must be made not later than June 23 to 
Chairman of Committee, Aston Villa Club House, 6 Witton Road, Aston. 
Canvassing members disqualifie/1 
Any definition of the early football manager is difficult therefore, as titles did not 
necessarily fit the job, and they became interchangeable. It also illustrates how the 
job of football management had changed. Tom Watson, for example, on his will, was 
given the title of secretary.22 One of his memorialists remarked however, that, 'Tom 
Watson had been given many titles and in his football wares was the title of 
secretary. This was not strictly correct. Tom was a manager pure and simple'. 23 
Furthermore, Jimmy Catton claimed that Watson had been asked by the Sunderland 
committee to become its manager?4 Because someone did not carry the title of 
football manager it did not disqualify them from carrying out management functions, 
and on the other hand someone who held the title of manager perhaps might have had 
20Bentley, 'Is Football a Business?', p. 393 
21Birmingham Daily Gazette, 21 June 1886, p. 2 Ramsey was chosen from 155 applications. 
Athletic News, 29 June 1886 
22 A survey of other managers in an index of wills from Watson's period failed to reveal anyone else's 
occupation. 
23 Liverpool Football Echo, 15 May 1915, p. 3 
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fewer responsibilities than some secretaries. It will be argued then that the early 
football manager and his role needs to be placed in a wider context and that the job 
developed in a piece-meal fashion that differed from club to club. There was no set 
job description for a football manager and any managerial powers were, and 
continued to be, limited by the management culture of the club that employed them. 
Table 3.1: Sample of Occupations of North East Football Club Secretaries, 1881-1891 
Occupational Category No. 
Higher Professions 3 
Lower Professions 2 
Employers and Proprietors 2 
Administrators and Managers 3 
Clerical Workers 9 
Foremen, Supervisors, Inspectors 0 
Skilled Manual Workers 7 
Semi-skilled Manual Workers 3 
Unskilled Manual Workers 4 
Based on occupational categories in G. Routh, Occupation and Pay in Great Britain 1906-60 (1965), 
pp. 155-57 
Sources: Newcastle Daily Journal, 22 August 1885, p. 4,23 September 1886, p. 3; Ward's 
Directory o/Newcastle (1883-88); Bulmer, History and Directory ofNewcastle-upon-Tyne (1887); 
25 Censuses 1881 and 1891 
Who were football's early managerial figures and what was their background? 
Clubs were initially looking for someone who had experience of being involved in 
football, and as a result, secretaries and managers came from diverse backgrounds. It 
was only after the first generation of footballers had retired that there was a more 
recognised path into management. The results of a small survey of secretaries of 
amateur clubs in the North East during the 1880s is shown in Table 3.1. It reveals a 
relatively even mix in terms of occupational categories, although unsurprisingly 
perhaps, clerks, with their organisational and administrative skills, formed the largest 
24 
Catton, Real Football, p. 178 
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group with skilled workers next (see Chapter 2). Three of the four secretaries from 
the category of unskilled workers were miners, reflecting the importance of the 
industry in the local economy. Ironically, workplace intermediaries such as foremen 
who undertook managerial functions did not figure in the survey. Most secretaries 
also shared similar backgrounds and occupations with their fathers (see below). 
Men who emerged as managerial figures in the professional game before the 
First World War had shared similar backgrounds to those in the North East. 
Experience of clerical work was an important qualification however. For example, 
John Nicholson, Sheffield United's secretary-manager from 1899 to 1932, originally 
worked as a clerk in the local deputy coroner's office, and Sam Allen who held a 
similar position with Swindon Town between 1902 and 1933, had been a clerical 
worker at the local Great Western Railway works.26 Another pre-1914 manager, Sam 
Hollis, had worked in a probate office and also the Post Office?7 A number of 
managers and secretaries were qualified as accountants. In Chapter 1 we saw how 
accountancy was one of the few professions that offered some management training. 
Derby's secretary-manager from 1900 to 1906, Harry Newbould, was actually a 
qualified accountant. 28 Similarly, Spurs's secretary from 1906 to his death in 1949, 
Arthur Turner, was an accountant who had a wide range of tax and rating law 
expertise?9 Glasgow Celtic's long-serving manager, Willie Maley, initially trained to 
be a chartered accountant with a city firm but continued to playas a professional 
25The sample was taken from two years, 1885 in which there were 43 clubs and also 1886 which had 
50. 
26D. Turner and A. White, The Breedon Book o/Football Managers (Derby, 1993), p. 74,198-99 
27 ibid., p. 153 
28 ibid., p. 198 
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with Celtic, and later abandoned accountancy to work full-time at the club.3o Before 
taking up his duties with Wolverhampton Wanderers, Jack Addenbroke was a 
teacher in a local school, and later became a tobacconist.31 Frank Brettell, manager of 
Portsmouth, Plymouth and Tottenham Hotspur, relinquished his position as a 
schoolmaster when he was appointed secretary of Bolton Wanderers in 1896.32 Will 
Settle belonged to the merchant class, selling coal. He had first been a director of 
Bolton Wanderers but became their manager in 1910 for five years.33 
Tom Watson came from a working-class background. He was born on 8 April 
1859 in the Byker district of Newcastle-upon-Tyne.34 His father, Ralph, was an iron 
moulder and before taking up a permanent position with Sunderland in 1888, Tom 
had followed him into the trade?5 Unlike Watson, John Cameron was a professional 
footballer. He was one of the first, if not the first, professional player to combine 
playing with the duties of club management when he became the player-secretary-
manager of Tottenham Hotspur in 1899. Cameron had initially joined just as a player 
in the autumn of 1898?6 A Scottish international, Cameron came to Everton from 
Queens Park of Glasgow in September 1895. Initially, he was an amateur and worked 
for the shipping firm Cunard but it was said that his amateur status caused friction 
29J. Holland, Spurs: A History o/Tottenham Hotspur Football Club (1956), p. 70 
30T. Campbell and P. Woods, The Glory and the Dream: The History o/Celtic FC 1887-1987 
(1987), p. 54 
3 1 Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 73. Included in Wolves's fixture list for 1892-93 was an 
advertisement that states that Addenbroke was a 'Wholesale and Retail Tobacconist' at 7 High Street, 
Wolverhampton. Source: Wolverhampton Wanderers FC. 
32Liverpool Review, 1 August 1896, p. 12; Young, Bolton Wanderers, p. 68. He had been a founder 
member of Everton then the club's assistant secretary and secretary. 
33 
Young, Bolton Wanderers, p. 69 
34Certified Copy of an Entry of Birth, CK 762194, 20.4.98 
35 1881 Census; Ward's Directory o/Newcastle, 1887-8. Dr Neal Garnham of Sunderland University 
has claimed that Watson was actually a money lender but I have been unable to verify this. 
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amongst Everton's professionals. They thought that being an amateur gave him some 
social advantage over them and his team mates refused to pass to him. This, 
apparently, forced him to turn professional.37 
What other qualities did clubs look for in their managers apart from their 
knowledge of running a football club? It has already been mentioned that one of the 
major themes of this thesis is that in football management, like industry, training and 
knowledge has been acquired on-the-job. In Chapter 1 however, it was stated that the 
education received by managers is one indicator that can be used to gauge their 
quality. What education did managers undergo therefore, and how did it effect the 
quality of football management? Education sharply reflected Victorian class society 
as for the bulk of the population it was a means to consolidate the rank, the sex role 
and social position of those receiving it.38 In terms of basic education however, all 
managers were probably literate as total literacy had been achieved in Britain by 
1913. A mass market for the printed word had also developed as the general 
population now had the time and money to spend and read newspapers and 
novels.39 Behind this phenomenon had been a gradual extension of compulsory 
education. In 1870 the Forster Education Act created local School Boards dedicated 
to running elementary schools. Attendance was initially optional but in 1880 it was 
made compulsory for all 5-10 year olds. In 1894 the school leaving age was raised to 
36p. Soar, Tottenham Hotspur 1882-1997: The Official Illustrated History (1997), p. 24 
37 Catton Folders, B-C, p. 218. It is possible however, that other factors may have forced the change, 
for example, being made redundant at Cunard. CB. Fry's Magazine, Vol. 2 (8), November 1904, p. 
180 
38Walvin, Victorian Values, pp. 86-87 
39Sanderson, Education, p. 3; Walvin, Victorian Values, p. 83 
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11, and to 12 in 1899. The Fisher Act of 1918 raised it to 14 across the board. 40 The 
substance of a child's education at an inner-city board school however, was largely 
based on that of the public schools. Teachers and pupils by 1900 were subject to a 
system of learning, a syllabus and to ideals, inherited from elitist institutions.41 
Nevertheless, the improvements in literacy rates and elementary education 
had important social and economic consequences. Literacy, acquired through 
schooling, could enhance job prospects and performance, and have direct relevance to 
tasks such as keeping accounts, reading and writing instructions. It also promoted an 
orderly mind, inculcated social discipline and facilitated urban living with its signs, 
advertisements for jobs and housing, not to mention enabling intelligent engagement 
in leisure activities. Literacy also became linked to earnings as Lady Florence Bell 
discovered when investigating her husband's iron works in Middlesbrough during the 
early 1900s. Linked with the prospect for greater earnings for the literate was an 
increased probability of upward social mobility which suggested that literacy was 
increasingly valued injob requirements.42 
In terms of secondary education however, working-class children were not so 
well catered for. At first, an ad hoc system of higher grade schools existed that gave 
children some post-elementary work. Not until the early twentieth century were 
more, if hardly equal, opportunities created for working-class pupils. Under the 1902 
Education Act higher grade schools were abolished and grammar schools were created 
40Sanderson, Education, pp. 3-4. Until 1891 however, and if they did not receive some form of 
charity, parents had to pay weekly schools fees, ranging from Id. to 4d. per week, and many refused 
to send their children to school for fmancial reasons. Thompson, Respectable Society, p. 136 
4lWalvin, Victorian Values, p. 88 
42Sanderson, Education, pp. 7-8. Reference to Lady F. Bell, At the Works (1907) 
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by new Local Education Authorities. Children from elementary schools could win a 
scholarship if they passed an examination at 11. Later, LEA scholarships were 
extended to the universities. In one sense, the system was more fluid as the number 
of sons of skilled artisans and unskilled workers who made up grammar school 
pupils increased from 9 per cent in 1897 to 20.6 per cent by 1913. On the other 
however, it perpetuated Edwardian England's highly stratified social structure as 
working-class pupils were denied the opportunities given to their middle-class 
counterparts. Furthermore, grammar schools reflected the liberal education and values 
of a public school and Oxbridge education. At the expense of more relevant and 
modem scientific subjects, a classical education was promoted in which Latin had to 
be studied. It was felt that this type of education was a gateway for working-class 
scholarship pupils to enter university, including Oxbridge.43 
It is reasonable to assume that the general educational levels of football 
managers, even up to 1939, were relatively poor, reflecting the experience of the 
majority of working-class men who did not receive a secondary education. In terms 
of education, it could be argued that levels even decreased once players started to 
become managers compared to the early pioneers. Some prominent managers 
however, did receive a more superior education than their contemporaries and this 
was perhaps reflected in the stature of the clubs they managed. At the top end of the 
educational scale, William Sudell received a private education at a Cheshire boarding 
school where he was probably given a classical liberal education in the public school 
43 ibid., pp. 9-13 
'_ 5' 119 
d·· 44 E M tra ItlOn. rnest angnall was a pupil at Bolton Grammar School. He became 
secretary-manager of Manchester United in 1903, and later managed Manchester 
City.45 On his appointment as Tottenham's new secretary, it was noted that John 
Cameron 'has splendid business experience and his educational credentials are far in 
advance of most of the other candidates' .46 Tom Watson, born in 1859, may have 
been too late to benefit from the 1870 Education Act but he did attend schoo1.47 His 
father, a skilled worker, was probably part of the independent educational tradition 
that sent its children to church, chapel or voluntary schools. Within respectable 
working-class households, learning was sought as a means of advancement and the 
schooling of their children was seen as normal before it became compulsory.48 After 
attending a local school, Tom attended a school in York where, in 1873 aged 14, he 
first played football. 49 
How did the role of the nascent football manager and his relationship with 
directors evolve during this period, and to what extent was it affected by the game's 
commercialisation? It would perhaps be beneficial to look at management relations 
within other sports first, and how these were influenced by commercialism. 
American baseball, for example, provides not only a contrast in management sty Ie 
but also national business cultures. Baseball in America became a professional sport 
earlier than football and, unlike English football, American Major League Baseball 
44 Preston Herald, 24 March 1888, p. 5 
45Tumer and White, Football Managers, p. 186. When he was at United, the club won the Football 
League in 1908 and 1911 and the FA Cup in 1909. 
46 Tottenham Herald, 24 October 1899, p. 3 
47 1871 Census. Watson's occupation is listed as 'Scholar'. 
48Thompson, Respectable Society, p. 137; Walvin, Victorian Values, p. 86 
49AthleticNews, 10 May 1915 
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clubs had few commercial restrictions placed upon them as the game was organised 
for profit from the outset. Dividends in baseball could reach 75 per cent whereas in 
England the maximum was 7 _ per cent. As early as the 1860s, teams from large cities 
had been funded by joint-stock companies and groups of wealthy capitalists. 50 
The first all-professional baseball team was the Cincinnati Red Stockings. 
Formed in 1869, Harry Wright was appointed manager to conduct its business affairs 
and in the process became baseball's first modem manager. 51 The first part of his job 
entailed dealing with the club's business affairs, particularly the organisation of 
tours. He also had to ensure that the club made a profit. It was the management of 
the team however, that brought Wright most recognition. During the 1860s and 
1870s a team captain acted as the team manager, with responsibility for making 
tactical decisions on the field of play. The manager of the club was its business 
manager, similar to a football club's secretary, who handled the day-to-day business. 
Wright was the first club official to take the management of the team upon himself, 
acting as manager on and off the field. He directed and supervised practices, decided 
who played where and when, maintained morale and kept an eye on the players' 
eating, drinking and sleeping habits. Wright, given the authority of the club's 
directors, established the principle of a manager's authority over the players in every 
52 
aspect of the game. 
501. Tyrell, 'Money and Morality: The Professionalisation of American Baseball' in R. Cashman and 
M. McKernan, (eds.), Sport: Media, Morality and the Media (Kensington, NSW, 1981), p. 89; W. 
Goldstein, Playingfor Keeps: A History of Early Baseball (1989), p. 11 
51H. Seymour, Baseball: The Early Years (Oxford, 1960), p. 71; Goldstein, Playingfor Keeps, p. 
11. Wright was actually born in Sheffield in 1835 and like his father, Sam, was engaged in America 
as a professional cricketer. In 1867 he switched to baseball, a decision, which, Goldstein argues, had 
far-reaching consequences for the future of both sports in America. ibid. 
52Goldstein, Playing for Keeps, pp. 112-13 
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Scottish football provides a different, if not a straightforward, contrast as 
there were no restrictions on the dividends paid to Scottish clubs. Celtic, for 
example, paid up to 25 per cent.53 Between 1888 to 1940, Willie Maley was Celtic's 
secretary and then manager. In 1896-97 the club became a limited liability company 
but was run like a family firm. Maley was appointed secretary-manager in 1897 and 
built a reputation as a martinet but he was never fully responsible for selecting the 
team during his entire career. Some of the directors had been former players and they 
even dispensed practical advice at training sessions. 54 British football clubs however, 
were generally non-profit making organisations. Commercialisation was not as 
advanced as in America and directors, like those at Celtic, maintained a tighter grip on 
the club's management and were unwilling to relinquish much control. 
Changes in the management of English football clubs and the relationship 
between managers and directors were gradual and uneven. Football clubs were small 
companies with small bureaucracies and so a club's management culture was partly 
shaped by the personality of individual directors. The process of football 
management however, was also partly framed by commercial pressures (see Chapter 
2) and as these increased so did the demands on the time of directors who were 
unpaid and had their own professions or businesses to run. More time therefore, had 
to be devoted to the administration of business on a day-to-day basis and this was 
increasingly left in the hands of the secretary, and later secretary-managers. 55 This 
process was evident by the 1890s as clubs began to gradually outgrow their amateur 
53 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 86 
54Campbell and Woods, Glory, p. 53,67; B. Murray, The Old Firm: Sectarianism, Sport and 
Society in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1984), pp. 207-11 
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roots, accompanied by the steep rise in football's popularity. George Ramsay had 
been appointed secretary of Aston Villa as early as 1886. Following their conversion 
back to the professional game in 1899, Middlesbrough's directors found that they 
could not handle the increased workload. For the next season they decided to appoint 
a paid secretary, and John Robson was upgraded from his honorary position to 
secretary-manager.56 Some clubs elected a match secretary plus a financial secretary 
to cope with the increased responsibilities. A match secretary's duties included the 
fixing and organising of games. Before, and during the early years of the Football 
League, secretaries advertised for games when there was a blank in the fixture list. 
Applications for match tickets and general ticketing arrangements were also dealt 
with by the secretary. All club correspondence was the secretary's responsibility, 
bringing this to the attention of the committee at their meetings, at which he would 
also take the minutes. George Ramsay also informed the players by telegram whether 
they were playing or not and about the forthcoming travel arrangements for an away 
game. 57 Some club officials, including secretaries, later became responsible for the 
recruitment of players. This required travelling to games to watch certain players, 
usually accompanied by a committee member or director. Some clubs even vested 
powers in their players. At Newcastle United in the early 1900s, following a series 
of poor results, the chairman, James Telford asked the club captain, Colin Veitch and 
two other players, Andy Aitken and Jack Carr, to pick the team, overlooking the 
55Mason, Association Football, p. 34 
56Middlesbrough Fe Minutes, 3 May 1900. Robson had initially been appointed assistant secretary 
at Middlesbrough to J. Borrie in 1893. ibid., 28 August 1893 
57p . Morris, Aston Villa: The First 100 Years, (Birmingham, 1974), p. 8 
J~ J'imleefJ ... 123 
club's secretary, Frank Watt. 58 In 1903 the newly formed Bradford City's board of 
directors consisted entirely of former members of Manningham rugby club. They 
realised they lacked any substantial knowledge of soccer, and allowed the players to 
elect their own captain. 59 
John Cameron was appointed secretary .. manager of Tottenham Hotspur in 
1899 because he was a football specialist. He was not a specialist in the true sense of 
the word but someone who had the experience and knowledge of playing at the 
highest level. 60 His appointment was at a time when the financial risks within 
football were becoming greater. Professional football had come late to London but its 
potential to draw big crowds was obvious. London's population provided a massive 
potential pool of spectators that was served by a transport network with the ability 
to move people rapidly around the capital. Woolwich Arsenal had been the first 
professional London club and they had joined the Football League in 1893. Spurs 
became professional in December 1895 and created the need to generate extra 
money.61 Under the direction of Charles D. Roberts, Spurs converted from a 
members' club to limited liability status in March 1898.62 Roberts became chairman 
in 1899 and initiated the club's move to a new ground, White Hart Lane, in 
58 Sunday Sun, 7 June 1931, p. 32 
59Williams, Code War, p. 162 
60His appointment to this joint position was from February 1899 to March 1907 during which the 
club won the Southern League in 1900, and in 1901 they became the first professional London club 
to win the FA Cup. Soar, Tottenham, p. 24 
61R. Finn, Tottenham Hotspur FC: The official history (1972), p. 28 
62ibid., p. 31. Roberts was known for his fund raising activities such as military tattoos in the 
northern home counties. He had also been, apparently, a baseball pitcher for the Brooklyn Dodgers. 
Soar, Tottenham, p. 21. At the end of the 1898-99 season only 1558 of the 8000 £ 1 shares had been 
taken up. Finn, Tottenham, p. 32; Soar, Tottenham, p. 22 
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September of that year.63 The club leased a plot of ground called Beckwith's 
Nursery from the brewers, Charringtons, and eventually purchased the freehold in 
1901 at a cost of £8900.64 Cameron's relationship with the Spurs' directors was 
based on deference. In an article he wrote that, '[t]he manager is not the sole 
governing authority. As regards his status, he is indubitably the servant of the club 
directors' .65 Cameron also acknowledged the managerial work undertaken by 
directors. By 1906 the Spurs' directors had decided that the growing demands on 
Cameron in connection with team building and management made it impossible for 
him to give the required amount of time to his secretarial duties. So his position was 
divided in two: Cameron was appointed team manager and Arthur Turner 
secretary.66 The following year however, Cameron resigned citing various differences 
with the board.67 
Notwithstanding the claims of George Ramsey, Tom Watson was probably 
the game's first prototype football manager and his career spanned both the amateur 
and professional eras, fulfilling the role as a football club intermediary between the 
players and directors. Initially a keen amateur player, he had also been a prominent 
figure in the rapid growth of football in the Newcastle area during the 1880s. In 1881 
Watson had founded Rosehill Football Club in the mid-Tyne district and by 1885 he 
63Finn, Tottenham, p. 32 
64Soar, Tottenham, p. 23-4. The ground was adjacent to Charrington's White Hart pub on the High 
Road, and part of the lease agreement was that Tottenham only served Charrington beers. Something 
they have done ever since. ibid. 
65J. Cameron, 'How to Run a Football Team', Gibson and Pickford, Association Football, Vol. 4, 
p. 128-133 
66G. Wagstaffe Simmons, History ofTottenham Hotspur Football Club 1882-1946 (1947); Holland, 
Spurs, p. 70 
67 Tottenham Weekly Herald, 20 March 1907, p. 4 
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was representing the club on the Northumberland FA Challenge Cup committee.68 
The following year he was the representative of Newcastle West End after being 
elected the club's honorary secretary at its 1886 AGM.69 During his time at 'West 
End' he had helped to secure the lease of a ground that was to become St. James' 
Park.70 In December 1887 however, he resigned his position. This seems to have 
followed an FA Cup tie between the Newcastle team, Shankhouse, who had been 
loaned St. James' Park, and Aston Villa, a few days earlier. At the game a crush 
developed and the arrangements for the admission of the public, which were 
presumably Watson's responsibility, were criticised.71 For the start of the 1888-89 
season, Watson was the honorary secretary at Newcastle East End.72 His time at 
West End and East End coincided with an infusion of capital into both of them. 
Watson was responsible for introducing several Scottish professionals into their 
ranks and offering them £5 for signing on plus a factory job on Tyneside.73 In 1887 
West End played a game in Edinburgh and it was the first time a local club had met 
all the players' expenses; previously they had paid them themselves.74 
In 1889 Watson was hired by Sunderland as their match secretary. 
Sunderland had needed someone with experience and he was one of the few 
68Athletic News, 10 May 1915, 'Obituary'. It was later re-named Willington Athletic. Tyne and Wear 
Archives Service, SINF AlB 
69Newcastle Daily Journal, 10 May 1886, p. 3 
70Catton Folders, W. Correspondence between Watson and Catton. He had been appointed by the 
club to wait upon the Lord Mayor of Newcastle, Sir BC Browne. It was the influence ofthe local 
MP, Sir CF Hammond, and the financial assistance of Messrs Stanger and Robinson however, which 
obtained the lease and permission for the ground to be enclosed. 
71Newcastle Daily Journal, 21 December 1887; Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 24 December 1887 
72Athletic News, 10 May 1915, 'Obituary' 
73Newcast/e Daily Journal, 7 May 1915, 'Obituary', p. 11 
74Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 13 September 1887, p. 7 
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candidates who had a background in what was a fledgling industry.75 Even the year 
before, it had been felt that Sunderland needed to appoint someone who could devote 
all his time to the club as 'the work of a football club secretary absorbed 16 to 17 
hours of his time weekly' and '[t]here was no reason why such work should be done 
voluntarily' .76 At the 1889 AGM, one member claimed that 'the [secretarial] duties 
had so greatly increased that a match secretary was imperatively required,.77 It was 
perhaps no coincidence that Watson's appointments at Sunderland, and then 
Liverpool in 1896 (see Chapter 2), were times when both clubs were facing 
competition within their own areas. On his arrival on Wearside the club was engaged 
in a spiteful local battle with Sunderland Albion for football supremacy in the 
town.78 For example, the two clubs had been drawn together in cup competitions on 
two occasions with 'Albion' having home advantage. Sunderland though withdrew 
from both, preferring to concede defeat rather than ensure large gate receipts for 
Albion. 79 Furthermore, to obtain a more lucrative fixture list than Albion, Sunderland 
increased the expenses paid to opposing teams. Sunderland even withheld the 
75Sunderland's secretary, John Grayston, had been instructed by his committee to find a full-time 
employee. He knew of Watson's reputation and, after fmding him in a Newcastle pub, Grayston had 
been given £10 to fit him out with a suit and instructed to present Watson in front of the committee 
for an interview that same night. Sunderland Weekly News, 2 October 1931, p. 7 
76Sunderland Daily Echo, 4 April 1888, p. 4 
77ibid., 4 June 1889, p. 3 
78The original founder of Sunderland, James Allen, had left and formed Sunderland Albion on 13 
March 1888 in a dispute over professionalism. Sunderland had been found guilty by the FA of 
playing three professionals in an FA Cup tie against Middlesbrough. Before being eligible to play in 
the competition, the players had not fulfilled the competition's residential qualifications of living 
two years near to the club's HQ. Middlesbrough, who had lost the tie, then protested to the FA. 
Albion had the financial support of James Hartley Jm., a glassworks owner and joined the Football 
Alliance in 1889. Appleton, Hotbed a/Soccer, p. 170-71; A. Rippon, Great Soccer Clubs a/the 
North East (Derby, 1981), pp. 46-47 
79 The Journal, (100 Years of Sunderland AFC: A Journal Football Special), 23 October 1979, p. xii 
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publication of the following season's fixture list so as not to give any advantage to 
h · . I 80 t elr nva s. 
During Watson's time at Sunderland the club was patronised by a local 
shipbuilder, Robert Thompson JP. Together with his brother Joseph Lowes Jnr., 
they owned Sunderland's most famous shipyard, J.L. Thompson and Sons, at North 
Sands, Southwick. 81 Thompson later claimed that as an employer he had benefited 
from football as it kept working men out of mischief on a Saturday because of their 
attendance at the matches.82 By 1887 Robert was President of Sunderland, and had 
been joined on the club committee by his brother.83 James Marr and a Mr 
McLintock were shipyard managers at Thompson who also joined the committee. 
Marr later became chairman of the club's committee.84 A future committee chairman, 
Jim McMillan, and an early member, was a monumental sculptor and master 
stonemason.85 Another important committee member and benefactor was the 
treasurer Samuel Tyzack, an Australian, who had inherited a local firm of iron-
80Sunderiand Daily Echo, 4 June 1889, p. 3 
81Rippon, Great Soccer Clubs, p. 46; Sunderland Daily Echo, 27 May 1893, p. 3. The Sunderland 
goalkeeper, Ted Doig was a timekeeper and the club's trainer, Joe Bell, was a shipyard foreman. 
Sunderland Weekly News, 2 October 1931, p. 7. For Doig and his family history see 
http://wkweb.cableinet.co.uklhaggis.whisky/inthe1.htm 
82Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 10 July 1896, p. 4. In 1894 Robert Thompson resigned from the 
committee, although he did not completely sever his ties with the club. Thompson cited the growing 
demands on his time due to the shipyard's new status as a limited liability company. Sunderland 
Daily Echo, 13 July 1894, p. 2; Sunderland Herald and Daily Post, 4 August 1894, p. 3 
83 Dictionary 0/ Business Biography, Vol. 5, Robert Thompson, pp. 504-06; Sunderland Daily 
Echo, 6 May 1887, p. 3; Robert Thompson was succeeded by John Potts Henderson, a wine and 
spirits merchant. Sunderland Daily Echo, 4 August 1894, p. 3; 28 February 1927, p. 7, 'Obituary' 
84Sunderland Weekly News, 2 October 1931, p. 7 Dictionary o/Business Biography, Vol. 4, James 
Marr, pp. 151-53. Marr later entered into a partnership with other members of the shipyard to 
establish the Sunderland Forge and Engineering Co. in 1887. By 1901 he was the managing director 
and chairman ofthe directors of the shipyard. During the First World War, Marr was a member of the 
Advisory Committee to the Ministry of Shipping and in 1919 was made a Baronet. Sunderland 
Echo, 24 November 1932, p. 1, 'Obituary' 
85Sunderland Daily Echo, 27 May 1893, p. 3 
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founders. 86 Despite the financial input of its committee, Sunderland had been forced 
to adapt continually to the game's changing climate. Before limited liability status, 
guarantee funds of £ 1000 and £ 1100 had been raised in 1892 and 1894 
respectively.87 Watson claimed that only in becoming a limited liability company 
would the club be able to compete with the wages paid to players by other clubs.88 
Liverpool Football Club, as we have seen in the previous chapter, was run by 
John Houlding. In an attempt to avoid what happened at Everton, he wanted to 
control the club as his own fiefdom. The club adopted limited liability status in 1892 
and its constitution allowed Houlding to nominate four committee members. Rule 3 
had stated that 'the Executive Committee shall have sole power to engage players, 
arrange fixtures, and have full control of all matters, including the election of members 
during its year of office'. Directors of the club were also allowed to make a profit 
from providing it with ancillary services.89 In 1902 Houlding died and three years 
later his son, William, sold the family shareholding. The Liverpool directorate 
however, was later characterised by the continuity of its personnel, and thus created 
a stable environment. None were from wealthy backgrounds like Houlding but 
86 ibid., 4 August 1894, p. 3; 16 June 1915, p. 4, 'Obituary'. Tyzack resigned from the committee in 
1894. ibid., 13 July 1894, p. 2; Sunderland Herald and Daily Post, 4 August 1894, p. 3 
87 ibid., 2 June 1892, p. 2; 4 August 1894, p. 3. In 1892 each guarantor was entitled to 2 three year 
season tickets to the vice-president's stand. He or she was required to pay £5 on entering into the 
guarantee with the balance to be made up during the three year period. ibid. 
88Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 10 July 1896, p. 4. The North Sands shipbuilding yard had been 
converted to a limited liability company in 1894 with a capital value of £ 125,000 made up of £ 1 00 
shares. Marr was appointed to the board of directors along with Robert and J.L. Thompson Jnr. In 
comparison, when the football club was converted to a limited liability company in 1896, its capital 
value was £5000. Sunderland Daily Echo, 13 July 1894, p. 2; Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 10 
July 1896, p. 4; B. Graham, The History o/Sunderland AFC 1879-1995 (Tyne and Wear, 1995), p. 
17. 
89Day, 'Football Club Directors', p. 65 
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instead were solid citizen types who got things done and believed in the value of 
. 90 
expenence. 
The extent of Watson's role and powers developed over his career. He was 
originally appointed Sunderland's match secretary in 1889 but later became the 
general secretary.91 Because of the increase in the club's business, secretarial duties 
were divided with the financial side left in the hands of the previous secretary, W.T. 
Wallace whilst Watson concentrated on running the club's administration and 
business, namely the team. It was Watson, in alliance with Tyzack, who went to 
Scotland to recruit the players that turned Sunderland into the 'Team of all the 
Talents,.92 This job had previously been undertaken by Tyzack alone.93 Although 
Watson accompanied the team on their away trips, the first and second teams were 
selected by a teams committee that included Tyzack. From 1892 the second team 
94 
was under the charge of Robert Campbell who succeeded Watson as secretary. 
Much of Watson's time was taken up travelling by train and indicates that the 
committee members either did not have the time or were not willing to devote theirs 
to the club's business anymore. In contrast, Middlesbrough's directors supervised 
the players on trips to away games.95 At Aston Villa James Lees undertook this task 
for a number of years, and during the 1904-05 season he travelled approximately 
90 Mason, 'Blues', pp. 5-6 
91Sunderland Daily Echo, 4 June 1889, p. 3; Sunderland Herald and Post, 28 August 1895, p. 3 
92Sunderland won the Football League championship in 1891-92, 1892-93 and 1894-95, and were 
runners-up in 1893-94. Appleton, Hotbed a/Soccer, pp. 176-77. 
93Sunderland Daily Echo, 4 June 1889, p. 3 
94Graham, Sunderland, p. 17; Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 5 September 1896, p. 3 
95Middlesbrough Fe Minutes, c.1899-1900, passim 
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3000 miles with the team.96 Watson, between September 1891 and May 1892 
covered over 14,000 miles, both travelling with the team, and also to Football League 
and FA meetings in his capacity as the club's representative.97 
One of Watson's first administrative tasks had been to draw up a fixture list 
containing the best teams but it was to be on easier terms than the previous season 
when they had paid £ 11 00 to the visitors.98 Watson was also in charge of organising 
the club's sports days which he had had experience of at Newcastle. For one game at 
Bolton he arranged an excursion party, although this was dependent on getting a 
guarantee of200 people. Watson also tried to arrange a tour to America in 1895. He 
corresponded with American clubs on Sunderland's behalf and was to make all the 
necessary arrangements. The tour seems to have fallen through, probably because 
financial terms could not be agreed.99 
Watson had been recruited by Liverpool because of the successful job he had 
done at Sunderland, and he continued to do well at Liverpool where he won the 
Football League on two occasions, in 1900-01 and 1905-06. This made him the first 
manager to win the championship with two different clubs. Watson's role at 
Liverpool seems to have become more influential as time went on. On taking up his 
new position it was suggested by a local paper that he should be given greater 
96Birmingham Post 16 December 1905, p. 10 'Obituary'; Birmingham Mail, 23 December 1905, p. 
3. As a token of the players' appreciation of his services on their behalf, the players had earlier 
presented him with a gold medal. Sports Argus, 16 December 1905, p. 4, 'Obituary' 
97 In 1891 Watson was elected to the FA Council as the representative of its number one division 
that covered the north east of England and North Yorkshire. For the 1892-93 season it was estimated 
he had travelled 13,000 miles. Sunderland Daily Echo, 19 May 1892,27 May 1893, p. 3 
98Sunderland Daily Echo, 4 June 1889, p. 3 
99Correspondence between Watson and Colonel John I. Rogers, the President of the Philadelphia 
Association Football Club were published in the local press. Sunderland Daily Echo 10 July 1894, 
p. 3 
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autonomy, '[t]he new secretary ought to be allowed as free a hand as possible and 
not be hampered in his work so long as he goes all right. It should be remembered 
that too many cooks spoil the broth' .100 This did not extend to the selection of the 
team however, which was undertaken by a committee. When Liverpool was first 
established, the recruitment of the team had been undertaken by a sub-committee 
that included John McKenna. lol As a director, McKenna also acted as honorary 
secretary and seems to have run the club along with Houlding' s son William, who 
was the club's chairman with his father as President. It was William and McKenna 
who had recruited Watson.102 He developed a close friendship with McKenna who 
was a witness to Watson's probate but their relationship did not effect the overall 
management model. The directors were still in charge. They ultimately decided on the 
players they wanted, they chose the team and disciplined the players if necessary. In 
January 1897, for example, three players, Wilkie, Allan and Niell, had been found 
guilty of drunkenness by the committee and it was the committee that delivered their 
k' . 103 wee s suspensIOn. 
100 Liverpool Echo, 29 August 1896, p. 3 
10lCatton, Leaguers, p. 79. McKenna was a vaccination officer with the West Derby Union. and a 
Liverpool director until 1922. Born in Ireland in County Monaghan in 1855, he came to Liverpool 
aged 17, and his first job was a grocer's boy. Initially, he played rugby and at one time was a 
member of the West Lancashire Rugby Union before supporting Everton. However, he joined 
Liverpool following Houlding's rift with Everton. It was McKenna who tendered Liverpool's 
application to join the Football League in 1893. He later served on the League's management 
committee between 1902 and 1908, was elected vice-president in 1908 for two years before his 
election in 1910 as League President, a post he held until his death in 1936. In 1923 he became a life 
member of the Football League. In 1905 he also became a member ofthe FA Council and in 1928 a 
vice-president of the Football Association. Liverpool Daily Post, 23 March 1936, p. 5, 'Obituary'; 
Mason, 'Blues, p. 5; Taylor, 'Proud Preston', Appendix 1, p. 370. Young, Football on Merseyside, 
pp.43-44 
102 Liverpool Football Echo, 1 August 1896, p. 2. Initially, the permanent secretary had been W.E. 
Barclay until 1895 but up to the time of Watson's appointment McKenna stood in on a part-time 
basis. Catton, Leaguers, p. 79, 84. Barclay had previously been Everton's secretary but supported 
Houlding during his dispute with the club. Young, Football on Merseyside, p. 43 
103 Liverpool Football Echo, 23 January 1897, p. 4 
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As the club was a commercial entity, Watson's main role was to ensure the 
smooth running of the club on a financial level, and between 1900 and 1915 
Liverpool made a profit every year. 104 It was also Watson who oversaw the outright 
purchase of the Anfield ground in 1907.105 Yet his responsibilities also extended to 
supervising the players, particularly to away games and when the players undertook 
special training. 106 Watson was a charismatic figure and tried various means to 
maintain control over the players as well as keeping them happy and relaxed. Once, 
on the eve of a big cup match, he feared that the team would spend the night out on 
the town. He enlisted the assistance of one of the players, Billy Dunlop, to play a 
few tunes that apparently captured the players' attention for the remainder of the 
evening. Another time, he asked a journalist to give him and his players 'some 
music'. This then turned into a concert with Watson himself acting as the MC, 
d d· d' . 107 eman mg an gIVrng songs. 
Watson however, had a contempt for the secretary who was just a 'postcard 
writer' who wrote to their various contacts nationwide asking if they could 
recommend any players. Instead, he believed that the art of management 'entailed the 
task of moulding men into one complete harmonious body'. It was one of his 
strengths, claimed Jimmy Catton, that 'he had the gift of assimilating varying natures 
. d' h ' 108 H"nfl h into one set of men ammate WIt a common purpose . IS 1 uence owever, 
104 Mason, 'Blues', p. 7 
105Athletic News, 3 June 1907, p. 3 
106Liverpool Football Echo, 14 October 1899, p. 4 
107Liverpool Echo, 7 May 1915, p. 4 
108Athletic News, 10 May 1915, 'Obituary' 
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could only stretch so far. In April 1915 a match between Manchester United and 
Liverpool was fixed in return for bribes to some of the players. 109 
One of football management's main functions, probably its most important, 
has been to build a winning team. Although managers are important, it is the quality 
of a team's players that is the main basis for its success. Managers therefore, have 
needed a good judgement of players, together with a slice of luck. Clubs explored 
various avenues in order to recruit players during the 1880s. One method was to 
place advertisements in newspapers. I 10 The content of the adverts were mainly 
directed at footballers who held a trade and as a consequence many professional 
players came from working-class backgrounds. 1 1 1 The other main method was for 
club committeemen to be informed of promising players through personal contacts 
112 I and networks. They would then approach the player themselves. Ear y managers 
were known as 'postcard writers' because of their willingness to sign players they 
had not seen on the recommendation of a friend or contact. Some clubs used agents. 
Middlesbrough used a Mr Ferguson who was paid a £5 commission for every player 
113 
who he had recommended and who then went on to play for the club. In 1893 
Aston Villa had used an agent to recruit some players without the committee seeing 
114 them beforehand and who were not very good. 
Before the First World War, Scotland was a major source for footballers. 
Why was this so? Why were they in such demand and apparently more skilful than 
109Inglis, Soccer, Chapter 3 
110Mason, Association Football, p. 91 
IllMason, Association Football, p. 91; Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 93 
112Mason, Association Football, p. 92 
1 13Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 4 July 1899 
---,/ 
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English footballers? By the early 1880s Scottish 'professors' had become renowned 
for their combination play and their ability to keep possession of the ball by passing 
it amongst themselves. Up until then the game in England was dominated by an 
emphasis on individual players dribbling the ball, resulting in possession being 
frequently lost. lIS Perhaps one of the reasons can be found in underlying national 
cultural characteristics. In particular, Scottish education has had a reputation, if a 
romanticised one, for being more democratic than the English system. Scottish rural 
areas, through the wide diffusion of education by parish schools, had high literacy 
rates. Talented local boys, the 'lad of pairts', were also trained for a university 
education that was cheaper and attracted students from a wider and lower social 
strata than English aristocratic undergraduates. 116 
The way the game was played therefore, was perhaps transmitted through 
notions of self-improvement in Scotland as opposed to English aristocratic and 
public school ideas of 'natural' superiority. In England more emphasis had been 
placed on playing the game for the sake of it rather than learning how to play it, and 
this may have engendered a more individualistic style. However, it should be noted 
that the Royal Engineers, one of the most successful teams during the 1870s, were 
noted for their 'combination' .117 English football also perhaps owed something to a 
lingering connection with rugby which was less popular in Scotland. Physical contact 
was important and a certain robustness was evident, although this was not absent 
1 I 4Birmingham Daily Mail, 25 February 1893, p. 3 
115Mason, Association Football, p. 207-08 
116R. Anderson, 'In Search of the "Lad of Parts": the Mythical History of Scottish Education', 
History Workshop Journal, 19 (Spring 1985), pp. 82-104; Sanderson, Education, p. 13 
117 Catton, Real Football, p.111 
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north of the border. Rushes of players downfield chasing the ball was another feature 
of English football and was perhaps a legacy of the public schools game, British 
Bulldog. For whatever reason, Scotland dominated the annual fixture with England 
during the 1870s and '80s through superior teamwork and passing. 118 In October 
1882, the FA's assistant secretary, N.L. Jackson responded by forming the 
Corinthians which was made up of players who had attended public school and 
university and provided the bulk of the England team. Jackson believed that this 
would give them more opportunities to practice together and eventually overcome 
the ScotS. 1l9 Despite the club's amateur ethos it could not hide the competitive 
. b h' d' C • 120 sentIment e III Its 10rmatlOn. 
During the 1880s Preston North End, largely made up of Scots, was known 
as the 'Invincibles' whilst 'Team of the Macs' was the sobriquet given to 
Liverpool's original side. Furthermore, professionalism had quickly dissolved the 
idea that teams should comprise local players. Under John Cameron, Tottenham 
Hotspur in 1900-01 did not include one player from London. 121 From the summer of 
1883 Preston's recruitment policy of Scottish players centred on Edinburgh, unlike 
other Lancashire clubs which had focused on Glasgow. 122 Sudell had acted on the 
advice of Tom McNeill, a native of Edinburgh, who was a foreman at the Preston 
118The ftrst game was played in 1872 and out of the ftrst 20, Scotland won 11, England 4 and there 
were 5 draws. 
119Williams, Code War, p. 77. 
120For a study in Victorian hypocrisy in amateur sport read Rae, Grace. 
121 Holland, Spurs, Chapter 6 
1221n 1883 Edinburgh had 40 football clubs. Berry and Allman, One Hundred Years, p. 19 
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Herald's composing room. 123 By 1884 there were 58 Scottish players in England and 
of these, eleven represented Preston North End. 124 Players however, had to be 
induced to come over the border, and at North End they were found fictitious 
employment by club members. For example, its most famous player Nick Ross, 
joined the club from Heart of Midlothian on 17 July 1883, and took up a position as 
a slater in Preston with a Mr Bradshaw. 125 Players' wages were then refunded to 
their employers by the club treasurer and deducted from the gates before they were 
entered in the club's books. 126 
Tom Watson, together with Sunderland's treasurer, Samuel Tyzack, went to 
Scotland to find players and negotiate terms with them. The result was the 'Team of 
all the Talents' .127 In addition to wages, Sunderland also offered the players jobs at 
the J.L. Thompson shipyard. Watson claimed that the players were paid on average 
a wage of30s per week and to no player did he give a retainer of more than £10. 128 
However, the case of John R. Auld, a Scottish international, suggests that the 
Sunderland players received more than this as well as other benefits. On signing for 
123Catton, Wickets, p. 138; Lewis, 'Football in Lancashire', p. 139; Athletic News, 4 September 
1911, p. 4, 'Obituary' 
124The geographical origins of Preston North End's Scottish players were: Edinburgh - 6 (Hearts - 3; 
St. Bernard's - 3); Glasgow - 3 (South Western; Lugar Boswell; Port Glasgow Athletic); Ayrshire - 2 
(Stewarton Cunninghame and Annbank). Scottish Umpire, 10 December 1884, p. 11; Berry and 
Allman, One Hundred Years, p. 28. In December 1884 the Scottish Football Association banned 
them and the other 47 from returning to Scotland as players because they were perceived to be 
professionals. ibid. It was not until 1893 that the Scottish FA legalised professionalism, although 
the Scottish League had been established two years earlier. Mason, 'Football', p. 147 
125 Catton, Leaguers, 1897, p. 96; Preston Herald, 11 August 1894, p. 5. Local players were not 
excluded however. Fred Dewhurst who played on the left wing, was a master at the local Catholic 
Grammar School and was also the club secretary, and full back Bob Holmes was a lawyer's clerk for 
a Preston firm. Preston Herald, 24 March 1888, p. 5; Athletic News, 1 May 1922, p. 4 
126Lewis, 'Football in Lancashire', p. 139 
127The origin of this sobriquet is attributed to William McGregor, although its actual meaning may 
he more ironical than literal as talent can also mean money. Athletic News, 26 February 1917, p. 1 It 
won 3 Football League championships in four years from 1892 to 1895. 
128 Football Field, 10 June 1893 
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the club in 1889, he received a cheque for £300 that was to be his wages paid two 
years in advance. He then received £150 for the actual signing and even £20 for just 
signing a professional form. Auld then requested that he wanted a place of business. 
This turned out to be a boot and shoe shop in Sunderland for which the club paid the 
first year's rental of £50 and it also put in the fixtures. After his second year with 
the club he received a £200 loyalty bonus. In addition to this, he also received 
playing bonuses of lOs for an away win, 7s 6d for a home win, and 5s for a draw. 129 
When clubs began to pay players it brought with it unique labour 
management problems. Footballers were young men, many of whom liked a drink, 
and, from the club's perspective, needed discipline. Yet, this was complicated by the 
fact that the players were the club's main assets. Thus, in terms of any managerial 
strategy directors and managers needed to feed players some carrot as well as 
brandish the stick. As we have seen, management-worker relations within football 
clubs were cemented by the prevailing class system (see Introduction). Virtually all 
professional footballers were from the working-classes whilst the majority of 
directors had middle-class backgrounds. On one occasion, the Aston Villa club 
programme reporting on a banquet, commented on how well one of the players, 
Joseph Bache spoke for afootballer! l30 In 1909 the players threatened to strike over 
the maximum wage and the repeal of the retain and transfer system. In response, one 
member of the Football League Management Committee, Charles Sutcliffe, wrote an 
article entitled, 'Who Shall Be the Masters - Players or Clubs?' By implication 
129 Auld had claimed that after his club in Scotland, Third Lanark, elected him on to their committee 
he decided to stay with them, and returned the cheque. Further meetings with Sunderland then 
followed before he moved to Wearside. Athletic News, 26 February 1917, p. 1. Auld opened his boot 
and shoe shop in August 1889. He still had it in 1917 in addition to another branch he opened. 
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players were still regarded as servants to their clubs despite the fact that they had 
signed a contract with their employers. The restrictions imposed by the transfer 
system however, added to the players' sense of obsequiousness. Furthermore, in 
1909 footballers were declared as workmen under the Workmen's Compensation Act 
of 1906. As a result, players were now entitled to compensation if they sustained 
any injuries 'while following their employment' .131 A certain tension existed 
therefore, between the two parties, and directors were to increasingly use their 
secretaries in matters between the club and players. 
The most obvious way to discipline players was through their pockets. As 
early as 1885 Villa's committee had wanted to reward or punish players through 
their wage packets. The club's poor performance was being blamed on the poor 
condition of their players. The committee was forced to resign and it was proposed 
that players should be fined for not attending practice. A graduated scale of pay was 
suggested where professionals received a match fee, a bonus for a win and bonuses 
for every goal scored. It was also proposed however, that any player who played 
whilst out of condition should not be paid at all. 132 
Clubs though still had the problem of controlling and discipling the players. 
The most important role was perhaps fulfilled by the trainer, a quasi NCO figure, 
who was the person most in contact with the players. In addition to maintaining the 
players' fitness, his main function was to keep an eye on them and make sure they 
kept out of mischief. The Middlesbrough trainer regularly reported to the board and 
130 AVNR,3 September 1910, p. 7 
131 J. Harding, For the Good of the Game: The Official History of the Professional Footballers' 
Association (1991), p. 54; AVNR, 13 November 1909, p. 189 
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was questioned on the condition of the players. l33 A trainer's authority however, 
was limited. Most were former players and they shared a similar status. 134 Clubs 
also used more covert methods to monitor and control the players. Aston Villa 
resorted to spying on their players and some were spotted in pubs when they should 
have been training. 135 Rules were also introduced for players to abide by with 
reference to training and playing. Any player of Wolverhampton Wanderers, for 
example, who did not undertake his weekly training would forfeit a day's wages, his 
daily meals and would be liable to suspension. l36 Clubs also insisted that any 
players who claimed that they were too ill to play or train had to provide a doctor's 
certificate. 137 Middlesbrough also made players sign their names in a book on training 
. h 138 mg ts. 
Rules also reflected temperance and non-conformist attitudes within a club's 
management. Middlesbrough, for example, adopted the rules of Aston Villa, and 
supplemented this with a ban on players betting on matches. 139 William McGregor 
had wanted Aston Villa to make a rule banning professional players serving in public 
1320sbourne Newscuttings, p. 55, Birmingham Mail, 12 December 1885 
133Middlesbrough FC Minutes, passim. 
134 Villa's trainer, Joe Grierson, apparently wore a flat cap. Information supplied by Don Bilton. 
135Inglis, Villa Park, p. 16; Taylor, 'Proud Preston', pp. 208-09 
136See Appendix 9 
137For example, Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 27 November 1899 
138Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 31 July 1899. One unusual transgression of club rules was 
committed by Villa player, James Cowan. In 1896 he absented himself from training to compete in 
the Powder hall Handicap Sprint in Edinburgh. He won the race and the prize money of £80 but he 
along with three other team mates, Charlie Athersmith, Albert Evans and Chatt, pulled off a betting 
coup. It was rumoured that Cowan's winnings totalled £1300. Unsurprisingly enough the club 
suspended Cowan for a week and fmed him four weeks wages. Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 123, 
Birmingham Mail, 2, 4, 10 January 1896, Birmingham Post, 11 January 1896 
139Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 31 July 1899 
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houses. 140 At the same time the welfare of the club's players sometimes conflicted 
with the interests of directors who worked in the drinks trade. It is reasonable to 
assume that, in keeping with his working-class background, frequenting pubs was 
one of a footballer's main leisure activities during this period. All too often for a 
club's liking this interfered with football, and in conjunction with any prevailing non-
conformist attitudes inside the club, management aimed to stamp down on the 
players. In 1893, during a poor season for Villa, Fred Rinder claimed that, '[ d]rink 
was the curse of the team', and that players had been drunk when training. 141 He also 
complained that some members of the committee used 'filthy, obscene and profane' 
language to the players, and that some of them had been seen drinking with the 
players. 142 By looking through the minutes of Middlesbrough it is clear that drink 
was a major problem for them and no doubt other clubs. 143 Following the imposition 
of the maximum wage in 1901, many players had had their wages reduced. Some, like 
Derby County's famous inside-forward, Steve Bloomer, resorted to turning up drunk 
at training on a number of occasions as a submerged form of protest. It was also 
claimed that Bloomer prepared for important matches with a few pints of beer at a 
144 local hostelry. 
A number of clubs adopted paternalism as an attempt to gain both control 
and the loyalty of the players. Many nineteenth century employers used this 
method to stabilise their workforce, prevent the loss of workers and also as an 
1400sboume Newscuttings, p. 80, Birmingham Mail, 17 June 1890 
141Birmingham Mail, 25 February 1893, p. 3 
142Birmingham Mail, 25 February 1893, p. 3 
143Middlesbrough Fe Minutes, passim 
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attempt to secure worker loyalty. In 1879 the brewers, Flowers and Sons, had built a 
club house for its workers, containing a billiard table, a bagatelle board and a library. 
Musical evenings were also regularly staged and team sports were introduced. 145 In 
his capacity as Harrods' general manager, Richard Burbidge appreciated that good 
conditions were a pre-requisite for an efficient workforce. He abolished lateness 
fines, introduced early closing, cost price meals and a provident fund for the lower 
grades. In 1905 Burbidge opened an athletics club at Barnes. 146 This was paternalism 
as a two-way process however: benevolence was part of an employer's duties but it 
was for the purpose of gaining control over the workforce and to engender a degree of 
deference and respect amongst them. 147 Breweries, for example, attempted to 
improve their dealings with their workers through the introduction of numerous 
bonuses like beer allowances, seaside holidays in the summer and allocating beef to 
workers at Christmas. 148 Nenadic has argued however, that despite its success as a 
response to the issue of labour control and workforce loyalty, paternalism is 
potentially inflexible 'because it is tied to a social institution whose virtues include 
reciprocal loyalty and the maintenance of traditions'. As the business environment 
changed therefore, a paternalist style of management would tend to change at a 
144T. Mason, "Our Stephen and Our Harold': Edwardian Footballers as Local Heroes', fJRS, Vol. 
13, 1 (March 1996), p. 80 
145J. Reinarz, 'A Social History ofa Midland Business: Flowers and Sons Brewery, 1870-1914' 
(PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 1998), Chapter 5 
146Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 1, Richard Burbidge, p. 512 
147D. Roberts, Paternalism in Early Victorian England (1979), pp. 5-6 
148 l' Reinarz, 'Flowers', see Chapters 5 and 6 on paterna Ism 
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142 
slower rate. 149 Seen in this light, it is perhaps unsurprising that Aston Villa did not 
appoint their first manager Jimmy McMullan, until 1934. 
During the 1892-93 season, in an attempt to keep an eye on their players, 
Villa built a club house at their Perry Barr ground that provided amenities such as a 
billiards table with card and writing rooms plus the availability of non-alcoholic 
refreshments, although there could be little doubt as to its main purpose. In 
welcoming the initiative, the Birmingham Mail commented that the sooner it was 
open the better 'for several of the team require to be under pretty constant 
supervision' !SO When the club moved to Villa Park more recreational facilities were 
also provided. A large room under the grandstand was fitted up as a gymnasium and 
the then current players' recreation room was connected to another room that was to 
be utilised as a reading room and library!SI When Fred Rinder proposed the 
redevelopment of Villa Park in 1914, he announced that the players' dressing rooms 
were to be moved to the other side of the ground and situated in the comer of the 
new stand nearest to the offices, gymnasium and recreation rooms. Training was to 
take place on a piece of land on the other side of the offices, and as a result all the 
players' facilities were to be situated in one comer of the ground. Rinder then added, 
'[t]he training quarters and recreation rooms would then be under the easy control 
and supervision of the trainer [Grierson] without him having to walk to the opposite 
'd f h d h hi ., IS2 Sl e 0 t e groun to see ow t ngs are gomg on . 
149S. Nenadic, 'The Small Family Firm in Victorian Britain', Business History, 35, 4 (1993), pp. 
86-113 
IS0Birmingham Mail, 7 November 1892, p. 3 
ISIAston Villa News and Record, 1 September 1906, p. 3 
152Aston Villa News and Record, 8 August 1914, p. 668 
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In 1892 Sunderland shipbuilders opened a Workmen's Rest Home that 
provided a reading room, a library and games facilities. 153 In the same year 
Sunderland Football Club purchased a house adjoining the club that was then fitted 
up as a billiard room. The club aimed to give the players somewhere to spend their 
leisure time whilst hoping (probably optimistically) it would keep them out of 
trouble. 154 Tottenham Hotspur also opened a social club for the players in 1899. The 
club provided billiards tables and card tables plus facilities for reading and writing. 155 
There the players were under the control of a club steward, Troop-Sergeant-Major 
Sinton, who had served twenty-one years in the 1st Royal Dragoons and who in his 
own person embodied the notion of the military model of management. 156 
Other forms of paternalism included financial compensation. For example, 
Preston North End's first Scottish import, J. Belger, broke his leg in November 1884 
and was forced to retire from football. At the club's AGM in January 1886, a sum of 
£50 was voted to be paid to him as a fmal settlement; previous to that he had been 
receiving £2 per week from the club since his injury.157 Belger had already received a 
cheque for £200 on leaving hospital in January 1885 which had been donated by the 
club's followers. 158 This was probably common among football clubs as Aston Villa 
had dispensed gratuities to injured players as far back as 1879_80.159 
153 Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 5., p. 505 
154Sunderland Daily Echo, 19 May 1892, p. 4 
155C.E. Hughes, 'The "Spurs" in Mufti', c.B. Fry's Magazine, Vol. 2, 8 (November 1904), p. 177 
156ibid., p. 183. The club also ran a cricket team during the summer in which Cameron played 
157preston Herald, 7 January 1885, p. 6; Football Field, 30 January 1886, p. 5 
158Scottish Umpire, 7 January 1885, p. 9 
159 See Appendix 2 
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By 1914 football's industrial relations were moving away from a paternalistic 
model to one drawn on capital and labour lines that reflected the unrest throughout 
industry as a whole. In March 1902, for example, Stockport County's players had 
bypassed the club's committee and picked the team themselves, after their wages had 
not been paid for over a week. 160 During the 1890s footballing competition had 
intensified. In 1896 Manchester City prohibited its players from working at any 
other job other than football, in order to increase their fitness levels. 161 Players also 
became more militant regarding their working conditions. An early players' union, 
the Association Footballers' Union, had been established in 1897 with John Cameron 
as secretary, something that he continued when manager at Tottenham Hotspur. It 
enjoyed the support of the Athletic News but was wound up in 1901.162 The union 
was revived in 1907-08 and by 1909 the players threatened to go on strike if their 
demands for the repeal of the retain and transfer system and the maximum wage were 
not met. As a result, more time needed to be devoted to the welfare of the players. In 
addition, directors were increasingly unwilling to deal with working-class players. It 
demanded therefore, a different approach to management and an increasing number of 
clubs used their secretaries or employed secretary-managers to handle the players. 
With football's growing competitiveness, what methods did clubs use to 
improve the team's performance? As we have seen, early trainers were employed to 
keep an eye on the players to make sure they stayed out of mischief. In addition to 
their supervisory role, trainers also prepared the players for games, and could have 
160Williams, Code War, p. 159 
161Harding, Football Wizard, p. 40 
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an impact on the team's results. Villa recruited Joe Grierson for example as their , , 
trainer in 1893 when he was lured from Middlesbrough Ironopolis. 163 Grierson was 
noted for specialist goalkeeping and weight-training routines. l64 The preparation and 
training of sportsmen for events was not new. In the late eighteenth century, for 
example, the pugilist, Tom Cribb, used the pedestrian champion, Captain Robert 
Barclay-Allardice as his trainer for some fights. 165 During the 1880s Preston North 
End hired Jack Concannon, a well-known distance runner from Widnes. He put the 
players through a physical preparation similar to that of professional boxers, runners 
and oarsmen. 166 Preston also employed a shoemaker who once travelled with the 
team to Scotland for a game against Renton to adapt the players' boots according to 
the state of the pitch. 167 Tottenham's trainer under John Cameron was Sam 
Mountford who had also been a professional athlete, winning Sheffield sprint 
handicaps. The training that the Tottenham players underwent was fairly 
representative of the period. During the season it was thought that walking and some 
practice at kicking with the occasional sprint was enough to maintain a player's 
fitness. 168 For important games teams retreated to hotels for a week to prepare 
162Harding, Good o/the Game, pp. 5-32. Harding's book provides a history of the player's union. 
See also Mason, Association Football, Chapter 4 
163He left in 1915 and during that period Villa won the League six times and the FA Cup on four 
occasions. 
164Infonnation supplied by Don Bilton 
165National Portrait Gallery, British Sporting Heroes Exhibition, 16 October 1998 to 24 January 
1999. 
166preston Herald, 4 January 1888, p. 3; Gibson and Pickford Association Football, Vol. 2, p. 160 
167Football Field, 22 January 1887, p. 2 
168J. Cameron, Association Football and How to Play it (1909), p. 33 
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themselves where they were under the supervision of the trainer and secretary.169 
The first team to do this was probably Blackburn Olympic who undertook a pre-
match preparation before their 1883 Cup Final victory.170 
When Preston won the cup in 1889, their preparation and training included 
ball practise, combined with some walking and running exercises, although it ceased 
on the Thursday before the game. In an attempt to engender team spirit the players 
drove twelve miles in an open wagonnette to Lytham on the Friday before the semi-
final where they had tea at 'The Ship' .171 Travelling to other games however, was 
usually a rushed affair with teams getting to the ground just before kick-off and then 
leaving soon after the game finished in order to catch the last train. On the saloon 
before Preston's final league game in 1888-89 at Aston Villa, the players chatted and 
smoked around a card table. After the train passed Wolverhampton they then 
changed into their kit. Following a four hour journey, they were then driven in an 
open conveyance to the ground, arriving just in time for the 3.15 p.m. start. The 
following week at Grimsby the train journey began at 8 a.m. To make sure the 
players got to the station on time cabs were sent round to their homes. Grimsby was 
169During Preston's run to the FA Cup Final in 1887-88 it used the Palace Hotel in Birkdale Park, 
Southport as its training headquarters. Preston Herald, 4 January 1888, p. 3 
170This consisted of spending a week at a health hydro a week before the Final where they then 
followed a set-routine. At 6 am they drank a glass of port wine plus two raw eggs followed by a walk 
along the sands. Next, there was breakfast that consisted of porridge and haddock. Lunch was made 
up of two legs of mutton, one for each end of the table. At tea-time there was more porridge plus a 
pint of milk each. Their final meal at supper consisted of half-a-dozen oysters. The Final itself went 
to extra-time, and, it is claimed, it was Olympic's superior fitness over their rivals, the former public 
school boys, Old Etonians, which was the telling factor. The club was patronised by Sydney Yates of 
W. and J. Yates, a firm of iron founders. Kicking and Screaming, BBC Television (1995); Mason, 
Association Football, p. 33 
171 Football Field, 23 March 1889, p. 5; 30 March 1889, p. 3 
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reached at 2 p.m. leaving enough time to eat a bowl of soup and to change. After the 
game there was only 30 minutes to catch the 5.30 p.m. train home. 172 
Around the turn of the century, books on the training and conditioning of 
footballers began to be published that reflected a growing awareness of the need for a 
more scientific approach to the training and coaching of sportsmen and women in 
general. I73 In 1901, for example, The Training of the Body, written by F .A. Schmidt 
and Eustace H. Miles, attempted to analyse the mechanical movements in humans in 
activities as diverse as bowling and climbing. Another pioneer in this field was Sam 
Mussabini, one of the first British athletics' coaches. He also coached cyclists and in 
1913 his first book on athletics, The Complete Trainer, was published. Later, 
Mussabini used a cine-camera to study the techniques of runners and used 
cinematography to aid his lectures. I74 An early lecturer on football had been Robert 
Campbell, Tom Watson's successor at Sunderland. Campbell made many speeches in 
support of the game and also wrote a short series of pamphlets on various aspects of 
football such as Football: Physical, Social and Moral Aspects, published in 1897.175 
One consequence of these new ideas was that more consideration was given 
to the player's physical well-being. Billy Meredith actually took this upon himself. 
He followed a strict match-day diet of a glass of port before and a boiled chicken 
I72ibid., 16 February 1889, p. 2; 23 February 1889, p. 2 
I73For example, 1. Goodall, Association Football (1898) 
I74D. Terry, 'An Athletic Coach Ahead of his Time', British Society o/Sports History Newsletter, 
11 (Spring 2000), pp. 34-38. Mussabini coached the winners of the men's 100m at both the 1908 
and 1924 Olympic Games, Reggie Walker of South Africa and Britain's Harold Abrahams. He also 
coached the early female athlete Vera Searle. Mussabini was a leading figure in the sport of billiards 
as both a journalist and referee. He died on 25 March 1927. ibid. 
1751 am grateful to Neal Garnham for providing me with this information. Campbell was the brother 
of Sunderland's centre-forward, John, and had worked at the 1.L. Thompson shipyard. Appleton, 
Hotbed o/Soccer, p. 182; Graham, Sunderland, p. 17 
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after the game and this helped to prolong a career that lasted over 30 years. Meredith 
also took advantage of the revolutionary heat treatment of sporting injuries offered at 
the Matlock House Hydro near the Manchester City ground in Hyde. 176 A book 
written by John Cameron put forward theories about the training and preparation of 
players and it also indicated how clubs had become concerned with the effect of vices 
on the well-being of their players. Robert Campbell, for example, advocated that 
players should be tee-totallers and Cameron advised players not to consume 
excessive quantities of alcohol, probably with little effect. l77 Smoking was 'a matter 
which is left to the men's common sense'. 178 Cameron also regarded diet as 
important. He recommended that 'a substantial meal should be taken at least two 
hours before a match'. This was to include a well-cooked beef steak, stale bread and 
vegetables with no potatoes. It was argued that this would enable the players to 
'play right through the game without ... feeling fatigued' .179 Players also had to be 
180 kept together, have regular hours for meals and go to bed early. Clubs have always 
wanted players to get an early night, although attitudes towards diet have changed 
markedly, particularly in the last ten years. 
Some early coaching of players had been undertaken by team captains such as 
Archie Hunter at Aston Villa and Jimmy Ross at Liverpool.181 The main role of the 
176Harding, Football Wizard, p. 52-53. The Hydro's proprietor was a club director, John Allison. 
ibid. 
177R. Campbell, Football: Physical, Social and Moral Aspects (1897); Hughes, 'The "Spurs" in 
Mufti', p. 178. Cameron claimed that plenty of internationals, including Vivian Woodward, were 
total abstainers. Cameron, Association Football, pp. 34-35 
178ibid., p. 35; Catton Folders, B-C, p. 218 
179Cameron, Association Football, p. 34 
180'b'd 40 I I "p, 
181Catton, Leaguers, p, 21, 83, Jimmy Ross had originally played for Preston North End and was 
the brother of Nick. 
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captain however, was that of leadership and to make tactical changes on the pitch. At 
Everton, Nick Ross was in disagreement with the committee over his role as captain. 
He felt that as captain and a professional that he should pick the team and their 
positions on the field but instead the Everton committee undertook these tasks. 182 
Despite the emergence of new ideas on the coaching of players, any improvements 
generally took place on an ad hoc basis. In 1908 one newspaper columnist bemoaned 
the repetition of players' mistakes, and was convinced that 'the first club who can 
secure the right man to give the team lectures with a blackboard on points of play 
and then take them on to the field to practice one point after another, will speedily 
rise to the top of the tree' .183 Preston North End however, had already done this. 
Nick Ross, along with Sudell, has been credited with introducing the blackboard into 
the dressing room, and of being a clever tactician. 184 Furthermore, a Doctor Gledhill 
used chessman set out on a billiard table to illustrate tactical plans. 185 On another 
occasion, Sudell hired a bus and four horses and, along with other members of the 
committee, drove the team to Blackburn to watch them play Everton. The reason for 
this, it was reported, was to enable the North End players to identify the fmer 
aspects of each teams' play which would serve them well when they met them 
186 later. 
182Liverpool Review, 16 March 1889, p. 18 
183Birmingham Sporting Mail, 5 December 1908, p. 1. The columnist was Charles Johnstone of 
Aston Villa. 
184Athletic News, 4 September 1911, p. 4, 'Obituary'; Berry and Allman, One Hundred Years, p. 
20; Inglis, League Football, p. 28 
185Catton, Wickets, p. 144. In Catton's The Real Football, p. 152, he claims that it was Sudell who 
used both diagrams on a blackboard and chessmen on a billiard table to illustrate tactics. 
186Football Field, 25 January 1890, p. 3 
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Sudell's advocacy of scientific football was supported by Preston's style. 
The team cultivated a short passing game partly as a consequence of employing 
Scottish players. It had been Queen's Park of Glasgow during the 1870s who had 
introduced passing and the combination of forwards using the full width of the pitch. 
Their formation had consisted of two backs, two half-backs and six forwards 
although by 1884 English teams had learnt to counter it. 187 Preston was the first 
team to consistently play with three half-backs and only five forwards; the extra 
half-back had previously been a centre forward. It became known as the attacking 
centre-half formation and lasted until 1925 when the offside law was changed. The 
new formation allowed greater balance between defence and attack. It was also 
characterised by a marking system in which the wing-halves marked the wingers and 
the full backs blocked the middle. The centre-half was then allowed to 'rove'. The 
five forward players would try to advance in a line and make the best use of the 
space in front of them and between the defenders. Importantly, through its passing, 
this formation brought a greater cohesion and emphasis on teamwork. 188 
Preston's style contrasted with the majority of their opponents. In a game 
against Bolton in 1885, North End was 'machine like ... in working the ball along the 
ground', whereas their opponents did 'their work in rushes,.189 Before their 1888 
cup tie, Aston Villa was advised to harry and bustle North End to prevent them 
187C. Lodziak, Understanding Soccer Tactics (1966), pp. 22-23; B. Joy, Soccer Tactics (1956), pp. 
44-45; Mason, Association Football, pp. 209-10; M. Golesworhty, Encyclopaedia of Association 
Football (1973), 'Tactics and Team Evolution'. See Appendix 6 for examples of early team 
formations. 
I 88Athletic News, 4 September 1911, p. 4, 'Obituary'; Joy, 1956, pp. 44-5; T. Mason, 'Kick and 
Rush or Revolt into Style? Football playing among the English professionals from Great Power to 
image of decline', Unpublished paper (1998), pp. 1-2; Gibson and Pickford, Association Football, 
Vol. 2, p. 160 
189Mason, Association Football, p. 209 
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dominating the game through their measured passing. It did not work. Preston's fmal 
goal in their 3-1 victory was described as their best; 'they passed the ball through the 
Aston Villa ranks with the utmost cleverness and appeared to be as fresh almost as 
at the beginning' .190 The 1889 FA Cup Final brought a comparison between the two 
sets of forwards: '[w]hile the Wolverhampton men went in for hard - very hard - and 
determined play, North End plodded away with a distinct system'. John Goodall as 
the centre-forward was the epitome of the team's play. The stress he placed on ball 
control earned him a reputation as the pioneer of scientific play!91 It was claimed 
that the early style of Aston Villa was based around the short, forward oblique pass 
in which the whole forward line, backed up by its half-backs would participate. This 
was varied by using alternate wing attacks who would centre the ball with, it was 
planned, three forwards coming in to meet it. 192 Players were also developing their 
own tactical plans at other clubs. At the tum of the century, full backs began to play 
an 'offside game', probably invented by Morley and Montgomery ofNotts. County, 
and perfected by Newcastle United's Billy McCracken. 193 
Football was still a very vigorous game at this time. Heavy shoulder charges 
were very much part of the play and goalkeepers, unlike today, received no 
protection. 194 On occasions, teams were prepared to use underhand tactics to stop 
Preston North End playing, although the Preston players were not averse to 
retaliation. In one game, Everton was accused of 'inaugurat[ing] a series of 
190 Preston Herald, 7 January 1888, p. 2; 11 January 1888, p. 3 
191Williams, Code War, p. 106 
192Birmingham Sporting Mail, 12 September 1908, p. 1 
193Joy, Soccer Tactics, p. 48 
194Mason, Association Football, p. 209 
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malpractices from the start of the game'. This met with retaliation from the Preston 
players, bringing the comment that' such disgraceful exhibitions ... tends to lower the 
respectability of the game and disgust the better class of onlookers' .195 During a third 
round FA Cup in October 1886 at Hampden Park match a foul by a Preston player, 
Jimmy Ross, against a Queen's Park player, Harrower, so incensed the Scottish fans 
that they invaded the pitch to attack Ross, ironically, a fellow SCOt. 196 
Football's popularity had coincided with, and was reinforced by, the 
expansion of the newspaper industry during the late nineteenth century. Mason has 
stated that, 'there is an important symbiotic relationship between the expansion of 
the game [football], both amateur and professional, and both the growth of a 
specialised press and the spread of football coverage in the general newspapers'. 197 
The press became part of the sporting sub-culture and through reporting on matches 
it gave football a cultural legitimacy. Following the success of the Bolton-based 
Football Field, football specials became common in towns with a professional 
football club after 1884. Sports coverage as a whole became more widespread in the 
national and, especially, the Sunday papers during the 1890s. It was during this 
decade that the Northcliffe Revolution took place. Newspapers began to be run more 
like businesses. As much advertising as possible was sought and this became linked 
to the size and nature of the readership. By the tum of the century no paper aiming 
195 Football Field, 3 December 1887 
196This incident was to have consequences for Scottish identity and also Scottish nationalism. On 10 
May 1887 the Scottish FA announced that Scottish clubs could not be members of any other FA's 
and this forced them to withdraw from the FA Cup. This speeded up the development of Scottish 
and English football on national lines, not British ones. In the process, it helped to reinforce Scottish 
consciousness. G. Jarvie and LA. Reid, 'Sport, Nationalism and Culture in Scotland', The Sports 
Historian, Vol. 19, 1 (May 1999), pp. 113-14 
197Mason, Association Football, p. 187 
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for a popular readership could neglect sport. 198 It was the manager who became the 
link between the press and the football club, and thus the fount of stories. Yet it was 
a two way process as information was sometimes passed on to promote the club. It 
was important that the club kept its local audience informed of anyon-going news 
such as the transfer of players or ticket arrangements for important games. 
Publicity therefore, was important for football clubs. Tom Watson had 
recognised its value from early on, and that the best way to convey it was through 
the press. At the 1887 AGM of Newcastle West End, one member, l.A. Mather, 
took exception to reporters being present and moved that they leave. Watson 
strongly objected. He insisted that the club was a public body and that instead, the 
press should be made welcome and be able to publish and criticise the club's 
proceedings. 199 When he was involved with Rosehill it was announced in 1885 that, 
as a publicity stunt, the club intended to engage a Highlander in costume to play the 
team on to the ground.2oo On other occasions, because the club did not have enough 
money to pay a printer's bill, Watson, under the cover of darkness, advertised a 
forthcoming game by painting details on a wall.201 Later, in September 1887 
Newcastle West End was accompanied by the columnist, 'Captain' on its trip to 
Edinburgh. His favourable report undoubtedly reflected the club's wishes as it 
embarked on a more professional approach?02 
198T. Mason, 'All the Winners and the HalfTimes ... or England lose by one goal and 326 runs', in 
Warwick Centre o/the Study o/Sport in Society Working Papers, Vol. 3 (1994), pp. 75-87 
199Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 6 June 1887, p. 7 
200Newcastle Daily Journal, 2 October 1885, p. 4 
201 Catton Folders, W 
202Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 13 September 1887, p. 7 
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Watson enjoyed a long and fruitful relationship with reporters and he used it 
to cultivate his own reputation. 
No secretary contrived to be mentioned in print so often as Tom Watson of 
Liverpool. He loved to see his name in good type. It was a little weakness of his -
and quite pardonable, for most people have their spice of vanity, although they take 
. l' 203 palOs to concea It. 
When he left Sunderland the local reporters presented him with an inscribed, 
carbuncle gold pin and a silver match box.204 Watson's particular relationship with 
the press has to be placed against the nature of football reporting of the period. The 
Athletic News, for example, was a strong supporter of professional football and 
exhibited a preference for northern teams. This is not surprising since it was 
published in Manchester, and John James Bentley was, between 1893 and 1900, its 
editor as well as the President of the Football League from 1894 to 1910?05 
Bentley's successor, James Catton, corresponded with Watson and other managers. 
This would usually entail a request by him for details of their careers which he could 
h fi . I 206 t en use or an artic e. 
At this early stage football clubs were usually reported in terms of their 
directors. Newspapers would announce that the directors had selected the team for 
Saturday for example. Yet some managers, such as Sudell, were already associated 
with their team. When Preston North End won the FA Cup in 1889, it was reported 
203 All Sports Weekly, 11 October 1924, p. 5 
204Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 19 August 1896, p. 3 
205Mason, Association Football, p. 191; Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 370. He was also a committee 
member of the Football League Management Committee between 1888-93 and again from 1910-12. 
ibid. 
206 Catton Folders, W 
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as Sudell's 'great victory' ?07 Sudell was also recognised as the club's dominant 
figure, and before the following season, the Athletic News predicted that 'Mr Sudell 
will keep the team up to its present high standards' ?08 It seems that Tom Watson 
had also established an early reputation with the press. In 1892 it was reported that 
a prominent FA Councillor lC. Clegg had asked Watson who he was. The reporter 
commented, '[f1ancy the great Tom Watson of Sunderland not being known' .209 
Liverpool were also referred to as 'Tom Watson's men', and this image was also 
transmitted to the pUblic. When the club won the League in 1901 the rejoicing 
crowds at Lime Street station in Liverpool attempted to shoulder him.210 
Furthermore, Watson was immortalised in a painting by Thomas Hemy, in a scene of 
a match between Sunderland and Aston Villa in January 189S?11 
Even if directors and committees ran clubs, it was still believed by some that 
a manager could make a difference to the team. When Aston Villa had problems with 
its committee in 1893 it was argued that the club lacked someone like Major Sudell or 
Mr Tom Watson who could improve its fortunes.212 At Burnley's AGM in 1894 it 
was remarked that some of the players were guilty of disobedience and misconduct 
and that it required a manager to look after the team. It was then claimed that, 
Mr Sudell ... was in the main responsible for the decision of the meeting. The 
argument was that while Mr Sudell was the manager, the North End were the 
207Athletic News, 1 April 1889, p. 5 
208Athletic News, 1 September 1889, p. 5 
209Liverpool Football Echo, 24 January 1891, p. 3 
210Birmingham Sporting Mail, 24 March 1906, p. 1; Liverpool Daily Post, 30 April 1901, p. 6. The 
crowd's attempt was unsuccessful due to size of his girth and his weight. 
211 h . h ft . h .. I W The Times, 16 October 1999, p. 37. Legend as It t at a er seemg t e ongma , atson was 
disappointed at not being depicted and Hemy then painted him on the line as the linesman. 
Information supplied by Eric Doig. 
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champions. Therefore, if Burnley have a manager, Burnley will become the 
h . 213 c amplons. 
In the majority of clubs though, directors and committees were unwilling to loosen 
the reins of power. However, the growth in newspaper readership also correlated 
with a rise in scapegoating, as fans wanted someone to blame when their team was 
not doing so well. Wagg has argued that club directors began to look for another 
figure to represent the public face of the club so that they instead, became the focus 
of the fans' ire?14 This was to help to project a public perception of the manager as 
a powerful figure within the club despite the fact that the main source of power was 
still located in the boardroom. 
What kind of lifestyle did the early football manager cultivate? First, how 
much were they paid and to what and to whom can this compared? It has been 
calculated that the mean average income of the male population in 1913-14, 
expressed as a percentage, was 116?15 For a manager this rose to 247, for clerks it 
was 122 while for foremen it was 152. It was also calculated that of 574,000 
managerial figures in 1913-14, nearly half earned over £200 per year. At the top end 
of the scale, 4140 (0.7 per cent) business managers earned on average £4321. William 
Sudell's annual salary in 1881 as a cotton mill manager was £500.216 This placed him 
within the middle incomes bracket of the upper and middle classes who accounted 
212Birmingham Daily Mail, 30 January 1893, p. 4 
213Athletic News, 13 August 1894, p. 1; Lancashire Daily Post, 28 May 1894, p. 4; 11 August 
1894, p. 3. Bradshaw was the late honorary secretary and was also the previous year's chainnan of the 
committee. Burnley's guarantors had originally wanted a Mr o. Pickles to take the job. He was the 
groundsman. Lancashire Daily Post, 16 June 1894, p. 2 
214Wagg, 'Organising Victory', p. 22 
215Savage and Miles, Working Class, Table 2.3, p. 26. The figure 100 is used to represent the 
average mean income for the entire population. 
216£26,865 at 2000 prices. 
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for 1.4 per cent of the occupied population?17 He enjoyed a 'comfortable' middle-
class lifestyle, as well as belonging to the 'servant-keeping class': in 1881 he also 
employed a live-in female, domestic servant.218 
Throughout this period, the growing importance of football managers was 
reflected by an increase in their salaries. Tom Watson originally earned 35s. a week 
(£89 per year) at Sunderland, later rising to £150?19 He also took over a 
tobacconist's shop in the town and it was in this shop's office that football business 
was conducted.22o On moving to Liverpool, Watson lived in terraced houses.221 His 
annual salary was £300 which at the time was considered the most anyone in football 
had ever earned, and this figure had probably increased by the time he died in 
1915?22 At 2000 prices £300 in 1896 converts to £20,310, equivalent to the salary 
of someone in the lower professional class such as teaching or academia. The effects 
of his probate amounted to £966 15s. 7d.223 He may also have taken his holidays 
abroad, although this might have included club tours?24 George Ramsey was also 
earning £300 by 1900 but by 1914 this may have increased to over £500. Ramsey's 
217preston Herald, 13 April 1895, p. 6; P. Thane, 'Social History 1860-1914', in R. Floud and D. 
McCloskey, (eds.), The Economic History of Britain since 1700, Vol. 2, First Edition (1981), p. 
205 
218perkin, Professional Society, p. 78; Census 1881. He lived at 3 St. George's Terrace, Preston 
with his wife, Ellen, and four children. They later had another five so it is not surprising that they 
employed a servant. 
219Sunderland Daily Echo, 4 June 1889, p. 3. The club's fmancial secretary was awarded a salary of 
£20 per annum, probably in the form of an honorarium. ibid.; Sunderland Weekly News, 2 October 
1931, p. 7. 
220Sunderiand Echo, 7 May 1915, p. 2, 'Obituary' 
221He occupied a terraced house at 106 St. Domingo Vale, and later 246 Anfield Road and house in 
Priory Road which were all close to the Anfield ground and John Houlding's establishment, the 
Sandon Hotel. I am grateful to Eric Doig for supplying me with this information, and for showing 
me Watson's home. 
222Liverpool Review, 1 August 1896, p. 6; Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 5 September 1896, 
(Football Edition), p. 3 
223In 2000 this converted to nearly £45,000. 
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assistant may also have earned a £150 annual salary.225 When John J Bentley became 
secretary of Manchester United in 1912 his salary was £300?26 These managers 
however, were at the top end of the scale and were employed by the bigger and more 
successful clubs. Lower down the scale, John Robson of Middlesbrough, earned a 
salary of £156 that was more in keeping with the status of a clerk.227 In 1895 Frank 
Watt was offered the position of secretary at Newcastle United with an annual 
salary of £140 plus a house owned by the club chairman, James Telford, that was 
rented to the club. Watson had earlier turned the position down because he earned 
more at Sunderland.228 Willie Maley's salary in 1897 was £150, although he also 
received £40 as an honorarium for past services rendered.229 
How did a manager's salary compare to other occupations as well as 
managers in other businesses? Male teachers, for example, in England and Scotland 
initially earned comparable salaries with salaried football officials but their incomes 
only increased gradually over a similar period. In 1880 the mean annual salary for a 
certificated teacher in England was £121 and in Scotland £138. By 1914 these figures 
had increased to £147 and £163 respectively.23o During the Victorian and Edwardian 
periods, the salaries of public figures reflected their status. For example, in 1913 the 
224Liverpool Echo, 6 May 1915, p. 5, 'Obituary' 
225See Appendix 5. On the balance sheet it states: Secretary's and Assistant Secretary's salaries -
£615 15s. 8d. £500 in 1914 equates to £28,087 at 2000 prices. 
226Tischler, Footballers and Businessmen, p. 74. £ 17,536 at 2000 prices. 
227Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 3 May 1900. This figure converts to £9677. 
228p. Joannou, The Black 'N' White Alphabet (Leicester, 1996), p. 482. Watt had formerly received 
an honorarium of £80 for being the secretary for the East of Scotland Association. Appleton, Hotbed 
of Soccer, pp. 124-25; R. Hutchinson, The Toon: A Complete History of Newcastle United Football 
Club (1997), pp. 24-25 
229 Campbell and Woods, Glory, p. 53 
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Chancellor of the Exchequer's salary was £5000?31 Earlier, in 1859-60, the Town 
Clerk of Manchester, Sir Joseph Heron, had been at the centre of a debate over 
whether to pay him an annual salary of £ 15 00 or £2000.232 
Managerial salaries in industry were dependent on factors such as locality, 
the type of industry and the job itself. The Stratford-upon-Avon brewery, Flowers 
and Sons, paid their clerks on average £10-£15 per month during the 1880s. Other 
salaried staff included department heads who earned £25 per month whilst the annual 
salary of a head brewer was between £300-£600. The wages of a malt house foreman 
were between 21 s to 26s per week whilst the foreman of the brewery's cooperage 
earned £4 per week.233 In the early years of the Birmingham motor car industry, FW 
Lanchester was appointed general manager of Lanchester Engine Company in 1899. 
d d D4 He was awar e a salary of £350 per annum that rose to £450 after two years. A 
works manager was appointed in 1901 but interestingly it proved impossible to get a 
properly qualified man because the salary offered, £150 a year, was too low?35 
It seems that, in terms of income, football managers had become part of the 
lower middle-class despite the lack of mobility from the working-classes to the 
middle-classes before 1914. It has been estimated that the odds against someone from 
a working-class home becoming a member of the middle class were 'monumental'. 
230H. Corr, 'Dominies and Domination: Schoolteachers, Masculinity and Women in Nineteenth 
Century Scotland', History Workshop Journal, No. 40 (Autumn 1995), Table One, p. 155. The 
current conversion rates for these are for 1881, £6390 and £7288; for 1914, £8257 and £9066. 
231Routh, Occupation and Pay, pp. 70-74. The equivalent of £280,867 in 2000. 
232 A. Briggs, Victorian Cities (1963), p. 207. £ 1000 in 1859 is the equivalent today of £50,301. 
233Reinarz, 'Flowers', pp. 219-21 
234 I' d h' .. h Lanchester had though a so mveste some IS own savmgs mto t e company. 
235P.W. Kingsford, 'The Lanchester Engine Company Limited 1899-1904', Business History, Vol. 
3,2 (1960-61), pp. 107-113 
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For a skilled worker's son it was 200 to 1 against and for an unskilled worker's son 
this increased to 2000 to 1 ?36 The idea of class however, is not merely defined by 
economic indicators such as income, nor by occupation or education. Instead, as E.P. 
Thompson has argued, class needs to be seen as a social and cultural formation, that 
it is defined by men and women as they live their own history?37 Melling argues that 
foremen were able to differentiate themselves from the ordinary worker through 
social aspirations and styles of life. This might also be reflected in a superior 
education and status. Foremen identified themselves more with the lower middle-
class than with artisans or workers, and they were often owners of small properties 
and frugal savers. Some also became freemasons. 238 Football managers probably held 
similar aspirations. It was claimed, with more than a hint of irony, that, '[ s ]ome 
secretaries sport big watch-chains, glittering rings and cigars the size of a policemen's 
239 truncheon' . 
Managers' aspirations were also reflected in the local societies and 
institutions that they joined. Freemasonry, for example, was an important part of a 
unitary civic culture (see Chapter 2). A number of football directors, like Fred 
Rinder, had joined its fraternity, and it is probable that with their assistance a 
number of managers were invited to join?40 Tom Watson, for example, was a 
freemason who was probably introduced to the 'brotherhood' by the Liverpool 
236Savage and Miles, Working Class, p. 34 
237Thompson, English Working Class, pp. 10-11 
238Melling, "Non-Commissioned Officer', p. 191 
239 All Sports Weekly, 11 October 1924, p. 5 
240 Aston Villa News and Record, 31 December 1938, p. 222 
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director, John McKenna.241 McKenna, himself, was probably invited to join a lodge 
himself by John Houlding, another freemason?42 The founder of Sunderland, James 
Allen, had also been an active freemason?43 During the late nineteenth century and 
early twentieth centuries there were regular reports of freemason meetings and who 
attended them. Football's link with freemasonry had begun as far back as the 
formation of the FA which used to hold its early meetings at the Freemason's Tavern 
in London?44 It continues to the present as the President of the Football 
Association, the Duke of Kent, is also the Grand Master of all freemasons?45 
Watson also attended church regularly and was a keen bowler. 246 He had been 
chairman of the Liverpool Parks and Garden League, and a former President of 
Liverpool and District Bowling Association.247 For his long service as a manager he 
was awarded the Football League's Long Service Medal in 1910 for twenty -one 
years in football management.248 Ernest Mangnall was also awarded one in 1921.249 
Furthermore, Watson's funeral was an occasion not just for the local community but 
for football as well. As a manager, Watson had become part of the football 
establishment. The Football League, local FA's and the major clubs were 
represented, as were members of the press. The number of wreaths numbered over 
241Liverpool Courier, 11 May 1915. At Watson's funeral it was reported that there was a large 
attendance of masons. Liverpool Daily Post, 23 March 1936, p. 5, 'Obituary'. McKenna was a 'well-
known freemason, being past master of several lodges and gaining high honours in the craft'. ibid. 
242Day, 'Football Club Directors', p. 55 
243Sunderland Daily Echo, 18 October 1911, p. 8, 'Obituary' 
244 . The Times, 27 October 1863, p. 3f, 2 September 1882, p. 10d, 29 August 1883, p. 8 
245 
1. Webb, Freemasonry and Sport (Addlestone, 1995), p. 28 
246Liverpool Echo, 7 May 1915, p. 4; Liverpool Evening Express, 6 May 1915, p. 5, 'Obituary' 
247Liverpool Evening Express, 6 May 1915, p. 5, 'Obituary' 
248Information supplied by Eric Doig, 10 June 1999 
249Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 186 
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one hundred (and this at a time of war). Seven former Liverpool players including 
Alex Raisbeck, Ted Doig, and the club trainer William Connell, acted as pall 
250 bearers. 
With its growing profile and the game's peculiar business that demanded 
weekly results, football management developed pressures all of its own. And these 
manifested themselves in various ways almost from the start. For William Sudell it 
ended with him being sent to prison for three years in April 1895. He had been found 
guilty of embezzling money from his mill and falsifying the accounts over a four year 
period from 1889 to 1893. Both the prosecution and defence agreed that Sudell did 
not gain personally from his felony. Instead, he diverted the money into the coffers 
of the club and used it for entertaining football officials and visiting teams.251 The 
management of Preston had started to overwhelm him. Football's increasing 
competition meant that he was forced to find other sources of income if Preston was 
to maintain its standing. 
The nature of the business could also fray the nerves. During the 1889 FA 
Cup semi-final against West Bromwich Albion, it was reported that Sudell and the 
club trainer, Tom Livesey, 'kicked about like a pair of restive ponies' due to the 
pressure from Albion?52 On another occasion Preston were losing 2-0 to Notts. 
County and Sudell encouraged or perhaps berated the players from the touchline.253 
Similarly, Tom Watson was also nervous about the result of any match, and 'for a 
250Liverpool Courier, 11 May 1915. When Doig died four years later he was buried 20 feet away in 
Anfield Cemetery, General section 4, plot 1477. Both graves are unmarked by a stone. Information 
supplied by Eric Doig 
25Ipreston Herald, 13 April 1895, p. 6; Preston Guardian, 13 April 1895, p. 2; Public Record 
Office H0140/161, A58929. See Appendix 10 
252 
Athletic News, 18 March 1889, p. 4 
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long period could not bear to look at a game in which his team was engaged until 
assured that a good lead had been obtained' .254 He was highly strung and it was 
common for him to leave the ground or walk around the grandstand because he could 
not stand the strain.255 This stress, combined with a weight that was between 18 and 
20 stones, perhaps resulted in pleurisy which caused his death.256 By contrast, John 
Cameron took a more relaxed attitude, and was still imbued with the amateur spirit. 
Before the 1901 Cup Final, he was the last of the Spurs team on to the field, walking 
casually with his hands in his pockets and with an air of indifference about him to 
the biggest game of the year.257 
By 1914 the role of a football managerial figure, in line with similar 
developments throughout industry as a whole, had gradually gained more 
importance. The business of football clubs had increased, and directors, with their 
own businesses to run, were unable to meet the rising demands of managing a club. 
Furthermore, as competition increased, more clubs realised that a sort of specialist 
was required to run the club on a day-to-day basis. Clubs had originally sought men 
with financial and clerical experience but would later turn to players who had had 
professional experience of the game. Directors however, were still in control, and 
made all the important decisions, including team selection. Furthermore, managers 
were hardly specialists but rather a product of British management's practical 
tradition. The job did not require any formal training nor qualifications, or even much 
253Catton, Wickets, p. 146. They recovered to win 3-2. 
254Sunderland Echo, 7 May 1915, p. 2, 'Obituary' 
255Athletic News, 10 May 1915, 'Obituary' 
256Catton Folders, W; Liverpool Evening Express, 6 May 1915, p. 5, 'Obituary' 
257 Kicking and Screaming, BBC Television (1995) 
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in the way of basic education. It was not 'professionalised' therefore, like some 
professions had been but managers did begin to try and forge a professional, and as a 
result a middle-class, identity using the expanding press coverage of football to help 
achieve it. In 1907, for example, a secretaries' and managers' association was 
established although it was more characteristic of a friendly society, than a 
professional body and it did not last long?58 The gradual importance of the 
manager's job however, was being recognised not just by the press but also by clubs 
through the increase in their salaries. Although clubs tried to control players' wages, 
a manager's income remained subject to individual negotiations in a largely free 
market. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HERBERT CHAPMAN: A MODEL OF FOOTBALL 
MANAGEMENT, 1907-1934 
That Herbert Chapman was the first and probably the greatest, in a line of great 
football managers is of crucial importance in the development of the game as we 
know it today. 
S. Studd, Herbert Chapman: Football Emperor (1998), p. 12 
Men of stature really have their own effect on football by doing something different 
when something different is needed. The sheep follow, until some other man of 
stature leads them along a different path his adventurous, probing mind has charted. 
Such an adventurer was Herbert Chapman who in transforming Arsenal transformed 
the game of football. 
Busby, Soccer, p. 135 
Herbert Chapman not only put Arsenal on top of the soccer world. He did more for 
professional football than any man since William McGregor, the founder of the 
Football League. The C.B. Cochran of football, he swept it from the committee 
and roped-off enclosure stage to be a leading entertainment industry and he showed 
that teams run by amateur directors could not match those run by expert managers. 
He looked beyond the cloth-capped supporters and made big soccer games as 
fashionable as Wimbledon or a Test Match. 
B. Joy, Forward Arsenal (1952), p. 85 
He dreamed while he worked, a dream ever glowing of the glory of Greece in an 
English game. 
Thomas Moult's tribute to Herbert Chapman, 1934 in D. Henderson, Soccer 
(1980), p. 72 
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Herbert Chapman provides a benchmark in the development of the football manager. 
He died suddenly and relatively young in 1934 at the age of 55 and it could be argued 
that this inspired the beatification process that the eulogies above suggest. Yet he 
was undoubtedly the model on which modem football managers have been shaped in 
terms of the influence they have held within football clubs and because of Chapman, 
the perceived importance of the football manager to his club has taken on a new 
dimension. He enjoyed unprecedented success with his clubs and demonstrated how 
essential skilled management was to the modem football club. As small organisations, 
football clubs have left much potential for individuals to influence their management 
through the strength of their personality. Traditionally, the directors had kept a tight 
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grip on the reIns of power, and this continued through the inter-War period. 
Chapman as a manager therefore, was exceptional; an example of the impact that 
human agency can have on the process of social change. 1 His career is also a study in 
micropolitics but it needs to be located within its wider context. 
Chapman had grasped the idea that football should, and could be modernised 
into something more akin to the entertainment business. Particularly when he was 
manager at Arsenal during the 1930s, he tried to attract and then cater for a wider 
audience that was less stratified and more heterogeneous. Chapman later claimed that 
[t]he old idea that a club may sit back and wait for the crowds to come should have 
died long ago. In these days you have to fetch them by making an irresistible 
appeal and in this respect, at least, we do not differ greatly from other entertainment 
2 promoters. 
Throughout Chapman's career in football, one of the most famous entertainment 
promoters was C.B. (Charles Blake) Cochran. Cochran was a theatrical entrepreneur 
and a showman who had an eye for the spectacular. He began by staging boxing and 
wrestling matches before making his name promoting Harry Houdini. He later staged 
a rodeo at Wembley's Empire Exhibition in 1924. Many theatrical productions 
followed, including a long collaboration with Noel Coward on 'On With the Dance'. 
Cochran was not a businessman, but his visual sense and good ear for music provided 
the basis for his success as an entertainer.3 In other service industries, entrepreneurs 
were also placing an increasing importance on the dramatic in order to attract 
customers. An early pioneer in the field of retail, for example, was Gordon H. 
1 P. Burke, History and Social Theory (Oxford, 1992), pp. 38-43 
2 H. Chapman, Herbert Chapman on Football (1934), John Graves (ed.), p. 125 
3 Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 1, pp. 715-19 
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Selfridge. An American, Selfridge had a flair for publicity and in 1906 he moved to 
London. He had been impressed by London style but neither its department stores 
nor their marketing and selling techniques. In 1909 Selfridge's opened on Oxford 
Street to a great fanfare of publicity and became an example of American retailing 
methods on this side of the Atlantic. Selfridge himself was a showman who loved 
display, although he paid careful attention to conditions of work for his staff. He 
also prided himself on knowing their psychology and that of his customers.4 
In addition to his awareness of the need to promote the game, Chapman 
brought a more systematic approach to football management. The journalist Jimmy 
Catton claimed that Chapman studied the styles and tactics of his opponents and 
that many matches were won before a game had begun.5 His emergence was also a 
reflection of the rise of dynamic managers in other areas of business, and a growing 
scientific approach to management in general. By the early twentieth century new 
ideas had emerged such as the scientific management associated with the writing of 
Frederick Taylor (see Chapter 1). Henri Fayol, a mining engineer from France, also 
argued that administration was a specialised function, and that the higher the position 
in a company's management hierarchy, the more administrative knowledge and skills 
became important.6 Fayol believed that every manager's objective was 'to get the 
optimum return from all employees of his unit in the interest of the whole concern'. 
He also argued that to manage was 'to forecast and plan, to organize, to command, to 
co-ordinate and to control'. Managing by command, for example, rested on certain 
\bid., Vol. 5, p. 109-13 
5 All Sports Weekly, 13 March 1926, p. 6 
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personal qualities and an awareness of the general principles of management such as 
having a thorough knowledge of hislher personnel and the setting of a good example.7 
1 By 1939 however, top British management whether owners or salaried 
managers, was still dominated by traditional attitudes. There was little evidence of a 
radical divorce of ownership from control and the business culture of personal 
capitalism persisted. Manufacturing industry was diffident towards management 
training not only in comparison to its American counterpart but also the British 
railway industry. The education and training of managers remained separate 
activities, and even large companies retained a cosy 'amateurishness,.8 Whereas in 
Japan, Germany and the USA there was a propensity to employ professional 
managers, in Britain there was still the widely-held belief that 'managers were born 
and not made' .9 
2 One company not part of this overall corporate lag was Imperial Chemical 
Industries (see Chapter 1). In its early years it was dominated by Harry McGowan 
who was at the cutting edge of the emergence of professional managers. A 
Glaswegian by birth, he rose from being a 5s a week office boy at Nobels' Explosives 
in 1894 to chairman and managing director of ICI by 1930. He possessed a shrewd 
judgement of character and excellent bargaining skills that facilitated his rise through 
the managerial ranks of Nobel Industries. In October 1926 McGowan, along with 
6Urwick and Brech, Scientific Management, pp. 39-46; H. Fayol, 'General Principles of 
Management' in Pugh, Organization Theory, pp. 135-56 
7H. Fayol, General and Industrial Management (1949), p. 6,43,97 
8Gourvish, 'British Business', p. 34 
9Wilson, Business History, p. 177 
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Alfred Mond, formed Imperial Chemicals Industries Ltd.lO He was an expert in 
commercial matters rather than technical ones but he was strong-minded and full of 
self-confidence, with a flair for negotiation and finance. McGowan however, was also 
an autocrat who was ruthless, purposive and resolute; and it was anathema for him 
to delegate authority to divisional managers. 11 
Chapman was born on 19 January 1878 in the small Yorkshire mining 
community of Kiveton Park half-way between Sheffield and Worksop. His father, 
John, was a miner, possibly illiterate as he was unable to write his own name, who 
had five other sons and one daughter. 12 Herbert attended the local colliery school 
which played football and cricket, and he became captain and secretary of the 
football team by the age of 12.13 He later played for Kiveton as did all his brothers. 14 
One of his brothers, Harry, later played for Sheffield Wednesday winning Football 
League honours in 1903 and 1904, and an FA Cup winner's medal in 1907. He was 
also manager of Hull City between 1913 and 1914.15 Of his other brothers, two lived 
in Grimsby; Thomas was a chief stevedore and Matthew a sanitary inspector. The 
other two stayed in Kiveton; Jack became a county councillor and a magistrate whilst 
Ernest was an official at the colliery. His sister married and also stayed in the village. 
IOThis involved an amalgamation of Nobel Industries, Brunner Mond, United Alkali and the British 
Dyestuffs Corporation. 
11 Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 4, pp. 21-27 
I2Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 19; P. Soar and M. Tyler, Arsenal: The Official Illustrated History 
1886-1996 (1996), p. 13 
13Catton Folders B-C, p. 263, 'The New Manager', May 61912; 'A Chat with Mr Herbert 
Chapman', November 11 1908; Daily Independent (Sheffield), 8 January 1934, p. 1, 'Obituary' 
I4Daily Independent (Sheffield), 8 January 1934, p. 1, 'Obituary' 
15Harry later died from tuberculosis, 29 April 1916. Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 105 
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Along with the rest of his family, Chapman regularly attended the local Methodist 
Chapel, and he also went to the Methodist Sunday school. I6 
On leaving school he initially worked at Kiveton Colliery with his father. 
When he was 17 he left Kiveton to work for a firm of ticket printers in Ashton-
under-Lyne. He earned lOs. a week but his income had to be supplemented by his 
mother as his weekly rent was 11 s. Chapman also played for a local team, Ashton 
North End, but he soon found another job and played for Stalybridge Celtic which 
paid him 7s 6d a week. Chapman went on to play for several clubs, although he 
enjoyed only a moderate career as a footballer. His first club as a professional was 
Grimsby Town whom he joined in May 1898. 17 He actually signed amateur forms 
but during the week he worked in a local solicitor's office for 5_ days and played 
football on Saturday afternoon with the club paying four-fifths of his salary!8 He 
also had spells at Swindon Town, Sheppey United in Kent, Worksop, Northampton 
Town, Sheffield United, and finally, Tottenham Hotspur when John Cameron was 
manager. During his playing days he showed an early knack for the spectacular by 
wearing light yellow boots. 19 
It has been widely reported that Chapman later qualified as a mining engineer 
but the evidence for this is vague and there is no record of him ever graduating. It 
maybe that he started a course at University College, Sheffield but never completed 
it because he moved around so much. He may have later claimed that he qualified in 
16Daily Independent (Sheffield), 8 January 1934, p. 1, 'Obituary'. His mother, Emma, died in 1908 
and his father became ill shortly afterwards. Chapman cared for him in Northampton when he was 
manager. Northampton Daily Reporter and Echo, 25 August 1908, p. 4 
17 Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 24 
18Catton Folders B-C, p. 263, 'A Chat with Mr Herbert Chapman', November 11 1908; 
Northampton Daily Echo, 4 May 1912, p. 4. 
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an attempt to embellish his profile. Whatever his qualifications, Chapman brought a 
more considered and humane approach to football management that was to be the 
basis for his later success?O In 1905 Chapman married Annie Poxon while he was 
playing for Spurs. They had met earlier at Kiveton Park where she was a teacher. She 
had wanted to continue her teaching career in North London at Silver Street school 
but because of married workers regulation, i.e. the 'marriage bar', this proved 
difficult. However, she did retain her position. Edmonton Education Committee had 
initially proposed that her job be advertised but the motion was defeated by a single 
vote after the headmistress had praised her efficiency and discipline as a teacher?1 
His first managerial position was with Northampton Town, which he took 
up in April 1907 at a time when clubs were beginning to employ managers at an 
increasing rate.22 The background to his arrival at Northampton Town reflected local 
as well as national issues within football. The club had been formed in 1897 and was 
in immediate competition with the town's older rugby club, the Saints. Northampton 
Town joined the Southern League in 1901 but struggled to make an impact and after 
the 1905-06 season had to seek re-election to the League.23 In 1906 a joint board of 
guarantors and members of the old committee had been appointed to manage the club 
due to its parlous financial situation.24 Northampton was then the only club in the 
19L. Knighton, Behind the Scenes in Big Football (1948), p. 62 
2°1 am grateful for the research undertaken by Lawrence Aspden, the Curator of Special Collections 
and Library Archives, University of Sheffield, and Mark Shipway at the Leeds University Archive, in 
helping me trying to trace Chapman's mining qualifications. 
21 Studd, Herbert Chapman, pp. 31-32 
22 . Northampton Dally Echo, 4 May 1912, p. 4 
23Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 35; Catton Folders B-C, p. 263, 'A Chat with Mr Herbert 
Chapman', November 11 1908. 
24Northampton Daily Reporter and Echo, 2 May 1906, p. 4 
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Southern League that relied on gate receipts and three or four patrons for its income. 
The other clubs relied on shareholders and directors?5 The guarantors included the 
officers of the club who controlled the club's financial affairs while the overall 
responsibility for the team fell to a selection committee and the club secretary, A. 
Jones. The club had also engaged a new trainer, Dick Murrell?6 
Northampton Town however, was really run by AJ. 'Pat' Darnell who was 
one of the club's guarantors?7 He was a charismatic figure both on a local and 
national scale. A prominent Northampton Conservative and a local solicitor, Darnell 
was appointed the Borough Coroner in 1911, a position that he held for 40 years. He 
had an interest in all the town's sporting clubs and was the honorary secretary of 
Northamptonshire County Cricket Club from 1891 to 1921. He also served on the 
MCC's Board of Control. Initially a rugby player, Darnell was elected acting 
President of Northampton Town when it was formed in 1897 and was responsible 
for managing the club's successive re-elections to the Southern League.28 
Fishwick has argued that only clubs that lacked strong traditions of directors' 
involvement or in which a crisis occurred, would experiment with new ideas?9 
Northampton Town fitted these criteria on both accounts. Chapman's appointment 
in April 1907, initially as a player-manager, was set against a further deterioration in 
the club's financial and football position as it again sought re-election?O The 
25ibid., 28 August 1906, p. 3. Studd claims that Northampton Town became a limited liability 
company in 1901. Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 35 
26Northampton Daily Reporter and Echo, 21 August 1906, p. 3; 28 August 1906, p. 3 
27 ibid., 28 August 1906, p. 3 
28Northampton Chronicle and Echo, 23 March 1955, p. 5, 'Obituary' 
29Fishwick, English Football, pp. 37-38 
30 Northampton Independent, 4 May 1907, p. 10 
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guarantors demanded more control of the club's management in return for a further 
sum of money that would allow the club to apply for re-election. Consequently, 'it 
was made a condition that a Playing-Manager should be secured,?1 Chapman was 
their selection 'and it was the intention of the guarantors to give him a free hand' in 
terms of his management of the team.32 This meant that the selection committee 
(which had both selected and dropped Chapman when he was a player at 
Northampton Town) was dispensed with, although not the services of the old 
officials. It was evident to the club's guarantors that for the club to advance both on 
and off the pitch, it had to follow 'the lead of most other clubs' and appoint a 
manager with a knowledge of professional football as opposed to relying on the 
h . 33 amateurs on t e commIttee. 
To what extent Chapman had a 'free hand' is not clear. At the end of his first 
season, it was commented on during the AGM that, 
it was impossible to pass without also thanking Herbert Chapman for his selection 
and dealing with the players. The standard of play and the good fellowship among 
the men were tributes to his skill in the selection and handling of players?4 
Chapman later claimed that he had had the responsibility of choosing the team at all 
the clubs he had managed.35 It is unlikely however, that Darnell acceded complete 
control on team matters. For example, when Northampton were looking for a suitable 
right-winger, it was reported that' [t]hey had no one who could fill that role to the 
31 As the new incumbent would be doing two jobs, the appointment of a player-manager instead of a 
manager was probably for economic reasons. 
32 
Northampton Daily Reporter and Echo, 24 August 1907, p. 3 
33'b 'd I I , 
34ibid., 14 July 1908, p. 3 
35 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, p, 7 
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satisfaction of the committee' .36 As Chapman was initially a player-manager his 
status would have been lower than ifhe had been the manager. Moreover, he had not 
been first choice for the job. That had been England international, Walter Bull, his 
team mate at Tottenham, and it was he who actually recommended Chapman for the 
job when they were players together at Tottenham. The fact that Chapman was 
promoted in status on two occasions also gives an indication of the level of his 
subservience. In 1909 he stopped playing and was given the revised title of 
secretary-manager with a three year extension to his contract.37 His salary was also 
increased in 1908 as a reward for the club's success.38 Before Chapman left to join 
Leeds City in 1912, the club had wanted to promote him again to the position of 
company secretary, at the time considered a more prestigious post than that of 
manager. 39 
A letter from Darnell to the editor of the Athletic News, Jimmy Catton, is 
suggestive of Chapman's position within the club might have been.4o In 1911 
Northampton Town drew at Newcastle United in the FA Cup but decided to forgo 
home advantage in the replay and switched the game to Newcastle in the expectation 
of a larger gate. This was Darnell's decision. He claimed that he consulted the players 
about the switch, not Chapman, although the players probably had little option but 
to go along with the suggestion. Darnell also refers to his manager by using his 
36 Catton Folders, V-W, p. 1870, 'Ideas', 27 February 1914 
37He continued to play for a local Thursday team. Catton Folders B-C, p. 263, 'The New Manager', 
6 May 1912 
38 Northampton Independent, 19 December 1908, p. 40 
39 
Northampton Daily Echo, 30 July 1912, p. 3 
40 Catton Folders M-O, p. 1238, 9 July 1911 
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surname only. He admits however, that he did not attend the replay which suggests 
that Chapman was in charge of the team. 
Chapman still operated within a framework where managers were not only 
subordinate but also socially inferior to their directors. To improve his social and 
professional standing however, he later became a member of a local freemasons' 
lodge.41 Dominated by the Protestant bourgeoisie, in addition to being elitist, men 
were only invited to join the craft, further narrowing the social field. His aspirations 
however, had only begun to be realised when Northampton Town was successful 
and his social mobility therefore, reflected his growing status within the club. At 
Northampton Town his appointment had an immediate effect on the team's 
fortunes. It finished sixth in his first season and won the Southern League 
championship in the following season, 1908-09. In the next three seasons 
Northampton finished in the top four. 42 The club's finances also improved 
markedly. Its income for the season prior to Chapman's arrival was £1855. In his 
final season it had increased to £5309.43 
The scope of his responsibilities embraced activities both on and off the field. 
But it was Chapman's influence as a manager in developing a tactical plan 'to 
organise victory' that was one of the most notable landmarks in the history of 
football management.44 As a player, he could only remember an occasional chat 
41He was a member of the Kingsley Lodge of Freemasons. Northampton Mercury and Herald, 12 
January 1934, p. 15, 'Obituary'. On moving to Sydney to take up a position as the secretary of an 
estate agency, Don Bradman became a freemason after being invited to join by the captain of his club 
side, St. George, in the early 1930s. Thus, reflecting both his rising professional and sporting status. 
C. Williams, Bradman (1996), pp. 26-29 
42Catton Folders B-C, p. 263, 'The New Manager', 6 May 1912 
43'b 'd I I . 
44 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, p. 13 
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between two men playing on the wing about tactics. Chapman was to make match 
preparation the main responsibility of the manager. This probably evolved out of 
Chapman's time as both player and manager which would have created opportunities 
to influence pre-match discussions about how to play. He later extended this by 
developing more long-term tactical ideas. Tony Say has claimed that his tactical 
acumen gave something extra to all the clubs he managed.45 At Northampton Town 
he sowed the seeds of his future strategies. Chapman believed that a team could 
attack for too long.46 He wanted to develop a more organic style of play where the 
team played together as a unit. At Northampton, for example, the two inside-
forwards would drop back in to defence at times to draw out the opposing defenders. 
This would then create more space behind the opposition's defence that could be 
exploited by swift counter-attacks. These counter-attacks were to be built on 
accurate long-passes and the element of surprise.47 But just as important as his plan 
was Chapman's ability to get it across to the players so that they understood it and 
believed in it. He achieved this through an ability to convey his arguments in an 
articulate manner but one in which the soft tones of his Yorkshire accent betrayed a 
certain steeliness.48 It also emphasises the importance of human capital and the need 
for intelligence in the field of management in general. 
In addition to his tactical acumen, Chapman was also a good judge of a 
player. Northampton did not have the financial resources of other Southern League 
45T. Say, 'Herbert Chapman: Football Revolutionary?', The Sports Historian, Vol. 16 (May 1996), 
p. 81 
46 
Chapman, Herbert Chapman, p. 65 
47 
Studd, Herbert Chapman, pp. 38-39 
48Chapman speaks briefly on Kicking and Screaming, Part 2, BBC Television. 
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clubs like Tottenham and Fulham, and this restricted the quality of the players 
Chapman could buy.49 Yet he was able to find the right players to suit the system he 
had developed. One of them was Edward Lloyd Davies, a Welsh international full 
back, whom he persuaded Darnell to make the first ever player for which 
Northampton paid a fee when he moved from Swindon in November 1907. He also 
discovered Fred Walden, an outside-right, at nearby Wellingborough in 1909 who 
was later to represent England.5o 
Chapman also has some claim to being the first 'track-suit' manager. It was 
reported after his death that, '[i]n his more active days he dressed for the part and 
went out to practice with a player whose deficiencies he wanted to remedy' .51 One 
of these players was Walden himself who improved his crossing of the ball through 
Chapman's tutoring.52 Chapman's successor at Northampton Town was, ironically, 
Walter Bull, and he can also claim to be a 'track suit' manager. At pre-season training 
it was reported that the players were practising their ball skills and 'among them was 
the new manager, Walter Bull, who donned training kit'. This is not surprising as for 
the previous 14 months he had been coaching the Gimnasia y Esgrima club in Buenos 
A· 53 Ires. 
In terms of his overall man-management of the team, Chapman's experience 
as a player had taught him that they should be treated with more consideration and 
that this could have a beneficial effect on the team. When he played for Grimsby the 
49 See Table 2.5 
50 Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 38, 45-46 
51 Yorkshire Evening Post, 6 January 1934, p. 10, 'Obituary' 
52 Catton Folders, V-W, p. 1870, 'Ideas', 27 February 1914 
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team had been run by a committee and its relations with the players had become so 
bad that training sessions had been riddled with indiscipline. 54 Chapman's 
background contrasted with the men previously responsible for the Northampton 
team, the financial secretaries, Benbow and Foyle and the secretary, 'Dado' Jones, 
who had been old officers of the club but with little real experience of professional 
football. 55 After Northampton Town won the Southern League in 1909, the impact 
of Chapman's contribution was recognised at the club's AGM, and he was praised 
'for the able way in which he has kept the team together and promoted that good 
feeling which brought about success' .56 
Chapman felt that managers had to share the problems of players to get the 
best out of them. He later used as an example the relationship between the French 
boxer Georges Carpentier and his manager Descamps, who had formed an 
understanding of human nature by psychological methods. Similarly, he felt that 
footballers and managers had to work together with confidence in each other to 
achieve the same goal. 57 Chapman also adopted a paternal approach. For example, 
players with serious injuries were sent to a specialist in Sheffield and the trainer, 
Dick Murrell, would rapidly provide treatment for other injuries. Chapman also 
arranged for the dressing rooms to be improved. 58 On his departure it was said that, 
, [t ]here has been an improvement in the morale as well as the football ability of the 
53Northampton Daily Echo, 1 July 1912, p. 4; 7 August 1912, p. 2; Albion News, 29 April 1911, 
p.5 
54 
Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 24 
55 Northampton Daily Reporter and Echo, 24 August 1907, p. 3 
56 Northampton Daily Echo, 20 July 1909, p. 3 
57 
Chapman, Herbert Chapman, pp. 9-10 
58 Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 41 
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players. The relations between manager and players have been of the best and 
between the players and public no less' .59 
As well as his responsibility for the players, Chapman, as secretary-manager 
had administrative duties. As Northampton Town was in local competition with the 
rugby club it needed to generate more support. Graham Williams has claimed that 
'how to overcome the Rugby game and win away its followers was one of the major 
issues confronting the early football clubs'. 60 Chapman never managed a club from a 
traditional football area. Both Leeds City and Huddersfield were located in rugby 
strongholds and although Arsenal did not face competition from the oval ball game, it 
was not regarded as London's major club when he became its manager. The county of 
Northamptonshire as a whole preferred the association code. Yet the town of 
Northampton itself favoured rugby. Northampton Town needed success to entice 
people from nearby small towns like Rushden, Kettering and Wellingborough who 
usually supported their local teams.61 
Chapman was aware of the value of publicity In stimulating interest in 
football and he used newspapers to promote the club.62 On taking up his position it 
was reported that, '[h]e wants to do everything possible to maintain interest in the 
cl ub' s doings while the 1 st XI is out of town'. The reserve team was to be 
strengthened and a scoreboard was erected on the ground that gave the results of 
other clubs' matches.63 The following season Chapman reported a large increase in 
59Northampton Daily Echo, 4 May 1912, p. 4 
60Williams, Code War, p. 4 
61 Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 52 
62 ibid., p. 42 
63Northampton Daily Reporter and Echo, 19 August 1907, p. 3 
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season ticket sales and the grandstand's central accommodation had to be increased. 64 
He later reached an agreement with Northampton Rugby Club whereby the fixtures 
of the two clubs did not clash.65 
Chapman left Northampton Town in May 1912 to become the secretary-
manager of Leeds City, possibly for more money or perhaps because he saw greater 
potential at Leeds.66 It had been reported a month before that Leeds was going to 
appoint 'the well-known secretary of a Southern League club in the Eastern 
Midlands' .67 Despite this rumour, Chapman later signed a new contract at 
Northampton, and when he moved Darnell made it a condition that he did not take 
any Northampton players with him.68 He agreed to this but in November 1912 tried 
to buy Fred Walden. He was thwarted when the Northampton supporters set up a 
shilling fund that enabled the club to keep him.69 However, in an early example of 
managers bringing their own assistants with them, trainer, Dick Murrell did 
accompany Chapman to Leeds but only after he made it clear that he wanted to leave 
Northampton and not just go to Leeds.7o 
It is a cliche that football managers never go to a club when it is doing well 
but one that has an element of truth. Consequently, one of Chapman's first tasks 
was to lobby (successfully) for votes for the re-election of Leeds to the Football 
64 'b 'd I I , 
65Northampton Daily Echo, 1 August 1911, p. 1 
66 , Athletic News, 6 May 1912, p. 1 
67ibid , 25 March 1912, p. 1 
68Athletic News, 6 May 1912, p. 1; Northampton Daily Echo, 30 July 1912, p. 3 
69 Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 54 
70Northampton Daily Echo, 30 July 1912, p. 3 
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League after the club had finished bottom of the Second Division. 71 Leeds, also like 
Northampton, underwent a financial reconstruction soon after Chapman's arrival. In 
a predominantly rugby area, Leeds City, which had only been formed in 1904, 
struggled to survive. Chapman's predecessor Frank Scott-Walford left the club due 
to ill-health apparently caused by the anxieties brought on by the club's poor 
financial situation. He had earlier written to the directors complaining that he had 
personally been called upon to meet the club's liabilities. Total losses since 1905 
amounted to £11,320 with a deficiency between assets and liabilities of£8365.72 
Following an EGM in August 1912, Leeds went into voluntary liquidation. A 
new company was formed which had a nominal capital of £7000. The claims of the 
club's previous guarantors, Sam and Reginald Kirk, were settled when they received 
£1000 in cash and £9000 in debentures. Norris Hepworth, the eldest son of the 
tailor, Joseph Hepworth, replaced them as the club's main benefactor and guarantor. 
In 1891 Joseph Hepworth & Son became a private company with a capitalisation of 
£360,000 and Norris as its chairman.73 Tom Coombes was appointed the club's 
liquidator, a position he held until August 1915 that emphasised the club's 
precarious financial situation.74 The club's underlying weakness was its share issue 
which only raised £5500, and when the bank pressed for the return of its £7000 
overdraft, Norris Hepworth paid up. The financial situation eased following 
71 
Chapman, Herbert Chapman, p. 2 
72 Arnold, Game, p. 61 
73 Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 3, pp. 170-73 
74 Athletic News, 26 August 1912, p. 6; Arnold, Game, p. 61 
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Chapman's appointment but it was again threatened by the death of Norris 
Hepworth in 1914 whose estate was owed £16,000 by the club.75 
Initially, Chapman needed to recruit players. An advertisement in the Athletic 
News simply stated, 'Leeds City FC Ltd; Require First Class Players; All 
Positions' .76 As the paper was virtually a trade journal, advertising for players plus 
managers and trainers, it was used by every club in England and even some abroad. 
By the end of his first season, Chapman had persuaded the financially prudent Leeds 
directors to part with £3000. This was to pay a dividend, literally, as the club 
finished sixth and attendances increased to the extent that there was a profit of 
£400.77 In October 1912 however, his team building led to the first in a series of 
skirmishes that Chapman had with the football authorities. As we have seen in 
Chapter 2, during this period football had been hit by a number of scandals usually 
involving illegal payments to players as clubs tried to circumnavigate the restrictions 
of the maximum wage. During the summer of 1912 Chapman had signed three new 
players and agreed to pay each of them a full year's salary of £208 to the end of the 
following April. The problem was that two months had already elapsed since the end 
of their previous contracts. This meant that, in effect, the players were receiving 
more than the maximum wage of £4 per week. Chapman, apparently, realised the 
illegality of this and persuaded the board to ask the Football League to instigate an 
enquiry. Chapman was admonished but also praised for his honesty. 78 
75 Arnold, Game, p. 62; Yorkshire Evening Post, 20 February 1914, 'Obituary' 
76 Athletic News, 20 May 1912, p. 4 
77 Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 56 
78ibid., pp. 56-57; 
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Chapman introduced two significant innovations to his management style at 
Leeds. First, in 1913 he began to use a round of golf as part of the training routine to 
help relax the players.79 Next, he inaugurated the team talk at Leeds. Chapman had 
decided that players should give as much thought to football as they did to playing 
billiards and gambling at cards.8o Before every home game the Leeds players would 
assemble on a Saturday morning at a city centre hotel to talk amongst themselves. 
Chapman presided but he encouraged every player to express his views on the 
previous week's game. At Leeds he also had a diagram of the field painted on a table 
top in his office where he would discuss the game with individual players. He 
recognised that the majority of northern and Scottish working-class players were shy 
and reticent about speaking in group situations, and that private interviews were a 
way of gaining their confidence.81 In comparison, his predecessor Frank Scott-
Walford had been a referee in the Southern League.82 He was perhaps more autocratic 
in his dealings with the players compared to Chapman's more paternalistic manner. 
Following the outbreak of war, first-class football was brought to a belated 
halt in 1915. A wartime regional competition replaced the traditional leagues and in 
1916 Leeds City won the northern group of the Midland League and the following 
year the Midland League itself. 83 Chapman had established a managerial reputation 
for himself by 1914 and during the War he took a position at the Bambow munitions 
79ibid., p. 61 
8°It was claimed that during the Euro 2000 football championships the England squad had been 
divided by those that had joined a card school and those that had not. It was also reported that sums 
of up to £6000 were gambled during card games causing friction amongst the players and 
undermining team spirit. 
81 
Chapman, Herbert Chapman, pp. 10-13 
82Tumer and White, Football Managers, p. 219 
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factory, the Number One National Shell Filling Factory just outside Leeds. He was 
chief storekeeper, in effect a sub-manager, with responsibility for the stores, the box 
factory plus the farm. 84 As head of his department, Chapman was empowered to 
place orders on behalf of the factory but the practical management of the stores and 
labour was under the direction of the works manager or managing director.85 Before 
the national filling factories opened, managers and foremen underwent training at the 
Woolwich Arsenal, although it is not known if Chapman attended.86 On the face of 
it, a football manager taking a managerial post, albeit a junior one, in a civilian 
workplace may seem unusual. In wartime however, anyone with managerial 
experience was probably sought out by the Ministry of Munitions. It also highlights 
again that British management in general was underdeveloped. Its practical tradition 
meant the Ministry was unable to recruit qualified managers and looked to people 
from various backgrounds like Chapman who had experience of handling people. 
83In 1918 Leeds again won the Midland League and also a play-off with the winners of the 
Lancashire League. Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 69 
84pRO MUN4/4297, Report of J. Gibson, 7 November 1917; R.H. Gummer, The Story of 
Rambow, 1919, 'Staff Lists of Nos. 1 and IA Filling Factories. Some accounts claim that he 
became its manager in chief with thirty sub-managers under him. However, there seems to be no 
evidence to substantiate this. See Huddersfield Examiner, 13 June 1925, p. 11 and Studd, Herbert 
Chapman, p. 68. The box factory was built in the spring of 1916 for the manufacture and repair of 
gun ammunition boxes. Up to 17,000 workers were engaged at Barnbow at its peak of which 93 per 
cent were women and girls. PRO MUN5/365/1122/4, National Filling Factory No.1. Leeds; 
Gummer, Rambow, p. 9 
85pRO MUN4/4297, Report of J. Gibson, 7 November 1917; PRO MUN5/102/400/14, Ministry of 
Munitions: National Filling Factories, Memo on System of Accounting. A sub-manager such as 
Chapman was subordinate to his managing director. In terms of salaries, foremen and sub-managers 
received annual salaries of about £250. The managing directors actually worked for nothing. The 
Ministry of Munitions had decided that could not afford to pay any managing directors because it 
would require an annual salary of between £2-5000. PRO MUN5/154/1122/3124, Copy of minute to 
Mr Nash CM, concerning the training of managers etc. for the National Filling Factories, 27 
November 1915; PRO MUN51153/1122.3/8, Meeting to discuss the administration of National 
Filling Factories and the appointment of managers, 17 August 1915 
86pRO MUN51154/1122.3/23, Outline of course of Instruction to be taken as Woolwich Arsenal by 
Managers and Foremen for National Filling Factories, November 1915 
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Working at the munitions factory may have influenced his later football 
management career. Seebohm Rowntree was placed in charge of the Ministry's 
Industrial Welfare Department and introduced measures similar to those in place at 
his York Cocoa Works. By the end of the War, 'modem welfare was firmly 
established in the public mind as an essential function of progressive industrial 
management' .87 What Chapman would have noticed was an emphasis on high health 
standards where workers were given regular medical examinations, backed up by 
surgeries and a dental department. 88 A Comfort Fund was instituted following a 
General Voluntary Agreement and a weekly deduction from the workers' wages. 
This also helped to pay for a two year lease on a convalescent home.89 
Chapman's managing director at Bambow was Joseph Watson.90 He was a 
soap manufacturer who had inherited the family firm, Joseph Watson and Sons. As 
managing director, Watson built up the firm and emerged as William Lever's main 
rival in the North. Watson had been impressed by Chapman's work at Bambow and 
offered him a position as superintendent of labour at Europe's largest seed crushing 
mills, the Olympia Oil and Cake Works in Selby.91 Throughout this period Chapman 
had still been advising Leeds but in December 1918 he resigned to take up his 
position at Selby which was probably a better paid job.92 In 1920 however, Watson 
87Urwick and Brech, Scientific Management, Vol. 1, p. 60 
88 Gummer, Barnbow, pp. 43-44 
89ibid., pp. 44-45. An important factor behind these developments may have been an explosion that 
killed 35 women workers on 5 December 1916. ibid., p. 50; PRO MUN5/365/112214, National 
Filling Factory No.1. Leeds. Gummer's account of the explosion's aftermath reads as government 
propaganda. Five other lives were lost due to accidents in two other incidents in 1917 and 1918. 
90pRO MUN5/36511122/4, National Filling Factory No.1. Leeds 
9 I Huddersjield Examiner, 13 June 1925, p. 11; Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 5, pp. 690-
92 
92Yorkshire Evening News, 16 December 1918; Huddersjield Examiner 13 June 1925, p. 2 
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sold the oil mills to a Dutch margarine company, and Chapman found himself out of 
. b 93 
aJo . 
On announcing that Chapman was leaving Leeds City to work for Joseph 
Watson, the report in the Yorkshire Evening News had read like an epitaph regarding 
his career in football. This was nearly prophetic. On 6 October 1919 Leeds City was 
suspended by the FA and later that month it was expelled from the Football League. 
A joint FA and Football League commission had been set up to inspect the club's 
books following allegations by a former player, Charles Copeland, of improper 
payments to players during the War.94 In July 1915 the FA had suspended all player 
agreements and ruled that players could not be paid and, in October 1916, the 
Football League Management Committee drew up stringent rules for players' 
expenses.95 Leeds City was asked to produce their accounts for inspection but the 
directors had given them to a Leeds solicitor who refused to hand them over, without 
a legal subpoena.96 Chapman was implicated and then suspended sine die together 
with four members of the Leeds directorate and another official, George Cripps.97 As 
he was at Barnbow during the time of the alleged payments, it was difficult to gauge 
the extent to which Chapman knew about them. 
93 Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 5, pp. 690-92 
94 Athletic News, 1 September 1919, p. 1 
95 A.J. Arnold, "Not Playing the Game?': Leeds City in the Great War', IJHS, Vol. 7,1 (May 1990), 
p. 113 
96 Athletic News, 29 September 1919, p. 1, 6 October 1919, p. 1 
97 Arnold, "Not Playing the Game?', p. 115, 117-18, n2. Tony Arnold has since traced the missing 
documents and has discovered that Leeds did break the FA ban on paying players and tried to mask 
the amount of expenses paid out. He does not specify however, the extent of Chapman's role in the 
affair. ibid., p. 118, n38. My own research, which followed protracted correspondence with a firm of 
Leeds' solicitors, Blacks, failed to unearth the missing records. 
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Chapman's ban was overturned in October 1920 by the same commission, 
although he was now out of work, and whereas the Leeds directors were unaffected 
materially by their ban, Chapman relied on football for a living.98 His career in 
football management restarted at Huddersfield Town where he was to win his first 
major honours; the FA Cup in 1922 and in 1924 and 1925 the Football League 
h . h' 99 C amplOns lp. 
Like Leeds City, Huddersfield had run into financial problems. By 1919 total 
accumulated losses were £6650, and despite spending over £21,000 on ground 
improvements, attendances only averaged 4000.100 Furthermore, two of the club's 
directors, David and Hilton Crowther, were owed over £25,000. They ran a large 
woollen textile mill in Milnsbridge and did not want to patronise a loss-making club. 
Instead, they wanted to move Huddersfield Town to Leeds City's old ground at 
EIland Road after that club had been disbanded in 1919, which they believed offered 
better commercial opportunities. The move to Leeds fell through however. 
Supporters of Huddersfield Town were mobilised by its chairman, W.L. Hardcastle, 
and another director, Amos Brook Hirst. IOI The Football League Management 
Committee had ordered that the club pay the Crowthers £25,000 by the end of 1919 
98 Catton Folders B-C, p. 263, 'Free and of Good Report', 25 October 1920 
99Huddersfield also won it the following season when Chapman left for Arsenal, the first club to win 
the Football League championship three years in succession. 
100 
Arnold, Game, p. 82 
10lBrook Hirst was a prominent Huddersfield lawyer, and had originally preferred rugby. He was one 
ofthe club's original directors in 1908 but resigned in 1911 before returning to assist with raising the 
funds to ensure the club's survival. He later served on the Football League Management Committee 
from 1931 to 1939, and between 1939 and 1941 was President of the League itself. He resigned his 
post that year to become chairman of the FA Council. Inglis, League Football, p. 394 
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if it wanted to stay in Huddersfield. A fund was set-up and the target reached and an 
upturn in results that season resulted in a profit of £368.102 
Huddersfield Town were also in competition with the older local rugby league 
club, Huddersfield, which played in the Fartown district. Huddersfield dated from 
1868 whereas 'Town' were comparative late-comers, being formed only in 1908. 103 
Huddersfield Town had been floated by 170 people who took up 600 £1 shares out 
of a nominal capital of £2000. It originally applied for membership of a proposed 
Third Division of the Football League. This scheme failed but it joined the Second 
Division in 1910.104 Along with the two Bradford clubs (see Chapter 2), a number of 
West Yorkshire clubs had adopted the association code during the early 1900s, 
including Leeds City in 1904 and Halifax Town which formed itself into a company 
in 1911. As a result, all of rugby's northern strongholds had become vulnerable to the 
lure of the Football League. lOS 
In the face of this competition, the Northern Rugby Union went through a 
phase of reconstruction. To make itself more attractive to potential spectators, for 
example, the number of players was reduced from 15 to 13 in 1906. 106 Before the 
102Catton Folders H-K, p. 836, Sunday Dispatch, 25 January 1931; Huddersjield Examiner, 18 June 
1921, p. 2. David Crowther continued to serve on the 'Town's' board while his brother, became the 
first chairman of Leeds United AFC Ltd in October 1920. It was he who carried the club's fmancial 
burden of £35,000, and it was not until 1924 when Leeds were promoted to Division One that he 
was repaid through a debenture scheme. Hilton Crowther was a Leeds board member for over 30 
years. Arnold, Game, p. 83; Huddersfield Examiner, 18 June 1921, p. 2 
103WiIliams, Code War, p. 33. By 1895 the rugby club was known as Huddersfield Northern Union 
Club following the breakaway by some northern clubs. This was later changed in 1922 to 
Huddersfield Rugby League Football Club following the adoption of the title Rugby League for the 
new code. 
104 
Arnold, Game, pp. 61-62; Catton Folders H, p. 74, All Sports Weekly, 10 March 1928; Catton 
Folders H-K, p. 836, Sunday Dispatch, 25 January 1931 
IOSWiIliams, Code War, p. 172 
106A.J. Arnold, 'The Belated Entry of Professional Soccer into the West Riding Textile District of 
Northern England: Commercial Imperatives and Problems', IJHS, Vol. 6 (3), December 1989, pp. 
330-31 
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First World War, Huddersfield had a winning team, led by the charismatic Harold 
Wagstaff, and support for it far outstripped that of its association rivals. In face of 
this competition the football club went into voluntary liquidation in 1912 and had to 
be reconstructed as a new company. 107 One visible consequence of this was that the 
local press gave preference to the rugby club in its coverage. By 1921 however, gates 
at Huddersfield Town were outstripping those of the rugby club and by 1923 it was 
the football club that enjoyed preferential treatment. 108 
Chapman became manager of Huddersfield Town shortly after his 
predecessor, Ambrose Langley, resigned on 24 April 1921. 109 Chapman had 
probably arrived at the club in February of that year but it is unclear under what role, 
although it may have been as assistant manager. 110 A few days before Langley's 
resignation, Chapman had signed Clem Stephenson from Aston Villa and Langley 
may have resigned on the principle that he was not informed of the transfer. He may 
also have felt that the directors had already decided to replace him with Chapman. III 
It was at Huddersfield Town that Chapman came to national prominence and 
the club's success made his name as a manager. Initially though, his position was 
relatively marginal as the directors took an active part in the club's management. 112 
107Williams, Code War, p. 178 
108 Huddersjield Examiner, 10 September 1921, p. 14. Huddersfield Town had had a gate of 19,000 
whereas the rugby club's last two crowds were 10,359 and 10,499. 
I09Huddersjield Daily Examiner, 24 March 1921, p. 1, 1 April, p. 3; Athletic News, 28 March 1921, 
p. 3 
1l0Huddersjield Examiner, 13 June 1925, p. 2. The circumstances behind his move to Huddersfield 
are uncertain as it is not actually known how long or in what capacity he had served before he became 
manager. 
IllHuddersjield Daily Examiner, 16 March 1921, p. 4 
I12Even on the day of his appointment, that story in the local paper was published below the 
appointment of the club's new trainer, Jack Chaplin (who had been at Leeds City with Chapman). 
ibid., I April 1921, p. 3 
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This is perhaps understandable considering the money that had been invested in the 
club. Clem Stephenson's transfer, for example, cost £4000 at a time when the record 
fee was £4600. 113 In addition to buying players, further improvements were made to 
the ground at Leeds Road in 1921. The capacity of a terrace side had been increased 
from 22,000 to 24,000 together with the construction of a new press box. 114 
Moreover, team building and its selection was reported through the actions of the 
directors. In 1922, for example, it was said that the 'Town Directors are following a 
very progressive policy in building up the team, and further signatures may be 
expected at any time' .1I5 By the end of his tenure however, the directors had been 
sufficiently impressed by Chapman's management skills to give him the 
'b'l' fl' h 116 responsl 1 Ity 0 se ectmg t e team. 
The background to Chapman's promotion may have been dependent on a 
number of factors. First, the club was faced with a precarious fmancial situation. In 
1922, for example, Huddersfield Town won the FA Cup but still made a loss on the 
season of £ 1707. 117 The town economy was dominated by the textile industry but 
following a short post-War boom a depression, through a fall in exports, had set in 
and this seriously affected the club's attendances. 1I8 By August 1923 there were 
6000 unemployed in Huddersfield and its outlying districts, with no indications of 
I13Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 75. The club later recruited Alex Jackson from Aberdeen for £2500. 
He had previously played in America for Bethlehem Steel Works. Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 89. 
Catton Folders H-K, p. 836, Sunday Dispatch, 25 January 1931 
114 
Athletic News, 22 August 1921, p. 5 
lIS 
Huddersfield Examiner, 13 May 1922, p. 2 
116 Huddersfield Daily Examiner, 6 January 1934, p. 3, 'Obituary' 
1I7'b d 3 Ii., 28 June 1922, p. 
1I8D. Baines, 'The Onset of Depression', in Johnson (ed.), Twentieth-Century Britain, pp. 173-74 
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. t 119 0 Ch d Improvemen. n one occasIOn apman met a eputation of the local 
unemployed who had asked for a reduction in admission. But he could only repeat 
the rules of the Football League Management Committee that did not allow any 
• 120 
conceSSIOns. 
In addition, in 1921 the club's directors had come under pressure from the 
shareholders' and supporters' committee which wanted the number of directors 
reduced from ten to eight and three of their own nominees to remain on the board. 121 
The directors were also not above criticism, and this was widely published through 
readers' letters in local newspapers. Furthermore, the Huddersfield players had 
shown signs of militancy. In 1922 the Football League Management Committee had 
decided to reduce the maximum wage from £ 10 to £8. There was little sign of a 
national strike but at Huddersfield Town the players had discussed the possibility of 
taking some form of industrial action. 122 This perhaps indicated to the directors that 
they needed to improve their relations with the players, and that by giving the 
manager more responsibility he could foster them. 123 Or it may have simply been 
thatthey did not want the stress of dealing with players face-to-face. 
Huddersfield Town's directors may have found that the business of running a 
club with its increasing commercial pressures and the intensifying football 
119 
Huddersjield Examiner, 25 August 1923, p. 13 
120 
Huddersjield Daily Examiner, 18 October 1921, p. 3, 19 
121Huddersjield Examiner, 18 June 1921, p. 2. The club's articles of association allowed no fewer 
than three directors and no more than 10. ibid. Huddersjield Daily Examiner, 21 June 1921, p. 3 
122Huddersjield Examiner, 15 April 1922, p. 2; Harding, Good of the Game, p. 148. The FLMC 
later claimed that under Rule 7 of its constitution it had the right to alter players' contracts. This was 
declared illegal by the courts however, following what became known as the Leddy Case in 1923. 
See Harding, Good of the Game, Chapter 15. 
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competition had begun to overwhelm them. They may have reasoned that the 
situation demanded someone with specialist football knowledge to take a bigger role 
in running the club. 124 What was Chapman's role as manager? Initially, it was more 
of an administrative one: he distributed tickets for games and arranged special trains 
for away matches. 125 He was also the public face of the club, acting as bridge 
between the club and the press. Chapman had also shown his flair for promoting the 
club following the transfer of Clem Stephenson by arranging a scoop for the 
journalist, Ivan Sharpe, to announce the player as 'A Harold Wagstaff for 
Huddersfield Town' .126 He also organised club tours including one to Paris in 
1921. 127 
It was Chapman's management of the team however, that bolstered his 
reputation and the signing of Clem Stephenson in 1921 turned out to be crucial to 
that success. He became the first in a line of Chapman's purchases whom he 
essentially built the team and its system around. Stephenson, at inside-forward, was 
given a roving role, and at Arsenal, Charlie Buchan and Alex James were similarly 
important. The impact of both Chapman's and Stephenson's arrival was immediate 
123Militant tendencies could also be found amongst rugby league players in general who, led by their 
union chairman, Harold Wagstaff, had threatened to strike at the same time. Huddersfield Examiner, 
15 April 1922, p. 14 
1240n this point, speculation is only possible as I was unable to gain access to the minutes of 
directors' meetings at Huddersfield Town. 
125For example, Huddersfield Daily Examiner, 13 January 1922, p. 3. In April 1921 the Triple 
Alliance of the miners, railway men and transport unions had threatened to strike. As Huddersfield 
Town had a game at Chelsea on the Saturday, Chapman had made contingency plans to take the team 
home by charabanc. Huddersfield Daily Examiner, 15 April 1921, p. 3. Eventually, only the miners 
went on strike in what became known as 'Black Friday' for the union movement. 
126 
I. Sharpe, 40 Years in Football (1952), p. 41 
127 Huddersfield Daily Examiner, 8 April, p. 3, 15 April 1921, p. 3; Huddersfield Examiner, 1 April 
1922, p. 2 
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as the team finished the season strongly. 128 Like at Leeds, his office had a table with 
a football field marked out on it and here he conducted pre-match talks. 129 
Chapman created a more relaxed environment for the players and improved 
their relations with the directors. Yet he was also a disciplinarian. He wanted his 
players to behave themselves both on and off the pitch. He warned them away from 
women and told them to quit smoking, although he did allow the players a glass of 
sherry the night before a game. It is unlikely however, that the players, young 
working-class men, totally adhered to this relatively spartan regime. Before a game, 
Chapman also gave each player a glycerine tablet, probably more for the placebo 
effect then any chemical assistance it might produce. 130 With control over the team's 
selection, Chapman employed psychological methods together with some gentle 
persuasion in an attempt to improve performance. If a player had had a good game, 
for example, Chapman would later ask them if they were not feeling well, and tell 
them that they had better have a rest. Conversely, after a poor game, he would praise 
a player for his efforts. 131 
It was at Huddersfield Town that Chapman developed his management skills 
and brought them to bear on a national stage. He had started out as subservient to the 
club's directors but when he left in May 1925 for Arsenal, he had established himself 
as a manager who, given autonomy over team affairs, could markedly improve its 
performance. The impact of Chapman's management was recognised by both press 
128 Athletic News, 22 August 1921, p. 5 
129Catton, Wickets, p. 144. Catton had been taken to the secretary's office by the then incumbent 
Arthur Fairclough who remarked, 'this is where the directors play'. ibid. 
130Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, p. 27 
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and public alike. One supporter wrote to the local paper stating that '[ e ]veryone 
must admit that, with all due respect to our players, if any man has played an 
individual part in bringing Huddersfield Town to its present heights that man is 
132 Herbert Chapman' . 
If Chapman achieved national recognition at Huddersfield Town then Arsenal 
was his tour de force. In eight years he had turned a mid-table team into the greatest 
footballing power in the land, and the most famous club in the world. It was at 
Arsenal that the full range of his managerial skills were brought to the fore and this 
probably could have only happened in London. Ever since he had played for 
Tottenham Hotspur, Chapman had seen the possibilities of managing a team in the 
capital with its access to a large supporter base, supported by London's transport 
network. Moreover, London had not suffered from the depression like some areas in 
the North and Wales which had relied on export industries. During the inter-War 
period the level of employment in London increased as it was able to attract a range 
of new industries which depended on domestic consumers rather than on exporting 
goodS.133 In London therefore, there was the potential to make something bigger than 
anywhere else. Chapman was to build two teams at Arsenal. The first was basically 
the one he inherited, and the second, marked its arrival by winning the FA Cup in 
1930, and later two Football League championships in 1931 and 1933. When he 
became manager in 1925 Arsenal had finished twentieth in the First Division. The 
following season they were second. Jimmy Catton, commenting on the 
131Sunday Dispatch, 7 January 1934, p. 13. This article involved an interview with fonner 
Huddersfield Town player, Alex Jackson but Studd (p. 89) claims that Chapman never managed him 
because he signed in May 1925 just before Chapman left for Arsenal. 
132Huddersjield Examiner, 13 June 1925, p. 2 
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transformation, declared that, '[ t ]he power behind a good team is the power of 
Herbert Chapman' .134 
Before Chapman joined in 1925, Arsenal had had a peripatetic existence. 
Originally formed by a group of workmen at the Woolwich Arsenal in 1886, it later 
played at the Manor Ground in Plumstead. 135 Henry Norris took over the club in 
1910 when it was suffering a financial crisis. At that time he was the chairman of 
Fulham and wanted to amalgamate the two clubs but the Football League had 
refused. 136 Norris, a solicitor by profession, was a very rich property developer 
having built 2000 houses in the Fulham and Wimbledon areas. He was also Mayor of 
Fulham between 1909 and 1919 and later the MP for Fulham East from 1918 to 
1922, and his political skills proved vital to Arsenal's short-term future. In 1913 he 
moved the club to Highbury and by 1915 he had poured £125,000 into the club. 137 
Arsenal's move to Highbury is the most significant example of an English football 
club removing itself completely from its roots to a new area.138 Norris's boldest 
manoeuvre however, came after the War when Arsenal found themselves in the First 
Division on the resumption of the Football League in 1919. Despite finishing sixth in 
the Second Division in the season before football was stopped, Arsenal beat 
133Baines, 'Onset of Depression', pp. 175-76 
134 All Sports Weekly, 13 March 1926, p. 6 
135Mason, Association Football, p. 26; Joy, Forward Arsenal, p. 9. The club's original name was 
Dial Square, after part of the factory The club had five names in total: Dial Square; second, Royal 
Arsenal FC; third, Woolwich Arsenal FC; fourth, The Arsenal FC; and finally, Arsenal FC. 
136Norris was assisted his football business by William Hall who acted as his eyes and ears. Hall, a 
metal merchant from Putney, was first a director at Fulham but when Norris became Arsenal 
chairman, Hall took over at Fulham to look after Norris's interests. In 1913 Hall was elected to the 
Football League Management Committee and served until 1917. Inglis, League Football, pp. 392-93 
137Norris initially obtained a 21 year lease from St. John's College of Divinity for their adjacent 
playing fields. Joy, Forward Arsenal, pp. 21-27; Dictionary o/National Biography (forthcoming); 
Who Was Who, Vol. 3, 1929-1940 (1941), p. 1009 
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Tottenham, who had finished runners-up in 1915, in a vote for a place in the top 
division. Norris had lobbied the Football League Management Committee intensely, 
and he also found an ally in the editor of the Athletic News, Jimmy Catton, to whom 
. . f I k' h' 139 N orns wrote a senes 0 etters see mg IS support. 
Chapman's predecessor at Arsenal had been Leslie Knighton who was a very 
different type of manager. Knighton had little playing experience but enjoyed a long 
career in management and administration. He arrived at Arsenal in June 1919 when 
the club was £60,000 in the red but when he left in 1925 the club was free of debt. 140 
Knighton took little interest in team affairs however. 141 Commenting on the different 
temperaments of players, he once described football stars with a temperament as 
'just hell' .142 In May 1925 he 'left' the club following a disagreement with Norris 
who had persistently bullied him and generally interfered with his management of the 
club. 143 'I never met his equal for logic, invective, ruthlessness against all who 
opposed him', Knighton said of him. He later admitted that he was not articulate 
enough or of strong enough character to stand up to Norris. 144 One of Norris's 
quirks had been that he disliked players under five feet eight inches. He also forbade 
Knighton to spend more than £ 1200 on a player when at the time transfer fees for 
1 138This is likely to be superseded if Wimbledon FC move to Milton Keynes in 2002-03. 
139 
Joy, Forward Arsenal, pp. 27-28; Catton Folders o-p 
140T. Whittaker, Tom Whittaker's Arsenal Story (1957), p. 26. £60,000 in 1919, equates to £1.66m 
at 2000 prices. 
141Tumer and White, Football Managers, p. 165 
142Knighton, Big Football, p. 37 
143 Athletic News, 11 May 1925, p. 1 
144Knighton, Big Football, p. 52 
_/ 
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good players were about £5000. 145 Instead, Norris preferred the team to be made up 
of local players yet he also prevented Knighton from employing a talent SCOUt. 146 
Before Chapman was appointed manager, the advertisement for the job in the 
Athletic News specified that 'Gentlemen whose sole ability to build up a good side 
depends on the heavy and exhorbitant [sic] transfer fees need not apply' .147 Yet 
Chapman was to break Norris's embargo and this had two far reaching consequences 
for football management. First, it marked an important albeit small shift in the power 
relations within football clubs as Chapman was able to demonstrate the influence a 
professional football manager could bring to bear on a big club's fortunes, even if 
directors held ultimate responsibility. Chapman was also recognised as 'the man who 
introduced big business into football' as the combination of Arsenal's fmancial 
muscle and his freedom to direct the club's affairs underlined the importance of 
money in football's production process. 148 
How did Chapman persuade Norris to part with more money? Knighton 
himself claimed that Chapman was 'exceptionally clever with finances and could ... 
charm off a donkey's hind leg' .149 Unlike Knighton, Chapman had a record of 
achievement, especially at Huddersfield Town and Studd argues that because of this, 
Norris accepted the limits of his own authority on a professional level, and that he 
too was also 'won over by the manager's charm, powerful persuasiveness and 
14\bid., p. 51. At the Football League's AGM in 1922, Norris had tried, unsuccessfully, to impose 
a universal transfer fee of £1650 per player. Joy, Forward Arsenal, p. 31 
146Knighton, Big Football, pp. 51-52 
147 
Athletic News, 11 May 1925, p. 4 
148Birmingham Gazette, 8 January 1934, p. 6, 'Obituary' 
149Knighton, Big Football, p. 62 
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d ., ISO C fi t' f Ch 'd " h' ynamlsm . on Irma Ion 0 apman s etermmatlOn to manage IS way came in 
the form of Charlie Buchan's transfer from Sunderland. Knighton claimed that he had 
originally bid for Buchan but Norris had refused to sanction the move!SI Chapman 
initially visited Buchan at his shop in the town and asked him to move to London. 
Sunderland valued Buchan, who was 34, at £4000, yet this time Norris agreed to the 
IS2 transfer. 
By 1927 however, Norris's association with Arsenal was at an end as he, and 
fellow director William Hall, were suspended sine die by the FA for paying their 
chauffeurs' wages from club funds. IS3 Following Norris's departure, it seems that 
Chapman's powers were extended. At a board meeting in 1928 the new chairman, Sir 
Samuel Hill-Wood, and the manager were delegated full powers by the board 
concerning the transfer of players. IS4 Later, it was recorded that the acquisition of 
new players was to be left with the manager. He was however, 'to communicate his 
suggestions and recommendations to the chairman, vice-chairman and George Allison, 
for approval' .ISS Yet, there is no suggestion that any of Chapman's 
recommendations were ever rejected. IS6 Neither is there any mention in the minutes 
ISO Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 92 
ISIKnighton, Big Football, p. 86 
IS2C. Buchan, A Lifetime in Football (1955), pp. 84-86. Norris later came to a peculiar arrangement 
with the Sunderland manager, Bob Kyle. There was to be an initial down payment of £2000 and then 
£100 for every goal Buchan scored. The total cost was £3900. See Appendix 11 
IS3Football Association Minutes, The Arsenal Football Club, Limited, Report of Commission, 
August 1927; Decisions of the Council, 29 August 1927. Two of the Arsenal directors G.W. Peachey 
and J.W. Humble were found to have failed in their duty to discover the irregularities, and were 
removed from the club's board. They were replaced by John Edwards and George Allison. ibid. 
Norris later brought an unsuccessful libel case against the club. The Times, 6, p. 5d, 7 February 
1929, p. 5a. 
IS4Arsenai FC Minutes, 30 October 1928 
ISS Arsenal Fe Minutes, 23 April 1929 
IS6This seems to be the case on the evidence of the minutes from 11.10.27 to 26.9.29. 
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of team selection which indicates that the manager was picking it. Chapman's 
relationship with George Allison however, was relatively cool. On one occasion he 
rebuked Chapman for not forwarding, in time, his application for a seat on the 
Football League Management Committee. 157 It is also interesting that in his 
autobiography, Allison rarely mentions Chapman and certainly not in the glowing 
158 terms that others have used. 
Some of the other directors who succeeded Norris could be described as 
gentlemen and were probably happy to allow Chapman to run the club with minimal 
interference. These included Lord Lonsdale, Colonel Sir John Norton-Griffiths and 
Colonel Sir Matthew Wilson.159 Perhaps their overall attitude was best summed up 
when they debated whether or not to allow their chauffeurs into the boardroom for 
tea after a game. It was eventually decided that Chapman would arrange for them to 
take tea in the gymnasium. 160 Another new director, John Edwards, was more 
proactive and had some responsibility for the re-development of the ground. 161 
Overall, the Arsenal directors still held ultimate responsibility for the club and also 
acted as financial guarantors. A hierarchy did exist and, as at his other clubs, the 
directors could dismiss Chapman because he was a paid officer. During the season, 
the directors held fortnightly board meetings where Chapman would give a manager's 
157 Arsenal FC Minutes, c. 1927-33 
158G. Allison, Allison Calling (1948), passim 
159 Arsenal FC Minutes, 30 August 1928; 20 November 1928 
160 Arsenal FC Minutes, 4 October 1928 
161 For example, he represented the club in negotiations with St. John's College of Divinity over the 
purchase of land from the college because Arsenal wanted to extend the southern part of the ground. 
Arsenal FC Minutes, 4 July 1928. Edwards was a solicitor in London's Piccadilly and when Norris 
left he became the club's vice-chairman and largest shareholder. He was elected to the FLMC in 1936 
but resigned in 1940 following his suspension by the Law Society for alleged professional 
misconduct. Inglis, League Football, 1988, p. 394 
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report and the language used during these meetings, such as 'the manager was 
empowered' and 'the manager was instructed to', suggests that Chapman was a 
subordinate. 
But he had full control over team matters and would not brook any 
interference by directors, on match days barring them and members of the press from 
the players' dressing room!62 Furthermore, he believed that it was vital that the 
manager should be with the team and so he did his scouting during the week. 
Chapman felt that if he was not present on match days then the team's match policy 
might break down. 163 It was this control over team affairs combined with Arsenal's 
financial resources that enabled him to demonstrate the full range of his skills and the 
fundamentals of modern football management. These were the ability to judge a 
footballer; an astute tactical acumen; and the personality to be able to motivate 
players generally. Chapman was considered a fine judge of a player and was 
convinced that a footballer's all-round intelligence was just as important as his 
footballing ability.164 Before signing a player however, Chapman would ask, 'How 
does he behave?' and 'What sort of life does he lead?' 165 He wanted his players to 
reflect his own sober lifestyle and would drop his interest if the answers were not 
satisfactory. On first meeting Eddie Hapgood, a future Arsenal and England captain, 
Chapman asked, 'Well, young man, do you smoke or drink?' 166 
162Islington Central Library, Arsenal Collection, YH779ARS, Islington Gazette, 29 July 1960 
163 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, p. 9 
164'b'd 25 I I "p, 
165 'b 'd 51 I I ., p, 
166 E, Hapgood, Football Ambassador (1945), p, 12 
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Players had to be blended into a tactical system and, Bernard Joy and Tony 
Say have argued that Chapman's tactical ability in exploiting the new offside rule 
from 1925 was a major reason for Arsenal's success. 167 In 1924-25 they had finished 
twentieth, the following season they were second. In addition, Catton attributed 
much of Arsenal's success to Chapman's ability to switch players' positions. Bob 
John, for example, was converted from a half-back to a full_back l68 The change in 
the offside law had produced a sudden increase in goals being scored. 169 Arsenal 
countered this by turning the centre-half, Jack Butler, from an attacking player into a 
purely defensive one, renamed a 'stopper' or a 'policeman'. This changed a team's 
whole system, producing the so-called W/M formation. The 'W' represented the five 
forwards with the 'M' as the defensive system with the wing-halves marking the 
opposing the inside-forwards, and the full-backs, the wingers. The centre-half would 
occupy a central defensive role as Chapman believed that it was in this area where 90 
per cent of goals were scored. 170 In the 1930s Butler was replaced by Herbie Roberts 
whom Chapman converted from wing half, and who was more a defensive player 
than Butler. Who actually invented the defensive centre-half is open to debate. 
Charlie Buchan, for example, claimed that he suggested it to Chapman at the start of 
the 1925-26 season but that Chapman had initially rejected the idea. 171 It was 
perhaps an indication of his willingness to listen that led Chapman to later re-
consider. Buchan claimed that this was one of Chapman's greatest strengths, '[h]e 
167Say, 'Herbert Chapman', p. 84; Joy, Soccer Tactics, p. 50 
168All Sports Weekly, 13 March 1926, p. 6. John later reverted back to wing-half. 
169 A player was now offside if at the moment the ball was played towards him, he did not have at 
least two opponents behind him. Under the previous law the number was three. 
170Say, 'Herbert Chapman', pp. 81-98; Joy, Soccer Tactics, pp. 50-64 
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would always listen to other people and take advantage of their ideas if he thought 
h ld . h . , In h t ey wou Improve t e team III any way. As we ave seen, Chapman also 
believed that teams could attack for too long; the essence of his overall plan was to 
create space in which to launch rapid counter-attacks. This sty Ie was more direct and 
Arsenal therefore, eschewed the short-passing game that had previously been the 
fashion. Wingers were also encouraged to cut inside and shoot for goal rather than 
cross from the by_line!73 Arsenal's style not only had its imitators but it ushered in 
a new era as football became faster and more physical, and the players got bigger. 174 
Chapman did not confine his tactical input to team discussions. During a cup-
tie against Aston Villa in 1931 played in foggy conditions, the two captains had 
agreed with the referee to forgo half-time and tum straight round. With Aston Villa 
leading 2-0 however, Chapman rushed to the touchline and ordered his players to the 
dressing room for a rest. Arsenal went on to draw the game and eventually won the 
replay. It was because of Chapman's actions that the FA made a rule that no official 
was allowed to walk to the touchline or on the field without the referee's 
.. 175 permISSIOn. 
Notwithstanding his tactics, Chapman still needed the best players to carry 
out his plans and this was where Arsenal's financial muscle played an important 
role. Chapman had seen that a linkman, a roving inside-forward, between defence and 
attack was the vital ingredient. Buchan had initially volunteered for the role but 
171Buchan , Lifetime in Football, p. 91 
172 ibid., p. 104 
173 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, pp. 65-67 
174 Joy, Soccer Tactics, p. 59 
175Whittaker, Tom Whittaker's, pp. 182-83 
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Chapman wanted to retain his goal scoring potential. 176 Chapman later found his 
ideallinkman in Scottish international, Alex James. His transfer from Preston North 
End in the close season of 1929 for £8750, along with David Jack's some months 
earlier from Bolton for a record, £10,647 lOs Od, represented Chapman's 
determination to buy the best players. l77 Chapman however, only secured James's 
signature with the assistance of Bradford City's chairman, Tom Paton. Paton had 
close contacts with Selfridges, and to satisfy his wage demands, James became a 
sports demonstrator at the store for a £250 annual salary. 178 It was also an example 
of Chapman's ability to persuade the Arsenal directors to speculate and they later 
signed a £10,000 guarantee with Barclays to meet the fees. 179 
Chapman did not just buy established stars for large fees. Herbie Roberts, for 
example, was bought in December 1926 from Oswestry Town for £200. 180 Eddie 
Hapgood cost Arsenal £250 from Kettering plus a friendly against them. 181 Cliff 
Bastin, aged 17, joined at the same time as Alex James from Exeter City. The fee of 
£2000 represented a risk but so keen was Chapman to buy him that it was decided to 
pay the fee up front and 'complete the matter immediately, therefore, eliminating all 
contingent happenings' . 182 It was a risk handsomely rewarded as Bastin had won 
every honour in the game by the age of 21 and became the club's record goalscorer. 
176 . . . Buchan, Lifetime In Football, p. 92 
177 
Jack's fee converts to about £400,000. 
178Arsenal Fe Minutes, 3 May 1929; 13 May 1929; J. Harding, Alex James: Life of a Football 
Legend (1988), pp. 99-100. James's job at Selfridges circumnavigated Football League restrictions 
on illegal payments because there were no rules to prevent professional footballers from having more 
than one job. 
179 Arsenal Fe Minutes, 8 January 1929; 23 July 1929; Harding, Alex James, pp. 98-101 
180 
Joy, Forward Arsenal, p. 45 
181Arsenal Fe Minutes, 18 January 1928 
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Joe Hulme played on the right wing and was renowned for his speed. In 1930 the 
forward line was completed by Jack Lambert at centre-forward. His eventual 
selection for that position had been more problematic for Chapman, and perhaps 
owed something to luck. He was originally bought as an inside-forward from 
Doncaster for £2000 but at first, he spent most of his time in the reserves. Chapman 
did not think Lambert was the ideal centre-forward and spent £20,000 on three other 
players. None proved as effective as Lambert who, although not as skilful, 
complemented the team's overall pattern with his robust style. 183 
Chapman's search for players was extensive. Taylor has identified the 
development of a highly regulated transfer market within British football during the 
inter-War period. The role of advertising and agents declined and was replaced by the 
circulation of transfer lists and an increase in clubs' scouting networks. Informal 
contacts and networks however, probably remained the most fertile source for 
locating new talent. 184 In 1928 Chapman arranged with W. Connell to be the club's 
'advisor' in Scotland at a rate of 10/- per week plus expenses. Chapman would watch 
recommended players himself before signing them. 185 Several clubs, Arsenal, among 
them, adopted nurseries such as Dartford, who nurtured players before they moved 
to the parent club. Moreover, Chapman tried to make arrangements with other league 
clubs including Northampton Town, Charlton Athletic and Clapton Orient. I86 
182 Arsenal FC Minutes, 13 May 1929 
183 
Joy, Soccer Tactics, pp. 60-61 
184 
Taylor, 'Proud Preston', pp. 159-69 
185 Arsenal FC Minutes, 5 January 1928; 10 January 1928. Connell may have been the former 
Liverpool trainer. 
186 . . h . . h . d b Chapman VISited the Northampton Town c aIrman Wit a view to a propose agreement etween 
the two clubs. Arsenal later 'arrived at an understanding' with Charlton Athletic in which each club 
would assist the other in finding and developing players. An agreement was later signed and sealed 
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As we have seen earlier, Chapman became skilled in his man-management of 
footballers, and at Arsenal he developed a close relationship with the players. Eddie 
Hapgood for instance, continually refers to Chapman as the 'Old Boss' throughout 
his autobiography. He was essentially an authoritarian figure however, who used his 
personality to demand discipline from players, and he was also as ruthless as a 
successful football manager had to be. No doubt Chapman preferred 'gentle 
persuasion' to wielding the big stick but he was not afraid to use it if he thought it 
necessary. His trainer, Tom Whittaker, recalled how Chapman 'never allowed 
sentiment of any sort to sway his judgement'. 187 In 1929 Arsenal had been invited to 
tour Argentina, and it is interesting that Chapman actually consulted the players to 
ascertain their feelings on the matter and then reported back to the board. The 
question of the tour was left with Chapman and the invitation was eventually 
declined. This perhaps had less to do with the players' opinions however, than the 
effects of six weeks at sea and the extra games would have had on them the following 
season.
188 The style with which Chapman dealt with players however, interestingly 
reflected emerging trends within wider management theory. During the 1920s the 
American political scientist, Mary Parker Follett, had pioneered work on the value of 
human relations within industrial organisations. She argued that a manager's overall 
objective was to create a 'functional unity' within hislher organisation. To achieve 
this required a different philosophy of leadership that was less autocratic but 
but it was discredited following a dispute. Charlton bought a player, Triester, and, under the terms of 
the agreement, contended that a payment was due from Arsenal. Arsenal however, emphatically 
repudiated any liability under the 1931 agreement. Chapman tried to take advantage of Clapton 
Orient's parlous fmancial situation and tum it into a nursery club for Arsenal but this was rejected by 
the Football League. Arsenal FC Minutes, 13 November 1928; 14 December 1928; 9 April 1929; J. 
Seed, The Jimmy Seed Story (1996 edn.), pp. 21-2; Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 133 
187Whittaker, Tom Whittaker's, p. 49 
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without managers abdicating their responsibilities. Instead, managers now needed to 
persuade workers to work with them rather than adhere to old ideas of leadership in 
which managers merely impressed their views on others. Managers needed to be co-
ordinators and organisers of their workers' skills. It was these qualities that would 
. h h' h' 189 gIve t em t elf aut onty. 
One aspect of Chapman's team discussions had been to create a sense of 
togetherness between the players, although there were also benefits on the tactical 
side. Chapman was convinced that because of the discussions the players were 
quickly able to sense a weakness in the opposition. 19o He also went to great lengths 
to eliminate any triumphalism or complacency within the team when it had won. A 
7-1 victory over Wolverhampton Wanderers was followed by a two-hour meeting 
that concentrated solely on the build-up to the goal Arsenal had conceded. 191 On a 
personal level, Chapman's approach was different according to the individual's 
make-up. George Male was a wing-half who became a right-back and later played for 
England. In getting Male to overcome his doubts about the switch, Chapman called 
him to his office. Male later confessed, 'By the time I came out of that room, I was 
not only convinced I was a full blown right-back, I knew, without doubt, that I was 
the best right-back in the country' .192 On Chapman's style Male said, 'he was the 
boss, and you knew it, even though his voice was so quiet. When he talked to you 
188Arsenal FC Minutes, 8 January 1929; 15 January 1929; 12 March 1929 
189H. Metcalf, and L. Urwick (eds.), Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker 
Follett (1941), pp. 247-70. See also Urwick and Brech, Scientific Management, Vol. 1, Chapter 5 
190 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, pp. 12-13 
191 Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 137 
192 17 '~b' , Guardian, 21 February 1998, p, , Ituary 
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there was no bUllying. He could persuade you in the quiet way he'd talk to you' .193 
On another occasion however, Chapman had pulled Male aside before a train journey 
and was told to 'pull his socks up' because he was 'playing for his place' .194 
Chapman did have problems however, with players who would not conform 
to his ideas, in particular Alex James. At the root of his disagreement with Chapman 
were the restrictions placed on James to exploit his commercial potential. In 1931, 
for example, his contract with Self ridges had expired and he had refused to re-sign for 
Arsenal unless Chapman offered him more money.195 James continually challenged 
Chapman's authority and made their disagreements public in the newspapers, 
something that infuriated Chapman. 196 James was a special player however, and 
because football was a peculiar business it was highly unlikely that Chapman would 
transfer him. He was less forgiving of those who were expendable. For instance, his 
first trainer at Arsenal, George Hardy, shouted out a tactical instruction to the 
players during a game in February 1927. On the Monday Chapman sacked him. 197 
After Arsenal had been famously defeated by Walsall in the FA Cup in 1933, one 
player, Tommy Black, was transferred within a week to Plymouth. Chapman had 
brought up the player's future at the next board meeting because Black had 
committed the crude foul that gave Walsall a match clinching penalty. Chapman also 
193Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, p. 29 
194Harding, Alex James, p. 154 
195James was already on the maximum wage of £8 per week and therefore, Chapman could not offer 
him anymore. However, James was later re-employed by Selfridges, which included a raise to £300, 
and so re-signed for the club. Harding, Alex James, pp. 135-39 
196ibid., Chapter 16 
197Joy, Forward Arsenal, p. 48. Chapman later found Hardy ajob as trainer at Tottenham Hotspur. 
Islington Central Library, Arsenal Collection, YH779ARS, Islington Gazette, 29 July 1960 
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transferred Charlie Walsh that month and another from that team, Billy Wames left 
at the end of the season. 198 
But in general, in order to claim a player's loyalties, the club invoked a more 
paternalistic approach. On one level players were dealt with personally. Jack Butler, 
for instance, received an award for his loyal service when he left the club. 199 In 1928 
Chapman signed Raymond Parkin who was given the option of completing his 
apprenticeship as an electrical engineer in London whilst remaining an Arsenal 
player.2oo Chapman was also concerned that the players had their horizons 
broadened and in 1928 enrolled them on a course of twelve lessons in Physical 
201 Culture. Arsenal operated a house purchase scheme whereby Chapman bought 
houses he thought suitable for players on the club's behalf. This was another 
example of how he wanted to mould the players in his own image. Many properties 
were located in the newly developed suburban areas of North London like Hendon, 
where Chapman himself lived.202 Chapman also launched a financial savings scheme 
where £ 1 of the players' weekly wage was deposited with the club at an interest rate 
of 6 per cent.203 A similar scheme had earlier been instituted by Lord Hawke at 
Yorkshire County Cricket Club, and mirrored the prevailing notion that employers 
knew what was best for their workers. 
198Arsenal Fe Minutes, c. January 1933; Joy, Forward Arsenal, pp. 78-79 
199 Arsenal Fe Minutes, 3 May 1929 
200Arsenal Fe Minutes, 14 February 1928 
201 Arsenal Fe Minutes, 20 November 1928 
202Arsenal Fe Minutes, 4 July 1928; 23 July 1929; 23 October 1928; 14 December 1928; 12 
February 1929. The scheme had been subject to the approval of the Football League Management 
Committee. The club also paid for the house's decorations at a cost of £45 before James took 
possession. Today, £800 converts to about £30,000. Charlie Buchan also lived in Hendon and a 
house in New Southgate was bought for Alex James for £800. 
203 
Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 129 
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As the club's assets, a player's welfare was paramount and Chapman 
improved dressing room and training facilities under Hardy's successor, Tom 
Whittaker. Whittaker's legacy as a trainer was as important as Chapman's was as 
manager. His work was recognised by the FA and he became England's regular 
trainer. Whittaker's football career had been ended by an injury but he was 
persuaded by Chapman to embark on a one-year study of anatomy, massage and 
electrical treatment at Arsenal. 204 Modern medical electrical apparatus such as sun 
. . 11 d d 1 . 205 ray eqUIpment was msta e ,an p ayers were sent on appropnate courses. 
Innovations were also introduced to the Arsenal players' training as they played 
head tennis and a shooting box was installed in the 1920s. Both aimed to improve 
ball control and these exercises were supplemented by the normal fitness work, 
particularly lapping?06 Charlie Buchan however, claimed that he felt fitter at 
Sunderland where he trained twice a day whereas at Arsenal it was only the once?07 
As Chapman held the title of secretary-manager, he also ran the club on a 
day-to-day basis. Furthermore, his control over his staff, which admittedly probably 
only numbered a handful, was as firm as that over the players. No member of staff 
was permitted to leave until they had phoned his office at six 0' clock and asked for 
permission to gO?08 He held wide responsibilities that entailed a variety of 
administrative tasks, ranging from sorting out the arrangements for the opening of the 
204Whittaker, Tom Whittaker's, p. 44 
205Joy, Forward Arsenal, p. 48; Arsenal FC Minutes, 4 December 1928; 18 December 1928; 8 
January 1929 
206Studd, Herbert Chapman, pp. l31-32; Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, p. 29; Joy, 
Forward Arsenal, p. 49; Kicking and Screaming, Part 2, BBC Television 
207Buchan, Lifetime in Football, pp. 100-01 
208 Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 108 
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new tea room to dealing with pirate chocolate sellers?09 His first job every morning 
was to open the post which included answering complaints from the public. Some of 
this was very trivial work. One correspondent claimed for a damaged umbrella and 
another claimed for a pair of glasses after they were broken by the ball during a 
game.2lO Chapman was the public face of the club and on one occasion visited a local 
resident after his fence had been damaged following a game, to 'point out in a friendly 
manner [that] we [Arsenal] can not be held responsible for damage at such a distance 
from the ground,?11 Chapman's duties also embraced financial responsibilities such 
as communicating with the Legal and General Insurance Society who handled the 
club's insurance and made a survey of the ground following Chapman's 
recommendations to the board. One result was that Legal and General arranged a 
guarantee policy regarding the club's payment of entertainment tax.212 The stadium's 
physical upkeep also came under the secretary-manager's remit and included drawing 
up a schedule of repairs and maintenance jobs such as the installation of additional 
female lavatories.213 Accidents on the club's premises were also dealt with by 
Chapman. When a casual labourer sustained a poisoned hand it was reported to the 
insurance company, as was a fire in the kitchen.214 Chapman was also responsible 
for the stadium's commercial income?15 For instance, the rights to sell chocolate and 
209 Arsenal Fe Minutes, 27 October 1927; 14 February 1928. 
2lOArsenal Fe Minutes, 5 January 1928; 13 November 1928. He was reimbursed for the glasses to 
the sum of £2 10s Od. 
211Arsenal Fe Minutes, 21 February 1928 
212Arsenal Fe Minutes, 20 October 1927; 3 November 1927; 25 November 1927; 6 December 1927 
213 Arsenal Fe Minutes, 10 January 1928,2 May 1928,25 November 1927 
214Arsenal Fe Minutes, 31 January 1928; 24 January 1928 
215 Arsenal also sought to exploit any outside commercial opportunities that arose. On the back of the 
Speedway craze of the late 1920s, the club seriously considered putting a track in at Highbury on two 
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cigarettes within the ground were acquired by the Elliot Bros. for £100 a season.216 
Refreshment stalls were also erected at the Gillespie Road entrance under Chapman's 
d. . 217 IrectlOn. 
The legacy of Herbert Chapman however, was not just restricted to the 
management of his teams. He embraced football modernity and was full of ideas 
about the future development of the football business?18 Chapman claimed that 
'[ w]e have not got to the bottom of football yet. There are still possibilities to be 
explored ... Insufficient regard is paid to the demands of the public. Give them what 
they want and you will get their support' ?19 He saw the press as an extension for 
advertising and in 1929 Arsenal had hired a publicity agent, F.J. Coles, for £100. He 
also doubled as the club's programme editor. Coles was expected to attend the 
majority of home matches and ensure a report of the game was published in 
London's morning and evening papers. He had to telephone Chapman every day for 
any information on the club that could be published in order to keep Arsenal's name 
occasions. First, in 1928, it was approached by Seymour and Graham Ltd., and Messrs Randolph 
and Dean and later the club met their representative, A.J. Hunting of the Speedway Motor Cycling 
Co. of Australia. After consulting the stadium builder, Archibald Leitch, about the possibility of 
ground alterations, Arsenal felt that too many costly difficulties would be involved. The following 
year however, Hunting was again interviewed by the club. 'Dirt Track Racing' at Highbury was 
conditional on fmancial guarantees being provided, and more importantly, that the pitch and terraces 
could be restored to a condition fit for football. Following a report by an architect, Mr Binnie, and a 
grass expert, Mr McDonald, it was decided not to proceed. Arsenal FC Minutes, 31 January 1928; 9 
February 1928; 21 February 1928; 15 March 1928. Leitch was paid £39 lIs 2d for his services. 
Arsenal FC Minutes, 22 March 1928. Arsenal FC Minutes, 26 March 1929; 9 April 1929 
216Arsenal FC Minutes, 30 August 1928 
217 Arsenal FC Minutes, 9 May 1928. Any application to sell newspapers and advertisements in or 
near the club's premises however, was not allowed under any circumstances. Arsenal FC Minutes, 30 
August 1928. 
218Dictionary of National Biography (forthcoming) 
219 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, p. 152 
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in the news.220 Chapman was a stickler for accuracy and if any reporter got his facts 
wrong, he would be on the receiving end of a few choice words.221 
The birth of the BBC in the 1920s provided another medium for Chapman to 
publicise his own views on footbal1. 222 Inevitably almost, Arsenal's home game 
against Sheffield United in 1927 was the first to be broadcast on radio by the BBC. 
The BBC applied directly to clubs for broadcasting rights and Arsenal willingly 
d .. ~ . 223 grante permIssIOn lor certaIn games. The club had a strong interest in 
broadcasting. While Chapman was a personal friend of the BBC's Outside 
Broadcasts Director (OBD), Gerald Cock, George Allison was an early football 
commentator.224 There appears to have been some tension however, between 
Chapman and Allison over the BBC on a personal level. For example, Allison had 
been invited by S.l. de Lotbiniere, Cock's successor as BBC OBD, to arrange 
football talks for the radio, but for the ones on football management Chapman was 
never recommended by Allison.225 Furthermore, on one occasion de Lotbiniere had 
inadvertently phoned Chapman when wanting to speak to Tom Whittaker 
220Arsenal FC Minutes, 31 July 1929. For the 1929-30 season a new programme editor, William 
Johnstone, was appointed in a honorary capacity and to maximise sales, a programme sales manager, 
Rowland Beatty was also hired. Arsenal FC Minutes, 23 July 1929; 31 July 1929; 18 September 
1929 
221Whittaker, Tom Whittaker's, p. 56 
2221n 1926 he gave a talk on the BBC about some of his ideas. He was also interviewed by Peter 
Batten on 'My Greatest Hour'. Yorkshire Evening Post, 6 January 1934, p. 10, 'Obituary'. 
Northampton Independent, 13 January 1934, p. 9 
223 Arsenal FC Minutes, 20 October 1927, 23 October 1928. The BBC encountered opposition 
however, from smaller clubs who felt it would affect attendances and at the Football League AGM in 
1931, the broadcasting of its games was prohibited. Taylor, 'Proud Preston', pp. 347-50 
224 
BBC WAC, R30/126211, Gerald Cock, Internal Memo, 22 February 1928; OB Department letter, 
23 February 1928 
225BBC WAC, George Allison File 1, 1927-32, Letter from George Allison to S.l de Lotbiniere, 
22 June 1932; George Allison File 2, 1933-34, Letter from George Allison to S.J. de Lotbiniere, 13 
October 1933. Allison had suggested Peter Hodges of Leicester City and Percy Smith of Tottenham 
Hotspur. 
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concerning a football talk. De Lotbiniere had said that Chapman was 'obviously 
anxious to have a finger in the pie but I think all will go well' .226 
Perhaps Chapman's shrewdest move was to persuade the London Electric 
Railway to change the name of their Piccadilly Line station adjacent to the Arsenal 
ground from Gillespie Road to Arsenal in 1932. The change in name was not just for 
the consumption of Londoners as it was claimed that a fairly large section of the 
Arsenal crowd came from outside of the capital, and many from as far as Scotland 
came just to see Alex James.227 Through his broadcasts and journalism, Chapman 
also advocated the use of a white ball that would be easier for the crowd to see at the 
end of dark winter afternoons and that players' shirts should be numbered.228 On the 
suggestion of the Daily Mail's cartoonist, Tom Webster, Chapman changed Arsenal's 
shirts from all red to red with white sleeves to make them more distinctive and 
modem.229 Floodlights were installed at Highbury after he saw them used on the 
continent in 1930, and the benefits that they could bring to the English game.230 For 
those chilly nights he even proposed that the stands should be heated?3! It would be 
over twenty years before most of these measures were adopted in England. 
He also believed in the value of coaching and had been impressed with the 
coaching scheme of the Corinthians and the FA that was inaugurated at Highbury in 
1930. It was initially for public school boys and Chapman wanted it to be extended 
226BBC WAC, George Allison File 1, 1927-32, Letter from SJ. de Lotbiniere to George Allison, 
12 December 1932 
227 
Islington Gazette, 28 October 1932, p. 6 
228Sharpe, 40 Years, p. 52; Daily Herald, 8 January 1934, p. 15, 'Obituary'. Clubs were forbidden 
to use numbers in Football League matches so Chapman used them in practice games. 
229Whittaker, Tom Whittaker's, p. 95 
230Chapman, Herbert Chapman, p. 156; Whittaker, Tom Whittaker'S, p. 283 
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to the whole country including elementary schools. He also wanted the FA to 
distribute a film on coaching.232 Chapman suggested that the England selectors 
choose twenty of the most promising players and bring them together for coaching 
once a week. However, he had no faith that this idea would be accepted.233 Chapman 
was also impressed with the progress of football on the continent and envisioned a 
West European Cup.234 He himself has a claim to have been England's first manager, 
if only on an unofficial basis. England visited Italy in 1933 whose team, with the 
patronage of Mussolini's Fascists, had been making rapid progress, something that 
had even been noted by the Foreign Office?35 The FA member in charge of the 
England team was Arthur Kingscott who Ivan Sharpe claims had invited Chapman to 
Turin to act as team manager, although without the FA's blessing.236 It was 
Chapman who gave the players a team talk before the game, and also at half-time?37 
What can we say about Chapman's lifestyle as Arsenal manager? In 
appearance he sometimes resembled a country gent with his plus fours 
complementing a portly figure and round face. His aspirations were partly reflected 
by an increase in salary. His initial wage at Arsenal was £83 6s. 8d. per month plus 
231 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, p. 157 
232Chapman, Herbert Chapman, pp. 173-74; Buchan, Lifetime in Football, p. 123 
233 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, p. 119, 165 
234 ibid., p. 170. The competition would consist of the champion teams of England, Scotland, 
France, Belgium and Spain. In fact, the first European Champions competition, was played in 1930. 
Called the 'Coupe des Nations' it was played solely in Switzerland, and the first fmal in Geneva, was 
between Ujpest of Hungary who beat Slavia Prague of Czechoslovakia 3-0. The referee was Stanley 
Rous. S. Rous, Football Worlds: A Lifetime in Sport (1978), p. 30 
235L. Porpora, 'Fascism vs. Democracy: Political Metaphor in Football Stadia in the Thirties', (MA 
Thesis, De Montfort University, date unknown), pp. 63-64 
236 Sharpe, 40 Years, p. 156 
237Joy, Forward Arsenal, p. 86; Chapman, along with the rest of the England party, is later pictured 
with Mussolini at his residence. Hapgood, Football Ambassador, op. p. 33 
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expenses and equated to an annual salary of approximately £ 1000 ?38 In 1933 he was 
awarded a new salary of £2000 per year, then the highest in football, and in today' s 
terms the equivalent of £86,000. This was the salary of a high-flying business 
executive, and a reflection of Chapman's importance to the club. In addition, there 
was a possible £500 bonus if Arsenal won the cup and £250 for the league.239 The 
nature of the manager's job, both in terms of its precariousness and importance, was 
illustrated when it was reported in April 1929 that he had resigned at Arsenal and 
gone back to Huddersfield?40 This may have been a story that was deliberately 
planted by Chapman because in June he was offered, and accepted, a new contract 
with the club?41 He also had aspirations for his family. He had two daughters and 
two sons who both played rugby union which suggests that they attended private 
schools. The eldest, Ken, born in 1908, played for the East Midlands and later 
became President of the Rugby Football Union. Bruce meanwhile represented 
Middlesex. Herbert regarded Bruce's qualification as a solicitor as his proudest 
moment.242 He can have had little time for a family life however, as he was a 
workaholic. It was this commitment that probably led to his early death when he 
contracted pneumonia and died without warning on 6 January 1934. 
The reaction to Chapman's untimely passing shared similarities with the 
those of assassinated American Presidents. His reputation soared. Supporters and, 
238Arsenal FC Minutes, 3 November 1927; 31 January 1928 
239Catton Folders B-C, p. 263; Birmingham Mail, 6 January 1934, p. 3, 'Obituary'; Northampton 
Chronicle and Echo, 8 January 1934, p. 4, 'Obituary' 
240Catton Folders B-C, p. 263, 5 April 1929 
241Arsenal FC Minutes, 14 June 1929 
242Northampton Mercury and Herald, 12 January 1934, p. 15; Dictionary of National Biography 
(forthcoming) 
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especially the players, were visibly upset at his death, and the fans paid their 
respects by turning up to Highbury in record numbers.243 In October 1936 a bust of 
Chapman by Jacob Epstein was unveiled and placed in the foyer of Arsenal's East 
Stand. It had been commissioned by twelve friends who formed the Herbert 
Chapman Club and met on the anniversary of his death to place a wreath on his 
grave.244 In this sense, Chapman had been immortalised, and a mythology grew up 
around him. In writing about Denis Compton, Jeff Hill has argued that he was 
famous in his playing days and remembered long afterwards in part because of the 
stories and images that made up the 'legend'. It was this language of the legend, based 
on accounts of his triumphs and perceptions of his personality, that gave people 
their ideas about Compton. Thus, he became a 'text' and like all texts, open to 
interpretation?45 It is the role of the historian, to interrogate these texts in order to 
separate the myth from the reality. And, in order to unveil the reality of Chapman's 
career the availability of sources needs to be taken into account. Chapman was not a 
literary man. He left neither diaries or letters, so the 'truth' needs to be teased out 
from a range of usually indirect sources. This work suggests that certain previous 
'truths' , concerning Chapman can no longer be supported with as much conviction as 
once was the case. 
Chapman therefore, was not a myth but perhaps his reputation was. How 
then can we place him in the wider history of football management? In one sense, his 
243For example, the second home game after his death, against Spurs drew 68,828. It was played on 
a Wednesday, in January, in daylight, and, at the time, was a record for mid-week League game. Joy, 
Forward Arsenal, p. 83 
244Whittaker, Tom Whittaker's, p. 131. Other famous figures who sat for Epstein included David 
Lloyd George and T.S. Eliot. 
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success with Arsenal was an historical accident, a product of circumstances. Things 
just fell into place for him that was not the case for managers at other clubs. Arsenal 
was a unique club. It was prepared to spend a lot of money in procuring success and 
was aided by its London location. Once Henry Norris had left, Chapman enjoyed 
unprecedented powers and influence. Yet he also had to prove he could manage, and 
in this respect he was uniquely successful, not only at Arsenal but also at his other 
clubs, especially Huddersfield Town. Chapman himself was unlike other football 
managers. In addition to his experience as a player, he was better educated, more 
articulate and had had a broader experience of life than most, including working for 5 
years in industrial middle-management. Arsenal may have had more resources than 
other clubs, but this in itself was not a guarantee of success. It was Chapman's 
management that was the key ingredient to Arsenal's emergence as the exemplar of 
football modernity and, to a large extent, it was this which justified his mythical 
status. 
Chapman's greatest legacy was to modernise the role of the manager and 
become its model for the future. His hands-on style and increased powers meant that 
the manager became more important to the players, and certainly more important 
than the directors. Managers would have more power over team selection, and over 
which players to buy and, more importantly, to sell. Some managers would show 
greater concern for the welfare of players, and some would even be seen as father-
figures. In the fullness of time, it would not be the players who would take 
responsibility for team tactics but the manager. Moreover, his role as motivator 
24\ Hill, 'The Legend of Denis Compton', The Sports Historian, Vol. 18,2 (November 1998), p. 
30 
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reinforced his increasingly powerful position. Players would come to rely on 'the 
Boss', and like the press and the fans, they would identify them as the most 
important person in the club. Largely because of Chapman's success, directors 
would come to regard a manager as someone who could change the fortunes of their 
club. They would seen them as 'experts' and professionals. Paradoxically, it would 
mean that a manager's job would become less secure as directors would search ever 
more frantically for the 'right man'. Chapman also defined and extended the 
boundaries of the manager's job, making it all-consuming. In terms of how a club was 
run, football managers would want to be in charge of everything, from the tea-lady to 
the first team. It became a job for obsessives and carried great pressures that left little 
time to self or family. 
Yet, Chapman's legacy was more than this. He realised that football could 
become a branch of the entertainment business, that it could be promoted. Because of 
the lack of leisure alternatives, other clubs were complacent on this matter but under 
Chapman, Arsenal was at the forefront of the game's modernisation. In promoting 
football, Chapman cultivated his own personality and used Arsenal, with its capital 
location and proximity to the national newspapers, as his vehicle. It enhanced his 
public and professional status and at the same contributed to his mythology. After 
Chapman, managers would seek to increase their own status by promoting 
themselves through their day-to-day contact with newspapers, weekly columns, 
serials and, later, books. In time they would become media personalities. Eventually, 
the manager would become a football club's focal point as Chapman had at Arsenal. 
A perception would emerge that they were all-powerful figures able to control and 
219 
shape the fortunes of clubs. The press began to link team performance with the work 
of its manager, and as a direct result, supporters would make the same association. 
Chapman may not have been the sole pioneer of these developments but he was 
certainly in its vanguard, the manager who set the standard by which other managers 
would be judged. However, as we shall see, this process would take time. Both 
Chapman and Arsenal were far ahead of the game. In the next chapter, an attempt 
will be made to examine Chapman's influence on his managerial contemporaries. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE FOOTBALL MANAGER, 1918-1939 
... it is not always possible for one man to be a football expert, an accountant, and 
to deal with the correspondence of a big club. Hence of late years the manager, as 
distinct from the secretary has become a growing fashion ... it is clear that there is a 
growing conviction that the secretary has separate duties, and the directors 
appreciate that an experienced manager is needed. 
Jimmy Catton in All Sports Weekly, 22 January 1927 
When is a football manager a real manager? Answer: When he's allowed to manage. 
Topical Times, 27 April 1935, p. 579 
In the previous chapter we saw how Herbert Chapman represented the manager of 
the future and how his career was a landmark in the change of football management 
from its essentially voluntary tradition to a more professional approach. As Figure 
5.1 demonstrates, during the inter-War period, and in the succeeding years, there was 
an increase in the number of football managers. I In terms of management however, it 
was much the same as before, as the idea of a manager may have become more 
popular but directors still held firm ideas on how clubs should be run. In general, 
they resisted any 'Chapmanisation' process. Instead, they preferred to retain the 
privileges of ownership and run the club as they saw fit, or until they felt the 
manager could be given more powers. A small number of Chapman 'disciples' did 
emerge who had their own ideas regarding the running of a football club but any 
change was slow overall, and with the outbreak of war any modernisation was frozen 
for its duration at least. Chapman therefore, was relatively unique because his role at 
lit should be noted that Figure 5.l refers to the number of people who became managers of Football 
League clubs during each five year period. It is not a calculation of the number of managers that have 
been employed by clubs i.e. managerial turnover (see Figure 6.1). These figures also need to be 
qualified. The data is at its most equivocal for period before the First World War as there is the 
probability that there may have been more managers appointed during those years. The periods during 
the World Wars have been included because football was played then, if only on a regional basis. The 
rise in new appointments after the wars can be partly attributed to clubs wanting a fresh start and to 
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Arsenal was so wide-ranging. To a large degree, the management of football clubs 
continued to reflect patterns within British industrial management as whole. Keeble 
has argued that, '[ m laking managers the British way ... produced for the country an 
industrial leadership less well educated and less widely experienced than their 
counterparts abroad ... The British way was inefficient and wasteful,.2 Similarly, 
football managers were increasingly former players but it was largely a matter of luck 
if they had any skills in man-management for example. 
The inter-War period as a whole was characterised by severe regional 
fluctuations in the economy. A short boom followed the First World War until 1921, 
but then Britain experienced the fastest economic collapse in its history. From 1921 
until 1938, unemployment remained above one million, reaching a peak of 2.8 million 
in 1932, and between 1929 and 1932 Britain was hit by a second international 
depression. During the Twenties there had also been a shift away from staple 
industries reliant on exports, towards high productivity industries such as motor 
vehicles, consumer durables and electric power that depended on the home market. 
These industries however, were mainly located in the South and the Midlands, so 
some regions such as the North East, that relied heavily on staple industries, 
continued to struggle to come to terms with the changing economic circumstances.3 
Yet despite the worst years of the Depression between 1929 and 1932, the 
193 Os was a decade of continual growth with the real incomes of consumers rising. 
the retirement of men such as Jimmy Hogan at Aston Villa who retired during the War and was not 
replaced until it ended. 
2 
Keeble, Ability to Manage, p. 61 
3Baines, ' Onset of Depression', pp. 169-76; D. Baines, 'Recovery from Depression', in Johnson, 
Twentieth Century Britain, pp. 188-91; B. Harris, 'Unemployment and the Dole in Interwar Britain', 
in Johnson, Twentieth Century Britain, pp. 203-06 
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Demand for leisure commodities during these years was buoyant and there was a 15 
per cent increase in consumer spending on the theatre, cinemas and sporting events.4 
Football attendances also increased considerably, closely mirroring the fortunes of 
the national economy. 5 In 1927, 23.4 million watched Football League games; for the 
1937-38 season, it was 31.43 million.6 Stephen Jones has suggested that the level of 
disposable income of the workers was the main determinant of consumer demand. As 
a football club's main source of income was gate receipts, its level of support was 
partially dependent on local economic circumstances such as levels of trade, 
7 
employment and wages. 
Gareth Williams has argued that the fortunes of Welsh rugby were reflected 
by the economic slump of the inter-War period. In South Wales, with unemployment 
endemic in mining areas, the Depression had a devastating impact on crowds at rugby 
internationals and at club level. Welsh football was similarly affected. In the early 
1920s there were six Welsh clubs in the Football League but by 1930 Aberdare 
Athletic and Merthyr Town had been forced to drop out. 8 Russell contends 
however, that there were only modest changes in the overall geographical balance of 
footballing power across the inter-War period. The rise of southern football, for 
4S. Jones, 'The Economic Aspects of Association Football in England, 1918-39', British Journal of 
Sports History, Vol. 1,3 (1984), p. 281. By 1939 cinema attendances had reached 23 million per 
week. A. Davies, 'Cinema and Broadcasting' in Johnson, Twentieth Century Britain, p. 269 
5S. Dobson and J. Goddard, 'Performance, revenue and cross subsidization in the Football League, 
1927-1994, Economic History Review, Vol. LI, 4 (1998), pp. 767-68 
6Dobson and Goddard, 'Performance', p. 767; Jones, 'Economic Aspects', p. 289 
7Jones, 'Economic Aspects', p. 288 
8Furthermore, haIfa million people moved out of South Wales, a fifth of the nation's population, 
affecting the numbers who played. Merthyr had an unemployment rate of 66 per cent, and more 
turned up to watch the team train than play because they were unable to afford the 9d admission 
charge. G. Williams, 'From Grand Slam to Great Slump: Economy, Society and Rugby Football in 
Wales During the Depression', Welsh History Review, Vol. 11, 1982-83, pp. 338-57. 
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example, can be largely attributed to the success of Arsenal.9 Despite this, a club's 
fortunes partly reflected the state of the local economy. Tottenham Hotspur's 
revenue, for example, increased from £37,087 in 1927 to £52,144 by 1934, during 
which time Spurs were mainly in the Second Division. lO Middlesbrough however, 
was deeply affected by the depression, and between 1927-28 and 1932-33, when 
unemployment in the town was 46 per cent, the football club's attendances fell by 
44 per cent. ll Revenue also dropped from £36,792 in 1930 to £24,611 in 1934.12 
Yet throughout the thirties', Middlesbrough, along with Sunderland and Newcastle, 
maintained their First Division status. This perhaps partly stemmed from cultural 
variables such as the North East's reputation as a 'hotbed' offootball. 13 
The main reason for football's relative resilience was the protection offered to 
clubs by the Football League in its role as a cartel and its equalisation policies. 14 As 
well as maintaining a competitive edge, promotion and relegation provided clubs with 
opportunities to increase their incomes by playing at a higher level. Moreover, not 
only did the retain-and-transfer system and the maximum wage regulate football's 
labour market, it limited, to a certain extent, the concentration of football talent in 
the richer clubs. During the First World War the principle of pooled resources had 
been established and in 1924 this was extended. League President, John McKenna, 
9Russell, Football, p. 77. In 1919 both the First and Second Divisions of the Football League were 
increased from 20 to 22. In 1920 a Third Division of 22 clubs drawn from the Southern League was 
added, and in 1921 the Third Division North comprising 22 clubs was established. 
lOSzymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, p. 375 
11 
Russell, Football, p. 82 
12Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, p. 363 
13 Russell, Football, p. 83. In 1932 Newcastle won the FA Cup. In 1936 Sunderland won the 
League and the Cup a year later. 
14 
Tay lor, 'Proud Preston', pp. 248-77 
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devised a scheme whereby 20 per cent of the home club's net gate was to be paid to 
the visitors. 15 In addition, the gate receipts for FA Cup ties were shared. Within this 
framework however, football clubs were still 'dynamic business enterprises', and 
Russell has identified the management of resources and the team as more significant 
factors in the clubs achieving success than the prevailing socio-economic forces. 16 
Britain's economic vicissitudes had a modernising impact on business. The 
government had encouraged a policy of 'rationalization' , leading to some ailing plants 
in the staple industries being closed down. The intention was to make industry more 
profitable and efficient, and so production was concentrated in just a few works: 7 
Rationalization was accompanied by a wave of mergers within industry as a whole 
between 1918 and 1933, changing the structure of British business. Between 1921 
and 1951 the number of employers fell from 692,000 to 457,000 due to industrial 
amalgamations, with small businesses being gradually eliminated from their 
markets. 18 The industries most affected included food, chemicals and shipbuilding. In 
addition, the government facilitated the merger of the 120 railway companies into 
just four geographically separate and gigantic businesses in 1923.19 The scale of these 
companies' operations increased and the day-to-day control over capital was 
gradually, if unevenly, transferred from its owners to career managers in bureaucratic 
15Dobson and Goddard, 'Performance', pp. 773-74; Taylor, 'Proud Preston', pp. 267-69 
16Jones, 'Economic Aspects', p. 296; Russell, Football, p. 84 
17Baines, 'Onset of Depression', p. 177 
18R. McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England 1918-1951 (Oxford, 1998), p. 47 
19 ., Jeremy, BUSiness HiStOry, p. 206 
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hierarchies. Consequently, the divorce between ownership and control widened and 
this signalled the start of 'the professionalization of management' ?O 
One of the new breed of modern business managers was Josiah Stamp. He 
originally worked for the Inland Revenue and also studied for an economics degree at 
the LSE. By 1914 he was on the Board of Inland Revenue where he created the 
Excess Profits Duty that raised nearly one-third of the total tax revenue collected 
during the War. In 1919 he was recruited by Harry McGowan to work for Nobels as 
company secretary. His expertise in accounting was unusual among businessmen, 
and he later became Britain's best-known expert economist. His professional 
reputation was such that in 1924 he was appointed as one of Britain's 
representatives on the Dawes committee, formed to examine the problem of German 
reparations. Stamp emerged as the committee's most effective member. He felt his 
new found status was not commensurate with his position at Nobels however, and in 
1926 he accepted the position of president of the executive of Britain's biggest 
company, the London, Midland and Scottish Railway. Under Stamp the LMS was to 
be run as a modem business?1 
In conjunction with the rise of career managers like Stamp, the inter-War 
period, particularly the 1930s, marked the emergence of a managerial middle-class. 
There was an increase in the membership of technical and scientific professions 
together with a rise of salaried employees. This was reflected by a gradual change in 
the structure of the labour force when the number of managers and administrators 
20perkin, Professional Society, pp. 294-96 
21 Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 5, pp. 260-71 
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nearly doubled from 704,000 to 1.25 million between 1921 and 1951. 22 Yet despite 
these changes and the merger activity in the large businesses, 'conservative 
management practices persisted,?3 The mergers were mainly horizontal, and were 
characterised by consolidation as they brought together firms in the same industry. 
The merger wave was defensive, aimed at stabilising competition and prices and also 
emulative, as British firms responded to the threat of intervention by foreign 
. 24 
compames. 
The increase in industrial mergers and concentration however, had created a 
demand for senior managers with a higher level of ability. It was a demand that the 
education system was not yet able to fill. Access to education in general remained 
restricted during this period. The Fisher Act of 1918 had raised the elementary 
school leaving age to 14 and it had also made provision for continuation schools. 
These were designed to give part-time education to children up to the age of 16 
already in work, and provide a link between industry and schooling but only a few 
were built. The local education authorities, not central government, were the major 
contributors to the finance of education between the wars. The economic depression 
however, severely diminished the capacity of some areas to fund education. In 
addition, much of a decreasing rate income, through the collapse of local businesses, 
was taken up by the payment of unemployment benefit. As a result, fewer grammar 
schools or junior technical schools (which were started before 1914) and technical 
colleges could be built in these areas. Overall, there was only a modest increase in the 
22McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, pp. 44-49 
23G . h .. h B' , 27 OUrvlS , 'Bntls US mess , p. 
2\bid., pp. 27-34 
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number of secondary schools and even by 1938 there was only 14 per cent of former 
elementary school children attending secondary schools. The access of working-class 
children to grammar schools remained low, rising from 4 per cent for those born 
between 1910 and 1919, to only 7 per cent in the period 1920-29. Grammar schools 
themselves were characterised by inequality and waste. On the one hand, 73 per cent 
of children of high intelligence still attended elementary or central schools by 1935; 
on the other, 49 per cent of fee-paying children in grammar schools were not of the 
intelligence to benefit from such education. The lack of mobility in the education 
system was even more acute at university level where in 1938-39 only 2.5 per cent 
of boys came from working-class backgrounds.25 
British managers therefore, were characterised by low levels of educational 
achievement and qualifications due to a lack of support from the education system. 
Keeble has argued that the gap between industry and education could have been 
narrower if industry had wanted it.26 In 1933 thirty-one leading industrialists and 
public figures such as Gordon Selfridge, Seebohm Rowntree and John Reith put their 
names to a manifesto that recognised 'the importance of efficient management to 
industry'. The manifesto suggested that, '[ s ]ystematic education for management is 
... one of the chief steps required to assure Britain's industrial future'. It also 
recognised that Britain provided competent technical and scientific training but not in 
the 'administrative application of ... specialised knowledge,.27 Employers however, 
were disinclined to recognise the virtues of training and as a result there was little 
25Sanderson, Education, Chapter 5. University numbers did rise from 40,000 to 50,000 during the 
inter-War period but this only accounted for 1.7 per cent of all eighteen year olds in 1938-39. 
26 
Keeble, Ability to Manage, p. 65 
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investment in future managers. They had failed to support the junior technical 
schools and also preferred employees to undertake vocational courses in their own 
time rather than the company' s. 28 Employers also found it difficult to understand 
that this form of education could benefit them. Perhaps this is understandable as 
many employers had also emerged from this management culture (see Chapter 1). 
Some businessmen also believed that higher education was perceived as a positive 
disadvantage to a business career and that it was the early years in industry that were 
critical for forming the right habits and ideas.29 
In terms of the social make-up of managers employed, Ross McKibbin has 
argued that management was dominated by the middle-class due to the importance of 
the possession of the correct social manners. Consequently, social confidence was 
put ahead of technical expertise as a quality most sought in managers, particularly in 
small firms. Successful management was seen as being able to get on with people and 
having a good sense of humour. British managers were generalists who needed 
leadership qualities and personality; it was men who had learned to lead their team to 
victory on the rugby field who were regarded as the ideal candidates to lead their 
workers to greater effort in the workplace. It was also a representation of British 
society where relationships within the workplace reflected its hierarchical class 
system. Furthermore, technically qualified men were rarely appointed to company 
boards because it was thought that their social skills were too narrow and disabled 
27 Evening Gazette (Middlesbrough ), 2 January 1933, p. 3 
28Keeble, Ability to Manage, p. 70; Sanderson, Education, p. 64 
29Keeble, Ability to Manage, p. 85 
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them for management.
30 
Overall, this situation compared unfavourably to Germany 
which placed priority on a high level of general and vocational education and also 
Japan which emphasised high academic abilities combined with a professional 
attitude to business. British industry instead ensured that the belief in the 'cult of the 
amateur' survived well into the twentieth century.31 
It was not surprising therefore, that football managers had no training or little 
education. Figure 5.2 shows that following the First World War, and particularly 
after 1930, managers increasingly represented the first generation of professional 
footballers. One simple equation directors worked on, was that the better the player, 
the better qualified he was for the job. For example, a number of players from the 
famous Newcastle team of the Edwardian period had become managers by the 
Twenties.32 Figure 5.3 shows that of the players who became managers there has 
been a relatively high percentage who have been former internationals footballers. 33 
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 5.4, it seems that no particular type, defender, 
midfielder or forward, was favoured. The exception to this was goalkeepers who 
perhaps suffered from the prejudice that they were not 'real' footballers?4 It was 
30McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, p. 97; Keeble, Ability to Manage, p. 59 
31Keeble, Ability to Manage, p. 59; Wilson, Business History, p. 177 
32These were Peter McWilliam, Billy McCracken, James Lawrence, Jack Carr, James Howie, Robert 
Hewison, George Jobey, Alec Gosnell and Colin Veitch. Huddersfield Examiner, 22 December 
1923, p. 16 
33For example, in 1997 there were approximately 2000 players of whom about 200 were current or 
former British Isles internationals. The ratio of internationals to players who became managers is 
about 1 in 3 to 1 in 4. News o/the World, Football Annual 1997-98 
34For this graph, not only has the number of goalkeepers, defenders, midfielders and forwards been 
taken into account, but also their formation on the field. Up to 1960 therefore, the overall percentage 
figure has been divided by 1 for goalkeepers, 2.5 for defenders and midfielders, and 5 for forwards. 
After 1961 the ratio changes to 1-4-4-2 to take into consideration changing formatio?s within the 
game. In a survey conducted in Desmond Morris, The Soccer Tribe (1981), p. ~28, It ~as found that 
in 1980 out of the 92 managers in the Football League, 88 were former professlOna~s With the 
remaining four ex-amateurs. Of the 88 ex-professionals 27 had been forwards, 32 mldfielders, 28 
defenders and one had been a goalkeeper. 
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their knowledge of the professional game that attracted football club directors. It was 
believed that former professionals would 'know the ropes' and understand all about 
players from the 'practical side' such as detecting 'malingerers' .35 
Of course, directors did look for other attributes notably, experience, 
leadership qualities and evidence of a better education but as most players came from 
working class backgrounds, it meant that few potential managers had had a secondary 
education, the great majority having left school at 13, or 14 after 1918. A few did 
have a secondary education behind them, and this was probably a higher proportion 
compared with footballers in general. Before becoming a professional footballer, 
Colin Veitch, for example, had trained as a pupil teacher at Rutherford College in 
Newcastle in the late 1890s.36 A superior education and a successful playing career 
however, were no guarantees for success and at his only club as manager, Bradford 
City, he left after eighteen unsuccessful months.37 Andy Ducat was similarly 
unsuccessful as manager of Fulham between 1924 and 1926. Like Veitch, he received 
a secondary education, at Compton House School in Southend. He also won two 
caps for England and captained Aston Villa when they won the FA Cup in 1920.38 
Of course, it was not compulsory for managers to have been players (and it 
never has been). Some were hired for their knowledge of local football or were 
35 . Huddersfield Exammer, 22 December 1923, p. 16 
36Sunday Sun, 3 May, p. 32; 10 May 1931, p. 32. Veitch, Newcastle's captain and an England 
international, was very atypical of a professional footballer. A committed socialist, he was also a 
talented actor, musician, a chorus member of the Newcastle Amateur Operatic Society and member of 
the Newcastle People's Theatre. Between 1911 and 1918 he was also chairman of the Players' Union. 
Harding, Good o/the Game, p. 91, 377. In Chapter 9 of his English Journey, J.B. Priestley visited 
the Newcastle People's Theatre. 
37 
Sunday Sun, 16 August 1931, p. 21 
38He also played cricket for England and later became cricket coach at Eton college. Ducat was one of 
only 17 men to represent England at both football and cricket during the twentieth century. He died 
whilst batting at Lords. Morris, Aston Villa, p. 112; Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 122 
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promoted after having previously served the club in some other capacity either as 
player, trainer or secretary. Charles Foweraker was the most successful manager in 
Bolton Wanderers' history, winning the FA Cup in 1923, 1926 and 1929. He had 
originally been a gateman for the club whilst working for the London and North 
Western Railway. He later became assistant secretary before he was appointed 
secretary-manager in 1919.39 In 1930 Bristol Rovers appointed Captain Albert 
Prince-Cox as their manager. He had been a referee and therefore, had some 
understanding of controlling players. Prince-Cox also held a professional qualification 
as a meteorologist.4o Fred Everiss had not been a player either, and had left school at 
13 in 1895 after passing the Labour Examination, allowing him to enter employment. 
He first worked as decorator and then as a printer's errand boy before joining West 
Bromwich Albion as an office boy at 4s per week in 1896, and was only 20 when he 
became the club secretary.41 Similar to Herbert Chapman, Fred Everiss later worked 
in a local munitions factory during the First World War. He interrupted his tenure 
with West Bromwich Albion in 1915 and was placed in charge of the production of 
shells at the John Spencer factory in Wednesbury.42 During the inter-War period 
therefore, managers still came from a diversity of backgrounds, although it is open to 
question whether William Beer, before managing Birmingham City, had received the 
ideal preparation for football management after spending ten years as a sheep farmer 
39 
Young, Bolton Wanderers, p. 69 
40Tumer and White, Football Managers, p. 208 
41Sunday Mercury, 'The Fred Everiss Story', 20 March, p. 13,24 April 1949, p. 13 
42Midland Chronic/e, 1 October 1915, p. 4; Sunday Mercury, 'The Fred Everiss Story', 29 May 
1949, p. 17 
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in Australia!43 Training was on the job. Billy Walker believed that he only required 
two fundamental qualifications for football management. First, that he had twenty 
years experience as a player and that he had familiarised himself with the '3Rs' of 
football management; the F A and Football League's rules and regulations.44 
Life experience therefore, was the main form of training for former players 
who became managers. Their experience of professional football was a form of 
preparation but in general it only perpetuated and consolidated the dominant 
thinking on how players should be handled. As we have seen, this had been built on a 
rigid hierarchical structure where everyone knew their place and strict notions of 
authority. In addition, following the First World War many footballers had served in 
the army. As we have seen in the Introduction, life in the forces shared some 
similarities with that in football clubs where management also largely consisted of the 
need to control and discipline young men. It is likely that some managers with 
military experience used this in their handling of footballers. Frank Buckley, for 
example, was awarded a commission in the 17th F ootballers' Battalion and was later 
promoted to Major and acted as second-in-command.45 On his first managerial 
appointment at Norwich City, Buckley actually advertised for players from the 
Footballers' Battalions.46 Previous to that he had served as a Sergeant-Instructor in 
the 2nd Kings Liverpool Regiment during the Boer War. In addition to his army 
background, Buckley had owned a farm in partnership with his brother Chris. He 
also dressed like a farmer, wearing a tweed suit with plus fours. Throughout his 
43Tumer and White, Football Managers, p. 86 
44 . B. Walker, Soccer In the Blood (1960), pp. 30-33 
45 Catton Folders B-C, p. 195,27 March 1916. 
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career he was always addressed as the 'Major', even by his wife!47 Three other 
members of the Footballers' Battalions also became managers; Jack Tresarden, Angus 
Seed and Charlie Bell who, like Buckley, was given a commission.48 Seed's brother , 
Jimmy also joined the Cyclists' Corps at Sunderland during the War.49 Without prior 
training it inhibited the ability of managers to approach the job with a more reflective 
and considered attitude. 
As the demand for more managers with a football playing background 
increased so their geographical diffusion closely mirrored the spatial pattern of origin 
amongst professional footballers, with 'northerness' a continuing characteristic in 
their production. 50 As a result, the geographical location of soccer 'hotbeds' reflected 
the sport's early development and consequently the distribution of the production of 
players and managers. 51 John Bale argues however, that the geographical diffusion of 
footballers, and thus managers, reflected the shifting economic performance of the 
North and the South.52 Despite the dominant flows of migrant footballers going from 
the North to the South, there was a definite, if slow, 'nationalisation' process. 
46 . AthletiC News, 17 March 1919, p. 6 
47 
Catton Folders B-C, p. 195 
48'Footballer's Battalion' by Frank Buckley. Infonnation supplied by Wolverhampton Wanderers 
Football Club. 
49Seed, Jimmy Seed, p. 67. Other footballers who joined the same regiment included Tommy 
Thompson and Tom Wilson. Wilson, who later captained Huddersfield Town when Herbert 
Chapman was manager, also captained his battalion's team. ibid. 
50J. Bale, Sport and Place: A Geography o/Sport in England, Scotland and Wales (1982), Tables 
4.1 and 4.2, pp. 32-38. See Appendix 15-16 for a spatial breakdown of the production of football 
managers born in Great Britain. One of its most notable aspects is the disproportionately large 
Scottish percentage and its long-tenn decline. This decline is reflected in the largely commensurate 
rise in English managers and closely resembles the pattern for professional footballers. See Chapter 2, 
n82 of this thesis. 
51Up to 1920, teams that were later elected to the League were invariably from the North. The one 
notable early exception being Woolwich Arsenal which was the first southern team to join the 
Football League in 1893. 
52 Bale, Sport and Place, p. 29. See part II, Chapter 4 
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Managers begin to hail from an increasing number of different locations including 
London and South Wales. 
Demand for managers was not confined to England of course. In Chapter 3 it 
was noted how Willie Maley was the first manager of Glasgow Celtic, helping them 
enjoy much success. In 1920 their Old Firm rivals, Glasgow Rangers, appointed Bill 
Struth, a stonemason by trade and the club's trainer, as their manager. He retired in 
1954 and under him Rangers surpassed the Maley years at Celtic. 53 Moreover, it 
was not just Britain where football managers were increasing. Through its trading 
links, football was exported by the British to all corners of the globe. Interest and 
competition in the game grew in these new footballing countries and so did the need 
for expertise to aid their development. Pierre Lanfranchi has argued that European 
football was a 'manifestation of technical progress' as many clubs were established 
by the growing number of engineers on the continent. 54 It was partly through this 
tradition that European football later developed a more technocratic attitude towards 
management and coaching compared to Britain's practical tradition. In addition, the 
game in Europe was a 'white collar' game whereas in Britain it had strong working-
class roots. Nevertheless, because they were the pioneers of football, British coaches 
were at the forefront of turning football into the world game. 55 One of the early 
pioneers was William Garbutt. He had been a player with Woolwich Arsenal and 
Blackburn Rovers in the early 1900s before moving to Italy to coach Genoa between 
53 
Murray, Old Firm, pp. 204-07 
54p. Lanfranchi, 'Exporting football: notes on the development of football in Europe', R. Giulianotti 
and J. Williams (eds.), Game Without Frontiers: Football, Identity and Modernity (Aldershot, 
1994), pp. 23-46 
55J. Walvin, The People's Game (Newton Abbot, 1975), Chapter 5. For a history of South American 
football see T. Mason, Passion o/the People? (1995) 
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1910 and 1915. He later managed Naples from 1929 and 1935 having helped to 
prepare the Italian team for the 1924 Olympics. 56 Fred Pentland became famous as 
manager of the Spanish Basque team, Athletic Bilbao, winning two titles in 1930 and 
1931. In 1920 he had coached the French Olympic team before managing Racing 
Santander. Pentland has been credited with introducing the short-passing game to 
Spanish football. 57 
Jimmy Hogan was probably the most famous of the British coaches who 
worked abroad. He began in 1910 coaching a club in Holland before taking charge of 
the Dutch national team. He moved to Austria in 1912 where he began a long 
association with Hugo Meisl who was described as the Herbert Chapman of 
European football. Hogan was peripatetic and also coached in Germany, Switzerland 
and Hungary. In 1936 he coached the Austrian side that reached the 1936 Olympics 
Fina1.58 European managers also began to emerge between the wars. Hugo Meisl has 
already been mentioned as a pioneer in Austria and he was later assisted by his 
nephew, Willy Meisl. Vittorio Pozzo was the leading coach in Italy. As a young man 
he had worked in Bradford but preferred to watch Manchester United, especially 
Charlie Roberts. Back in Italy he first worked at Torino before managing the national 
team that won the World Cup in 1934 and 1938 and also the Olympics in 1936.59 
Both European and South American countries concentrated more on the 
training and preparation of players than the British. Furthermore, greater emphasis 
56T. Mason, 'Death ofthe Soccer Exiles', BBC History Magazine (June 2000), p. 34; Lanfranchi, 
"Mister Garbutt", pp. 44-59 
57 When Saturday Comes, March 2000, p. 20. He had also played for Blackburn Rovers like Garbutt 
and had been interned by the Gennans during the War. ibid. 
58n. Turner, 'A Coach's Trip to Europe', The Footballer, Vol. 1,6 (MarchlApriI1989), pp. 28-29 
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was placed on the national team rather than the club game. In Italy, admittedly 
assisted by a Fascist regime that used football for political purposes, the national 
team under Pozzo assembled three weeks before a game for practice and tactical 
preparations.6o In Holland all potential internationals were card indexed and then 
underwent a thorough preparation consisting of blackboard demonstrations and ball 
practice.61 English coaches returning from the continent to management positions, 
like Tom Bromilow at Burnley, faced cultural resistance from players to the methods 
they had used on the continent.62 Similarly, Jimmy Hogan had returned to England in 
1934 to manage Fulham but was dismissed after only one season. The players did 
not respond to his methods and the directors agreed with them that experienced 
players did not need coaching. 63 
English football was at a more mature stage of development than in Europe. 
Its management culture therefore, was more deeply embedded and despite the 
increase in the number of football managers, it would be wrong to assume that a 
change in their relationship with club directors was inevitable. Burke has argued that 
to understand why social change takes place historians need to examine how it takes 
place, i.e. the mechanics of change. 64 During the inter-War period, the management of 
English football clubs was essentially about power, and this continued to be 
exercised by the directors. Despite the impact of Herbert Chapman, the amateur, 
59Walvin, People's Game, pp. 94-95; S. Kelly, 'Charlie Roberts: The Complete Centre-Half, The 
Footballer, Vol. 1,6 (March/AprilI989), pp. 26-27 
60 Sharpe, Forty Years, Chapter 12 
61 Chapman, Herbert Chapman, pp. 166-67 
62 . . TopIcal TImes, 12 January 1935, p. 43 
63Turner, 'A Coach's Trip to Europe', pp. 28-29 
64 
Burke, History, p. 139 
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voluntary tradition of English football management persisted as directors were 
unwilling to concede the perks of their position. In one sense, this is not surprising. 
Many directors were successful businessmen who had a lot of self-esteem and 
thought they knew a lot about football, and some did, having played it at a 
reasonable level. Harold Hardman, for example, a director of Manchester United, had 
been an England amateur international. In comparison to footballers, directors were 
also better educated and more experienced in life in general. Any claims therefore, of 
interference from directors is perhaps a case of history with hindsight because 
directors had always taken the responsibility of running the club and expected to 
continue to do so. 
Some directors therefore, like James Taylor at Preston North End, dominated 
their clubs during this period.65 At nearby Blackburn Rovers, former England 
captain, Bob Crompton was honorary manager between 1926 and 1931 as well as 
being a director of the club at the same time.66 Newcastle United's tradition of 
directors being in charge of the team was continued by Stan Seymour, another former 
player, until the 1950s.67 George Allison of course, had been a director before 
relinquishing this position to become Arsenal's full-time manager. Other directors 
just liked to interfere. At Glasgow Rangers however, Bill Struth as manager also held 
the largest individual shareholding and in 1947 he was able to oust the club chairman, 
James Bowie.68 As Fishwick has similarly argued about football (see Chapter 4), 
Gourvish has identified the role of crisis as one of the necessary ingredients in the 
65 
Russell, Football, p. 90 
66 
Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 114 
67 Appleton, Hotbed of Soccer, pp. 151-61; Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 222 
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transition within British industry from an owner-dominated to a manager-dominated 
enterprise in large-scale businesses during the Twenties and Thirties but he also 
argues that this transition was marked by a determination of families to maintain 
69 
control of a company. 
Because they were small and peculiar businesses, any management changes 
were specific to each football club. For example, Frank Buckley initially had to defer 
to the directors of Wolverhampton Wanderers when he became manager in 1927. It 
was not until 1933-34 when the team was having a poor run of results, together with 
changes in the boardroom, that he was accorded full powers to select the team. 70 
Peter McWilliam also became Middlesbrough's manager in 1927. It was claimed that 
he was to be given total control of team selection without any interference from the 
board. It was actually stipulated in his contract that he was to have full powers to 
select both the first and second teams. The reality however, was rather different. 
When Herbert Bamlett, his predecessor, had been manager, the directors had selected 
the team, and when they disagreed on this together with the recruitment of players 
they took a vote. McWilliam was also faced with the problem of directors 
questioning his selection and having to change the team at their behest.71 Similarly, 
on taking up the post of secretary-manager at Sheffield Wednesday in 1933, Billy 
Walker felt that his position was one of full power and full responsibility. When the 
68 
Murray, Old Firm, p. 206 
69G . h .. h . , 28 ourVlS ,'BntIs Busmess, p. 
70Wolverhampton Wanderers FC Minutes, 23 August 1933; 29 August 1933; 3 October 1933 
7lM·ddl . . 1 esbrough FC Mmutes, passIm 
239 
club was later relegated to the Second Division in 1937 however, the directors began 
to interfere with Walker's handling of the team.72 
In contrast, Jimmy Seed, who was appointed manager of Charlton Athletic in 
May 1933, virtually ran the club himself. This can be concluded from the actual 
number of directors' meetings Charlton held between 1935 and 1939: only one every 
two months. Middlesbrough's directors on the other hand met once a week during 
the playing season and their interference probably stemmed from the voluntary 
tradition, and the need to be involved. In 1932 Charlton had been taken over by two 
brothers, Albert and Stanley Gliksten who were millionaire timber merchants from 
London's East End. They were probably too busy running their business to manage 
the football club and so left it in the hands of Seed.73 In 1932 Charlie Paynter had 
been appointed West Ham's team manager and he also continued with his duties as 
club trainer. The recruitment of players however, was now the responsibility of two 
directors, Messrs. Liddell and Leafe. This division of labour represented a dilution of 
the responsibilities of the previous secretary-manager, Syd King.74 
How did a manager's relationship with his directors effect his role? According 
to Jones, football management, in strict economic terms, has to satisfy a demand for 
'productivity gains in the form of a quality team' and that during this period this was 
increasingly translated into techniques such as coaching and tactics.75 Before this 
however, a team had to be assembled. With the growth of the transfer market in this 
72 
Walker, Soccer, pp. 36-37 
73 
Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 2, 1985, pp. 574-78 
74 I fi h" fi . West Ham Fe Minutes, 7-22 November 1932. I am grateful to Matt Tay or or t IS In onnatlOn. 
Korr, West Ham, pp. 88-90 
75Jones, 'Economic Aspects', p. 293 
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period, due to an increase in the number of transfers and actual fees, it further 
underlined the importance of selecting the right player.76 In effect, the main job of 
the manager had become that of a personnel manager: someone who built the team by 
looking for players but whose power was conditional on the club's overall strategy 
and financial situation. 
When the post for manager of Wolverhampton Wanderers was advertised in 
the Athletic News in 1927, it was unequivocally stated in capital letters, that 'A 
SPENDTHRIFT IS NOT NEEDED,.77 And during Frank Buckley's tenure this set 
the tone for the club's long term policy. When he took office the club owed the bank 
£14,000, and had made a loss for the 1926-27 season of £1500 with first team 
receipts totalling £15,000. By 1935-36 the club had made a profit of £17,000, were 
in credit with the bank to £4000 and gate receipts had increased to £32,000. 78 
Buckley had built himself a reputation for 'wheeling and dealing' in players, and, 
importantly, finding talent. Between 1935 and 1938 the club's income from 
79 f transferred players was £110,658; an overall profit of £68,000. At the centre 0 
this turnaround was Wolves's scouting system and Buckley's ability to sell on 
players for large profits. In 1938, for example, Wolves sold Bryn Jones to Arsenal 
for a record £14,000.80 On his appointment as Charlton manager, Seed was told by 
76 
Taylor, 'Proud Preston', pp. 165-67 
77 Athletic News, 2 May 1927, p. 19 
780uide and Ideas, 'Football is My Life Story' by Major Frank Buckley, 1 May 1937, p. 3 
79p.M. Young, Centenary Wolves, Wolverhampton (1976), p. 109; Cullis, All/or the Wolves 
(1960), p. 94 
80Express and Star, 22 December 1964, p. 24, 'Obituary'. Buckley also needed some luck. Billy 
Wright won a then record 105 caps for England and played only for Wolves during his career. Yet 
Buckley thought that he was too small to be a footballer and was prepared to transfer ?im but was 
prevented from doing so because the groundsman argued that he was the hardest workmg member of 
his staff. Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999 
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the Glikstens of their ambitious plans to make Charlton's ground, the Valley, the 
best in the country but their motivations later changed.81 When they first assumed 
control at Charlton they had taken an active role in all the club's affairs. This 
stemmed from their financial investment that later totalled £105,000, made up of two 
debentures. 82 Later, it became the aim of the Glikstens to reclaim the loan rather than 
make further investment. Seed claimed that, as a result, the club had 'a policy against 
big spending,.83 In his 23 years as manager of Charlton, Seed spent £55,000 on 
players but sold others worth £ 170,000.84 
I t was noted in previous chapters how the labour market underwent a 
process of bureaucratisation, and during the inter-War period it continued to be 
formalised. This meant its organisation was increasingly placed in the hands of 
managers and officials. The national insurance scheme, introduced in 1911, was 
extended to most industrial workers by 1920, including footballers with Football 
League clubs. Bureaucratic employers, particularly the railways, also took greater 
steps to monitor and control their workers by imposing fines, placing workers under 
surveillance and subjecting them to medical tests and examinations of competence. 85 
Football clubs also adopted more systematic methods regarding the recruitment of 
players. For example, many began to develop sophisticated scouting networks that 
81 
R. Redden, The History a/Charlton Athletic: Valley a/Tears, Valley 0/ Joy (1993), p. 32 
82 A debenture is defined as a sealed bond issued by a company acknowledging that it is indebted to 
the holder of the bond for a specified sum of money, bearing interest until repayment of the principal 
sum. The first, worth £65,000, was a debt the club owed to Messrs Humphreys Ltd, a firm of 
engineers. The Glikstens took this on and took out a second debenture of £40,000 in April 1937 
when the club accrued further debts from transfer fees and wages. Charlton Athletic FC Minutes, 21 
April 1937; Seed, Jimmy Seed, p. 25 
83Seed, Jimmy Seed, pp. 30-31. For example see Charlton Athletic FC Minutes, 22 January 1935 
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extended across the British Isles, and the richer the club the more sophisticated the 
network.86 Jimmy Seed arranged for scouts to cover most of Britain on behalf of 
Charlton. He was particularly keen to cultivate the North East that was generally 
regarded as a breeding ground for professional footballers. 87 Seed appointed his 
brother, Anthony, as the chief to the other five scouts there.88 Sam Bartram, for 
example, Charlton's longest serving player, was recommended to Seed whilst playing 
for Boldon Villa in county Durham.89 Professional clubs also began to develop links 
with local junior clubs and adopted them as nursery clubs. Young professionals 
played for these junior clubs who would then cultivate their talent before playing in 
the Football League. Charlton's nursery club was Bexleyheath and Welling. 90 
Scarborough approached Middlesbrough with the view of becoming their nursery 
club but Middlesbrough rejected it. Instead an arrangement was reached where 
Middlesbrough gained first refusal on Scarborough's players.9} 
In addition to the reports from scouts, Jimmy Seed kept a record of every 
Charlton first team game in which he gave brief comments on each player from both 
86Fishwick, English Football, p. 41. Reports on players were dispatched to clubs where they were 
usually discussed between the directors and manager who would then decide whether someone should 
watch the player before signing him. 
870ver 15 per cent of Football League players born in England and Wales between 1919 and 1939 
and who signed with clubs after 1945, came from the North East. At the time, the North East's 
popUlation accounted for less than 6 per cent of the population of England and Wales. The overall 
total was 756 out of a grand total of 5016. Of this total, 53 per cent came from the three major urban 
conurbations: Tyneside - 213 (28 per cent); Teesside - 120 (16 per cent); and Wearside - 69 (9 per 
cent). P. Hutchins, 'Sport and Regional Pride: Association Football and the North East of England 
1919-1961' (PhD Thesis, University of Sussex, 1990), pp. 59-60 
88Seed, Jimmy Seed, p. 31. One of whom was a Mr Fake of Annfield Plain who was employed in 
1935 on a trial basis for a season at 30 shillings per week plus expenses. Charlton Athletic FC 
Minutes, 28 May 1935 
89 S. Bartram, Sam Bartram By Himself(1996 edn.), pp. 26-27 
90Charlton Athletic FC Minutes, 22 January; 26 February; 23 April; 11 July; 19 July 1935. They 
had had a previous agreement with Romford that was cancelled. 
91Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 24 April 1927; 18 January; 25 January 1928 
Emergence iJ!rfle F'lJottJall Jt:fanager 243 
sides. For example, Seed signed Don Welsh from Torquay in February 1935 for 
£3250.92 Earlier that season when Charlton met Torquay United, Seed remarked that 
Welsh was the best player on the pitch, a 'brilliant player in defence and attack' .93 
Other players were judged more harshly. Manchester City and England goalkeeper, 
Frank Swift's performance in October 1936 apparently 'did not inspire 
confidence' .94 Reports on players at Middlesbrough were made by directors, the 
manager and scouts. Their comments placed great emphasis on a player's social and 
physical characteristics as well as his technical ability, reflecting the traditional 
masculine qualities managers sought in players. In 1927, for example, McWilliam 
reported that the Wolves' full back, Shaw, had two good feet 'but is very weak at 
close quarters' .95 On reporting on Boyd of Newcastle United, one director, Rand, 
observed that 'the player struck him as lacking in pluck, otherwise a good player'. 
McWilliam made his own enquiries and came to the conclusion that 'he was a very 
good footballer but a bit timid,.96 Armstrong of Jarrow was reported as having 
satisfactory ability but of being of poor physique as he was only 5 feet 6 inches tall 
and weighed 9 stones and 10 pounds.97 A report by a Middlesbrough scout on 
Ballantine of Partick Thistle detailed some of his personal habits. He was a married 
man who was strictly temperate and a non-smoker but was inclined to be moody. 
92Charlton Athletic FC Minutes, 26 February 1935 
93Charlton Athletic FC Team Book, 27 August 1934 
94Charlton Athletic FC Team Book, 10 October 1936 
95Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 14 December 1927 
96Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 12 September 1928 
97Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 18 December 1929 
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Follow-up reports confirmed his footballing ability but also a hasty temper that led 
• • . c. I 98 hIm to commIttmg too many petty lOU s. 
Age was another significant factor when Middlesbrough decided to sIgn a 
player. It was common for players to mislead clubs regarding their actual age for fear 
that they might not be taken on. Jack Curnow was 25 when he joined Wolves in 
1935 but he had told the club's scout that he was 23. The scout then said that this 
would be too old, and told Curnow to tell Buckley that he was in fact 21. Buckley 
believed him.99 In 1930 the Middlesbrough chairman, Phil Bach, wanted to see the 
birth certificate of any player they were interested in who was around 30 years 
old. IOO In 1933 the club cancelled the contract of E.P. Taylor on the grounds that he 
had wilfully misled the club over his age. lOi In the following year, Middlesbrough 
finally decided to obtain all the players' birth certificates. 102 
To what extent did the relationship between players and managers change 
during the inter-War years? Were there any advances in the management of labour at 
football clubs? In terms of managerial styles employed by football managers, Wagg 
has argued that managers in this period could be divided between a 'players' 
manager' and the more authoritarian NCO types. 103 This distinction however, is 
simplistic, as any man-management methods needs to be placed in the context of 
football's wider employer-employee relations. 
98Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 9 April; 16 April 1930 
99Interview with Jack Curnow, 5 June 1990; Jack Curnow Memoirs. For similar reasons, Alf 
Ramsey changed the year of his birth from 1920 to 1922. M. Marquis, Anatomy ola Football 
Manager: Sir Alf Ramsey (1970), p. 11 
100Middiesbrough FC Minutes, 11 April 1930 
10lMiddiesbrough FC Minutes, 8 June 1933 
102Middiesbrough FC Minutes, 11 April 1934 
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As we have seen, the relationship between club and player was increasingly 
formalised, reflecting changes within British industry. During the twentieth century 
industry gradually shifted from old-style paternalism towards a more rational system 
of welfarism. 104 The overall aim however, was still to maximise worker producti vi ty . 
At the level of employment relations, few UK employers had a broad strategy 
beyond nineteenth century paternalism. By the 1930s however, the concepts of 
human relations had emerged. Before 1914 Quaker firms such as Cadbury and 
Rowntree had already conducted experiments in this field and these contributed 
towards advances in employment relations. Their work contributed to some 
acceptance of the new American ideas of personnel management. These were 
associated with the Hawthorne experiments in industrial psychology that were 
undertaken by Elton Mayo, a Harvard Business School professor. Moreover, 
Lyndall Urwick, who had worked at Rowntrees, became a pioneer of UK 
105 
management consultancy. 
Between 1900 and 1939 the Football League evolved into a central regulatory 
body, gaining formal control over player conditions relating to employment, pay, 
discipline, movement and welfare. 106 In terms of the players' general welfare, 
Charlton were more progressive than many other clubs. In 1936 it was one of only 
two London clubs that took advantage of the FA's arrangement with the Board of 
103 Wagg, Football World, pp. 50-51 
104Jeremy, Business History, p. 450 
105 ibid., pp. 452-53 
106Taylor, 'Proud Preston' p. 159; p. 198. See Chapters 5 and 6 
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Education and London County Council to provide educational classes for London's 
professional footballers. 107 Taylor however, argues that 
the extension of welfare schemes [between 1900 and 1939] to cover accidents, 
pensions, sickness or death was not the work of idealistic paternalists but of hard-
headed employers intent on maximising the efficiency and ensuring the dependence 
oftheir workforces at the lowest possible cost.108 
Some clubs however, continued to playa paternal role. Players of Wolves, for 
example, were encouraged by Buckley to save their wages and also to send some 
h . 109 money to t elr parents. 
However, a club's labour management methods were still fairly rudimentary. 
Most managers had little daily contact with the players and were regarded as 'ivory 
tower' figures who remained in their offices whilst trainers continued to supervise 
the players on a day-to-day basis. In addition to this distant relationship, a 
generation gap existed between managers and players. With former professionals 
becoming managers, the average age of new managers increased to around forty, as 
shown in Figure 5.5. llO As a young player at Charlton after the Second World War, 
Malcolm Allison questioned the value of the club's training. He was told to see 
Jimmy Seed the following day who informed him that he was being transferred to 
West Ham. His response was to ask Seed if he could shake his hand. Allison said, 'I 
107Football Association Instructional Classes for Boys in Association Football, Committee Report 
1936-7, May 1937. The other club was Clapton Orient. Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 244. Several 
Charlton players enrolled at Woolwich Polytechnic for courses on technical subjects, and in co-
operation with the Woolwich Commercial Institute, it also held special courses at their ground, the 
Valley 
108 Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 246 
109Guide and Ideas, 'Football is My Life Story' by Major Frank Buckley, 8 May 1937, p. 5 
110 From the 1960s onwards however, the average has levelled out to about 37 years of age. 
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want to thank you for teaching me the art of communication, because you've just 
spoken to me for the third time in seven years!,lll 
Industry also continued to display an aversion to the benefits of scientific 
management. Taylorism, it was popularly believed, would result in a de-skilling of 
the workforce, and thus proved unpopular with British workers. In addition, few 
large firms paid much attention to scientific management until the 1930s. One 
exception was the Bedaux system designed by the Frenchman, Charles E. Bedaux. 112 
It was based on a universal measurement of work, and spread to England in the late 
Twenties. By 1939 about 250 firms had adopted it including Rover at Coventry, and 
a number of firms made savings. l13 These were emerging ideas however, and the 
reality for many workers was a continuation of past practices. In a paper given to 
the psychology section of the British Association in 1923, Alice Ikin listed 32 
qualities that were felt to be desirable in a foreman. These included an ability to 
swear, to teach, organise and inspire confidence, as well as qualities such as character, 
personality and self-control. 114 
In terms of man-management techniques, a manager's personality was his 
most important tool, and as we have seen in the Introduction, some managers 
employed verbal authoritarianism, in dealing with players. At Rangers, for example, 
it was claimed that Bill Struth was a charismatic personality who would not accept 
111 Observer (Sport), 2 January 2000, p. 4 
112Bedaux committed suicide in 1944 before he faced a trial in Florida for treason as a Nazi 
sympathiser in Vichy France. His home, the 16th century, Chateau de Cande, hosted the wedding of 
two other well-known Nazi sympathisers, the Duke and Duchess of Windsor. Express and Star, 19 
February 1944, p. 8 
113In 1934 however, glasscutters employed by Pilkington Brothers in St. Helens, Lanes. refused to 
work under the Bedaux system. Daily Herald, 9 January 1934, p. 11 
114Blackpool Times, 21 September 1923, p. 4 
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neither criticism nor advice, and ruled by fear. He also ruled the team through a 
hierarchy of older players who were given petty privileges. II5 Frank Buckley was 
perhaps the prime exponent of the military method unsurprising perhaps given his 
army background (see above). The word 'martinet' was never far away when 
describing Buckley's managerial style. Don Bilton, who joined Wolves just before 
the outbreak of the Second World War, said he ruled by fear and that 'If you had a 
rotten game you'd hardly dare go in at half-time, you were going to get the biggest 
bawling at ... cursed and swore at you. So from that point of view he was a terrible 
chap' .116 Jackie Sewell described him as 'a very frightening man', when he was his 
manager at N otts. County, who could 'make grown men have tears in their eyes'. 117 
Conversely, Bilton also recognised acts of kindness when Buckley, on occasions, 
supplied young players from poor backgrounds with new clothes. These actions 
were perhaps part of Buckley's methods, albeit rudimentary, for motivating players, 
and; as well as striking fear into them, to also engender an 'I'll show him attitude' 
amongst them. When he was at Blackpool, the supporters' club had complained 
about Buckley's sty Ie of management. They suggested that the players had lost their 
enjoyment of the game and that this was the reason for the team's lack of success. 118 
Other managers however, were more sympathetic. Matt Busby, for example, was 
greatly influenced by George Kay, his manager at Liverpool during the Thirties who 
displayed much loyalty towards his players and treated them with consideration. 
I I 5 Murray , Old Firm, pp. 205-06 
II6Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999 
II7Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, p. 34 
118 R. Calley, Blackpool: A Complete Record, 1887-1992 (Derby, 1992), p. 60 
Kay's approach contrasted sharply with the malicious atmosphere Busby had 
. d M h C' 119 expenence at anc ester lty. 
Football clubs also continued to issue players with rules by which they had 
to abide. At Hull City, for example, players were not allowed to enter public houses 
after Mondays nor attend dances after Tuesday.12o For Wolves's players, dancing 
after Wednesday night was 'strictly forbidden' .121 In addition, Buckley had a 
network of spies throughout Wolverhampton's pubs and clubs to observe whether 
the players were behaving themselves and not breaking any curfews. 122 Because of 
the club's recruitment policy, young players predominated and at one point, in 1937, 
Wolves did not have one married man amongst the forty players on their books.123 It 
was further claimed that Buckley wanted to know when and who a player was going 
to marry. Buckley was almost obsessed by having control and his office was situated 
in the foyer of the main stand so everyone who went in had to go past it. 124 In 1938 
he created a hostel for the clubs young players complete with recreational facilities, 
in order to keep them under the one roof and make supervision easier. 125 
Buckley was the sole authority at Wolves when it came to player 
supervision. The club trainers were directly under his command and they feared him 
119Dunphy, Strange Kind of Glory, pp. 56-72 
120See Appendix 13 
121See Appendix 14 
122Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999 
123 Albion News, 16 January 1937, p. 195. Evidence of the club's long-tenn policy of developing 
young players came in 1932 when it paid out a record six benefits. Young, Centenary Wolves, p. 
106, 114 
124Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999 
125 Express and Star, 23 December 1964, p. 8 
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as much as the players did!26 The role of the trainer, as seen at Arsenal with Tom 
Whittaker, took on increasing importance. Jimmy Seed delegated many supervisory 
duties to his trainer, Jimmy Trotter, and on a day-to-day basis it was Trotter who 
was in charge of the players. At most clubs trainers were still regarded as important 
figures in terms of the daily supervision of players. Many were also former 
footballers who, like managers, brought with them a practical experience of the 
professional game. In 1922 however, West Bromwich Albion appointed Bill Gopsill 
as trainer, a man who had been an NCO in the Army.127 A trainer's overall authority 
though was limited, and at some clubs senior players would take advantage of this 
fact. Charlie Cole was Middlesbrough's trainer throughout the inter-War years. 
George Hardwick said later that, '[h]e had little or no authority. The players ruled 
him rather than him ruling the players. Poor Charlie, he had a hell of a time because 
ak· h' f h' ,128 everyone was t mg t e pISS out 0 1m. 
The club captain was still regarded as an important position in the club 
throughout the period, often acting as intermediary between the manager and players. 
Stan Cullis was made Wolves captain at the age of 19 by Buckley who told him that 
he was to be the 'boss' on the field, and make any necessary tactical changes. Once, 
at a reserve game, Cullis overturned a director's tactical decision, and received 
Buckley's backing for it afterwards!29 When Jimmy Seed was captain of Sheffield 
Wednesday between 1927 to 1931, he admits to being given 'unlimited licence' to 
126Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999; T. Matthews, Golden Greats a/Wolves, Vol. 6 
(Warley, 1993), pp. 28-29, Vol. 4, p. 24. The trainers included Jack Davies (1918-45), George 
Holley (1922-32) and Val Gregory (1925-39) 
127Albion News, 26 August 1922, p. 2. He had been a Corporal in the Boer War and a Sergeant in 
the Royal Army Medical Corps during World War One 
128Interview with George Hardwick, 25 February 1999 
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introduce his own methods and ideas. The manager at the time was Bob Brown who 
was more of an administrator, and he never interfered in any of Seed's onfield 
decisions. Once a week they would have a chat and Seed would then convey 
Brown's views to the players. Seed believed that a captain, including his at Charlton, 
should be a manager on the pitch. 130 Like Arsenal, Charlton introduced pre-match 
tactical discussions on Friday mornings where players and the trainer were given the 
opportunity to state their opinion. 131 At other clubs such as West Bromwich Albion 
it was the players and not the manager who devised the tactics.132 Bill Struth also 
left tactics to the Rangers' players on the field. 133 
Football's industrial relations were characterised by a lack of player militancy 
during this period. Union membership was generally low and there were also 
fluctuations between clubs. Some, such as the Manchester clubs, United and City, 
were almost always unionised whereas the opposite was the case at Everton and 
Liverpool. It has been suggested, although there is little evidence, that powerful 
individuals had an influence over the make-up of a club's union membership. 
Everton, for example, was run by its dictatorial chairman, Will Cuff, who was a 
prominent member of the Football League Management Committee. Similarly, the 
lack of union activity at Wolves may have been due to Buckley's influence. 134 
Arsenal players were also absent but instead of Chapman's influence, the more 
obvious answer however, may have rested with the fact that Arsenal were successful 
129Cullis, Wolves, pp. 12-14 
130 . (0 0 J. Seed, Soccer From The Inside 1947), pp. 1 8-1 
131 ibid., pp. 67-68 
1321 am grateful to Ian Atkins for this information. 
133Murray, Old Firm, p. 205 
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and that the players were doing all right. l35 If there was a lack of militancy amongst 
players, it did not stop their disgruntlement over the transfer system and the 
maximum wage. In 1938, for example, Tranmere Rovers won the Third Division 
North but on the eve of the new season the players went on strike until they had 
received an extra £2 per week. 136 
One problem that managers had not previously encountered was the wishes 
of players' wives. As a result of their political emancipation in 1918, and then having 
their franchise extended in 1928, women were becoming more assertive in other areas 
of society. Football clubs also recognised that a player's family life might influence 
his performance on the pitch. Tom Bromilow had agreed with two players to their 
transfer to Burnley but in both cases they had just been fIxed up in new houses and 
the wives were not willing to move having just got settled in. In what he described as 
'[q]uite a ticklish little job', Bromilow had to persuade them that the transfer was to 
everyone's advantage. l37 Billy Walker also had problems with getting players' wives 
to settle in a new town. On one occasion, a wife had complained because there was 
I . fi . h h 138 no e ectnc Ire m t e ouse. 
As was mentioned earlier, the actual training of players at most English clubs 
was still relatively basic. It mainly consisted of lapping, i.e. running around the 
ground, and was notable for the absence of any work with a football. This was partly 
due to the widely-held belief that by not seeing a ball during the week players would 
134 Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 217 
135Harding, Good a/the Game, pp. 170-74 
l36Interview with Jack Curnow, 5 June 1990 
l37 Topical Times, 12 January 1935, p. 43 
138 Walker, Soccer, p. 112 
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be hungry for it on a Saturday, and also that very few trainers had actually had any 
qualifications themselves. Occasionally, some players would indulge in a game of 
head tennis. 139 Nat Lofthouse, the former Bolton centre-forward, has remarked that 
when Saturday arrived they did not know what to do with the bal1. 14o The debate 
over the merits of coaching had been in progress for a number of years, yet according 
to Stephen Wagg, it met considerable resistance throughout the professional game 
from both management and players. 141 Nevertheless, on the initiative of its secretary, 
Stanley Rous, the Football Association began coaching courses in schools in 1934-
35. 142 
Frank Buckley, like Herbert Chapman, was one of the few managers who had 
recognised the benefits of coaching much earlier. He gained a reputation as a pioneer 
of modern training methods and had an obsession with physical and mental 
fitness. 143 Soon after his appointment at Blackpool in 1923, it was reported that a 
'pleasing feature of the training ... is that the manager dons the jersey and joins the 
boys giving them advice and practical demonstration of what to do and how to do it'. 
Buckley also held practice games on Friday afternoons aimed at developing a better 
understanding between the players. 144 Later, at Wolves, he introduced mechanical 
innovations to supplement training sessions. A rowing machine was an early 
139Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, pp. 42-43; Interview with George Hardwick, 25 
February 1999 
140 Kicking and Screaming, Part 2, BBC Television 
141 Wagg, Football World, pp. 31-32. For example, Birmingham Sporting Mail, 5 December 1908; 
Athletic News, 24 November 1919 
142 . h lb' . J P' K' One of the ftrst was taken by former West Bromwlc A IOn captam, esse ennmgton, at mg 
Edward VI School in Stourbridge. Albion News, 26 January 1935, p. 223 
143 The Times, 24 December 1964, p. 11, 'Obituary'; P. Morris, The Team Makers (1971), p. 39 
144Blackpool Times, 31 July, p.12; 7 August 1923, p. 5 
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example. Buckley also had a machine purpose-built that fired out footballs at 
different angles for players to control. A room under a stand was fitted with rubber 
walls at which players kicked a ball that would then return at unpredictable angles 
again with the aim of improving their ball control. 145 One of Buckley's most peculiar 
practices was to encourage players to go ballroom dancing. This, he believed, would 
improve their balance and movement. On occasions, he would insist on players 
dancing with each other in training. 146 Buckley was very keen that all players, 
including goalkeepers, should be able to kick proficiently with both feet. In practice 
matches, for example, right wingers would play on the left wing for this purpose. He 
wanted his players to be versatile and would play them in a number of different 
. . 147 posItIOns. 
Buckley's most infamous innovation or, some may argue, stunt, was to inject 
his players with monkey gland extracts. It was later sensationalised by the popular 
press. 148 Buckley began using the treatment on Wolves players in 1935. He refuted 
accusations of using chemical assistance to improve the team's performance and 
claimed its purpose was to increase a player's resistance to colds and other minor 
illnesses. 149 Buckley's wife later claimed that he had the injections himself and that 
145Express and Star, 3 August 1927; Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999 
146Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999; Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, p. 34-
35 
147Interview with Don Bilton, 26 February 1999; Cullis, Wolves, p. 13 
148This treatment was pioneered by Serge Voronoffin the 1920s for the purposes of rejuvenation. 
W.F. Bynum and R. Porter, Companion Encyclopaedia of the History of Medicine (1993), p. 1106; 
R. Porter, The Greatest Benefit to Mankind (1997), p. 568. See D. Hamilton, The Monkey Gland 
Affair (1986) 
149Young, Centenary Wolves, p. 115; Express and Star, 29 March 1939, p. 12; Taylor and Ward, 
Kicking and Screaming, p. 32; Cullis, Wolves, pp. 15-16 
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they worked wonders for him! 150 The use of medicinal substances was not 
uncommon in football, although there is no evidence that they helped to improve 
performance. 151 At Blackpool, Buckley had handed out pep pills to players before a 
cup-tie in the mid-1920s.1 52 Leslie Knighton also gave pep pills to Arsenal players 
before a cup-tie with West Ham in 1925:53 
Other aspects of pre-match preparation that gained more importance included 
the treatment of injuries. In Chapter 4 it was seen how Tom Whittaker became an 
early expert in this field. Jimmy Trotter at Charlton was also a leader, qualifying as a 
masseur and physiotherapist. West Bromwich Albion players who required cartilage 
operations were sent to Mr Stewart, a knee specialist from Newcastle who also 
treated players from other clubs. 154 Psychology was also tried by clubs in the 1930s. 
The Reverend M. Caldwell, a chaplain to two large London mental hospitals, was 
described as an expert in practical psychology who gave lectures on what he termed 
'psychotactics'. Some of the clubs who employed him included Arsenal, Brentford 
150Express and Star, 12 September 1964, p. 37. After Wolves defeated Leicester City in the 1939 
F A Cup the MP for East Leicester, Montague Lyons, asked the Minister of Health to order an 
investigation into the treatment of football players with gland extracts from animals. ibid. In 1938 
the Football Association held an enquiry and stated that gland treatment was not compulsory for 
players, and anyone who refused could not be subjected to any disciplinary action. Stan Cullis 
claimed that only one player, Dickie Dorsett, refused the injections whilst others discontinued the 
treatment. Don Bilton, as a seventeen year old, also refused them at the start of pre-season training 
for the 1939-40 season. B. Ferrier, Soccer Partnership: Billy Wright and Walter Winterbottom 
(1960), pp. 88-89; Young, Centenary Wolves, p. 115; Cullis, Wolves, pp. 15-16; Interview with Don 
Bilton, 26 February 1999 
151It was not uncommon in other sports either. The use of drugs by athletes can be traced back to 
ancient Greeks where Olympians ate rams' testicles to give them extra strength. Dorando Pietri who 
was disqualified after winning the 1908 Olympic marathon in London after getting assistance from 
officials, had entered the stadium and was near to collapse probably from the effects of some form of 
strychnine. Many other competitors had also taken it. Due to the exertions imposed on cyclists by 
the Tour de France, drug-taking was common before 1914. In 1924 the previous year's winner, Henri 
Pelissier showed a journalist his medical bag that contained cocaine, chloroform and various pills. 
Guardian (Sport), 20 July 1998, p. 6; R. Holt, Sport and Society in Modern France (1981), p. 98; 
Guardian, 1 August 1998, p. 13 
152R. Daniels, Blackpool Football: The Official Club History, 1972, p. 36 
153 Joy, Forward Arsenal, pp. 32-3 
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and Sheffield Wednesday. 155 At one time Wolves players also attended regular 
sessions at a local psychologist in an attempt to build up their confidence. 156 
Amateur psychology, combined with newspaper hyperbole, became a feature 
of the run-up to the 1939 FA Cup Final between Wolves and Portsmouth that 
Wolves surprisingly lost 4-1. The Portsmouth manager, Jack Tinn was better known 
for his ability to attract publicity rather than for any tactical acumen he possessed, 
and before the Final, Portsmouth's players were photographed allegedly 'drinking' 
monkey gland extracts. A player was also photographed clipping on Tinn' s famous 
spats as part of a pre-cup-tie ritual. 157 On the day of the Final, it was noted that of 
the two teams Portsmouth were the more relaxed perhaps because Tinn had 
employed a comedian, Albert Burden, to ease the players' pre-match tension. In 
comparison, and perhaps due to Buckley's stricter regime, the Wolves players 
looked nervous. It was claimed that he himself knew little about the need for 
personal relaxation. Jimmy Guthrie also claimed that evidence of Wolves' 
nervousness came in the form of the official Wembley book that all the players 
signed. The Wolves players signed first and on receiving it, Tinn pointed out that 
their scrawling signatures indicated their nerves, thus boosting Portsmouth's 
confidence. 158 
Herbert Chapman had been at the forefront of the game's tactical 
developments, and other managers tried to emulate his methods albeit with varying 
154Seed, Jimmy Seed, pp. 89-90; Albion News, 11 December 1937, p. 139 
155Albion News, 16 January 1937, p. 195 
156Cullis, Wolves, p. 16; Morris, Team Makers, p. 39; Pawson, Football Managers, p. 34 
157J. Guthrie, Soccer Rebel (Newton Abbot, 1976), pp. 16-17 
158Guthrie, Soccer Rebel, pp. 16-17; Cullis, Wolves, pp. 16-17 
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degrees of success. Many other clubs however, still developed tactics on a match-to-
match basis without any long-term plan. Following the change in the offside law in 
1925, a greater emphasis was placed on speed and athleticism, and the need to stop 
conceding goals. The need for tactics became greater. As a result, the immediate goal 
explosion that accompanied the law change subsided, and by 1937-38 the number of 
goals scored per game fell back to less than three for the first time since 1924_25.159 
After 1925 many teams attempted to copy Chapman's W/M formation. They 
tended to place the emphasis on its defensive aspects as opposed to its attacking 
potential. The main reason behind this was that other clubs did not have the [mancial 
resources of Arsenal and were unable to purchase forwards of the quality of Alex 
James and David Jack. Under Jimmy Seed, Charlton Athletic were criticised for 
playing negative football. When he was captain of Sheffield Wednesday, Seed had 
developed a tactical plan that was to be used at Charlton in which an inside-forward 
would drop back into defence. Its chief aim was getting men behind the ball when the 
other side had it. 160 Seed, like Chapman, regarded the centre-half as an essentially 
defensive player. 161 Other managers, such as Brentford's Harry Curtis, still saw the 
centre-half as the team's pivot, at the heart of the team's defence and attack. 162 This 
was a fading belief however, during the inter-War years as centre-halves increasingly 
came to be seen as a third back or stopper with the job of close marking the opposing 
centre-forward and preventing goals. 
159 Russell, Football, p. 85 
160Seed, Jimmy Seed, pp. 35-36 
161 Seed, Soccer, p.67 
162Seed, Soccer, p. 26; Albion News, 'Football Programme Supplement', Volume 22, 1930-31 
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Frank Buckley's tactics reflected his personality - direct. There was little 
close inter-passing as the accent was on attacking, high-speed football. 163 Others 
termed it 'long ball' or 'kick and rush'. Attacks were launched by the full-backs 
whilst the centre-half, Stan Cullis, would support the forwards. Like Arsenal, the 
wingers would also cut in from the wing and make for goal diagonally.l64 Because of 
Buckley's training methods, his teams were also renowned for their high levels of 
fitness. To take advantage of their stamina, Buckley regularly flooded the pitch 
before every home game. He claimed later that a softer pitch would lead to fewer 
injuries. 165 Another major characteristic of the Wolves style under Buckley was its 
emphasis on the physical. Football during the inter-War years could be violent and 
certain players, like Frank Barson, gained reputations as 'killers'. The football 
authorities however, wanted to stamp out these tendencies, partly in an 'attempt to 
establish football as a sophisticated commercial sport' that would be attractive to a 
wider audience. 166 This conflicted with an acceptance by many players of the 
legitimacy of football's physical approach: they still saw it as a 'man's game,.167 
Wolves came under particular scrutiny. In 1936-37 seventeen cautions, more than 
any other club, were recorded against them and because of this the club's proposed 
continental tour that year was vetoed by the FA Council. 168 
163Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, pp. 31-32; Morris, Team Makers, p. 33 
164Young, Centenary Wolves, p. 112; Guthrie, Soccer Rebel, p. 17 
165Taylor and Ward, Kicking and Screaming, p. 33; Young, Centenary Wolves, p. 115 
166Fishwick, English Football, pp. 83-85 
167Russell, Football, pp. 87-88. For example, see Guthrie, Soccer Rebel, pp. 17-18 
168Football Association Council Minutes, 30 April 1937; Football Association Disciplinary 
Committee Minutes 18 January-26 June 1937. Buckley did not help Wolves's cause by a curt letter 
he sent on the matter to Stanley Rous, the FA secretary. 
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How did football's relationship with the media during the inter-War period 
change and how did it affect the position of the manager? The game's increasing 
commercialisation during the inter-War years was aided by developments in the 
media that Fishwick argues became an agent in football's nationalisation process. 169 
It also created an increase in hyperbole. In addition to the press, the broadcasting of 
games on radio widened football's potential audience. 17o The inter-War period was 
marked by a continuation of the expansion in newspaper readership that had begun 
before 1914. 171 Football was particularly important to Sunday papers such as the 
News o/the World and the People as they carried Saturday's results and reports that 
were most important to football fans. Reporting centred around gossip and this also 
applied to football. Before 1914 the front page of the Athletic News had also been 
dominated by tittle-tattle. Any criticism it offered however, was relatively benign. In 
During the inter-War period, and partly due to a developing circulation war between 
the popular press, the language used in the reports became more aggressive and 
sharper. It was now full of violent words and jargon-ridden due to the American 
influence of' Sportuguese' . 173 
Moreover, there was a proliferation of specialist local sports papers such as 
Saturday evening 'Greens' and 'Pinks'. These were also vehicles for fans offering 
169Fishwick, English Football, p. 94 
170The game's broader appeal was also reinforced through the football pools that in 1936 had an 
annual turnover of £30 million; twenty times the annual income of all Football League clubs. The 
Economist, 17 April 1937, p. 132 
171In 1920 the national morning newspapers had a combined circulation of 5.4 million; by 1937 this 
had risen to 9.9 million. There was also an expansion in the circulation of Sunday papers from 13 
million to 15.7 million during these years. At the same time there was a decline in the number of 
papers and also a fall in the readership of provincial newspapers. R. Williams, The Long Revolution 
(1961), pp. 204-07 
InBy 1931 the Athletic News had been discontinued. 
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their opInIons on the team's situation, and thus provided a framework for 
discussion. 174 Football clubs however, were (and still are) very sensitive to criticism, 
and on occasions this affected their relations with the local press. 175 Many 
supporters' clubs had also sprung up in the Twenties and Thirties but they were 
non-threatening organisations. When the National Federation of Football Supporters' 
Clubs was formed in 1926 it adopted the motto, 'To Help and Not to Hinder,!76 
Nevertheless, the game's image was changing and public relations became an 
increasingly important aspect of a manager's job. Directors preferred to stay in the 
background and it was the manager who gradually became a club's public face as well 
as the first point of contact with the press. In addition to the increase in football 
coverage, reporters needed a regular source for their stories and the manager was the 
obvious choice. Directors were too remote and also resented any press intrusion and 
the players were usually forbidden by clubs to make any comment in public. l77 The 
press therefore, had an interest in managers having sole charge of the team as the 
more autonomy managers enjoyed the more inside stories reporters were likely to 
get. Wagg has contended that by the 1930s the football manager, through the press, 
was becoming more closely associated with the team's performance, and that 
manager-reporter relations had become institutionalised. 178 Russell has also 
173Fishwick, English Football, pp. 100-13 
174ibid., pp. 94-100 
175In 1930 the Middlesbrough board received a letter from a player R. Bruce who asked for a transfer 
due to the continual barracking from the crowd and the criticisms in the local Evening Gazette. The 
directors decided to forward a copy of Bruce's letter to the paper's local competitor, the Northern 
Echo. Middlesbrough FC Minutes, 9 April 1930 
176R. Taylor, Football and its Fans (Leicester, 1992), see Chapters 3 and 4 
177 Players did put their names to ghosted articles however. 
178 Wagg, Football World, p. 44, pp. 54-57 
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recognised how the press began to report on a club's perfonnance in tenns of its 
'managerial activity'. Russell however, is also aware that the press constructed 
reality, as well as reflecting it and that the powers that managers actually held did not 
always reflect the media's perception of these powers. 179 
The impact of the BBC on football was not as great as the press but its 
influence grew steadily throughout the period.18o In 1924 licences were held by 10 
per cent of British households but by 1939 it had increased to 71 per cent. 181 Under 
John Reith, the BBC was driven by a strong sense of moral purpose that included 
the raising of cultural and educational standards. Broadcasting was also intended to 
bring different classes together, promote social unity and enhance a sense of national 
identity through the coverage of major national events such as the FA Cup Final, 
first broadcast in 1927. 182 The radio provided managers with limited opportunities of 
exposure to a national audience. We saw in the last chapter how George Allison, one 
of the game's first commentators, organised a series of football talks throughout the 
season. 183 In 1932, for example, Allison suggested to the BBC that the Leicester City 
manager, Peter Hodges give a talk on 'Team Building and General Managerial Worries 
or Practices'. The OBD, S.l de Lotbiniere, actually preferred Fred Everiss. 184 In 
1944 Frank Buckley was interviewed by Dennis Moore on the radio programme, 
179Russell, Football, p. 88; see also Fishwick, English Football, pp. 35-36 
180The British Broadcasting Company was established in 1922 and became a corporation in 1927. 
181In 1930 it was 30 per cent and by 1933 48 per cent. The middle-classes made up a 
disproportionate percentage of listeners as many poorer sections ofthe working-class were unavailable 
to afford a wireless. Davies, 'Cinema and Broadcasting', pp. 265-69 
182'b 'd 1 1 • 
183BBC Written Archives Centre, George Allison File 1, 1927-32, Amount paid during the fmancial 
year ended 5 April 1931. In 1931 Allison himself was paid £339 6s. for his services to the BBe. 
184BBC WAC, George Allison File 1, 1927-32, Letter from George Allison to SJ. De Lotbiniere, 
22 June 1932 
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'Strike a Home Note', where he expounded his views on the development of football 
at home and abroad. Buckley was able to broadcast his idea of a British League that 
included clubs from Scotland and Ireland in addition to those in England and Wales, 
and he also predicted a European tournament with clubs travelling by aeroplane. 185 
In 1946 a banquet was held to celebrate Fred Everiss's association of fifty years with 
West Bromwich Albion, and this was featured on a local radio programme, 'Midland 
R . ,186 eglon. 
How did the lifestyle and status of the football manager change? During this 
period, there was an increasing gap in salary between managers of top clubs and 
those in the lower divisions. This reflected not only a club's size, status and 
economic fortunes but also a manager's importance to the club. On accepting the 
position of secretary-manager at Bolton Wanderers, Charles Foweraker's salary was 
£400 in 1919. His contract was for five years and he received annual increases of 
£25: 87 In contrast, George Allison, on succeeding Herbert Chapman at Arsenal in 
1934, was awarded a five year contract worth £3000 per annum, reputedly the 
highest in the game. 188 During the Thirties, a player's maximum basic weekly wage 
was £8 during the playing season. Managers with lower division clubs however, were 
not paid much more than the players they managed. In 1934 Walsall's new manager-
coach, Andy Wilson, was paid £5 per week whereas the club's star player, Gilbert 
185BBC WAC, R30/91SI1, 1 March 1944; Express and Star, 3 March 1944, p. 7 
I 86West Bromwich Public Libraries, Scrapbook No. 10, p. 29, Midland Chronicle and Free Press, 
18 October 1946; Albion News, 26 October 1946. It was also featured on the Pathe News reel in 
cinemas. 
187Young, Bolton Wanderers, p. 69 nl. At 2000 prices this converts to £11,070. This relatively low 
conversion rate was due to the economic effects of the First World War. 
I 88Arsenal FC Minutes, IS June 1934; Catton Folders A-B, p. 6, Daily Mail, 31 May 1934. This 
was nearly £ 130,000 at 2000 prices. 
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Alsop was offered £6 per week a year later!89 Similarly, George Collins at 
Darlington was paid £4 per week and only £2 lOs. in the summer. The club' s 
secretary received £2 per week while its trainer's wage was £3 lOs. and 30s in the 
summer. In 1935 one player R. Strang's weekly income was £5 in the playing 
season.
190 Later, Jackie Carr was engaged as manager-coach at £5 per week plus 
191 bonuses. 
Some clubs from the Third Division however, were ambitious and were able 
to offer substantial salaries. Ipswich Town, backed by the brewers, Cobbolds, 
entered the Football League in 1938 and the year before they had offered the position 
of manager to Frank Buckley. He eventually refused and so the club then turned its 
attention to the Manchester United manager, Scott Duncan. He was given a seven 
year contract at £1500 per annum plus a 5 per cent commission on the sale of all 
players, together with bonuses if Ipswich gained entry to the Football League and 
any subsequent promotions.192 In 1936 Jimmy Seed's annual salary was increased to 
£1040 following Charlton's successive promotions to Division One. 193 Frank 
Buckley was re-engaged by Wolverhampton Wanderers in 1933 for five years on a 
189Walsall FC Minutes, 25 September 1934; 23 April 1935. Alsop was awarded £4 per week during 
the close season, £5 per week if he was playing and £6 per week in the ftrst team. At 2000 prices £ 1 
in 1934 was worth £43.27. 
190Darlington FC Minutes, 8 May 1935; 14 May 1936 
191Darlington FC Minutes, 19 October 1938. The board later cancelled his contract due to the club's 
fmancial position but Carr offered to work only for his travelling expenses. A new manager was later 
engaged with Carr as coach on a wage of £5 per week plus ftrst team bonuses. Darlington FC 
Minutes, 21 December 1938; 22 May 1939 
192Ipswich Town FC Minutes, 4 October; 1 November 1937. I am grateful to Matt Taylor for this 
information. Duncan's bonuses were £100 on election to the Third Division of the Football League; 
£250 on promotion to the Second Division; and £500 on promotion to the First Division. Duncan 
later requested that the term relating to 5 per cent commission on all transfer of players be deleted 
from his contract. ibid., 29 November 1937. At 2000 prices £1500 converts to £60,000. 
193 Charlton Athletic FC Minutes, 8 April 1936 
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194 yearly salary of £800 plus £200 expenses. In 1938 he stated that he would be 
happy to stay at Wolves for the entirety of his career but later left in 1944 for N otts. 
County that was offering him an annual salary of £4500, then the highest salary paid 
to a football manager. 195 This compared to the Chancellor of the Exchequer who 
during the inter-War period, as in 1913, had a salary of £5000. 196 
How do these figures compare with the salaries of other managers during the 
inter-War years? In 1922-24 the mean average income of the male population, 
expressed as a percentage was 114; for a manager it was 307. By 1935-36 the figures 
were 115 and 272 respectively.197 The average salary of a manager in 1922-23 was 
£534 and the median salary was £483. 198 By 1938-39 these figures had declined to 
£490 and £444 respectively.199 At the top end of the scale, it was calculated that 
4240 managers received an average salary of £8290?00 Some of the top company 
executives however, earned substantially more. In 1926 Josiah Stamp, for example, 
was offered a salary of £17,500 on taking up the position of president of the 
executive of the London, Midland and Scottish Railway?OI At ICI Harry 
194Wolverhampton Wanderers FC Minutes, 24 October 1933 
195Express and Star, 4 December 1943, p. 7,22 February 1944, p. 7. £4500 converts to £108,000 in 
2000. 
196Routh, Occupation and Pay, pp. 70-74. It should be noted that the salary of the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer had not changed since 1913 and was still £5000 in 1960. ibid. At 2000 prices £5000 in 
1944 converts to £120,000. 
1975avage and Miles, British Working Class, Table 2.3, p. 26 
198£ 18,382 and £ 16,627 respectively at 2000 prices. 
199 At 2000 prices these actually increased to £19,593 and £17,754 respectively. 
200Routh, Occupation and Pay, pp. 72-74. At 2000 prices this converts to £331,150. 
201 Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 5, p. 264. A salary of £608,343 in 2000. 
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McGowan's annual salary as chairman and managing director averaged £57,000 
between 1931 and 1937, and in 1937 he received £64,410.202 
In terms of income criteria, most football managers belonged to the middle-
classes as it was (crudely) calculated that the middle-class began and the working 
class ended at £250 per year?03 The extent to what constituted 'middle-classness' 
however, was complex and social indicators such as education (especially in a 
grammar school), fertility, lifestyle, manners and social aspirations were considered 
just as important to people who did not fit the financial indicator. For example, what 
mattered to clerks about being middle-class was the status of their occupation, social 
aspirations and manners and, importantly, a very strong sense of not being working 
204 
class. 
Jimmy Seed, for example, sent his daughter, Gladys, to Brooklands Prep 
School and from there to Bromley County School for Girls. Seed and his family lived 
in a detached house on an estate opposite a golf course in Bromley, Kent, and their 
neighbours included an anaesthetist and a doctor. His house was fitted with 
consumer durables such as a washing machine and telephone, and they later owned a 
television. Seed also owned a car that he first bought in the 1920s when he was a 
player. Private car ownership stood at 100,000 in 1919 and had reached 2 million by 
202Gourvish, 'British Business', p. 28; Dictionary of Business Biography, Vol. 4, p. 23. At 2000 
prices his 1937 salary converts to £2,504,260. 
203This indicator applied to 13-15 per cent of the population between the wars. In 1921 9 million 
people, 21.71 per cent of the population, were categorised as middle-class. In 1931 it had risen to 
only 21.93 per cent but by 1951 the total was 13 million, 27.81 per cent. McKibbin, Classes and 
Cultures, pp. 45-46 
204McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, pp. 44-45. See also R. Samuel, 'The Middle Class Between 
the Wars', Parts 1-3, New Socialist (January-June 1983). Fertility was one of the most important 
social indicator of the middle-classes, and during this period there arose the phenomenon of the only 
child. McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, pp. 44-45 
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1939, although the majority of working-class families were unable to afford one.20S 
Unsurprisingly, Seed's homelife took a back seat to his job and its demands. Even 
during the summer he was away from home on club tours to Sweden and the USA. 
Gladys and her mother usually stayed with relatives in the North East. On other 
occasions the family went to Jersey and once on a cruise. Christmas was also a 
difficult period for family gatherings as matches were played both on Christmas Day 
and Boxing Day. Furthermore, Seed hardly ever sat down with his family for meals 
or helped his wife with the housework. He never discussed football at home although 
Gladys did attend every Charlton home game. Seed's interests outside of football 
seem to have been golf, gardening, bridge, sketching and he could also play the 
. 206 plano. 
Another aspect of middle-class life during the inter-War period was a 
propensity for joining clubs. Membership became synonymous with friendship and 
in middle-class communities, membership of these mainly masculine associations 
was regarded as obligatory. 207 After the failure of the previous organisation, football 
managers and secretaries re-formed the Football League Secretaries' and Managers' 
Association in 1919?08 Membership required five years service in club management 
and in 1935 this comprised 90 per cent of all secretaries and managers in the 
League.209 It lacked any pretensions however, to further its members' professional 
credentials. In essence, the FLSMA was a friendly society. Fred Everiss was elected 
20SDavies, 'Cinema and Broadcasting', p. 264 
206Information supplied by Gladys Dutton, 20 April 1999 
207McKibbin, Classes and Cultures, pp. 87-88 
208Sunday Mercury, 'The Fred Everiss Story', 5 June 1949, p. 13 
209 Albion News, 5 October 1935, p. 67 
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chainnan in 1935?10 He declared that, '[i]t is not a trade union. We have nothing to 
do with agreements, salaries or quarrels with employers which we consider a 
domestic matter' .211 Football management therefore, was not regarded as a 
profession by its own members. 
Despite the increase in their material well-being, managers were ultimately 
judged by results, notwithstanding the limit of their powers, and the intensification 
of competition brought with it a steady increase in managerial insecurity.212 There 
was also a decline in the number of men who gave a lifetime of service to one club.213 
The stability of some clubs contrasted with others who employed several managers 
over the period. For instance, Walsall hired nine managers between 1921 and 1937 
and during the 1930s Manchester United had fOUr.214 As we have seen in previous 
chapters, football management was a stressful job. Matt Busby recollected George 
Kay sitting on the trainer's bench 'shouting, beseeching, wringing his hands, holding 
his head in apparent anguish, and making an excellent attempt to head and kick every 
ball in the match' ?15 The pressures of the job could also take their toll on a 
210Sunday Mercury, 'The Fred Everiss Story', 5 June 1949, p. 13 
2IlAIbion News, 5 October 1935, p. 67 
212See Figure 6.1 
2 I3In 1937 it was commented on that only eight managers had been managers of one club for ten 
years or more. Albion News, 25 December 1937, p. 155. The eight, including club and date started 
were: 
[1]Fred Everiss West Bromwich Albion 1902 
[2]Robert Jack Plymouth Argyle 1909 
[3]Charles Webb Brighton and Hove Albion 1919 
[4]Charles Foweraker Bolton Wanderers 1919 
[S]George Jobey Derby County 1925 
[6]Harry Curtis Brentford 1926 
[7]Frank Buckley Wolverhampton Wanderers 1927 
[8]Jack Tinn Portsmouth 1927 
214Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 66; Wagg, Football World, p. 47 
215Dunphy, Strange Kind o/Glory, p. 103; Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 161 
/',mergence 0] me £Qfl1I2fJ1llYlUnuger 268 
manager's health, Kay himself was forced to retire in 1951 on medical advice. The 
case of Syd King at West Ham however, was extreme. King, secretary-manager since 
1901, was suddenly sacked in November 1932 following a board meeting where he 
was drunk and insulted the directors. King, a regular at many local pubs, took the 
news badly, and less than a month after his dismissal he committed suicide. An 
inquest was held and he was found to be of 'unsound mind' and that he had been 
suffering from persecution delusions. These had begun in the previous season when 
d 216 West Ham ha been relegated. 
By 1939 most football clubs employed a manager. It was becoming more 
widely recognised that there needed to be some buffer between directors and players. 
Yet few followed Arsenal's lead and allowed managers the range of powers accorded 
to Herbert Chapman. The management of clubs was characterised by a struggle 
between the amateur, voluntary tradition and an emerging, fledgling professionalism. 
Directors were generally resistant to change. Between the wars football was slowly 
modernising itself into a commercial leisure activity and they believed that they were 
more capable than managers in dealing with this and the game's rising financial 
problems brought on by increased competition. Managers received no training for the 
job and were unlikely to have had a secondary education. Experience of playing 
professional football, possibly at international level, became the main qualification 
for being a football manager. Although administration and secretarial duties were still 
a major part of the job, more managers were becoming responsible for the players. 
Yet their technical input remained limited as coaching was not part of their remit and 
216Korr, West Ham, pp. 84-85. He died by drinking a corrosive liquid mixed with alcohol. 
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only a few recognised its benefits. The growing media interest in football though 
made the manager a more visible figure, and in its eyes, he was more accountable for 
the team's performance. The job was a demanding one that could bring material 
rewards but more stress. In 1934 the growing importance of a manager was 
recognised when Dick Ray, then manager of Leeds United, was chosen to manage the 
Football League team against the Scottish League?17 More importantly, and on a 
larger, national scale, managers were leading out their teams in the FA Cup Final by 
1939. In the next chapter, we shall see how, after the Second World War, football 
management modernised itself, albeit this took place on a gradual basis rather than 
through any acceleration of the process. 
217Albion News, 10 February 1934, p. 245 
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CHAPTER 6 
FOOTBALL MANAGEMENT AND MODERNITY, 1945-1966 
[W]hen questioned closely, many [British] managers clung tenaciously to the idea 
that management could never be taught because it was more about instinct than 
expertise. The British, it seemed, were largely happy to remain devotees of ... 'folk 
management' regardless of the advice that was so avidly proffered from across the 
Atlantic. 
N. Tiratsoo, 'Limits of Americanisation: The United States Productivity Gospel in 
Britain' in B. Conekin, F. Mort and C. Waters (eds), Moments of Modernity: 
Reconstructing Britain 1945-1964 (1999), p. 102 
If [AU1 Ramsey is now to hold the overall responsibility ... then at last the English 
system will have moved closer to the pattern for long employed in many countries 
overseas. 
1 The Times, 4 December 1962, p. 4a 
From 1945 up to the 1960s, football management underwent a process of 
modernisation. When the Football League re-started after the Second World War, 
football management had changed very little since 1939. The directors were in charge 
and to a large extent managers were employed on the basis of 'Front Man and Office 
Boy,.1 By the mid-1960s however, there had been a change in the perception of 
football managers that was symbolised by the knighthood accorded to Alf Ramsey in 
1967. It was widely believed that the new professionalism that he had brought to the 
management of the England team was a crucial factor in its World Cup victory the 
previous year. It will be argued however, that despite a gradual shift in the role of the 
manager, football management was slow to modernise. It struggled to uproot itself 
from its Victorian roots, echoing a reluctance to embrace reform throughout the game. 
This chapter will examine the context, both management and football, plus pressures 
from society in general, in which the role of the manager developed. By looking at the 
changes in management in industry we can see how they related to those in football 
1 Wagg, Football World, p. 157 
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management. Finally, the chapter will chart the effect 'modernisation' had on the 
manager's job and also his lifestyle. 
Conekin et al have identified modernisation as a period in which 
'extraordinarily contradictory impulses towards the modem '" were expressed within 
British society'? Modernity in post-War Britain was shaped to a certain extent by 
foreign influences, although modem American culture and ideas did not penetrate as 
deeply as has previously believed.3 Instead of a 'linear history of progressive 
advance ... British modernity was always a balancing act between innovation and 
tradition' and can be placed 'within the broader traditions of English ad hocery and 
the orchestration of change under the guise of continuity,.4 
British society was also marked by fundamental economic and social changes 
throughout this period. Following war and peace-time austerity, and the imposition 
of rationing, the 1950s saw the beginning of a more affluent society in which living 
standards doubled between 1946 and 1973.5 Greater prosperity amongst the 
working-classes also brought a decline in deference. This was assisted by the creation 
of the welfare state with its cradle-to-the-grave provisions and a more egalitarian 
ethos that permeated the public consciousness. Libertarian measures such as wider 
access to contraception, and a burgeoning youth culture added to a growing 
permissiveness within the country. People did what they wanted more often then 
ever before. 
2Conekin et ai, Moments of Modernity, pp. 2-3 
3 ibid., pp. 18-19 
\bid., p. 19,20 
5perkin, Professional Society, p. 419 
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How was British management in general affected by these changes, and to 
what extent did it undergo a process of modernisation? A demand for managers arose 
due to the changes to the British economy that saw an increase in production and 
mechanisation.6 In addition, with the nationalisation of certain industries, the 1945 
Labour Government promoted a new 'managerial class' that was later continued by 
Conservative administrations. In an example of the 'Butskellite' political consensus 
of that era, Alfred Robens, a former official in the shop workers' union and a Labour 
MP, was appointed chairman of the National Coal Board in 1960 by Harold 
Macmillan.7 The nation's industrial structure continued to change as the number of 
small owner-managers declined (see Chapter 5). A corresponding rise in the salaried 
class was supplemented by the welfare state that became a haven for professional 
administrators (see Chapter 5).8 In 1955 one survey estimated that there were 
between 400,000 to 450,000 managers, demanding an annual replacement of 12,000 
per year.9 Perkin has argued that British society now displayed the attributes of a 
meritocracy as it accepted 'the principle that ability and expertise were the only 
respectable justification for recruitment to positions of authority and responsibility'. 
In Britain however, a purely professional society, one structured around career 
hierarchies rather than classes, did not emerge. Instead, professional interests became 
entangled with the class system. lO 
6The Economist, 17 December 1955, 'What Makes a Manager?' Supplement, p. 1 
7 Guardian, 28 June 1999, p. 18, 'Obituary' 
8perkin, Professional Society, p. 418 
9The Economist, 17 December 1955, 'What Makes a Manager?' Supplement, p. 1 
IOperkin, Professional Society, p. 405, 359 
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The question of managerial efficiency had been raised during the production 
crisis of the Second World War and continued throughout the post-War years.ll 
Steven Fielding has stated that, '[m ] ore enlightened managers came to appreciate that 
workers could be encouraged to greater efforts if treated like human beings' .12 The 
1945 Labour government advocated more efficient working practices, arguing that 
treating workers better would eventually create higher productivity. The private 
sector however, deemed this as 'illegitimate interference' and the government was 
reluctant to compel them to change. Moreover, trade unionists were more interested 
in their families and leisure activities then in raising productivity. 13 
Overall, efforts to maximise industrial output failed and the deficiencies 
within British management were partly blamed. After the War attempts were made 
to utilise American management ideas through technical assistance programmes. As 
part of the Marshall Plan, they aimed to improve the efficiency of the economies of 
Western European countries because the Americans were afraid if these economies 
failed, it left Europe open to the challenge of Communism. Many Americans felt that 
many British firms were run on autocratic and unscientific lines, and to improve 
efficiency, it was felt that they should embrace American techniques, such as 
personnel management. This required teamwork and consultation at all levels of the 
firm with complex problems being solved rationally by different specialists within 
I I During World War Two attempts had been made to improve factory efficiency by setting up joint 
manager-worker production committees but these ultimately failed. S. Fielding, 'The Good War: 
1939-1945' in N. Tiratsoo (ed.), From Blitz to Blair: A New History of Britain since 1939 (1997), 
p. 37 
12'b 'd I I . 
13 J. Tomlinson, 'Reconstructing Britain: Labour in Power 1945-1951', in Tiratsoo, From Blitz to 
Blair, p. 98. The private sector still accounted for 80 per cent of the economy in this period. ibid., 
p. 97 
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the company's management. Instead, American advisors felt that too many British 
executives acted on the spur of the moment. 14 These initiatives were accepted by a 
number of firms but they were ignored by the majority. IS Nick Tiratsoo has argued 
that' [t]he problem was ... that American prescriptions conflicted with long-standing 
indigenous methods and traditions within British industry' .16 The British believed 
that management was about leadership of people in the same way that the army was 
led by generals. Many British companies were dominated by charismatic chief 
executives who were all-powerful personalities. It was felt that British managers had 
to inspire their subordinates with any procrastination seen as a sign of weakness. 
Furthermore, the effects of the class system continued to penetrate British 
management. Middle managers were organised into ranks, for example, with 
differentiation based on privileges and badges of position as opposed to expertise, 
and there was also a move away from an emphasis on specialist skills. 17 
Attempts to persuade British business of the benefits of management 
education had limited success. Higher education institutions in Britain were 
unenthusiastic and academics regarded management studies as intellectually inferior. 
The courses offered were also of a poor quality. Larger firms did begin to take the 
training of managers more seriously but it was not until the mid-1960s that the 
14Tiratsoo, 'Americanisation', pp. 104-105 
ISN. Tiratsoo, "What you need is a Harvard.' The American Influence on British Management 
Education, c. 1945-65', in T. Gourvish and N. Tiratsoo (eds), Missionaries and Managers: American 
Influences on European Management Education, 1945-60 (1998), p. 141 
16Tiratsoo, 'Americanisation', p. 97 
17 ibid., pp. 105-10 
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London and Manchester Business Schools were launched. I8 During the 1950s the 
preferred method was still to put a future manager 'through the mill' on a job 
rotation basis within that particular firm. Businessmen continued to believe that 
graduates cost too much and had to be told to forget a lot of what they had learned. 19 
In large firms 55 per cent of managers had started from the bottom and a fifth of 
them had only a primary education; seventy per cent of top executives had no 
professional qualifications whilst only a third had attended university. 20 
The nature of the developments in industrial management were largely 
reflected by those in football management. Between 1945 and 1966, the overall 
management of an English football club by its directors remained relatively 
unchanged. With the Football Association still limiting share dividends to 7.5 per 
cent gross, few organisational changes were made and, as a result, clubs were not run 
for private profit. Boardrooms were also largely characterised by staleness and 
immobility. A survey in 1964 found that a director's average age was 58 with 38 per 
cent aged over 60. Furthermore, the majority of shares tended to be passed on to 
relatives and friends. 21 Directors' motives had also changed very little from the turn 
of the century. Many were local businessmen with money and time to spare. They 
benefited from their association with the club as it raised their standing in the 
18 ibid., pp. 10 1-02. In 1955 five universities offered postgraduate courses in business administration; 
Birmingham and Glasgow offered one on production engineering whilst the London School of 
Economics, the Manchester College of Technology and the Dundee School of Economics offered one 
similar to that at Harvard. The teaching consisted of lectures, the case study method for seminars, 
study-visits to factories were linked with problems under discussion in the classroom and 
businessmen were brought in to have their brains picked on their own specialities. The Economist, 17 
December 1955, 'What Makes a Manager?' Supplement, pp. 1-8 
I9The Economist, 17 December 1955, 'What Makes a Manager?' Supplement, p. 3 
20ibid., pp. 3-4 
21 'English Professional Football', Planning, Vol. XXXII, 496 (June 1966), p. 120; Butler, Football 
League, p.223 
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business community and local social cirdes.22 In general, a director's contact with the 
club stopped at the manager. A PEP report criticised this development as the 
director became 'completely detached from any dealings with the player, and the 
resulting gulf between the two is a poor basis for communications when ex-players 
become members of a club's organisational or administrative staff .23 Boardrooms 
were riddled with complacency, and frequent power struggles that undermined a 
club's prospects. Little attempt was made to embrace new management ideas as the 
directors wanted to remain in control. In 1965, a survey of 76 clubs found that in 73, 
one manager was responsible for all spheres of the club's activities - playing, 
administrative and financial. Only three clubs had a general manager as well as a 
24 
manager. 
Attitudes to management were also partly formed by the prevailing insular 
and parochial nature of English football that held little regard for the rapid progress 
of European football. As League Champions in 1955, Chelsea had been invited to be 
England's representatives in the inaugural European Cup but the Football League 
would not sanction their participation?5 Before competitions were instituted, some 
English clubs did play foreign opposition in friendlies under floodlights, an 
innovation that was at an embryonic stage. Wolverhampton Wanderers's victory 
over Honved in 1954 created great interest, particularly as the second half was 
televised live. Wolves played a number of friendlies against top continental 
22'English Professional Football', Planning, pp. 120-21 
23 ibid., p. 121 
2\bid., p. 124 
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opposition and other clubs recognised that European football was an important 
source of revenue. It also demanded improved playing standards but the widespread 
acceptance of this was a slow process?6 
English insularity had been represented by the management of the England 
team. In 1945 it was taken for granted by many people, both inside and outside the 
game, that England was still the premier footballing nation. This view suffered a 
setback when the USA defeated England 1-0 in the 1950 World Cup but it was 
written off at the time as a one-off. English football however, received a major jolt 
when Hungary's 6-3 victory at Wembley in 1953 made them the first European team 
to defeat England on home soil. 27 Before the game, the press had disregarded the 
Hungarians but defeat created a demand from the same newspapers that English 
players should be subjected to the same modern, pre-match preparation of their 
opponents. 
Walter Winterbottom, appointed in 1946, was England team manager as well 
as Director of Coaching. He was responsible to an FA International Selection 
Committee and in his early days as manager, the team was picked by 'committee' 
with members nominating and then voting on players for particular positions.28 
Winterbottom's role was advisory, and although he gradually gained more influence 
over selection, it was never total. In 1954, for example, a conference of club managers 
25Manchester United, under Matt Busby, were England's pioneers the following year. The Inter-City 
Fairs' Cup was inaugurated in 1955 (later renamed the UEFA Cup in 1971-72) with the first Final 
played in 1958. In 1960-61 the Cup-Winners' Cup was first played. 
26'English Professional Football', Planning, p. 152 
27The following year Hungary defeated England 7-1 in Budapest. 
28 Kicking and Screaming, BBC Television; D. Bowler, Winning Isn't Everything ... : A Biography 
olSir AlfRamsey (1998), pp. 64-65 
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was called by the FA with the purpose to assist the England team.29 Shortly after, an 
Assistant Director of Coaching was appointed to allow Winterbottom more time to 
concentrate on preparing the international teams. He was still instructed however, to 
keep reports of players that members of the committee had brought to his 
attention.3o Winterbottom's successor was Alf Ramsey. His appointment followed 
meetings in 1962 between the FA and prominent club managers that were intended to 
assist England's preparation for the 1966 World Cup. Apart from recommendations 
concerning the co-operation between clubs and the England manager in the training 
and preparation of players for 1966, it was the unanimous feeling among all the 
managers canvassed that the England manager should have full responsibility for 
1 . h 31 se ectmg t e team. 
The FA had actually been aware of the rise in playing standards in Europe 
and that also by the early 1960s, European clubs and national teams only employed 
qualified coaches.32 Resistance had been centred within the Football League and its 
clubs who feared fixture congestion?3 To improve the quality of football 
management, the FA endeavoured to establish courses for managers but it was 
29Whittaker, Tom Whittaker's, Plate op. p. 159. The managers included Matt Busby, Arthur Rowe, 
Ted Drake and Vic Buckingham 
30Football Association International Senior Selection Committee and Technical Committee Minutes, 
22 July 1954. This was held at the Great Western Royal Hotel. The same place as the managers' 
conference. 
31Football Association Minutes, Regional Meetings of Managers of 1st and 2nd Division Clubs, 
Plans for England XI-World Cup 1966, October 1962. These included Matt Busby, Bill Shankly, 
Stan Cullis and Don Revie but interestingly, not Ramsey. 
32F ootball Association Technical Committee Minutes, 11 August 1961. In Italy, for example, the 
flrst football management course was introduced in 1946. Two years later a diploma course was 
initiated. I am grateful to Pierre Lanfranchi for this information. 
33 Rous, Football Worlds, p. 153 
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frustrated in its efforts.34 In 1969 an F.A. News editorial commented on how it had 
been nearly ten years since the FA had first investigated the possibility of a course 
for training club managers.35 In the intervening years there had been a number of false 
starts. The first initiative, for example, involved a course for senior managers to be 
undertaken at Loughborough College of Education.36 It reached an advanced stage of 
planning but had to be deferred, apparently because of England's qualification for the 
1962 World Cup.37 
The FA's concern for improvements in the quality of managers was linked to 
the high degree of wastage in managerial turnover where many new appointees 
proved unsuitable for the job. Figure 6.1, based on Turner and White's on 
calculations, shows that the number of managerial changes between 1946 and 1965 
figure was 480.38 Planning estimated that throughout a similar period over 600 
managers had parted from their clubs. The annual turnover of football managers was 
34Football Association Technical Committee Minutes, 11 August 1961 
35 F.A. News, February 1969, p. 247 
36In 1961 the Technical Committee had circulated a report to member clubs, including 
recommendations for the breakdown of duties between manager, trainer and coach. A manager's 
responsibilities included: the scouting system; signing players approved by the Board; dealing with 
players' salaries; overall control of all staff; planning of tactics and coaching with coaches; and, 
selection of the team. Coaches were to have responsibility for the day-to-day coaching; development 
of tactics; reports on players; and supervision of apprentices. Football Association Technical 
Committee Minutes, 11 August 1961 
37F.A. News, February 1969, p. 247. In 1963 and 1964 the FA did organise conferences for 
managers, and one lecture was given by John Marsh, the director of the British Institute of 
Management. A view that courses for managers should be established, appeared to have had 
considerable support, but nothing came of it. Again, in 1966, proposals concerning a course of 
training for management were made by the FA to the Football League and the Football League 
Secretaries' and Managers' Association. The FA negotiated with a University of Technology 
(possibly the University of Manchester Institute for Science and Technology) to set up a course of 
study. This was to comprise of either three consecutive annual periods of four weeks or two 
consecutive annual periods of six weeks during the close season. The proposals seem to have been 
rejected. ibid. 
38Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 9. It also demonstrates how a manager's average tenure 
at one club (in terms of years), has fallen, in line with the rise in the number of new managers 
employed. 
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a quarter, probably by far and away the highest turnover in industry.39 The overall 
aim of the FA was to establish a formal appointments procedure, similar to other 
professions, for those entering football management. This was perhaps the reason for 
the rejection of their proposals. Directors of Football League clubs, for instance, 
would have been loath to forgo their prerogative of employing who they wanted as 
manager. Some managers though were in favour of the FA's initiatives. Stan Cullis, 
commenting on the high turnover, believed that it could be alleviated if the League 
instituted a training course for prospective managers. This would include, he 
suggested, a study of 'tactics, business administration, laws and regulations of the 
Football Association and Football League, the art of handling men,.40 Others 
however, without qualifications would not have been in favour of a system that 
decreased their chances of fmding work. It would have also decreased the pool from 
which clubs picked managers. 
Like their counterparts in industry therefore, football managers continued to 
learn their job 'on the job' and had few qualifications. This next section will consider 
what qualities they brought to the management of clubs and also their backgrounds. 
There was a significant increase in the number of new football managers appointed 
between 1945 and 1970 (see Figure 5.1). After 1945 managers were nearly always 
former professionals, a high proportion being internationals. In 1998 a poll was 
conducted to find the top one hundred players to have played in English football 
since 1888. Despite the subjective nature of the poll it does indicate that good 
players do not necessarily make good managers. From the list, forty nine became 
39'English Professional Football', Planning, p. 123 
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managers, the most successful being Alf Ramsey and Kenny Dalglish. Some, like 
Danny Blanchflower, Bobby Moore and Bobby Charlton, had very brief 
management careers.41 Directors also looked for leadership qualities and, to a certain 
extent, captains fitted this criteria. For example, of the nineteen captains who lifted 
the 'Cup' between 1946 and 1966, thirteen went on to become managers.42 In 
addition, Stan Cullis, Eddie Hapgood, George Hardwick and Billy Wright were 
captains of England who became managers during this period but of this group only 
Cullis enjoyed managerial success. 
No doubt some directors did look for evidence of qualifications, and an 
increasing number of managers, like Bill Nicholson, had acquired FA coaching badges. 
Although this was never (and still is not) a prerequisite for taking a position as a 
football manager, it undoubtedly helped managers in gaining employment. 
Interestingly, future Liverpool managers Bill Shankly and Bob Paisley both held 
qualifications in physiotherapy. 43 The coaching schemes initiated by the FA during 
the 1930s were expanded after the War, and supervised by Walter Winterbottom.44 
Russell has identified these trends as attempts by the Football Association 'to meet 
contemporary challenges and to shed off at least some of its conservative 
traditions' .45 Wagg has argued that football was moving towards a technocracy 
40Cullis, Wolves, p. 102 
41Guardian, 5 August 1998, p. 20; Turner and White, Football Managers,passim 
42Turner and White, Football Managers; News o/the World Football Annual, 1997-98, pp. 74-75. 
For the period 1923 to 1939 only three out of sixteen FA Cup winning captains became managers. 
43Kelly, Bill Shankly, p. 50, p. 199. Paisley was in fact a qualified physiotherapist.. 
44 Russell, Football, p. 127 
45 ibid., p. 130 
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although its members thought of themselves as professionals rather than being part 
f £ . 46 o a pro esslOn. 
As a result, there was still much resistance to the idea of coaching that 
emanated from the tradition of anti-intellectuallism within the working classes. A 
stigma was attached to coaching as it challenged firmly held beliefs that English 
football was based on individual skill and masculine toughness. Walter 
Winterbottom's early team meetings as England manager were met with scepticism 
by senior players like Tommy Lawton and Raich Carter.47 Stan Cullis was never 
impressed by coaching. He regarded it as too theoretical and academic, and worried 
when some of his players came back from England games with new ideas. On one 
occasion, in exasperation, he said to his England half-back Bill Slater, 'Bill, Bill, 
you're playing ... like an England player! ,48 Billy Walker, a manager who spanned 
the inter- and post-War periods, was convinced players were becoming 'vastly 
overcoached from the beginning', and should be allowed to adapt their own natural 
skills to any given situation.49 
As in the inter-War period, most managers had left school by the time they 
were 14 and had only received a basic education. Raich Carter, for example, attended 
Hendon Board School near Sunderland.5o Others however, did enjoy a better 
education. Alan Brown, for example, attended Hexham Grammar School whilst Bill 
46 Wagg, Football World, p. 73 
47Interview with Pat Carter, 30 December 1998; Kicking and Screaming, BBC Television 
48Anon., Talking With Wolves (Derby, 1998), p. 15 
49 Walker, Soccer, pp. 88-89 
50Interview with Pat Carter, 30 December 1998 
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Nicholson won a scholarship to the prestigious Scarborough Boys' High School. 51 
Stan Cullis won a scholarship to Chester Grammar School but his father refused to 
let him go. He later attended a few evening classes and spoke French plus Esperanto 
and had a knowledge of shorthand and book-keeping, a particularly valuable skill for 
management.52 Matt Busby's headmaster had initially advised him to train as a 
school teacher. 53 Walter Winterbottom had been a PE lecturer at Carnegie College in 
Leeds before he was appointed England manager. 
Before 1960 there was no formalised apprenticeship scheme for footballers 
and many managers had worked, usually in typical working-class occupations.54 
Some, like Bill Shankly, Matt Busby and Jimmy Adamson, had worked down coal 
mines. 55 Before joining Sunderland, Raich Carter was an apprentice artificer in a forge 
but never served his time. 56 Don Revie left school at 14 and served his time as an 
apprentice bricklayer. 57 George Hardwick gained an apprenticeship as a draughtsman 
at Dorman Long (courtesy of a Middlesbrough director).58 After failing to get a job at 
the newly-built Ford plant in his home town of Dagenham, Alf Ramsey decided to 
become a grocer and was apprenticed to the local Co-op store. 59 
51 Hopcraft, Football Man, p. 112; Rogan, Football Managers, pp. 24-25 
52Express and Star, Newspaper Library, 'Stan Cullis' file; Hapgood, Football Ambassador, p. 130; 
Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999 
53 Busby, Soccer, pp. 13-14 
54parker, 'Big-Time', p. 16 
55Kelly, Bill Shankly, p. 15; Rogan, Football Managers, p. 1; Turner and White, Football 
Managers, 1993, p. 73 
56Interview with Pat Carter, 30 December 1998 
57 Rogan, Football Managers, p. 93 
58Interview with George Hardwick, 25 February 1999 
59Bowler, Winning, pp. 25-26 
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One notable social characteristic of the post-War period was a downward 
trend in religious observance. In 1910 12 per cent of the population attended 
Anglican church services falling to 7 per cent by the 1960s.6o Despite this a number 
of prominent managers retained strong religious beliefs. Raich Carter was a Primitive 
Methodist who as a child went to Sunday school three times a day and went to 
church three times on a Sunday as an adult. When he was at Hull City, Raich Carter 
read the lessons for Sportsmen's services in local churches.61 During his spell at 
Sunderland (1957-64), Alan Brown joined 'Moral Rearmament', a Christian 
evangelical movement based in Switzerland. It underlined not only his views in 
general but his commitment, so he claimed, to protecting the integrity of football. 62 
Matt Busby was a devout Catholic. In addition to his knighthood from the Queen, he 
received a papal knighthood in 1968. He was known to 'kneel quite 
unselfconsciously inside his own boardroom to kiss the hand of a visiting bishop'. 63 
Bill Shankly was brought up in a Protestant family. However, this did not prevent 
him watching Rangers one week and Celtic the other, despite the sectarianism that 
characterised the Glasgow clubs' rivalry.64 
Stan Cullis was a regular church-goer, and his son Andrew, later became a 
vicar.65 Moreover, Cullis never swore. The nearest he got was to splice any 
60p . Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-1939 (1996), pp. 160-61 
61Interview with Pat Carter, 30 December 1998 
62Hopcraft, Football Man, p. 112; Independent on Sunday (Review), 30 June 1996, pp. 11-12 
63 Observer (Sport), 23 January 1994, p. 20 
64Kelly, Bill Shankly, pp. 15-16 
65Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999 
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outbursts with the word 'flopping' .66 In this respect, Cullis was undoubtedly one of 
the few exceptions to a general rule. Before becoming a manager, Alf Ramsey decided 
to take elocution lessons to rid himself of his Dagenham accent. It was the early 
Fifties and Britain was still a class-conscious society in which accent was a 
significant indicator of one's class. Ramsey wanted to gain self-confidence by 
learning how to speak like the bosses.67 
One of the most important influences on how managers managed was 
probably still the experience they gained of military life in the armed forces during 
the War as physical training instructors, or through National Service until it was 
abolished in 1963.68 It gave a number of future managers a feel for handling men, 
albeit in a less intense environment then actual warfare. It was this experience that 
perhaps persuaded some directors to recruit a certain manager following the War. 
Matt Busby had initially served in the 9th Battalion of the King's Liverpool 
Regiment but was later transferred to the Army Physical Training Corps. He also 
managed the Army football team that included internationals like Bert Sprotson and 
Frank Swift, and claimed that he quickly learned the importance of delegation by 
assigning men to various tasks.69 Arthur Rowe was attached to various units and was 
66Anon., Talking With Wolves, p. 75 
67Bowler, Winning, pp. 95-96 
681n the fIrst few weeks of the War, a number of coaches and players who had signed onto the FA's 
army national service Register, went to Aldershot. This scheme had been planned before the War. By 
February 1940 over seventy well-known players had successfully completed their training in the 
army, becoming Sergeant-Instructors of Recreative Physical Training. The FA had also prepared a list 
before the War containing the names of men to be selected for enlistment and training as NCOs in the 
RAF Physical Training School. Green, Football Association, pp. 362-3; Jack Curnow collection, 
Letter from Football Association, 14 February 1940, RE: Recreative Physical Training (Army Side); 
Football Association War Emergency Committee Minutes, 30 October 1939; 22 January; 4 March 
1940 
69Tyrell and Meek, Manchester United, pp. 8-9; Busby, Soccer, pp. 14-15 
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also put in charge of service sides.7o Stan Cullis actually joined the South 
Staffordshire Territorials in May 1939. He was called up when war broke out and 
became a Company Sergeant Major Instructor in an anti-tank regiment. In July 1944 
he took charge of sport at an Eighth Army military rest camp in Italy.71 Moreover, 
military experience perhaps created, or even reinforced, a collective sense of 'British 
is best', and that 'we' have little to learn from foreigners, thus, perpetuating 
resistance to European-led innovations. On the other hand, others may have 
benefited from the experience of different cultures. Neither did military experience 
produce a uniformed style of management. Instead, managers developed their own 
styles although it was underpinned by notions of authority, something that life in the 
forces highlighted. 
The next question to address is how changes within the football industry 
affected the aims of management and subsequently the role of the manager. As we 
have seen, the years from 1945 to 1966 created better living standards. This had 
important consequences for football, and marked a shift by clubs towards a more 
business-oriented approach. Changes to the population's leisure pursuits were 
reflected by a gradual shift in the audience habits of football fans. In the immediate 
post-War period, attendances at Football League clubs reached a peak of 41.3 million 
in 1948-49 but by 1964-65 they had fallen to 27.6 million. This decline was partly 
explained by the growth in real incomes which gave people the choice to diversify 
70Morris, Team Makers, p. 70 
71Express and Star, Newspaper Library, 'Stan Cullis' file. Express and Star, 21 August 1944, p. 7; 
26 April 1945, p. 7 
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their leisure pursuits. 72 During the Fifties there was also an increase in owner-
occupation, accompanied by a rise in car ownership and spending on consumer 
durables. The home was to become the chief leisure centre for all the family with 
gardening and DIY becoming weekend alternatives to watching a game on a Saturday 
73 
afternoon. 
Fans were also becoming more discerning. In 1962 a Football League survey 
revealed that the poor condition of many stadiums was a contributory factor to their 
staying away. In 1964 seats made up only 12 per cent of a League club's total 
accommodation whereas in Portugal the figure was 80 per cent. With the rise in 
personal incomes, people experienced higher standards of comfort. In response, 
Spurs increased their seating capacity from 15 per cent in 1960 to 28 per cent in 
1964 and although crowds fell by 27 per cent, the revenue through the gate remained 
largely unchanged, thus proving that there was a market for more seats.74 
Furthermore, Gavin Mellor has suggested that post-War crowds in the North West 
were not the typical homogenous, working-class mass as increased car ownership 
and better communications had given fans a greater choice of games to watch.75 
Television also provided an alternative to watching a game on Saturdays. In 1945 the 
BBC's television service had only 15,000 licence holders but this had increased to 5 
million by 1956. In 1954 the Independent Television Authority was established and 
72Between 1950 and 1966 there was approximately a 1 per cent fall in attendances for every 1 per 
cent increase in consumer spending. 'English Professional Football', Planning, p. 110 
731. Obelkevich, 'Consumption', in J. Obelkevich and P. Caterall (eds), Understanding Postwar 
British Society (1994), pp. 141-54 
74'English Professional Football', Planning, pp. 111-13 
75G. Mellor, 'The Social and Geographical Make-Up of Football Crowds in the North-West of 
England, 1946-62', The Sports Historian, Vol. 19,2 (November 1999), pp. 25-42 
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by 1969, 90 per cent of households held a licence. By then television occupied nearly 
a quarter of the leisure time of both men and women in England and Wales. 76 
The most important changes to the management of clubs however, were the 
abolition of the maximum wage in 1961 and the modification of the retain and 
transfer system two years later. They not only changed the club-player relationship 
but it also signalled the decline of mutuality amongst Football League clubs. Until the 
1960s clubs had strongly resisted any changes despite a growing militancy amongst 
the players after 1945. Footballers increasingly thought that they were part of the 
entertainment industry, and regarded themselves as professionals rather than 
workers. There had also been a feeling amongst both press and public after the War 
that footballers should be paid more, particularly as they were playing in front of 
record crowds.77 Despite this, between the mid-1950s and 1960, the average earnings 
of skilled manual workers had risen marginally faster than those of footballers. 78 In 
1950 Stoke City and England centre-half, Neil Franklyn, along with other players 
like Charlie Mitten of Manchester United, had briefly been enticed to Bogota, 
Columbia to play for a local club. At home Franklyn had been paid the maximum 
wage of £ 12 per week, and Stoke had turned down his transfer request. He received a 
£ 1500 signing-on fee in Columbia, this compared to the mandatory £ 10 at home.79 In 
76 Clarke, Hope and Glory, pp. 250-53 
77 Mason, 'Football', pp. 160-62 
78Following the abolition of the maximum however, the average earnings of players rose 148 per 
cent between 1955 and 1964 from £711 to £1559; the average worker's earnings rose from £572 to 
£936 over the same period, a 61 per cent increase At 2000 prices these figures represented an increase 
from £10,808 to £18,963 for footballers; and £8695 to £11,385 for workers. Mason, 'Football', p. 
162; 'English Professional Football', Planning, p. l31; Clarke, Hope and Glory, p. 255. 
79He later returned but never played for England again. T. Mason, 'The Bogota Affair' in 1. Bale and 
J. Maguire (eds), The Global Sports Arena: Athletic Talent Migration in an Interdependent World 
(1994), pp. 40-41. £1500 in 1950 is the equivalent in 2000 of £28,654. 
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1956 Wolves had been forced to cancel a televised floodlit friendly against Spanish 
champions, Bilbao, that would have earned them £10,000. The Players' Union 
however, had wanted its members to be paid for playing in these games and, 
following a vote, the Wolves players went on strike.80 
Clubs may have been unwilling to scrap the restrictions on a footballer's 
freedom of movement and their earning potential but that did not prevent them from 
luring players with under-the-counter payments. In 1957 Sunderland were heavily 
fined with several directors banned for life after it was found that they had made 
illegal payments to players that stretched back many years.81 The fall-out from this 
affair and a steady flow of top League players to Italy, like Denis Law, John Charles 
and Jimmy Greaves, for bigger pay packets, provided the background for the 
Professional Footballer's Association's threat to strike over the removal of the 
'maximum' in 1961. The Football League acquiesced to their demands. Two years 
later, in the High Court, following the 'Eastham Case', the retain and transfer system 
was found to be in restraint of trade, although it was modified as opposed to being 
abolished. 82 
The Times caught this new mood amongst the players who, it said, were 'no 
longer content to let the big money go to boxers, tennis stars and other highly 
80The Players' Union had set a deadline for 13 March for the FA and the League to come to the 
negotiating table on this issue. The Wolves-Bilbao game was to be played on the following night but 
if no payment scheme was in place, the Union would ban all of its 2500 members from participating 
in floodlit games. The Wolves players narrowly voted, 15-12, in favour of strike action. However, 
this was not a vote against the club as the Wolves directors had favoured the payment of fees to 
players for these games. The Wolves players proposed a motion of 'no confidence' in the Union's 
executive although it was later withdrawn Daily Herald, 5 March, p. 10; 6 March, p. 10; 8 March 
1956, p. 9; Express and Star, 12 March, p. 22; 13 March, p. 24; 14 March 1956, p. 26 
81Russell, Football, p. 146. For a full account of this affair see Inglis, Soccer, Chapter 8 
82For a detailed account of the background and aftermath of these events see Harding, Good of the 
Game, Chapters 20-26 
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publicised darlings of the crowds. A new generation of professional footballers has 
arisen which knows that its life is a short one and is determined to make it 
lucrative' .83 Arthur Marwick has argued that the removal of these restrictions 
symbolised the period's prevailing mood that resulted in an 'End of Victorianism', 
where 'British society seemed to have broken out of the straitjacket of dullness and 
conformity which had pinioned it since Victorian times' .84 This was also reflected in 
cricket when the Gentlemen versus the Players fixture was abolished in 1963.85 
The changes in football's industrial relations, together with the fall in demand 
for professional football and the changing habits of fans, saw the emergence of a 
process of economic rationalisation. This had begun in the mid-Fifties and accelerated 
during the Sixties. First Division clubs were less affected by the fall in crowds then 
teams in the lower divisions, and in terms of income, First Division clubs steadily 
increased their share. By 1964-65 First Division clubs accounted for 50.4 per cent of 
the game's gross receipts. In 1950-51 this figure had been 44.4 per cent. The other 
divisions experienced a concomitant decrease in their gate receipts.86 The income of 
Bury in 1951, for example, a club that yo-yoed between Divisions Two and Three, 
totalled £51,885, in 1960 it was £71,774; and in 1970, £90,616. At nearby 
Manchester United however, the figures were: 1951, £89,636; 1960, £183,218; 1970, 
83 The Times, 5 May 1962, p. 9 
84A. Marwick, British Society since 1945 (1990), p. 152 
85The professional-amateur distinction was not abolished in football until 1974. 
86'English Professional Football', Planning, pp. 108-10 
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£527,118.87 Not only were fans supporting the bigger teams but consequently the 
best playing talent became concentrated in fewer clubs.88 
Pressures therefore, were building up within clubs to confront the changing 
circumstances. To what extent did they affect the relationship between a manager 
and his directors? In essence, the growing tensions between them redefined their 
relationship without changing its basic structure. The directors were still the bosses 
who traditionally disliked delegating, did not like spending money and therefore, 
were reluctant to cede power to managers. Managers, on the other hand, wanted to 
manage their own way, mirroring their experience as players and, for some, in the 
armed forces which had been, 'Do as you are told, not as you like.' Yet any 
demarcation between a manager's duties and the directors' prerogative to wield their 
power was still hazy. A 1962 documentary, for example, about West Bromwich 
Albion, The Saturday Men, showed how at a board meeting, the manager, Archie 
Macaulay, could only recommend that the directors select the team he wanted.89 
As we have seen, managers had few qualifications and it may have been the 
case that some directors did not want well qualified managers as they could not 
manipulate them. In 1955 Coventry City engaged Jesse Carver as their manager. He 
had been a successful coach in Italy, winning their League in 1950 with Juventus. 
However, he left after six months and returned to Italy, accused by Coventry's 
directors of not knowing the transfer market. His successor, George Raynor had been 
his assistant. He also had experience of managing abroad, winning the 1948 Olympic 
87 Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, pp. 340-78 
88The Economist, 25 December 1965, pp. 1419-422 
89D. Bowler, Danny Blanchflower - A Biography of a Visionary (1997), p. 54 
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Games football championships with Sweden and he was later in charge when they 
reached the World Cup Final in 1958. Raynor also resigned complaining of 
interference from the directors.9o One source of this problem perhaps stemmed from 
the terms of a manager's actual contract. The terms of Raich Carter's contract with 
Leeds United in 1955 left his role open to the interpretation of the directors for 
example. It was stated, that the 'manager shall [sic] subject to any orders or 
directions given to him by the Board of Directors during his employment hereunder 
be responsible for and have the control of the training and management of all the 
football players'. In other words, directors reserved the right to interfere in team 
91 
matters. 
How some managers gained autonomy in team matters was a complex and 
gradual, almost imperceptible process, and much depended on an individual club's 
management culture. Moreover, because they were small organisations football clubs 
could be dominated by powerful personalities, and during this period an increasing 
number were managers. At Manchester United Matt Busby used the force of his 
personality and argument to gain greater control over team affairs. On one occasion, 
early in his stewardship he was sitting in the directors' box during one game when a 
director, Harold Hardman, 'leaned forward and said in a voice that people around him 
could hear: 'Why didn't you do so-and-so?' Busby rebuked him in private and 
insisted that directorial interference was put on the agenda at the next board 
90Coventry Evening Telegraph, 23 March 1955, p. 6; F.A. News, December 1959, p. 163 
91 See Appendix 17 
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meeting.92 On another occasion in 1947-48, club chairman, Jimmy Gibson insisted 
that Busby should sign a player but Busby refused and stood his ground. He claimed 
from then on his autonomy as manager was never questioned and this continued 
under future chairmen, Hardman and Louis Edwards.93 One reason for United's 
decline from 1968 however, was Busby's continued presence at the club. On 
retirement he became the club's general manager and this seems to have intimidated 
his successor Wilf McGuinness.94 Busby, unable to relinquish the reins of power, 
was also implicated in the sacking of Frank O'Farrell who succeeded McGuinness.95 
When Bill Shankly was recruited by Liverpool, then in the Second Division, 
in 1959 it was because of his reputation for running small clubs on a shoestring 
budget, not because the directors thought he was going to play a prominent role in 
the club's later success. Attendances were falling throughout football and Liverpool's 
average gates were under 30,000.96 Shankly subsequently encountered directorial 
interference similar to that which he had experienced at his other clubs, Carlisle 
United, Grimsby Town, Workington Town and Huddersfield Town. When he was 
manager at W orkington the board had selected the team and signed new players. It 
92Busby, Soccer, pp. 16-17; Dunphy, Strange Kind a/Glory, pp. 111-12. It was not possible to 
verify this claim as Manchester United would not allow me access to their archives. Hardman, as a 
former England amateur player, probably thought he was qualified, as well as entitled to question 
Busby's judgement. Dunphy, Strange Kind a/Glory, p. 112 
93 Busby, Soccer, pp. 17-19 
94Tumer and White, Football Managers, p. 99. He also had short period as caretaker manager 
between December 1970 and July 1971 and was a director from June 1971 until August 1982. The 
club made him its President in March 1980 
95Tyrell and Meek, Manchester United, pp. 126-27; Dunphy, Strange Kind a/Glory, pp. 344-60, 
pp. 363-68; Pawson, Football Managers, p. 73 
96Kelly, Bill Shankly, pp. 135-37 Shankly begun his managerial career at Carlisle United between 
March 1949 and July 1951. He then moved to Grimsby Town and was manager from July 1951 to 
January 1954. Next was Workington between January 1954 and November 1955. After that he 
became assistant manager at Huddersfield Town to a former Preston North End team-mate, Andy 
Beattie, from December 1955 until November 1956 when he became the manager. He held that 
position until November 1959 when he became manager of Liverpool the next month. 
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had a large number of directors who were continually involved in power struggles and 
at one chaotic meeting some nearly came to blows.97 Initially, the Liverpool directors 
also wanted to tell Shankly what to do. 
With his past record and Liverpool's economic situation, the directors were 
unwilling to provide him with any money to buy players. However, help was 
literally round the corner in the form of near neighbours Everton. In 1960 John 
Moores, owner of the Littlewoods football pools company, became chairman of 
Everton after holding a controlling interest for a number of years. He had now 
decided to exercise his authority and immediately offered Everton a £56,000 interest 
free loan to buy players.98 Moores was also the major shareholder in Liverpool and a 
bridge-playing friend of its chairman, Tom Williams. He decided to place his own 
nominee on the Liverpool board, Eric Sawyer, an accountant. Sawyer was in charge 
of finance at Littlewoods and was made financial director at Liverpool. He realised 
that if Liverpool was to make progress it needed to invest in new players.99 In 1961 
Sawyer persuaded his fellow directors to release the money for Shankly to buy Ron 
Yeats and Ian St. John, two players who were pivotal to Liverpool's promotion to 
D· .. 0 . 1962 100 IVlSlOn ne In . 
Before John Moores, Everton themselves had had a tradition of directors 
running the team stretching back to William Cuff who had dominated the club for 
97 ibid., pp. 74-75 
98Young, Football on Merseyside, p. 152 
99Kelly, Bill Shankly, pp. 136-41 
100pawson, Football Managers, pp. 66-67; Guardian, 17 March 2000, p. 36 
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many years. lOl The club's first manager, Theo Kelly, was not appointed until 1939. 
Kelly had been the secretary and the directors continued to run team affairs. He was 
replaced in 1948 by Cliff Britton, a former player, with Kelly resuming his 
secretarial duties. 102 In 1956 Britton resigned citing directorial interference but rather 
than appoint a successor, team matters were delegated to a sub-committee with Ian 
Buchan as chief coach. 103 In 1961 Moores however, installed his own choice, Harry 
C . k 104 attenc ,as manager. 
It was Liverpool however, who eventually became Merseyside's top club. In 
one way Shankly was lucky because he was at Liverpool at the right time. They 
were a 'fallen giant' but had great potential to exploit the changing economic 
circumstances, post-maximum wage. The club's success was in no small way due to 
Shankly but only because he had been given more freedom to manage. As a result, 
his influence over the running of the club grew, and this included the negotiation of 
players' salaries. lOS Yet, Shankly's relationship with the directors remained strained 
right up until his mysterious departure in 1974. He perhaps began to alienate the 
directors as he may have felt that the club could not do without him. Shankly had 
threatened to resign on a number of occasions as a way of getting the directors to 
accept his views on a specific issue. Perhaps Liverpool's directors felt that the club 
101 Cuff was club secretary from 1901 to 1918, and then chairman for seventeen years between 1921 
and 1938. He then became President of the Football League until his death in 1949 Young, Football 
on Merseyside, p. 76; p. 105 n3; pp. 146-47 
102Tumer and White, Football Managers, p. 162 
103 Daily Herald, 10 March 1956, p. 10 
104 Young, Football on Merseyside, pp. 152-53. Under Catterick Everton won the Football League 
in 1963 and 1970, and the 'Cup' in 1966. 
lOSprior to his retirement, Shankly had improved the salaries of all the playing staff with Kevin 
Keegan's being doubled. M. Dononvan, 'Football as a Life and Death Struggle: A Critical Analysis 
of the Management Style of Bill Shankly' (MA Thesis, University of Warwick, 1992), p. 54 
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was in such a healthy financial position that Shankly was now dispensable or that 
the increase in the game's commercial growth meant that they had to have control of 
the club's finances. 106 
At smaller clubs, directors probably had a greater say in the running of the 
club, particularly as money was tighter than for Division One clubs. Darlington were 
a perennial lowly club during the Fifties, and none of its managers had money to buy 
107 d new players. At the en of the 1951-52 only twelve players were offered 
contracts for the following season. 108 During the 1950s the club's management 
changed very little compared to the 1930s. In March 1952, following criticism of the 
team's performance in the local press, the club appointed Bob Gurney, a centre-
forward for Sunderland when they won the League in 1936 and the Cup the 
following year. 109 Despite his playing reputation, the directors continually 
questioned Gurney's team selections and the players he wanted to sign. On one 
occasion, it was recorded that, '[t]he manager submitted his team '" Certain 
suggestions were made by us as to the constitution of the team and it was agreed that 
the manager would consider them in the light of playing conditions'. 110 Gurney was 
replaced in 1957 by Dick Duckworth, the chief scout at Sheffield United. One of the 
terms of his contract was that as manager he would have full control of the playing 
and training staff, and scouts, and to be responsible for all team selections. However, 
106'b'd I I . 
107 Evening Gazette (Middlesbrough), 5 October 1957, p, 15 
108 Northern Echo, 6 May 1952, p. 6 
109 Northern Echo, 28 February 1952, p. 6 
110Durham County Record Office, D/XD 97/4, Darlington FC Minutes, 16 December 1952, See also 
Minutes 13 October 1953 
297 
a few months later it was recorded that the manager had put forward his 'suggested' 
teams for Saturday's game. III 
Despite any changes in their relationship with the board, the recruitment and 
buying and selling of players was still the most important aspect of the manager's 
job. Following the abolition of the maximum wage however, clubs had to concentrate 
their resources. Before its abolition many clubs had been able to employ a large 
number of players. In 1953 Barnsley had 42 professionals and 40 amateurs on its 
books which created a lot of competition just to reach its fourth team. 112 Manchester 
United had five teams with the youngest players, aged 15, in the fifth. l13 During the 
Sixties however, wages and transfer fees began to escalate and forced clubs to reduce 
their staffs. Yet even in the era of the maximum wage, the bigger clubs could still 
afford the best players. Richer clubs were also able to pay the maximum wage to as 
many players as possible, not to mention illegal payments. Matt Busby was never 
afraid to payout large transfer fees, and in eighteen seasons between 1950 and 1967, 
United made a loss on transfers on eleven occasions. 1 14 Managers also had to satisfy 
directors who had an eye on the balance sheet. Even after the Liverpool directors 
allowed Shankly to spend money on building up the team, he still had to sell other 
players. By 1964 he had invested just over £150,000 in new players but had 
recouped just under the same figure. 1 IS Stan Cullis, continuing the policy of Frank 
Buckley, was even more successful. Between 1948 to 1956, he made a total of 
11 1 Durham County Record Office, DIXD 97/4, Darlington FC Minutes, 25 November 1957; 2 
October 1958 
112Ward and Alister, Barnsley, p. 11,24 
113Dunphy, Strange Kind a/Glory, p. 189 
114Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, p. 360 
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£ 170,150 profit in transfer dealings. 116 Wolves made an overall profit of £ 186,222 in 
the period 1948 to 1959.117 
During the 1950s Wolves' success, both on and off the field, had been based 
on the production of home-grown talent, enabling the club to save on transfer fees. 118 
One of their nursery teams was based at Wath-on-Dearne in South Yorkshire. Run 
by a former Wolves player Mark Crook, it had been instituted by Frank Buckley 
before the War. After 1945 it supplied the club with a number of players such Ron 
Flowers and Roy Swinbourne. Matt Busby also developed home-grown talent at 
Manchester United. The 'Busby Babes', his most famous team, was virtually wiped 
out after the Munich air disaster in February 1958. It had been a product of United's 
youth system, and the team's average age when United won the league in 1955-56 
was 22. 119 United's youth scheme had initially been set up in the form of 
Manchester United Junior Athletic Club by James Gibson when he first became 
chairman in 1931. The chief scout had been Louis Rocca who had many contacts all 
over Britain and Ireland. Rocca died in 1950 and was replaced by Joe Armstrong. 120 
His main asset was the ability to charm parents into letting their sons sign for 
U . d 121 mte . 
Dunphy has claimed that originally, Busby would not agree to under-the-
counter payments for schoolboy footballers but he later relented in the face of the 
115Kelly, Bill Shankly, p. 159 
116 Express and Star, 17 March 1956, p. 15 
117 Express and Star Newspaper Library, 'Stan Cullis' File, Sporting Star, 7 May 1960 
118Wolverhampton Wanderers won the Football League in 1954, 1958 and 1959. They also won the 
FA Cup in 1949 and 1960. 
119Tumer and White, Football Managers, p. 99 
120Dunphy, Strange Kind a/Glory, pp. 147-48 
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competition from other clubs.122 The poaching of talented schoolboy footballers was 
a common, if shady practice during this period. In 1959 Wolves were found to have 
contravened the FA's Rule 32(d). It stated that' [n]o approach of any description 
shall be made either directly or indirectly to a boy on the roll of a recognised school 
either to sign registration forms or to play for a Club affiliated to a County Football 
Association' .123 A Wolves scout, Mr G. Cotterell, denied trying to induce a young 
player but he admitted that he went to the player's house to help the father find 
employment when his son left school. Wolves were fmed £250 with the conunission 
ak· . f~ . 'd' 124 t mg prevIOUS 0 lences mto cons! eratIOn. 
As the business of football clubs increased, managers delegated more 
responsibilities to a growing number of assistants. Furthermore, backroom staff 
provided some clubs with continuity when a new manager was appointed. At 
Manchester United, Matt Busby came to rely on Jimmy Murphy and Bert Whalley 
who supervised the reserve and youth teams. 125 Bill Nicholson and Eddie Baily 
played under Arthur Rowe when Spurs won the League in 1951. Baily later became 
Nicholson's assistant when Tottenham won the 'Double' ten years later. 126 Stan 
Cullis was manager ofWolverhampton Wanderers from 1948 to 1964, following a 
playing career with the club that had begun in 1934 and lasted until 1947. He then 
had a short spell as assistant manager. The club's link with Frank Buckley had been 
interrupted by the appointment of Ted Vizard in 1944 but even then continuity was 
121 
Rogan, Football Managers, p. 6 
122Dunphy, Strange Kind o/Glory, pp. 124-25,254 
123Football Association Handbook: Rule o/the Association and Laws o/the Game (1960-61) 
124Football Association Consultative Committee Minutes, 6 April 1959 
125Dunphy, Strange Kind o/Glory, p. 104 
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maintained by secretary, Jack Howley who had joined the club as a player in 1923. 
Joe Gardiner, who as trainer acted as a foil to Stan Cullis, was another player under 
Buckley. Later, Wolves player Bill Shorthouse retired in 1957 and then became the 
club's coach. 127 
When he took over at Liverpool, Shankly's first task was to ensure the jobs 
of the club's coaching staff; Bob Paisley, Joe Fagan, Reuben Bennett and Albert 
Shelly. They were later joined in the Sixties by Ronnie Moran and this group formed 
what was to be known as the 'Boot Room'. This was a room under the stand where 
the group would meet up and discuss tactics and the form of players. It was to 
eventually create a body of knowledge and experience unmatched in the history of 
English football. Each brought their own brand of knowledge. Shankly was the leader 
who motivated the players and Paisley was the tactical brains while Fagan was more 
of a psychologist. 128 When Shelly retired in 1970, Paisley became Shankly's 
assistant. Paisley came to be regarded as his 'hatchet man', keeping the manager 
informed of any dissension amongst the players. 129 
How was the relationship between the manager and his players, affected by 
the changes in post-War football and society? Overall, there was no radical 
transformation and with no training for managers any changes were mainly through 
trial and error. Overwhelmingly, managers still felt that young men needed discipline 
from an authoritarian figure. What style that took depended much on the manager's 
own personality, and some, for example, continued to maintain a Sergeant-Major 
126 Rogan, Football Managers, pp. 24-48 
127T. Matthews, The Wolves (Warley, 1989), passim 
128Kelly, Bill Shankly, pp. 120-22 
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persona. Nevertheless, subtle changes in the style of management did emerge, one 
that involved a closer a relationship between manager and players, and that owed 
something to the decline in deference throughout the country. Some managers talked 
about a so-called 'family-like' atmosphere in their clubs. This revolved around the 
notion of the manager as the father-figure demanding obedience without question 
from the players. In football clubs however, as in any family, it did not prevent 
dysfunctional behaivour by some of the members, and these methods did not fit an 
increasingly permissive society. 
Younger managers though were able to develop a better understanding of 
modem players. Stan Cullis was forced to retire early from football at 32 in 1947. 
When he became manager in 1948 he regularly trained with the players. He also 
initiated team talks on a Friday morning, similar to those of Herbert Chapman. 
Wolves won the Cup in his first season, something Cullis put down to co-operation 
with the players as a result of his weekly team talks. In addition to helping form 
tactics, the talks that involved all the players, built up confidence and established 
130 h C d h .. trust between manager and players. Other managers owever, loun t e tranSItIOn 
from player to manager difficult to overcome. Former England international, Raich 
Carter had problems coming to terms with the fact that some of his players did not 
show the same dedication towards the game as he had done. 131 
Conditioned by his experience as a player, Matt Busby wanted to bring a 
more humane approach to management, similarly to his manager at Liverpool, George 
129 
Rogan, Football Managers, p. 212 
130 Express and Star, 9 May 1949, p. 11 
131Interview with Pat Carter, 30 December 1998 
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Kay.132 He first tried to fill any gulf between the manager and his charges by training 
with the players. Busby was also prepared to listen to a player's personal problems, 
although he was more concerned with the impact that these may have had on 
players' performances. He also had his players' vetted for any vices and domestic 
problems. 133 Busby's style of management brought him into conflict with a number 
of players and highlighted a streak of authoritarianism. Johnny Morris found 
Busby's paternalism, his attempt to create a 'family' at Old Trafford, condescending 
and would not submit to Busby's ways. Following an argument with Busby on the 
training pitch, Morris walked off and was promptly placed on the transfer list. 134 
Furthermore, when Charlie Mitten came back to United after the 'Bogota' incident, 
he was also transferred listed. 135 However, when George Best started to dispute 
Busby's authority during the Sixties, the manager was criticised for being too lenient 
towards him 
With the decline in social barriers as a whole, footballers grew in confidence 
regarding their own status and also became more independently minded, a process 
that accelerated once the maximum wage was abolished. In the Fifties, a group of 
West Ham players including Malcolm Allison became part of an 'Academy' that 
met in a local cafe, discussed tactics, and would then try and impose them on their 
manager, Ted Fenton.136 From early in his career Danny Blanchflower had also 
challenged convention and had his own ideas on the way to play and prepare for 
132Guardian, 21 January 1994, p. 4, 'Obituary' 
133Dunphy, Strange Kind a/Glory, p. 105 
13\bid., p. 129; pp. 144-46 
135ibid., p. 161 
136 Russell, Football, p. 130 
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matches that ran contrary to that of the management at Barnsley and Aston Villa 137 
The problem for his managers was how to deal with his rebelliousness. He moved to 
Spurs in 1954 but the manager Jimmy Anderson, did not take kindly to Blanchflower 
changing team formations during matches. He stripped Blanchflower of the captaincy 
and dropped him for a while. 138 When Bill Nicholson became manager in 1958 he 
decided to harness Blanchflower's footballing talents as opposed to regarding them 
as a threat to his own authority. He let Blanchflower run the team during games and 
to make any positional changes.139 By giving a senior player more responsibility, he 
could act as a buffer between the manager and players. In return for his extra 
responsibility he would maintain discipline. At the same time, this reinforced the 
masculine hierarchy within clubs with captains of the team taking on the role similar 
to that of a Lance Corporal. 
A manager's motivational methods however, still resonated with the past. 
Cullis was captain under Frank Buckley, and in many ways adopted a similar 
persona, that of a hard, authoritarian figure. His son described him as a 'hard man' .140 
Former player Dennis Wilshaw believed that the team spirit 'stemmed from the fact 
we all hated his guts' .141 Another former player, Bill Slater, however, described him 
as a 'very demanding manager' but one who the players liked. Slater said that they 
might' complain a bit that he was never satisfied but I think they respected him, and 
137 Guardian, 10 December 1993, p. 4, 'Obituary' 
138 0 b °d I I 00 
139Bowler, Danny Blanchjlower, passim 
140Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999 
141Anon., Talking With Wolves, po 13 
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liked him' .142 Cullis methods of motivation were also more subtle then those of 
Buckley. After a victory he would pick up on some of their faults but after a defeat 
he would say very little. 143 On one occasion in 1953 he asked Roy Swinbourne, the 
club's leading goalscorer at the time, his age. Swinbourne said, 'Twenty-six.' 'Oh. I 
shall have to be looking for a replacement,' Cnllis replied, much to Swinbourne' s 
. h 144 astoms ment. 
Sometimes the demands of management however, resulted in an abuse of 
players. One player, Ted Farmer, discovered during half-time at one game that after 
being elbowed in the stomach he was urinating blood. Despite an examination by the 
doctor, Cullis forced Farmer to play on. He told the doctor, 'Wait till it comes 
through his backside before you take him off.' His injury was later diagnosed as 
damage to the wall of his bladder, necessitating five days in hospital where no 
Wolves official visited him. 145 
The abolition of the maximum wage affected Wolves more than the big city 
clubs, and also created problems for Cullis as manager. Until then the club had 
prospered by a mixture of careful husbandry and nurturing home-grown players. 
Other clubs however, were able to offer markedly better wages. At Fulham, England 
captain, Johnny Haynes, became the country's first footballer to be paid £100 per 
142Interview with Bill Slater, 9 December 1999 
143'b'd 1 1 , 
144Anon" Talking With Wolves, p. 15 
145T. Farmer, The Heartbreak Game (West Bromwich, 1987), pp. 53-54. In 1969 a Roma player, 
Giuliano Taccola, died after being forced to train in cold conditions by his manager, Helenio Herrera, 
who had earlier been warned by the club doctors that Taccola had a heart murmur. Guardian, 11 
November 1997, p. 18, 'Obituary' 
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week. 146 Everton, with John Moores as chairman, offered a potentially lucrative 
bonus system. On top of their basic wages and bonuses, players would earn £2 per 
thousand on home gates over 35,000 if the club was in the top two of the First 
Division at the time. It was calculated that for certain weeks players could earn over 
147 £ 100 per week. Everton won the League that season and there was a 50 per cent 
. . h· b·11 148 I . W I Increase In t elr wage I. n companson, 0 ves's wage structure was not 
radically altered after 1961. Initially, to maintain an equality amongst the players, 
they were all paid the same. 149 However, Cullis had problems coming to terms with 
the fact that players put money over their loyalty to the club. In 1961 and 1962, 
club captain Ron Flowers held out for more money before re-signing. ISO Previously, 
the imposition of the maximum wage had made moving not so attractive, making it 
easier for him to motivate the players. 
Bill Shankly motivated players with an eccentric brand of authoritarianism 
mixed with an enthusiasm and sense of humour which meant that no-one was ever 
quite sure if he was being serious or not. Despite his autocratic tendencies he seems 
to have transcended any generation gap and at Huddersfield Town the players 
preferred Shankly's more open style to his more stuffy predecessor, Andy 
146At 2000 prices £100 converts to £1300. 
147 The Times, 27 July 1962, p. 12f 
148Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, p. 354. Manchester United had a similar bonus 
scheme, and in the mid-Sixties George Best claimed that sometimes he was earning nearly £1000 a 
week. At the height of his popularity in 1969, his income, not just from football, was £5000 per 
week. He also claims that in the late Sixties his basic weekly wage was £700 whereas Denis Law and 
Bobby Charlton earned twice as much. At 2000 prices £1000 in 1967 was worth £10,935. £5000 in 
1969 was worth nearly £50,000. G. Best, The Good, the Bad and the Bubbly (1990), p. 30,64, 166. 
149Interview with Bill Slater, 9 December 1999 
IS0R. Flowers, For Wolves and England (1962), pp. 90-92; The Times, 18 July 1962, p. 4c 
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Beattie. 151 If ever a player was injured however, Shankly would ignore him. Ray 
Clemence described how 'if you were injured, you almost went round with a little 
bell' .152 Ian S1. John claimed that Shankly was 'capable of exaggerating any situation 
to get the best out of his players' .153 During team talks Shankly would be 
completely dismissive of the opposition. The players of course knew that it was all 
nonsense; an act, a regular performance. But it worked. It had the effect of relaxing 
them by banishing negative thoughts and filling them with confidence. 154 
Increasingly, there was a greater awareness by managers of the need to 
prepare players better before games due to the increase in footballing competition. 
More attention was paid to training for example. Wolves gained a reputation for 
being a very fit team that won many games when other teams tired during the fmal 
minutes. The club acquired a training ground at Castlecroft where the coaching and 
practice took place. The players had to meet at the football stadium, Molineux, to 
catch a bus. They also had to sign a book so that the manager was aware of any late 
arrivals. Cullis would attend but training was usually supervised by the coaches and 
trainers. A Monday morning would sometimes be taken over by an inquest on 
Saturday's game. On other days practice games and coaching took place with time 
being allotted to practising certain moves like throw-ins. Ideas were interchanged 
between coaches and players alike and not forced upon them. All this was designed 
to make training more interesting and prevent it becoming too repetitive. For two 
days a week training was under the direction of Frank Morris, an international 
15l Kelly, Bill Shankly, p. 92 
152 Sunday Correspondent, 11 March 1990, p. 58 
153Sunday Times, 4 October 1981, p. 31 
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athlete, who concentrated on the players' physical conditioning. Training also 
included weight-lifting and circuit training. On a Friday, after picking up their pay 
cheques, the players would do some light work at Molineux, including a spell in the 
shooting-pen, a legacy of Frank Buckley. 155 
For over thirty years, Liverpool's training was conducted under 'Shankly's 
Rules' even after he retired. He had instituted them when he arrived in 1959 and they 
continued until the early 1990s. Training took place at Melwood over 90 minutes on 
a pitch the exact size as Anfield. The day would begin with a long-warming up 
session, followed by ball exercises. (Surprisingly, Liverpool never practised any set-
pieces like comers or free-kicks.) Stamina training was always done on grass, not on 
roads. To finish with there was a five-a-side game which Shankly would insist on 
being competitive. It was during these games that the basis of Liverpool's style of 
play, control, pass and move, was founded. 156 Routine was everything, particularly 
the 'cooling down' period after training. This served two purposes. First, the players 
changed at Anfield as a psychological ploy designed to make the players familiar 
with their home ground. The most important aspect of the coach trip was that it 
allowed the players' bodies to cool down, closing the pores and helping to avoid 
injuries. Shankly and Paisley, with their background in physiotherapy, earnestly 
154 Rogan, Football Managers, pp. 88-89 
155 Flowers, Wolves, pp. 57-63 
156 8 . h' Kelly, Bill Shankly, pp. 194-98; Sunday Correspondent, 11 March 1990, p. 5 . To spIce t mgs 
up he would sometimes divide teams up on the basis of England versus Scotland or bachelors versus 
married men. Shankly made sure he was on the best team and he always took the penalties. If he 
missed it had to be re-taken as the keeper was deemed to have moved, a scene reminiscent of the 
film, Kes where Brian Glover's PE teacher insisted on re-taking a penalty after it was saved by one of 
the boys. Kelly, Bill Shankly, p. 194-98 
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believed in its advantages. It resulted in very few injuries and Liverpool would 
regularly field fewer players in a season than any other c1ub. IS7 
Throughout the period a demand grew for better training and coaching. After 
1961 there was a gradual shift in the occupational culture of footballers where they 
attained a greater sense of their own professional identity.ls8 Some players, probably 
a minority, also began to look upon coaching as something that was necessary to the 
extension and development of their careers. Busby had initially made the ball 
available during training together with physical conditioning. By the Sixties however, 
this was not enough for some players. Noel Cantwell, who came from West Ham's 
, Academy', criticised Busby's pre-match preparations and the lack of coaching at 
the c1ub. IS9 When he left Manchester United for Leeds under Don Revie in 1963, 
Johnny Giles noticed a difference in attitude. Without the quality of players that 
United had at Old Trafford, Revie concentrated on paying attention to detail. 16o 
More people consciously thought about the game, would plan set-pieces and in 
general, try not leave things to chance. Revie himself became famous for his dossiers 
on the opposition that would highlight their faults and strengths. It was something he 
had picked up when he played as a junior for Middlesbrough Swifts from its 
IS7Kelly, Bill Shankly, p. 50, p. 199. In Italy, where some clubs were owned by multi-millionaries 
like the Agnellis at Juventus, the owners of Fiat, there was greater pressure placed on managers and 
more emphasis was placed on preparing the players. At Inter Milan, owned by the oil merchant, 
Angelo Moratti, Helenio Herrera invented the ritiro, the training camp, where players would be sent 
on the eve of games, allowing Herrera to keep an eye on them. It also enabled him to impose some of 
his eccentric methods on the players such as making them hug each other before a game. S. Kuper, 
Football Against the Enemy (1994), pp. 78-79; Guardian, 11 November 1997, p. 18, 'Obituary' 
I S8M. Polley, Moving the Goalposts: A History of Sport and Society since J 945 (1998), pp. 114-17 
IS9 f C' Dunphy, Strange Kind of Glory, p. 257. Cantwell later became manager 0 Coventry Ity. 
160ibid., p. 295 
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manager, Bill Sanderson. Revie realised that managers, as well as inspiring players, 
needed to exploit the flaws of the opposition. 161 
Managers increasingly made themselves responsible for the team's tactics and 
new ideas on playing strategy also emerged after the War. There had been a fear that 
coaching would produce a uniformity of play but instead a variety of styles emerged. 
Just after the War Burnley, under Cliff Britton, employed the 'clockwork' method. 
It aimed at getting all the players behind the ball when Burnley lost possession of it, 
so when they regained possession it was done by the short pass. 162 To a large extent 
style depended on the players a manager had at his disposal. Arthur Rowe instituted 
a 'Push and Run' method in his Spurs' team that won the League in 1951 but by the 
mid-Fifties he was unable to find replacements of a similar quality. 
Under Cullis, Wolves were characterised as a typically British 'Kick and 
Rush' team during the Fifties. However, it was more sophisticated than this. Cullis 
basically wanted to play the game in his opponent's half. They employed a pressing 
game, harrying the opposition into mistakes, and a smothering defence so as not to 
let the other team enjoy easy possession. Wolves would then look to play long 
passes to their wingers, Johnny Hancocks and Jimmy Mullen. They would 'work 
the touchline' and be available for the ball out of defence. It was also important that 
they were very good and they helped to create many chances for themselves and the 
other Wolves forwards. In every season between 1957-58 to 1960-61, Wolves scored 
over one hundred League goals. 163 Although successful in England, Wolves were 
161 Rogan, Football Managers, 1989, p. 93 
162 A. Ledbrooke and E. Turner, Soccer From the Press Box (1955), p. 86 
163Interview with Bill Slater, 9 December 1999 
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unable to reproduce this form in European competition. In the 1960 European Cup, 
they were beaten 9-2 on aggregate by Barcelona. One of the major innovations from 
Europe was the defensive system catenaccio, where, basically another defender, the 
'sweeper' played behind the back four. A Swiss coach of the 1950s, Karl Rappan, 
was probably the first to use it, but catenaccio was perfected by Helenio Herrera's 
teams in Italy, producing a negative and sterile, albeit successful form of football. 164 
In 1962 Ipswich surprised the football world by winning the Football League. 
Ramsey played a flexible 4-3-3 formation to suit the players he had. In particular, 
the left winger, Jimmy Leadbetter, was played in a withdrawn role on the left that 
created an element of surprise, allowing him to make runs into the penalty area 
without being marked. When England won the World Cup it was said it was achieved 
by a team of 'wingless wonders' but Ramsey was more interested in how the team as 
a whole would function within a certain pattern, and found that none of the specialist 
wingers he tried conformed to his ideas. Alan Ball and Martin Peters were used 
during the competition, partly for their ability on the wing but also because they 
could 'tuck inside' and reinforce the midfield. The England team overall was built on 
a strong defence and an emphasis was placed on efficiency with the team working as 
a unit. Ramsey's methods were later copied by clubs with lesser players bringing 
perhaps a more bland form of football. He was later criticised for this, as Herbert 
Chapman had been in the Thirties for the W 1M formation. 165 
During the Sixties some managers had become well-known media 
personalities. This process was to be accentuated by the arrival of television, 
164Kuper, Football, p. 78; Guardian, 11 November 1997, p. 18, 'Obituary' 
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although football's relationship with it was still at a early stage. Until the mid-1960s 
there was little football shown on television apart from the Cup Final and 
internationals. Yet its potential to directly affect football was shown by the 
estimated audience of 10 million that watched the 1953 'Matthews' Final. 166 It also 
demonstrated how television could appeal to wider audience who were not 
supporters and enhance the game's status. Images of managers however, were still 
formed by the press. Wagg argues that 'the assumption that the managerial hand 
alone guided team performance, became more deeply woven into the popular football 
consciousness, gaining acceptance not only on the terraces and in the stands, but 
among directors and managers themselves' .167 Not only did managers come to be 
regarded as witchdoctors but also as figureheads for their clubs, and by the mid-
Sixties, a flair for public relations was a growing requisite for the job. The overall 
purpose of advertising is to stimulate a demand for the consumption of goods, and 
with falling attendances during this period, football clubs became aware of the need 
to 'sell' themselves and to promote the right image. 168 The advertising of the club 
therefore, became a function of the manager, and he came to be seen as 'the club'. 
Not only were they promoting the club but managers were also enhancing their own 
image. During the 1960s Bill Shankly's quotability endeared him to reporters and he 
also used this to promote the club, its players, and importantly, the fans. 
165Mason, Kick and Rush 
166 As a result of the drop in attendances at the League games played on the same day, the following 
year's Final was switched to the last day of the season when no other matches were played. Russell, 
Football, p. 139 
167 Wagg, Football World, p. 159 
168F. Mort, 'The Commercial Domain: Advertising and the Cultural Management of Demand', in 
Cone kin et ai, Moments of Modernity, p. 68 
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A manager's relationship with the media was also a two-way process. After 
the War, for example, local football personalities were sought by BBC radio for post-
match summaries. In August 1946 these included Blackpool's manager, Joe Smith. 
Prophetically, with regard to the high media profile of today's managers, the BBC 
OBD SJ. de Lotbiniere remarked that, '[p]eople's vanity can so easily be tickled by 
microphone appearances,:69 Some managers also developed their own post-match 
soundbites. Asked a question by Eamon Andrews on the BBC' s Sports Report, Stan 
Cullis would invariably reply, 'I haven't got a crystal ball here to know the future 
Eamon'; an early equivalent of the 'We'll take one match at a time' cliche that 
modem managers so often use. 170 During the 1950s Cullis also appeared on a weekly 
local radio show, Talking Football, with Danny Blanchflower. 171 Cullis was also 
aware of the importance of newspapers. He took many calls from journalists through 
the day on his office phone and he also took calls at home in the evening and on 
Sundays. He claimed that 'the services of the newspapers are vital to the prosperity 
of football which could scarcely continue in its present position if the papers ignored 
it' .172 However, this did not prevent him from banning David Jack from the 
Molineux press box for a report that 'went beyond what might be expected from a 
S . f ' 173 portswnter 0 repute. 
169BBC WAC, R30/91511, Letter from OBD, S.J. de Lotbiniere to Victor Smythe, Manchester, 27 
August 1946; Memo from OBD, S.J. de Lotbiniere to Victor Smythe, Manchester, 4 September 
1946 
170Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999 
171Bowler, Danny Blanchflower, p. 83. Blanchflower was then at Aston Villa. 
172Cullis, Wolves, p. 205 
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Some managers however, were still uncomfortable with dealing with the 
press. Alf Ramsey always treated them with suspicion. The day after England won 
the World Cup, Ken Jones, a journalist who had supported Ramsey, requested an 
interview. Ramsey replied, 'Sorry, its my day off.' When congratulated by reporters 
who had been less appreciative, his response was to ask, 'Are you taking the 
piss?' 174 A year later on a tour to Canada, Ramsey was approached by a TV 
reporter who said: 'Sir Alf, we're going to give you five minutes of CBC time.' 'Oh 
no you're not,' he responded and continued to walk on. l75 
To what extent had the football manager's job changed during this period? In 
general, managers were obsessives and workaholics, in line with some of their 
autocratic tendencies. A 1967 study of the work of 160 managers in business 
h 176 calculated t at they worked, on average, 42_ hours per week. It can be safely 
assumed that by 1967 the lot of the football manager was much greater, and more 
stressful. One reason for this increase since 1945 was that managers, like Tim Ward 
at Barnsley, were spending more time coaching players and had to fit it in with the 
club's administration. I77 At Workington, Bill Shankly had to the answer the phone 
himself and also make up the players' wage packets.178 Some managers however, had 
administrative duties written out of their contracts. 179 
Managers also spent a lot of time travelling up and down the country 
watching games. Wagg argues that they were not only used for scouting purposes to 
174Bowler, Winning, p. 223 
175 ibid., p. 228 
I76R. Stewart, Managers and their Jobs (1988, 2nd edn.), p. 15 
177Ward and Alister, Barnsley, p. 36 
178Kelly, Bill Shankly, p. 71 
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improve their team's performance but gossiping with other managers would also 
reaffirm their professional identity.180 Stan Cullis spent a lot of time travelling, 
looking for players, sometimes accompanied by his son, Andrew. It was probably 
one of the few opportunities he had to spend some time with him. Andrew 
recounted how they rarely saw him. He was there at Christmas but because Cullis 
came from a large family, he would forget birthdays. Following one scouting trip to 
Blackburn Rovers, Cullis was driving home until he realised that he had left Andrew 
in the Blackburn boardroom. Andrew also often accompanied his father to the 
Wolves' ground, Molineux on Sundays where Cullis would check up on injured 
181 players. 
There was no doubt managing a football club was a stressful occupation, and 
probably became more stressful over this period. Tom Whittaker became ill with 
nervous exhaustion when secretary-manager at Arsenal and died in office in October 
1956. 182 Arthur Rowe suffered a nervous breakdown when manager of Spurs in 
1954. After six months recuperation he had a relapse and he had to step down in 
1956.183 Bill Shankly's predecessor at Liverpool, Phil Taylor, retired on grounds of 
ill-health. He was only 42. 184 Liverpool's success during the mid-Sixties with its 
attendant increase in the club's administrative workload, was perhaps the reason for 
179Ward and Alister, Barnsley, p. 135 
180 Wagg, Football World, p. 187 
181Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999. Cullis came from a family often. 
182Tumer and White, Football Managers, p. 249 
183ibid., p. 216 
184Kelly, Bill Shankly, p. 115 
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the suicide of the club's secretary, Jimmy McInnes, in May 1965:85 Yet perhaps 
football management is also addictive. It has been speculated that Shankly died of a 
broken heart because his sudden retirement in 1974 left him 'in the tormented frame 
of mind of one who had forfeited the power and responsibility of decision-making' in 
which he was centre-stage. 186 
Even when he was ill and confined to bed on doctor's orders, Stan Cullis 
would still conduct club business over the phone such as negotiating transfers and 
picking the team. 187 He was sacked by Wolves in September 1964 two days after he 
came back from a week's recuperation in Eastbourne which his doctor had 
ordered. 188 The directors later blamed Cullis's treatment of the players for their 
subsequent complaints and transfer requests. He had lost their confidence and 
respect. 189 His son, Andrew, confirmed that he had not been well for a few months 
and that this may have been due to a mini-stroke. As a result, he became increasingly 
short-tempered with the players. 190 Following a game during the club's 1964 tour to 
North American, he was seen chasing the referee around the ground. 191 
Despite their responsibilities, managers had little control over games and 
referees were often the target of their frustrations. In one of his match reports, 
following a game at Cardiff that ended in a draw, Cullis described the performance of 
185Kelly, Bill Shankly, pp. 179-80. McInnes, a former player who became secretary in 1955, was 
found hanging in a turnstile attendant's box the day after Liverpool had played Inter Milan in the fIrst 
leg of a European Cup semi-fmal. 
186Sunday Times, 4 October 1981, p. 31 
187 Express and Star, 15 March, p. 28; 17 March 1956, p. 15 
188ibid , 9 September 1964, p. 36; 19 September 1964, p. 1 
189ibid , 18 September 1964, p. 1 
190Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999 
191 Farmer, Heartbreak Game, p. 82 
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H.J. Husband as '[p]oor, a definite "homer'''. His appearance was described as 
unsatisfactory; his control of the game, poor; and regarding his fitness, he was 
insufficiently mobile. 192 Another referee, K.A. Collinge was blamed for inciting the 
misconduct of some Wolves' supporters against Burnley. He was described as 
'[b lad, incompetent, gave bad decision after bad decision ... if he has one or two 
games like this he will be responsible for Grounds being closed'. Cullis concluded 
that, '[t]here is no doubt that the trouble was caused by the incompetence of the 
referee' .193 It may also have had something to do with the fact that they lost. 
The most tense part of the job was the game itself, again highlighting the limit 
to a manager's powers that tormented them week after week. This even applied to 
the more successful managers like Stan Cullis. He said that because' [t]he margin 
between success and failure is so small that every match in which Wolves play is 
something of an ordeal for me. Sitting in the directors' box or on the touchline, I make 
every pass, go into every tackle with every Wolves' players'. Anyone sitting next to 
him would be kicked and elbowed throughout the game. Cullis wondered how other 
managers like Matt Busby could be so phlegmatic. 194 
Undoubtedly the perceived importance of football managers was growmg. 
The increase in their salaries not only reflected this but also the game's increasing 
commercialisation and the need for better management. When Matt Busby first 
became Manchester United manager in 1945 his salary was £750 but this increased 
192Wolverhampton Wanderers FC Minutes, 27 February 1957 
19\bid., 4 April 1957 
194Cullis, Wolves, pp. 98-99; Anon., Talking With Wolves, p. 75 
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fourfold to £3250 in 1949:95 In 1963 it had increased to approximately £6000 while 
his players earned £25 per week. 196 Following a 1958 study of a sample of managers 
in industry, it was calculated that their average salary was £ 1794. This varied 
amongst different groups however. Managers in the top bracket earned on average, 
£3193. At the other end of the scale, managers who had worked their way up from 
the bottom and had left school early, averaged £1422.197 Based on census categories, 
it was calculated that managers earned on average £1480 in 1955/6 and £1850 in 
1960. 198 
On taking up his position with Ipswich Town, then in the Third Division 
South in 1955, Alf Ramsey's salary was £1500. He was also given £150 for car 
expenses and moved into a house owned by the club worth £2850. The salary of his 
secretary, Scott Duncan, was £1000 plus £150 for expenses. 199 On becoming 
England manager in 1962, Ramsey's salary increased to £4500?OO After 1966 it was 
increased to £6000 plus £20 per week living expenses. In 1974 it was believed that 
Ramsey was still earning less than a third of First Division managers.201 
Managers' salaries also reflected the status of their clubs. When Shankly 
moved from Huddersfield Town to Liverpool in 1959, for example, his salary 
195Busby, Soccer, p. 16. At 2000 prices £750 equates to nearly £18,000. Dunphy, Strange Kind of 
Glory, p. 147. (In Chapter 5 it was stated that Frank Buckley's salary at Notts. County was £4500). 
In contrast, the maximum wage for players in 1945 was £9, and in 1961 it was £20. 
196 Observer, 9 May 1999, p. 11. £6000 in 1963 was the equivalent in 2000 of £76,500. 
197R.V. Clements, Managers: A Study of their Careers in Industry (1958), p. 175. At 2000 prices 
£1794 in 1958 equates to £25,163; £3193 to £44,787 and £1422 to nearly £20,000. 
198Routh, Occupation and Pay, p. 104. £1480 in 1955 equates to £22,500 at 2000 prices. £1850 in 
1960 converts to £25,500. 
199Ipswich Record Office, GC 426/2/2/2, Ipswich Town FC Minute Book, 8 August; 5 December 
1955; 9 April 1956. £1500 converts to £22,800 at 2000 prices. 
200Bowler, Winning, p. 153. This converts to £58,380. 
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increased by £500 to £2500.202 In 1952 lowly Darlington offered Bob Gurney £15 
per week. He also received five per cent on the profits made on transfers. It 
highlighted, if only in a limited way, how managers, unlike players, were free to 
negotiate the terms of their own contracts. In 1957 Gurney's salary was upgraded to 
£1000.
203 His successor, Dick Duckworth, was later offered a three year contract at 
£ 1200 per year and the same bonuses as the first team. He also received a car 
allowance when on club business but had to keep a record of his mileage.204 
Raich Carter's contract, signed in June 1955, reflected the different 
aspirations of Leeds United compared to Darlington. He received a fixed salary of 
£1850 plus 'reasonable' expenses incurred on behalf of the club. Carter was also 
entitled to 21 days annual holiday on full pay but this had to be taken during the 
close season. Furthermore, the contract included potential bonus payments for 1958. 
This was dependent on the club's position in the First Division and progress in the 
F A Cup. If Leeds reached the Cup Final and became champions, for example, Carter 
stood to earn a £ 1000 bonus for each achievement. 205 
Stan Cullis also had bonuses written in to his contract. In 1956 he received 
£1000 and the following year, £912-10-0?06 Cullis was also offered five year 
contracts in 1955 and again in 1960?07 In 1959 he formed himself into a private 
2010bserver (Sport), 2 May 1999, p. 5. The conversion rates at 2000 prices are: £10,000, £112,050; 
£6000, £67,230. 
202Kelly, Bill Shankly, p. 117. At 2000 prices these convert to £7013 and £35,066 respectively. 
203Durham Record Office, D/XD 97/4, Darlington FC Minutes, 1 April 1952; 31 January 1957 
204ibid., 9 May 1958 
205See Appendix 17. At 2000 prices £1850 converts to £28,122. 
206Wolverhampton Wanderers FC Minutes, 28 May 1956; 23 July 1957. £1000 in 1956 converts to 
nearly £ 15,000. 
207 Express and Star, 2 March 1961, p. 32 
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company, 'Stanwin Limited', with a capital of £100 in £1 shares. It was reported 
that he was following the recent example of several leading figures in entertainment 
and sport. The advantages of this move included the protection of his private assets 
and it centralised all his various sources of income. At the time these included 
broadcasting, newspaper articles and authorship .. 208 When Cullis was sacked by 
Wolves in 1964 he was paid £14,000 by a national newspaper for 'his story' ?09 It 
was probably at least twice his salary at Wolverhampton Wanderers. It also 
highlighted the importance that tabloid newspapers had begun to attach to managers. 
They had now become personalities who could sell papers, reinforcing their 
relationship with the media. This figure was a record until 1974 when Alf Ramsey 
was paid £21,000 by the same paper for three signed articles following his dismissal 
as England manager?10 Following England's World Cup triumph, Ramsey was 
offered £10,000 by a Sunday paper for a few quotes but had refused. However, the 
salaries of even the top British managers paled in comparison with that of Inter 
Milan's Helenio Herrera who in 1966 was awarded a contract of £90,000, the 
equivalent in 2000 of £1 million.211 
What of their homelife? In general, a football manager was rarely at home. 
Their wives had to be selfless and understanding of the fickle nature of their 
husband's job. However, it usually meant a better, more middle-class lifestyle due to 
the job's financial rewards and the opportunity to enjoy a higher standard of living. 
208ibid., 28 December 1959, p. 8 
2091t was either the Sunday People or Sunday Mirror. 
2100bserver (Sport), 2 May 1999, p. 1,5. The conversion rates for £14,000 in 1964 and £21,000 in 
1974 are £170,289 and £124,173, respectively. 
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The climb of managers up the earnings ladder also enabled some to send their children 
to private schools. Stan Cullis's son, Andrew, went to a prep school and then went 
to Repton public school where he boarded. His parents chose a boarding school 
because they felt that he should not be exposed to the pressures of living in a 
'football home'. Stan Cullis' s choice of Repton was determined by the fact that they 
played football and not rugby! His daughter was also sent to boarding school at the 
age of seven.212 Raich Carter also sent his two children to private school. His 
daughter, Jane, initially went to a private school in Mansfield but later attended state 
schools. His son, also called Raich, went to a prep school and then passed the 
entrance exam for Hymers College, the top school in Hull. Raich senior had been 
indifferent to putting his children through a private education, 'If they've got brains 
they'll get there anyway,' he had said. But his wife, Pat, was most insistent. She 
said, 'With you and me as parents they might not have brains. I can't take that 
. k ,213 ns . 
Houses were another indication of social mobility. Many managers during 
this period mainly stayed in club houses. The semi-detached Bob Gurney was 
provided with, for example, was next door to the club's honorary secretary?14 In 
W olverhampton, Stan Cullis moved from a small house in Stafford Road when he 
was a player to Tettenhall, a middle-class area. He bought two houses in that area. 
The second one was a 'good size family house' and was on the same road as club 
211Guardian, 11 November 1997, p. 18, 'Obituary'. It is not known if the figure was an annual 
salary. 
212Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999 When Andrew was born Cullis chose not to 
travel with the Wolves to Blackpool the day before the game but instead went the following day. 
Express and Star, 10 September 1948, p. 7 
213Interview with Pat Carter, 30 December 1998 
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chairman, John Ireland, who later sacked Cullis?15 Raich Carter always lived in 
houses that the club owned but they were in keeping with an aspiring middle-class 
lifestyle. When he went to Leeds his wife, Pat, commented that 'it was a fabulous 
house, very beautiful house. We had a car. The standard of living was wonderful.' 
When he was manager at Middlesbrough, they were able to choose their own house 
and which the club would buy. Pat Carter recalls that, 'They let you choose it and 
they would buy it. They would pay for your choice in wallpaper. They'd pay for 
the decorating and your removal expenses. It was quite exciting because it meant we 
could have a new carpet.' The house Middlesbrough bought in Redcar cost £2500 
and later fetched £6000. They then put their savings to a house in Hull worth 
£7000.216 Managers also moved in different social circles from those of their 
working-class origins. In addition to mixing with showbusiness personalities, they 
were invited to sportsmen's dinners and to various societies. Some like Jackie 
Milburn and Jock Stein became freemasons?17 Stan Cullis, on one occasion, was 
invited to speak at a meeting of the South Staffordshire branch of the Institute of 
Marketing and Sales Management in W olverhampton where he pontificated on the 
challenge to football from changing social habits?18 
What did managers do away from football? How did they relax? In the case of 
Bill Shankly this proved near impossible. He liked to listen to records of hymns and 
214Kelly 's Directory of Darlington and Neighbourhood (1957) 
215Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999 
216Interview with Pat Carter, 30 December 1998. £2500 in 1963 converts to £31,860 at 2000 prices. 
217 Webb, Freemasonry, pp. 29-30. 
218Express and Star, Newspaper Library, 'Stan Cullis' File, Express and Star, 23 November 1962 
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drink lots of tea but mostly he liked to talk about footbal1.219 On Sunday afternoons 
at Huddersfield he regularly met a bunch of sons and their dads for a kick-about. His 
one concession to his wife was that he cleaned the oven before he went out. 220 Stan 
Cullis liked to playa bit of golf but he particularly liked to tend to his garden. He 
would also take his family to church on a Sunday. Cullis was unable to spend much 
time on holiday with his family due to his football commitments. In the summer 
Wolves would often tour so the rest of the family went to places like the Channel 
Islands and Tenby without him.221 
By the mid-Sixties, the role of the football manager had undergone a process 
of modernisation. The abolition of the maximum wage had marked the beginning of 
the gradual change from football management's amateur tradition to a more 
professional approach. Where previously directors had been reluctant to spend 
money, they now found that the new commercial pressures demanded a specialist to 
run the club. Directors were still the bosses but the powers of the manager had 
increased, probably reaching a peak in the Seventies and Eighties. The rise in the 
status of football managers also mirrored the shift towards a more meritocratic 
society and the rising managerial class, reflected by their rising salaries. Managers 
were eager to establish their professional identity, and in this they were assisted by 
changes in the media; a process that would later intensify, turning them into 
celebrities. With the rise in their profiles, they were increasingly identified by 
directors, fans and especially the media as the scapegoat for a poor run of results. 
219Sunday Times, 4 October 1981, p. 31 
220Kelly, Bill Shank/y, pp. 87-88 
221Interview with Andrew Cullis, 26 January 1999 
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Despite the job becoming more stressful and demanding, they were unwilling to give 
up many of their duties, particularly the financial side. This highlighted the 
'contradictions' of British modernity where innovation was checked by tradition. 
The role of the football manager had developed but it did so within the framework of 
traditional management practices as attempts to modernise failed. Football managers 
continued to be employed more for their practical knowledge of the game than any 
qualifications that they held. Despite the rise in the standards of European football, 
English clubs continued to be managed 'the British way'. 
CHAPTER 7 
'WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?': MANAGERIAL 
EFFICIENCY IN FOOTBALL'S PRODUCTION PROCESS 
Another of football's eternal mysteries is the question what a manager actually 
does. My theory is that his function is the same as that of a fuse in an electrical 
circuit. Its sole purpose is to be changed when the lights blow up. 
Simon Barnes in The Times, 13 January 1997, p. 27 
A coach may be 60 per cent responsible for a team's performance in the build-up to 
a match but once the game has begun he is less than 10 per cent accountable for 
what happens on the field. 
Cesar Luis Menotti, Argentina's World Cup coach of 1978, quoted in Guardian 
(Sport), 2 July 1998, p. 1 
... players are as fallible and vulnerable as the rest of us. And it is the players and 
only the players, and how they play on match day, who make or break managers. 
Busby, Soccer, p. 20 
Napoleon used to ask of a man: 'Has he Luck?' Ability, experience, integrity were 
important; without luck they were useless. 
A.lP. Taylor, Politics in Wartime (1964), p. 190 
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In the previous chapter we have seen how by the mid-Sixties football managers had 
begun to emerge as important figures within the game. Increasingly, a perception 
arose that the performance of a team was closely associated with the actions of its 
manager. Newspapers reinforced this idea as they relied heavily on managers for their 
daily stories. Ultimately, the perception that the football manager was a powerful, 
mystical figure began to be disseminated amongst fans, players and, importantly, 
directors, and this was to signal an increase in the powers of this new breed of 
managers. This process begs important questions, most centrally, what difference did 
managers actually make in football's production process during this period and to 
what extent were they able to influence a club's performance? With reference to the 
modem era, Wagg has argued that, '[i]n plain terms it is simply wrong to equate the 
performance of a football team with the performance of its manager. It makes no 
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more sense, in principle, to ... blame the head teacher of an inner city secondary 
modem school for regularly poor exam results'. 1 Yet just as there are undoubtedly 
competent and incompetent head teachers, there are efficient and inefficient football 
managers. Russell has stressed how the ability of individual managers and coaching 
staffs in getting the best out of players remains the crucial ingredient; 'As any fan is 
aware, managers can literally make, re-make or break a club. ,2 
It will be argued in this chapter that managers did make a difference. Yet, with 
particular reference to the time span of this thesis, it is necessary to take into 
account the changing socio-economic and cultural environment within which football 
management was carried out. In particular, during this period, we have seen how 
football management was beginning to throw off the shackles of its 'amateur' past 
and how the abolition of the maximum wage in 1961 expedited more professional 
attitudes. Yet, the culture of management within some clubs meant that this process 
was slow and uneven. Directors, for example, liked to interfere in some clubs more 
than others, thereby reducing the influence of the manager. Because of this culture, 
we have to beware of copper bottomed generalisations concerning the manager's 
influence, and therefore, it is important to take into consideration the wider context. 
Historically, coaching in sport in general has had a long tradition. Boxing was 
an early example and this has continued into the modem era. Muhammad Ali, for 
example, built up a close partnership with Angelo Dundee. Through the Marylebone 
Cricket Club, cricket was one of the first sports to produce a coaching manual. Track 
l Wagg, Football World, p. 174. For a fuller discussion on the ability of teachers to improve 
standards in under-funded school, see N. Davies, The School Report (2000) 
2 Russell, Football, p. 171 
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and field athletes have also been noted for their close relationships with their 
coaches. In Chapter 2, the influence of Sam Mussabini was mentioned and in more 
recent times, Sebastian Coe was coached by his father, Peter, whilst his rival during 
the early 1980s, Steve Ovett, was similarly successful under long-time coach, Harry 
Wilson. Other individual sports, like golf, have begun to place a premium on the 
value of coaching. From the mid-1980s, for example, Nick Faldo teamed up with 
David Leadbetter who helped him win six major titles.3 Because of the pressures of 
top level sport, it is increasingly difficult for individuals to succeed by themselves. 
Instead, like team sports, they need the support of experts such as agents, managers, 
coaches, dieticians and fitness trainers. Tiger Woods's entourage, for example, is 
known as 'Team Tiger', and includes his coach Butch Harmon.4 Yet, judging the 
value of coaches is still problematic. 
American team sports have traditionally placed a greater emphasis on the role 
of coaches and managers than those in Britain. Even in the supposedly amateur 
environment of college sports, coaches have earned salaries of over $1 million 
because of the intense competition within the collegiate system. Tom Landry was 
the head coach of the professional American football team the Dallas Cowboys for 
29 years. Through their success under him, they became known as 'America's Team' 
and it was Landry who popularised their image by introducing cheerleaders. As a 
coach Landry was a tactical innovator and a master strategist. He also developed a 
revolutionary computerised scouting system that became the basis for Dallas's 
success. Yet, in 1989 he suffered the same fate as most managers when he was 
3Three Open Championships (1987,1990 and 1992) and three US Masters (1989,1990 and 1996). 
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sacked by the new owner.5 American sport not only reflected that country's 
business culture but also how commercialisation and increased competition can have 
an impact on the management process. In America generally, compared to Britain, 
there has been greater investment in management resources. 
Unsurprisingly, the most extensive work on the question of managerial 
contribution to the success of sports clubs has been on American Major League 
Baseball. A brief survey of the literature, reveals that most studies conclude that 
managers can make a difference.6 Porter and Scully, for example, estimate managerial 
efficiency by manager and by firm. They are positive regarding a manager's 
contribution, stating that 'managerial skill in baseball contributes very substantially 
to the production process'. 7 Furthermore, for those managers who remain with one 
team for any length time there is a systematic improvement in efficiency, similar to a 
learning curve.8 A high-quality manager contributed as much to a team's revenues as 
a superstar player; in effect, increasing the 'marginal revenue product' as, it was 
claimed, managers did not earn as much as superstar baseball players.9 
In order to establish the background to football managerial efficiency before 
1966, it has been necessary to use research that highlights aspects of modem football 
4 Observer (Sports Monthly), July 2000, pp. 29-35 
5 Guardian, 17 February 2000, p. 24, Obituary 
6See, for example, L. Kahn, 'Managerial Quality, Team Success, and Individual Player Performance 
in Major League Baseball', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 46, 3 (April 1993), pp. 
531-47; G. Scully, 'Managerial Efficiency and Survivability in Professional Team Sports', 
Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 15,5 (1994), pp. 403-11. One dissenting view is 
provided by I. Horowitz, 'On the Manager as Principal Clerk', Managerial and Decision Economics, 
Vol. 15,5, (1994), pp. 413-19. For a view on baseball in Japan see Y. Ohkusa and F. Ohtake, 'The 
relationship between supervisor and workers - The case of professional baseball in Japan, Japan and 
the World Economy, Vol. 8 (1996), pp. 475-88. 
7p. Porter and G. Scully, 'Measuring Managerial Efficiency: The Case of Baseball', Southern 
Economic Journal, Vol. 48, 3 (January 1982), pp. 642-50 
8 ibid., p. 646 
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management but may be imaginatively used to compare with the past. Measurements 
of the worth of football managers have been traditionally difficult to calculate. 
Conventional observers tend to make judgements on managers based on the number 
of trophies they win, taking no account of the socio-economic environment in which 
they work. King and Kelly (1997), for example, have devised a graded scoring 
system predicated on a number of variables: teams finishing in first or second place 
in the League plus cup wins including European trophies even though this was not 
applicable to some managers such as Herbert Chapman. 10 There has been an 
increasing number of British academic investigations on the subject. Looking mainly 
at the period after 1980, the management scientist, Stefan Szymanski, has brought a 
statistical approach to the question of managerial efficiency and his findings concur 
with Wagg's earlier supposition. Szymanski has stated that managers 'have little 
impact on the performance of the clubs they manage'. Instead, it has been the extent 
of a club's financial investment that has been the main factor behind its success (or 
failure ).11 
Szymanski has calculated, by means of regression analysis, that between 
1982 and 1997 the wage expenditure of football clubs accounted for 80-90 per cent 
of a club's performance whereas the manager's contribution was estimated at about 2 
per cent. 12 By further use of regression analysis, Szymanski and Kuypers worked 
9ibid., p. 649 
10King and Kelly, Cult a/the Manager, pp. 260-62. European competition did not begin until 1955. 
l1S. Szymanski, 'Suits in a league of their own', Observer, (Business, Work), 1 November 1998, p. 
I 
12S. Szymanski, 'Why money talks louder than managers', Observer (Sport), 22 February 1998, p. 
7; Szymanski, 'Suits'. The top ten in order were: Kenny Dalglish; Joe Kinnear; Lawrie McMenemy; 
Howard Kendall; Alex Ferguson; Keith Burkinshaw; Dave Bassett; Trevor Francis; Bruce Rioch; 
Kevin Keegan. 
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out that between 1978 and 1997 the relationship, i.e. the regression, between wage 
expenditure and league performance was very efficient. The money that a club spent 
on players' wages accounted for 92 per cent of its league position during this period. 
In layman's terms, clubs got what they paid for: the best players cost the highest 
wages. This 'goodness of fit' can be traced back to 1978 when footballers gained 
freedom of contract. There is however, a greater variability when looking at just one 
particular year. For the 1996-97 season, for example, the correlation between wage 
expenditure and league position was 78 per cent, admittedly still a high figure. 13 
Despite this concentration on wage expenditure, Szymanski has produced a 
list ranking managers based also on regression analysis. It highlights how managers 
can make a difference, although he continues to argue that it was relatively slight. In 
this list, which covered the 1982-1997 period, Kenny Dalglish was ranked first. It 
was argued that in winning championships with Liverpool and Blackburn Rovers, 'he 
achieved more at those clubs he managed than would have been expected given his 
spending on wages'. Other top ten entrants, like Joe Kinnear, Lawrie McMenemy 
and Dave Bassett, appear due to their ability to extract the best from limited 
resources. Alex Ferguson is ranked only fifth and George Graham does not make the 
top ten despite their successes at Manchester United and Arsenal respectively.14 In 
addition, Dawson et ai, by measuring coaching performance against available playing 
talent, have also concluded that the most successful coaches are not necessarily the 
most efficient ones; that 'coaching efficiency is only partially correlated with team 
performance'. Using match outcomes rather than league rankings as a variable, 
13Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, pp. 162-66 
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playing talent has then been measured by a combination of the 'Opta Index' that 
evaluates player performance based on a series of categories (ex post) against a 
player's start of season transfer value (ex ante) to predict coaching efficiency.15 
Looking at the impact of pre-1966 managers, the historical context in which 
they worked clearly needs to be taken into account. In our period, for example, the 
financial context was very different. Before the maximum wage was abolished the 
years 1950 to 1960 show a regression of only 50 per cent. Szymanski and Kuypers 
have claimed that wage expenditure did matter in the 1950s but that the market was 
relatively inefficient. Because of the constraints of the maximum, wage expenditure 
was less important in terms of its relationship to league performance compared to 
the modem era. 16 Before 1961, a player's power was restricted and the potential for 
management to influence performance was perhaps greater as playing talent was 
distributed more evenly. Despite the relatively greater potential for managers to 
make an impact, compared to the 1990s, changes in the management of clubs were 
slow and gradual. The skills and powers of managers before 1966 were less extensive 
than their modem counterparts and change usually stemmed from an increase in the 
game's competitiveness and the subsequent rising financial costs. 
Any change in the role of the manager took place within the framework of a 
club's overall aims and objectives, and these varied little throughout the period as 
they were not run for profit. These objectives, and their ultimate effect on the 
14Szymanski, 'Suits' 
15p . Dawson, S. Dobson, and B. Gerrard, 'Estimating Coaching Efficiency in Professional Team 
Sports: Evidence From English Association Football' , Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
47,4 (September 2000), pp. 399-421. The Opta Index has been used to measure player performance 
in the FA Premier League from the 1997-98 season. 
16ibid., pp. 167-70 
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management of clubs, had developed out of the historical governance of the game. As 
we have seen, early in its history, the FA had been determined to limit 
commercialisation by requiring that certain restrictions be placed on clubs in their 
articles of association. In 1896, under rule 4S(a), it imposed a 7_ per cent maximum 
on shareholders' dividends. 17 Furthermore, until 1981, the Football Association 
prohibited the payment of fees to directors and also excluded paid managers from 
sitting on the board. 18 Arnold has argued that the price of the Football Association's 
protection of football against financial greed 'was to deny the incentives that might 
have widened the supply of managerial talents and investment' .19 Other businesses 
would 'either adopt a cooperative structure utilising the enormous fund of available 
local goodwill and commitment or raise equity capital'. In return, the business would 
have to give effective voting rights and an increase in monetary returns to 
shareholders. Football however, 'allowed power to concentrate into the hands of 
directors' and as shares rarely offered a monetary return, they only became useful as 
20 
a means of control. 
Moreover, in its capacity as a cartel, the Football League had tried to equalise 
competition through the imposition of the maximum wage and the retain and transfer 
system?1 These measures enabled clubs to control their players and prevent the 
17Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, p. 16. There were further periodic rises; in 19207.5 
per cent, 1974 10 per cent, 1983 15 per cent. 
18Arnold, Game, p. 127; Sloane, 'Economics of Professional Football', p. 131 
19 Arnold, Game, p. 20 
20ibid., pp. 124-25 
21Vamplew states that there are four interrelated features that characterise a profit-maximising sports 
cartel. First, there has to be a central, decision-making organisation to act as a rule-making body. 
This will then try to influence profits through cost-minimising regulations, usually labour market 
intervention. Cartels can also attempt to maximise revenue by improving the quality of the product 
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richer clubs buying up the best ones.22 The League's retain and transfer system, that 
evolved in the 1890s, allowed clubs to hold 'monopsony' power over players. This 
meant that clubs had a fIrm grip over their players and that a player's club was the 
only buyer in the market for that player's services, unless it chose to sell him. If a 
player wanted a move his club could refuse and no player could leave if they were 
offered the maximum wage. As a result, there was little incentive for players to want 
to move as they would, in theory, only receive the maximum at another club, curbing 
competition for playing talent in the process.23 The League also adopted cross-
subsidisation mechanisms to try and further equalise competition. It regulated the 
quality of the competition by controlling entry into it through a re-election process 
and by promotion and relegation so as to avoid unattractive one-sided contests?4 In 
1890 the League had set a minimum admission fee of 6d, and there were few 
increases until the 1960s when football admission costs began to outpace inflation. 25 
Furthermore, in 1924 it had also approved a 20 per cent allocation of gate receipts to 
visiting teams.26 In 1891, to prevent competition for spectators, the League decided 
not to admit any club whose ground was within three miles of another member?7 
Between 1889 and 1915 the professional game had been 'reasonably 
competitive', with ten different clubs winning the championship over the 27 years.28 
such as rule changes. Finally, the league's viability depends on sporting equality being preserved, and 
this may involve richer clubs subsidising the needier ones. Vamplew, Pay Up, pp. 112-13 
22 Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 258 
23Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, p. 170; Mason, Association Football, pp. 104-05 
24 Arnold, Game, p. 124 
25Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 81, p. 328 n28; Dobson and Goddard, 'Performance', p. 769 
26 Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 269 
27 Vamplew, Pay Up, p. 137 
28 Russell, Football, p. 53 
333 
Although looking at the period 1900 to 1939, Taylor has argued that there is little 
evidence to show that the League's equalisation measures 'substantially assisted the 
attainment of equality' of competition, with the possible exception of the promotion 
system.29 Taylor points out that the Football League's early policy makers were not 
economists but administrators, unpaid volunteers, and had a different perspective on 
how the game should be run. Arnold and Benveniste have also argued, that 
'individual sporting leagues reflect differences in the cultures in which they are 
grounded, in the aspirations of those who influence their activities, and in the 
historical development of their practices and rules' .30 Economic considerations 
therefore, like increasing profits, were important but the League was just as 
interested in the notions of friendship and mutuality, and it was this that permeated 
much of the League's early policy and which continued up until at least 1961.31 
Nevertheless, these Football League regulations, in combination with those of 
the FA, had important consequences for a club's organisation and its management. 
Sloane has argued that football clubs were 'utility maximisers' where directors, with 
an urge for power, and shareholders, who had a desire for group identification, 
invested emotionally, not financially. Instead, a club's main goal was 'to provide 
entertainment in the form of a football match. The objective was not to maximise 
profits, but to achieve playing success whilst remaining solvent'. Utility 
maximisation suggests therefore, that clubs would always strive to maximise their 
29 Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 256 
30T. Arnold and I. Benveniste, 'Cross Subsidisation and Competition Policy in English Professional 
Football', Journal of Industrial Affairs, Vol. 15, 1 (1988), p. 3 
31 Taylor, 'Proud Preston', p. 277 
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playing success, and any profits were usually ploughed back into the club.32 Arnold, 
like Sloane, has also argued that English football clubs developed unusual business 
objectives: they were motivated by playing success not by maximising profits. 33 
Despite the commercial restrictions, the pre-1960s football club was not a 
moribund entity. Instead of being concerned with the finances of others, clubs 
naturally had their own ambitions. A football club therefore, was a dynamic and 
organic organisation with its direction continually shaped by human agency. But 
what direction did individual clubs want to take? Arnold and Sloane have agreed that 
clubs sought playing success but what did clubs consider as 'success'? And how was 
football 'consumed'? Adam Smith argued that the 'sole end and purpose of all 
production' is consumption, defined as 'the process in which goods and services are 
bought and used to satisfy people's needs'. 34 The relationship between demand, 
supply and consumption however, is difficult to disentangle as supply does not 
necessarily create its own demand.35 John Benson has argued that 'people's interest 
in sport could be, and often was, an important determinant of their behaviour as 
consumers' .36 
Football's production process is perhaps more difficult to disentangle than 
other industries. What has it meant to individual clubs for example? Football's 
consumption is illogical, and as a commodity it does not conform to the forces of 
economic rationalism. Clubs, the ones who supply the 'product', have been subject 
32p. Sloane, 'The Economics of Professional Football: The Football Club as a Utility Maximiser', 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 17,2 (1971), pp. 121-46; Vamplew, Pay Up, pp. 80-87 
33 Arnold, Game, p. 124 
340belkevich, 'Consumption', p. 142 
35J. Benson, The Rise of Consumer Society in Britain, 1880-1980 (1994), p. 35 
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to different motivations, conditioned by factors such as their fan base. 
Notwithstanding the measures to restrict commercialisation and competition, some 
clubs from major conurbations, were inherently bigger and more ambitious than 
others due to the size of their potential spectator base. 'Success' for a club therefore, 
was (and still is) an ambiguous term. For a First Division club success could have 
meant winning the League or FA Cup, while others may have been satisfied by a 
mid-table position or avoiding relegation. It was only from the late Fifties that 
European competition became important to a few clubs. In the lower divisions, some 
clubs aimed for promotion whilst others wanted to maintain their League status. 
Some clubs may have just been happy with maintaining financial solvency. 
Similarly, fans have 'consumed' the game for different reasons. Furthermore, 
when fans 'chose' a team they usually stay with that team for life. It has been said, 
and with more than a grain of truth, that the average male football fan will change his 
wife more often than his football team. Even if a team has not been successful, some 
fans will continue to support it. In terms of the nature of consumption this is 
irrational. If, for example, someone had bought an iron it would be replaced as soon 
as it stopped working. Football however, is different. Up to the 1960s the vast 
majority of fans identified with their local team. Post-war crowds were becoming 
more heterogeneous but only gradually, and there was little football on television to 
divert attention away from the local team (see Chapter 6). Attendances still 
fluctuated however. Every club had a hardcore of supporters who would attend most 
home games but many others were more discerning. Success was usually the main 
36 ibid., p. 117 
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attraction. A club's latent support, for example, could be stirred by a winning run. 
The FA Cup, in particular, generated much excitement because of its sudden death 
nature and the attraction of the Final, the biggest game of the year, held in London. 
Others perhaps would only go to certain games, like those over the Christmas 
period, a local 'derby' or when the local team was playing against one of the big 
clubs. Some fans watched football more for its overall excitement and entertainment 
value rather than using it as an exercise in partisanship. For the majority though, 
games became occasions wracked with tension and anxiety where winning overrode 
the enjoyment factor. One crucial element that dictated attendances during our period 
was the weather. A cold, wet winter's day held little appeal, especially if it meant 
standing on the open terraces that were a common feature of the majority of grounds. 
Football management therefore, like the game itself, has been a peculiar 
business. Initially, as we have seen, unpaid directors ran nascent football clubs rather 
than salaried managers as football management reflected the English traditions of 
amateurism and voluntarism. Not only had the absence of a profit motive tempered 
the need for greater investment in managerial resources, but club directors also 
devoted a lot of their spare time to running their clubs. They were generally local 
business or professional men who had more interest in the indirect benefits that being 
a director of a local club could bring rather than for any financial remuneration. 
Initially, the manager was usually the secretary who dealt with the club's 
administration with the directors looking after team affairs. This situation gradually 
changed as football's competition intensified and directors had to look after their 
own businesses. As a result, secretaries and managers gradually gained more 
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responsibility for team affairs. This has not been a linear process however, with 
most clubs having different ideas on how they should be run. For example, following 
the split in 1892 of Everton Football Club's membership, and the subsequent 
formation of Liverpool, a different management culture emerged within each club (see 
also Chapters 2 and 3). John Houlding, the chairman, had wanted the club to be run 
more commercially, with him as the controlling figure, whereas the main bulk of the 
membership felt strongly that Everton should remain a members' club, and hence 
more democratic in nature. When Liverpool was formed after the split, it was run 
more for profit as well as being centrally controlled by Houlding. In 1896 Tom 
Watson was appointed secretary-manager, in line with Liverpool's more 
commercially-driven policy. Despite becoming a limited liability company, Everton's 
management, on the other hand, continued to be run on more voluntaristic lines. This 
tradition persisted, and the club did not appoint a manager until the 1930s, with Will 
Cuff, an early member, remaining its dominant figure up to the 1940s.37 
Before 1914, cricket shared some similarities with football but also offered a 
contrasting management structure. Like most football clubs, their county cricket 
counterparts had not been run for profit, and this had implications for their 
management culture. Cricket was never viewed as a business in any form however. 
Competition was not as intense as football and there was very little commercial 
activity. Instead, the game's supporters were more concerned with notions of local 
pride and county allegiance as by the late nineteenth century the game was seen as an 
37For a more detailed account of the split of Everton, the subsequent formation of Liverpool and the 
ramifications for both club's management culture, see D. Kennedy, 'The Split of Everton Football 
Club, 1892: The Creation of Distinct Patterns of Boardroom Formation at Everton and Liverpool 
Football Club Companies', Unpublished Paper (2002) 
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integral part English culture.38 Unlike football clubs that turned themselves into 
limited liability companies during the 1890s, a country cricket club maintained its 
status as a members' club. Their management therefore, was based on traditional 
committee lines, with its members democratically elected by the club membership.39 
Committees picked the team and also looked after the club's finances. On the field, 
instead of a manager, it was the playing captain who was responsible for the team. 
This situation still basically exists today. 
By comparison, American baseball clubs of the nineteenth century had few 
commercial restrictions placed upon them and mirrored how American society itself 
was more business orientated. Baseball was organised for profit and it allowed 
owners to move their club, or 'franchise', to different cities to exploit more 
favourable commercial opportunities such as access to large populations, most 
notoriously exemplified by the move of the Brooklyn Dodgers to Los Angeles in 
1958.40 In terms of a baseball club's organisation, there was a more decisive divorce 
between ownership and control than in either football or cricket. Early in baseball 
history, commercial forces had led to a manager replacing the captain as the 
progenitor of on-the-field tactics. The managerial hierarchy generally associated with 
major league baseball franchises hardly changed over the entire twentieth century. It 
38K. Sandiford and W. Vamplew, 'The Peculiar Economics of English Cricket Before 1914', British 
Journal of Sports History, Vol. 3 (1986), pp. 311-26 
390ne exception was the London County Cricket Club. It was formed in 1898 by the directors of 
the board of the Crystal Palace Company who had decided to establish a first class cricket club 
(although it was not a member of the County Championship) at the Crystal Palace site in Sydenham. 
W.G. Grace was appointed secretary and manager. Rae, Grace, pp. 432-33. In 2000-01 Hampshire 
became the first county cricket club to form itself into a limited liability company due to the rising 
salaries of players and the cost of a new stadium that increased the members' liabilities. Observer 
(Sport), 22 April 2001, p. l3 
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consisted of the owner who provided the capital and took the risks; the general 
manager who had responsibility for acquiring and trading players and negotiating 
salaries; and then the manager who was responsible for the team.41 
How then has the manager fitted into football's peculiar pattern of 
consumption? On the face of it, his main function is to win football matches. Like 
their counterparts in industry, football managers take a set of inputs (resources) and 
turn them into something of greater value than anyone else. Most managers fail to 
win but, as we have seen, measuring success has been relative, and managers 
therefore, have still made an impact. And at football clubs, which were smaller than 
most businesses throughout this period, the potential has been greater for the 
manager to influence a club's direction and fortunes. The traditional management 
model of English football clubs has rested on a manager who has been responsible to 
a board of directors. The impact of this relationship can be seen when placed 
alongside Chandler's model of managerial capitalism that entails a complete divorce 
between control and ownership, and allows for all forms of management to be 
undertaken by professionals.42 There seems little difference, for example, between 
football's management hierarchy and that of American baseball's three-tiered 
structure. The divorce between ownership and control however, is still wider in 
baseball and therefore, there has been more scope for professional management to 
undertake particular managerial tasks. In England, on the other hand, the potential for 
directorial interference has been greater because the organisational structure of 
40The only comparable example of this type of move in England was when Woolwich Arsenal 
moved across London from Plum stead to Highbury in 1913. Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and 
Losers, p. 309 
41 Horowitz, 'Manager', p. 415 
lrld""~' lUI t:.:Jj1Clency 340 
football clubs has caused power to be concentrated in the hands of directors. Yet, 
conversely, this organisational culture has meant that managers themselves have had 
greater potential to increase their influence within clubs through mini power 
struggles. The manager's role has also been a reflection of football's management 
culture. There has never been a job description for football management, no formal 
qualification have been required and a manager's range of duties has varied from club 
to club. This has highlighted British laissez faire attitudes towards football 
management compared to those on the continent. In Britain there has been a strong 
tradition of anti-coaching throughout the game, and, unlike some European countries 
who have invoked a licensing policy, it has allowed clubs to choose anyone they like 
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as manager. 
Notwithstanding this culture, and the reality or potential for directorial 
interference, directors expected managers to improve a team's performance. In what 
context did they achieve this? As we have seen, Szymanski and Kuypers have argued 
that in the modem era, a team's performance in the long run has been more reflective 
of that club's finances rather than any managerial expertise. Before 1966 however, 
money played less of a role in football management; and there was more potential for 
managers to make a difference. Furthermore, it can be argued that over a shorter 
period, like one game, a manager can have an important influence. Over time their 
influence perhaps waned. Yet it does not take into account the importance of the 
42Wilson, Business History, p. 13 
430ne manifestation of this has been that by 2000 there were 1000 UEFA qualified coaches in 
England whereas in France there were 17,000 and in Germany, 53,000. The Football Association has 
proposed that by 2003 managers in England will need a coaching qualification in order to work. 
Tony Banks MP quoted on BBe News, 12 October 2000. Guardian, 28 March 2000, p. 34 
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'then and now'. Fans are more interested in the present and unconcerned with the 
long-term. In general, they want instant success. 
By what means then has a manager been able to improve a team's 
performance? Basically, a football manager has needed three key qualities: an ability 
to judge a player, tactical acumen and motivational skills. Good judgement when 
purchasing a player (within a club's budget), together with recruiting young players 
and bringing them through, has probably been the manager's most important 
attribute as it is essentially players who win or lose matches. However, as we have 
seen throughout this thesis, the extent to which managers have been able to exercise 
their ability in this area has been usually dependent on their directors who have had 
the ultimate sanction on any transfer. Paradoxically, clubs have been transformed due 
to the talents of certain players, making them more indispensable than the manager. 
During this period, players such as Derby's Steve Bloomer and Dixie Dean at 
Everton were deemed irreplaceable. Similarly, Tom Finney and Stanley Matthews 
were crucial to their clubs. Across the Atlantic, not only did Babe Ruth transform 
the New York Yankees but also baseball itself during the Twenties. Before the Sixties 
however, it had been easier for football clubs to prevent players moving due to the 
game's labour regulations. 
In addition to recruiting skilful players, they need to be able to blend in with 
the manager's overall tactical plan. And that, during this period, was contingent on 
them actually having one. Initially, it had been the players who devised team tactics 
but gradually managers took it upon themselves to make tactics their responsibility 
and the importance of tactics increased as competition intensified. Defences became 
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better organised and the need to find an edge became more urgent. The process of 
imparting knowledge or instructions to players in general has become an important 
development of football management. The idea of team talks before games was 
introduced by Herbert Chapman and then used by other managers such as Jimmy 
Seed and Stan Cullis. However, the regulations of this period restricted the extent to 
which managers could influence games after they had started. It was not until 1965-
66, for example, that substitutes were first used in the Football League. There had 
been a principled ideological opposition to their introduction amongst the rulers of 
English football. They felt that substitutions were somehow unfair and would be 
open to abuse. It was also felt that they would increase the use of 'tactics' in the 
English game, just as it had done in Europe and was something that was sneered at 
by English officials and players alike.44 By contrast, American sports have featured a 
constant turnover of players during games, reflecting their acceptance of increased 
specialisation. 
The extent of a manager's influence has also been restricted by the rules of 
the game. Compared to American sports, a manager in association football has 
limited opportunities to make changes during play. A game of soccer is played over 
two 45 minute periods and is a non-stop, 360 degree game where players frequently 
change positions. Furthermore, association football has steadily moved away from 
440ne substitute was allowed at first but only for an injured player. The following season substitutes 
were pennitted for any reason. Jimmy Mullen ofWolverhampton Wanderers was the first substitute 
used by England in 1950 but they had been used in Europe before the War. By 1960 substitutes were 
being pennitted but only with the approval of the National Association or International Association. 
The number of substitutes in the Football League was later increased to two in 1987-88, then three in 
1995-96. Five can now be selected from but only a maximum ofthree can be used. In international 
games whole squads can be placed on the bench, although, again, only three can be used. News a/the 
World Football Annual, 1997-98, pp. 327-30; Butler, Football League, p. 225; Matthews, The 
Wolves, p. 280; Football Association Handbook: Rules a/the Association and Laws a/the Game/or 
Season 1960-61, p. 179 
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relatively static formations as the game's pace has increased. Increasingly, footballers 
have needed to display all-round skills such as tackling, running, passing, heading, 
shooting. By contrast, a game of baseball is, in theory, timeless and revolves around 
the pitcher-hitter confrontation. As a stop-start game it lends itself to frequent 
opportunities for coaching, if not by the manager then by other specialist coaches. In 
basketball and American football time-outs have been available to coaches to devise 
'plays' in response to situations teams find themselves in during games. In 
comparison, half-time has traditionally been the only time when a football manager 
can make a significant intervention.45 
In soccer, in fact, coaching from the touchline was initially banned. It was 
regarded as a form of cheating, highlighting again the conflict between football's 
amateur tradition and its burgeoning professionalism. In 1939 a law was introduced 
that stated '[ w]hile the game is in progress ... trainers or club officials must not coach 
players along the boundary lines' .46 In 1955 Stan Cullis had been asked by the 
referee to refrain from coaching during a game Wolverhampton Wanderers played at 
Grimsby Town. Cullis later said that it was essential for him to be able to shout 
instructions to a player during the game. He also claimed that most managers or 
trainers did the same, and, in exasperation, he asked, 'How else could they 
[managers] affect team positional changes if necessary?' .47 Tactical changes 
therefore, were not regarded as so important before 1966 as they have been in recent 
years. It now seems to many fans that making tactical changes is the litmus test of 
45 At first it was 5 minutes but has since increased to 10 and now 15 minutes. 
46Express and Star, 10 January 1955, p. 20; Football Association Handbook: Rules a/the 
Association and Laws o/the Game/or Season 1960-61, Law 5, Referees, p. 186 
344 
managerial competence, and in this sense they are akin to witchdoctors with mystical 
powers because they apparently have the ability to change the direction of a game. 
Instead, successful managers, like Busby, Shankly and Cullis, from the 
immediate post-War period, gained reputations as leaders of men. They were 
charismatic personalities who had the capacity to dominate players, something that 
Arthur Hopcraft has identified as the key factor in managerial success.48 To achieve 
this they have imposed an authority over players that echoes not only workplace 
relationships but those in wider society generally. As we have seen, in order to 
maintain discipline amongst these young men, the methods adopted by some 
managers were not dissimilar to those used in the military. A manager's personality 
therefore, together with an element of social psychology, can be added to their 
powers of motivation to inspire players to greater efforts. This is not just to get the 
best out of players but also to keep them in a relaxed frame of mind in the days 
between games so that they do not use up nervous energy. 
Perhaps the main requirement of a manager however, has been that which 
Napoleon asked for when discussing the quality of his generals: luck. And in football 
luck plays a bigger part than in most other sports. American football and rugby, for 
example, have placed a greater emphasis on physical power that tends to confrrm the 
old saying that 'a good big 'un will always beat a good little 'un'. This is mostly not 
the case in football which is more technically oriented and where footballers usually 
reflect average heights and weights. Moreover, many factors can influence a game of 
football. First, games of soccer are generally low scoring and that usually maintains 
47 Express and Star, 10 January 1955, p. 20 
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an uncertainty throughout the contest. One team therefore, can dominate the game in 
terms of possession without scoring and then concede a late goal. Furthermore, there 
are a variety of ways to score a goal including own goals from lucky deflections that 
can not be planned for. The referee can also influence a game's outcome by his 
decisions, most notably when mistakenly awarding a penalty kick or allowing or 
disallowing goals. Of course, over the course of a season luck may balance itself out 
but sometimes it may not and a team's bad luck may persist for longer. For instance, 
a club may have been afflicted by a bad run of injuries to key players, unsettling 
team formation and morale. The fate of a manager therefore, is subject to a variety of 
factors, over most of which he has little or no control. 
The position of a football manager though, has meant more than merely 
someone who was just responsible for the team's results. Managers have become 
emblematic figures for their clubs. From the time of William Sudell and Tom Watson, 
a kind of footballing menage a trois emerged between managers, the press and the 
fans; each one needed the other. To feed the rising interest in the game, newspapers 
required quotations and it was the manager who increasingly provided them. With 
more intense competition, the media spotlight on the game increased. Directors, 
unwilling to take responsibility for poor runs, increasingly replaced their managers. 
At the same time, a fan's perception of a manager's powers increased through this 
heightened media interest. Whether real or imaginary, the stature of the manager was 
raised. It was Herbert Chapman who had been the first to command such status and 
after the War, this process developed further with Matt Busby. In particular, 
48 Hopcraft, Football Man, p. 97 
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following the Munich Air Disaster, and with the growth of television, Busby's 
stature became almost iconic. 
How then have managers made a difference to the teams they have managed? 
This part of the chapter will analyse a number of case studies but rather than try to 
establish who were the most successful managers, the aim is not only to underline 
how they did it but also to draw attention to the historical context in which their 
success took place. Such a framework could be applied to other managers, like Matt 
Busby, who have been looked at in previous chapters but have not been included 
here. 
One aspect of football management that seems to have made a difference, in 
addition to the individual impact of a manager, is that of continuity. Here perhaps a 
parallel can be drawn with that of teaching. School children, for example, find it 
difficult to handle constant changes in teachers and respond better to a familiar face. 
Not only does familiarity breed contempt but it can also breed a certain amount of 
affection, or at least stability. Similarly, the relationship between manager and player 
is easier to build if it has a long-term basis. In the era before the maximum wage was 
abolished these relationships were easier to maintain as player mobility was 
relatively low. Moreover, when a club changed a manager some directors felt that it 
made sense to promote from within. A long period of continuity would mean fewer 
distractions and more stability in the running of a club. With less time and mental 
energy being expended in thinking about these changes, manager and players alike 
could focus more on the playing side. One negative aspect of managerial continuity 
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however, may be the development of a generation gap where older managers may be 
unable to relate anymore to their younger players. 
The most successful modern example of managerial continuity has been 
Liverpool. From Shankly through to Dalglish, successive managers all had a previous 
connection with the club. Paisley and Fagan had been members of the backroom staff 
whereas Dalglish was a player when appointed manager. It can be argued however, 
that a similarly successful form of continuity had been pioneered by Arsenal, starting 
when Herbert Chapman became manager in 1925. Like Liverpool however, the 
transition from one manager to another was never an entirely smooth one. As we 
have seen, Chapman was the first manager to bring the full range of his managerial 
skills to bear on a club's fortunes, first at Huddersfield Town and then at Arsenal. 
Yet Arsenal's later success following Chapman's death in 1934 was based on 
promoting from within. Chapman's successor was George Allison, a club director. 
He was followed in 1947 by Tom Whittaker, the club trainer since 1927, who was 
manager until his death in office in 1956. During this period, Arsenal's management 
tradition had also been analogous with a small family firm. Since 1927 the position of 
chairman had been 'kept in the family' when Samuel Hill-Wood became chairman. He 
was later succeeded by his son, Denis, who in tum was followed on to the board by 
his son, Peter.49 In addition to managerial continuity, there was the quality and 
longevity of Arsenal's backroom staff. Joe Shaw, for example, was assistant manager 
to both Chapman and Allison. Bob Wall joined the club in 1928 as assistant 
49peter Hill-Wood is still the current Arsenal chainnan. 
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secretary, a role in which he continued until 1956 when he was made secretary and 
provided a link between each manager. 50 
Arsenal, during the Thirties, was the first club to dominate English football 
for a long period; this in an era of relatively equal competition.51 Furthermore, as we 
suggested earlier, the relationship between wage expenditure and league position was 
not as great in the 1930s as it has been the in 1990s with more clubs able to satisfy 
the demands of players due to the maximum wage. Arsenal's success created a 
certain aura and even a mythology that surrounded the club. No team until then 
produced such polarised opinions. Even Arsenal's style of play and tactical plans 
engendered a belief that they were 'lucky' as they would win many games by 
soaking up pressure and then score goals on the counter-attack. 
Throughout this period Arsenal had been the biggest spenders in football, 
with the resources to maintain their success by purchasing quality players like David 
Jack and Alex James. In 1938 Allison paid a world record fee of £14,000 for Bryn 
J ones of W olverhampton Wanderers. 52 Yet, because of its achievements, the club 
still made large profits. 53 Wealth however, was not a guarantee of success; it was the 
management of resources that was the crucial factor. Arsenal's policy of 'speculate 
to accumulate' compared with the performance of some of London's other relatively 
50Studd, Herbert Chapman, p. 108; Joy, Forward Arsenal, p. 193. During the War Joe Shaw was 
assistant manager at Chelsea but returned to Arsenal in 1947. 
51 In seventeen playing seasons, between 1930 and 1953, Arsenal won the Football League on seven 
occasions and the FA Cup three times. It was not until 1970, when they won the Fairs Cup, that the 
club lifted another trophy. 
52During Chapman's tenure Arsenal spent £101,400 on transfers reclaiming £40,000. Between 1934 
and 1939 Allison paid out £81,000 for players, although £51,000 was claimed back. Allison, 
Allison Calling, p. 101 
53Under Chapman, Arsenal made a yearly average profit of £ 1 0,000 in his eight years, and between 
1934 and 1939 this figure rose to £22,000 per year. Allison, Allison Calling, p. 217. 
349 
prosperous clubs at the time. Tottenham Hotspur, for example, was thought to be as 
wealthy as Arsenal. It had assets worth £80,000 but the Spurs directors ran a very 
tight ship. They were unwilling to pay the same transfer fees as their North London 
rivals, and consequently, the club made a profit on transfers nearly every year during 
the inter-War period. Moreover, wage levels were only a third of the club's income. 
But in 1935 Spurs were relegated to the Second Division and its manager, Percy 
Smith, resigned, claiming that, because he had been unable to emulate Arsenal's 
success, he, instead of the directors had been made the scapegoat.54 West Ham's 
board was similarly parsimonious. Up to 1961 the club had only ever employed 
three managers: Syd King, Charlie Paynter and Ted Fenton. Despite this managerial 
continuity, the board imposed strict financial constraints on them all, and for much 
of that period West Ham was a Second Division team.55 Chelsea, on the other hand, 
as one of the best-supported teams in the Football League during the inter-War 
period, was much more ambitious. Unlike Spurs, Chelsea's wages swallowed up over 
half of its income. Chelsea wanted to emulate Arsenal and in 1930 they paid 
Newcastle £10,000 for the Scottish centre-forward, Hughie Gallacher. Later, in 1933, 
they lured former Arsenal manager, Leslie Knighton away from Birmingham City. 
Success was elusive however, and Chelsea averaged only thirteenth place during the 
fifteen seasons it spent in the First Division between the wars. 56 
54Tottenham Weekly Herald, 19 April 1935, p. 11; Sunday Dispatch, 21 April 1935, p. 9; 
Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, p. 375 
55 Korr, West Ham, Chapter 6 
56Russell, Football, pp. 81-82; Szymanski and Kuypers, Winners and Losers, p. 351; I. Sharpe, 
Soccer Top Ten (1962), p. 117; Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 165 
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However, Arsenal's policy of promoting from within did not guarantee 
permanent success, and the playing fortunes of the club declined during the Fifties 
and Sixties. When Whittaker died, his assistant, Jack Crayston, another former 
player, became the next manager. He had two ineffective years before he was 
replaced by the club's former goalkeeper, George Swindin who was equally 
unsuccessful. It was not a matter of money either. Throughout the post-war period, 
Arsenal was consistently one of the richest clubs in the League. Arsenal's decline can 
perhaps be traced back to the War when the club practically lost a full team of 
internationals through retirement or injury, breaking the link with the Thirties.57 
Furthermore, Arsenal perhaps failed to adapt to football's changing circumstances. In 
1956 Whittaker was still a secretary-manager with responsibility for team and 
administration. 58 It was this tradition that perhaps checked the club's progress as the 
management of football clubs was increasingly devolved with the manager 
concentrating his efforts on the players on the pitch. 
In an attempt to reverse its fortunes the club broke with tradition and 
appointed an outsider as the next manager in 1962. Billy Wright had no previous 
connection with the club nor any management experience. But as a former England 
captain, and in line with the prevailing thinking of the time, it was thought that this 
gave him the right qualities for the job. Arsenal was no more successful however, and 
he was sacked in 1966, the same year that Arsenal experienced their lowest ever 
League crowd. 59 Arsenal then reverted back to their policy of appointing from within 
57 Joy, Forward Arsenal, p. 133 
58Joy, Forward Arsenal, p. 140; Whittaker, Tom Whittaker's, p. 30 
59The crowd was 4554 for a game against Leeds in May. 
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as the next manager, like Tom Whittaker, was the club physiotherapist, Bertie Mee. 
He had had a brief playing career with Derby and Mansfield before turning to 
physiotherapy, going to Arsenal in 1960. Mee's greatest management asset was his 
ability to delegate. He left the playing side to Don Howe and their partnership 
helped Arsenal win the 'Double' in 1971.60 Continuity therefore, may have long-
term benefits but clubs still needed to pick the right man; someone who knew how to 
manage footballers. 
Unlike the majority of clubs, Arsenal's perennial ambition, since Chapman 
had been to win trophies. Others however, aspired to more modest targets. Lower 
division clubs, for example, had their ambitions stymied by the Football League's 
promotion and relegation system for a large part of this period. Despite the 
expansion of the Football League in the Twenties, promotion from the Third 
Divisions, North and South, was restricted to only one team per division.61 A 
'closed shop' emerged as there was little mobility within the league structure. Third 
Division clubs therefore, were forced into setting different targets. With promotion 
for the majority difficult to attain, financial stability became perhaps a more realistic 
aim; something that was aided by the League's rules on players' wages and mobility. 
Yet there was still some pressure to succeed, and lower division managers 
continued to lose their jobs. One who kept his was Bob Jack, manager of Plymouth 
Argyle from 1910 to 1938.62 'Argyle' was a founder member of the Third Division 
60Guardian, 23 October 2001, p. 22, Obituary; p. 30 
61 1n 1958 the Third Divisions, North and South, were replaced by Third and Fourth Divisions. 
Between the Second and Third Divisions there was a 2-up, 2-down promotion and relegation system 
whereas between the Third and the Fourth, it was 4-up, 4 -down. 
62He had previously joined Plymouth as a player in 1903, and became manager for one season, 1905-
06. He then joined Southend as player-manager in 1906 before re-joining Plymouth. 
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South in 1920, after previously winning the Southern League in 1913. Amazingly, in 
six consecutive seasons between 1922 and 1927 they finished second. Pressure 
mounted from the fans who believed it was a deliberate policy on the part of the 
board who did not want promotion.63 Despite this 'failure' however, Jack continued 
as manager. In 1930 Plymouth finally won promotion, and maintained their Second 
Division status until 1938. Another manager who gave long service to a club was Sam 
Allen at Swindon Town. Between 1902 and 1933, he was secretary-manager, when 
Swindon, who joined the Football League in 1920, was mainly a middling Third 
Division South team.64 In comparison to their modem counterparts, it is difficult to 
believe that Allen or Jack would have kept their jobs for as long as they did. It 
highlights the different context in which football management operated and how 
pressures, if not absent, were not as intense as they are now. Not only did the 
Football League's policies cushion any inequalities but the media spotlight on the 
game was not as intensive. Directors therefore, probably felt less pressure to take 
some action when results were poor. In later years, because of football's rising media 
profile, they perhaps believed that they ought to be seen to be doing something, and 
this invariably meant sacking the manager. 
Following the Second World War football underwent a process of 
modernisation, albeit a sluggish one. There was a greater turnover of managers, 
although for many, the extent of their powers and role was ambiguous. By the Sixties 
however, more managers had greater autonomy and they began to think more deeply 
63Turner and White, Football Managers, p. 157 
64Swindon had earlier won the Southern League in 1911 and 1914. Turner and White, Football 
Managers, p. 74 
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about the game. Perhaps chief amongst these was Don Revie. His major achievement 
was to establish Leeds United as a force within English football. Despite its large 
population, Leeds was located in a rugby area and the football club had traditionally 
competed with Leeds Rugby League Club for the city's patronage. Because of the 
lack of interest in soccer, Leeds was generally a mid-table Second Division team 
before Revie's arrival. He brought a new professionalism to football management, 
completely transforming the club's standing. Between 1965 and 1974 Leeds was 
consistently the best team in the country, although they ultimately gained a 
reputation as perennial runners-up.65 Importantly, from when he became manager 
Revie had the support of his chairman, Harry Reynolds, a millionaire businessman. 
He continued to support Revie especially in the transfer market. Revie was also ably 
assisted by Les Cocker, who was regarded as the top trainer in the country at the 
time. 
Revie had been fortunate to inherit an outstanding group of young players at 
Leeds including Billy Bremner, Norman Hunter and Paul Reaney. However, he was 
also astute in the transfer market in the signings of Bobby Collins, Johnny Giles in 
particular, and also Alan Clarke who cost a then record fee of £165,000 from 
Leicester, proof that Leeds's success under Revie had put them among the country's 
most wealthy clubs. By inheriting a mostly young team, he was able to gain an 
65They won the League twice in 1969 and 1974 and were second on five other occasions, 1965, 
1966, 1970, 1971 and 1972. The FA Cup was won once in 1972 and they were runners-up three 
times, 1965, 1970 and 1973. On four occasions they narrowly failed to win the 'Double' and only 
once won a trophy in these seasons. Leeds had won their first trophy, the League Cup, in 1968, and 
later that year won its first European trophy, the Fairs Cup which it won again in 1971. It had 
previously been runners-up in the same competition in 1967 and also lost the Cup Winners' Cup 
Final to AC Milan in 1973. In 1975, after Revie had left to manage England, but what was basically 
his team, Leeds, now managed by Jimmy Armfield, unluckily lost in the Final of the European Cup 
to Bayem Munich, having earlier in 1970 lost in the semi-fmal to Celtic. 
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intense loyalty from his players, and saw Leeds in terms of a family club with him at 
the head. In recognition of changes within society and football during the Sixties, 
Revie placed great importance on the welfare of his players. This included sending 
birthday cards and chocolates to the players' wives and children. In return, the 
players had to accept his strict code of discipline. No one could grow their hair long 
or wear jeans, and the night before games the players would play carpet bowls and 
bingo to prevent them from going out. 
Revie had wanted Leeds to emulate the achievements of Real Madrid, and in 
1963 he changed their colours to all-white in honour of the Spanish club. Revie was 
also very particular in his pre-match preparations and had dossiers compiled on 
opponents to draw attention to their weaknesses (see Chapter 6). In 1964, Leeds 
won promotion to the First Division with a ruthless style of football, combined with 
a cynical professionalism. Leeds players would put pressure on referees by 
questioning decisions, overreacting and feigning injury. Initially, their style of play 
had concentrated on efficiency but they later developed into one of the greatest 
footballing sides of the modem era. Surprisingly, despite Revie's professionalism, he 
was incredibly superstitious, betraying a realisation that he was unable to control 
events. Many players had their lucky charms and would follow particular rituals. 
Revie himself continuously wore a 'lucky' blue mohair suit and raincoat for games. 
Despite their success, Revie's team had grown old together and his successors were 
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unable to replicate its achievements. It was another fifteen years before Leeds would 
approach anything like the success they enjoyed under Revie.66 
To understand how managers have made a difference therefore, it is important 
to realise not only that their impact changed over our period but that it has to be 
assessed in a variety of contexts. Making an accurate quantitative judgement 
therefore, on a manager's contribution is difficult, and suggests a need for the detailed 
case study. The evidence used by Szymanski and Kuypers, for example, is only part 
of the equation. In addition to examining managerial efficiency on a long-term basis, 
account must be taken of the short-term. It is a club's fans' expectations and the 
week-to-week experience that have determined the game as a product, something the 
projection of long-term economic forecasts cannot begin to explain. Questions on 
managerial efficiency therefore, are contingent on a definition of 'efficiency'. Yet 
managers have made an impact, and it has been all the more evident because football 
clubs, instead of resembling monolithic corporations, are really small organisations. 
And as such the human factor becomes more important. The potential to influence 
has been much greater but this potential was often constrained by football's 
management culture which, through the interference of directors, inhibited the role of 
the manager. Yet the perception of the manager as a powerful figure continued to 
66pawson, Football Managers, pp. 68-70; Rogan, Football Managers, pp. 92-122; Taylor and 
Ward, Kicking and Screaming, pp. 188-202. Revie was to also acquire a reputation for astute 
financial management not just for the club but also himself, gaining him the unfortunate nickname of 
Don 'Readies'. In 1977 he dramatically resigned as England manager. Thinking that he would be 
sacked anyway he thought it would be best to jump before he was pushed and he secretly negotiated a 
coaching job in the United Arab Emirates. He announced his resignation in a daily tabloid, his letter 
of resignation followed the same morning. He was heavily criticised by the FA who banned him 
from football for 10 years, although this was later overturned in the High Court. Allegations over 
match-fixing were later unproven. Rogan, Football Managers, pp. 92-122 
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grow, and his success, or failure, became increasingly public. Whatever their impact, 
managers, it was deemed by directors, players and fans alike, mattered. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lingering belief that outstanding deeds on the field automatically confer on a 
retired player the gifts of motivation, inspiration and a deep understanding of the 
human psyche gets less credible as the financial side of the game becomes 
increasingly tied up with big business. 
David Lacey, Guardian (Sport), 12 February 2000, p. 2 
357 
In many quarters (including sport itself) there has been a widespread belief that 
football, and sport in general, are somehow autonomous from the rest of society, 
and, as a result, not a serious subject for academic study. 1 One of the major 
objectives of this thesis has been to confront these attitudes and demonstrate how a 
history of the football manager has reflected both social changes and continuities. No 
study of a particular occupation can ever provide a complete history of its 
development and the broader social and economic environment within which it 
operates. Nevertheless, by filling a gap in football's historiography this thesis 
provides a number of insights. It not only charts the development of management 
within British industry in general from the 1880s up to the 1960s but it also locates 
the history of football within the wider debates of social, economic and cultural 
history. As well as summarise the findings of this thesis, the conclusion will also 
include a short postscript that will try and outline how football management and the 
role of the manager have developed since the 1960s. 
One of the two main ideas that has emerged has been that football 
management has largely reflected the practical tradition of British industrial 
management as a whole. Football clubs, like most British firms have been small 
organisations, and managers have been employed more for their experience rather 
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than any training they have undertaken or theoretical qualifications gained. During 
the twentieth century, management in general became increasingly professionalised as 
emerging corporations demanded a more sophisticated approach to administrative 
affairs. However, it has been within a society divided by class, and the consciousness 
of its distinctions that a tradition of British management has emerged in which the 
ideas of gentlemen amateurs and practical men have persisted. A minority of 
managers did have middle-class backgrounds and attended public or grammar schools 
but most of them came through the apprenticeship system or via promotion from the 
shopfloor. These managers were trained in the gathering of knowledge by learning on 
the job rather than through any formal training or academic study. This was 
supplemented by the attitudes of employers who mainly ran small firms and were 
reluctant to employ professional managers. 
Despite a gradual growth in professionalistion, management has been at the 
centre of debates concerning British economic performance up to the Sixties, and it 
can be argued that football management has not escaped these criticisms. Britain's 
supposed economic 'decline' has provided a rich polemical source for economic 
historians. Barry Supple, for example, has argued that any decline has been relative 
rather than absolute as the British economy from the mid-nineteenth century has 
maintained a steady growth rate of about 2 per cent. Notions of decline therefore, 
owe more to perception than reality? One of the most famous 'declinist' theses was 
put forward by Martin Wiener who argued that Britain had suffered from a loss of 
lL. Allison, 'The Changing Context of Sporting Life' in L. Allison (ed.), The Changing Politics of 
Sport (Manchester, 1993), pp. 5-6 
28. Supple, 'Fear of Falling: Economic History and the Decline of Britain', Economic History 
Review, Vol. XLVII, 3 (August 1994), pp. 441-58 
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'industrial spirit' since the 1850s due to the ambiguous attitudes which the social 
elite held towards industrialism and hence, management. These attitudes were formed 
from the elite's prevailing cultural values that permeated down through the rest of 
society. One result was that the boardrooms of companies were filled by educated 
young men who held anti-business values, what Wiener refers to as the gentrification 
of the industrialist.3 Harold Perkin however, has responded that the old aristocracy 
was not anti-industrial and was gradually replaced by a professional class in which 
company directors formed the new aristocracy.4 English culture, argues David 
Coates, has been a social product linked to class power. As a result, this has created 
English 'peculiarities', such as the persistence of the values of paternalism, within 
the modern United Kingdom through the continuity of a sensitivity to class and 
status that stems from its pre-industrial hierarchical society.s Rather than being 
influenced by cultural values or being anti-business, employers preferred to retain 
control over the firm's direction. And when they did employ professional managers, 
they eschewed managerial training for them, preferring to mould them in the ways of 
the company. Football managers have evolved from this same practical tradition. 
They have mainly been former players working-class, men who had little, if any, 
secondary education, and whose playing ability, rather than potential management 
qualities, was the main criteria for their selection. 
Football management shared similarities with the traditions of management 
generally but it was also shaped by its own peculiar context, and this had 
3M. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline o/the Industrial Spirit 1850-1980 (1981), pp. ix-24 
4perkin, Professional Society, pp. 374-75 
5D. Coates, The Question otUK Decline: The Economy, State and Society (1994), p. 149 
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implications for the development of the manager's role. During the late nineteenth 
century, football had been part of the commercialisation of leisure. Other sports such 
as boxing, cricket and horse racing were also part of this process that had been made 
possible partly by the increase in the spending power of the working-classes and the 
expansion of the railway network. In one sense, football has changed little. It was, 
and continues to be, an unusual business where the game revolves around two 
opposing sets of players who have the same objectives: scoring goals at one end 
while keeping them out at the other. And although the aim is to win, in order to 
equalise competition and attract supporters, the outcome of games must retain an 
element of uncertainty. By the 1890s football had established itself as the most 
popular sport; filling the demands of working class men for escapism and glamour on 
a Saturday afternoon. Early football clubs had resembled voluntary organisations and 
had conducted their management through elected committees. Later, as their financial 
responsibilities increased, clubs formed themselves into limited liability companies, 
run by boards of directors but as football clubs remained small organisations 
throughout this period, they were usually dominated by powerful personalities, 
unwilling to relinquish the reins of power. In addition, there were also other external 
factors that framed their management. The maximum wage and retain and transfer 
system, for example, maintained a certain equality amongst clubs and inhibited the 
need for investing in managerial talent. Long-running tensions in the governance of 
the game between its amateur ethos and a fledgling professionalism also created a 
resistance to managerial developments as there were no payments for directorates 
and only limited share dividends. 
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Changes in football management therefore, were slow and it inherited much 
from its Victorian origins. Yet as the period wore on, the role of managers became 
increasingly prominent. This was partly contingent on the environment in which 
football developed, particularly due to the nature and intensity of its competition, 
the growing media interest and the increased financial costs. Of equal importance 
were the personal relationships that forged an individual club's management culture. 
During the nineteenth century the workload of directors increased and they devolved 
more duties to secretaries who took on more responsibility including that for team 
affairs. Managers and secretary-managers would become increasingly accountable for 
the performance of the team, although real power remained very much in the hands 
of the board. Even during the inter-War period, change was slow with only Herbert 
Chapman and a few others really having an idea of what football management 
entailed. 
Up until the 1960s, football had had few leisure rivals to challenge its 
position. But in the Fifties other leisure alternatives had emerged, with much of these 
centred around the home either through DIY or watching television. Attendances fell 
and football clubs were placed under greater financial pressure, although smaller clubs 
suffered most. They now had to improve their product, possibly by having a 
winning team or one that played attractive football, to attract fans whereas before 
their audience had been a relatively captive one. The role of the manager increased in 
importance as directors began to realise, albeit slowly, that their own knowledge of 
the game was limited and management required greater expertise. And with the 
increasingly cut-throat competition, they wanted someone to blame for failure. By 
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the Sixties, football management had undergone a process of rationalisation, albeit a 
gradual and uneven one, with tasks, such as selecting the team and deciding the 
tactics, increasingly placed in the hands of the manager. 
Despite the increase in expertise, football management offers insights into 
seemingly contradictory aspects of British management. On the one hand, football 
management quickly established itself as a meritocracy. In this sense, it has been in 
the vanguard of managerial capitalism, driven by a combination of commercialisation 
and increasing competitiveness, resulting in the best managers being recruited by the 
biggest clubs. Whereas the boardrooms of major companies had been dominated by 
family members well into the 1960s, there has been little nepotism in football as 
ability has usually been the over-riding factor in club appointments. On the other, 
these meritocratic tendencies were still accompanied by the lack of any tradition of 
preparation for the job, and the absence of a screening process. To talk in terms of 
football management as a profession, similar to that of lawyers or GPs, would be 
incorrect. However, in the wider world, football managers have represented an 
example of late twentieth century social mobility. To a certain extent they have 
always been engaged in a struggle for social status, and have wanted to move away 
from their working-class roots. They have reflected a growing meritocratic society as 
more and more people have occupied what were thought of as traditional middle-
class jobs and where income has come to defme status. Football managers therefore, 
acted like professionals, shared a similar status and lifestyle but, in theory, were not 
formally qualified to deserve the distinction. 
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The second main idea of the thesis, and from the point of view of the social 
historian, one of the most important insights to be gained from a study of football 
management, is how it has mirrored attitudes and methods of handling groups of 
young working-class men in general. Football managers, for example, have imposed 
their authority over players in a manner not dissimilar to Army NCOs and other 
male authority figures. In other sports, social relationships have also provided the 
background for labour management methods. Horse-racing, for example, still exhibits 
strict feudal and 'squirearchical' overtones where racecourse officials are deferentially 
addressed as 'sir' by jockeys. Cricket's model of management has revolved around 
the team captain. Through the nature of their position, captains have been aloof 
figures, and for many decades at Test level, England captains had to be amateurs 
which meant appointment from the middle-classes. It was not until 1952 that a 
working-class professional, Len Hutton, was appointed as captain of the England 
team. The cricket captain's job was similar to that of a player-manager with 
responsibility for team discipline and tactics. Former England captain Mike Brearley 
has stated that part of the job's make-up is epitomised by 'the image of a traditional 
Sergeant-Major' where at 'some point, consultation, delicacy of feeling, weighing-up 
of pros and cons need to give way to orders, bluntness, decisiveness' .6 
During this period, football management typified the division of workplace 
relations on class and hierarchical lines, and owed much to its Victorian legacy . Yet 
changes did take place, noticeably that of a closer relationship between management 
and players as the role of the manager evolved. Despite this development, the 
6M. Brearley, The Art o/Captaincy (1985), pp. 263-64. Recent studies of successful managers in 
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relationship remained an essentially authoritarian one where managers demanded 
obedience from players, some in a manner not dissimilar to a Sergeant-Major, others 
via more subtle methods but nonetheless all relying on traditional ideas of 
masculinity to enforce their authority. Initially, the directors, as well as picking the 
team, dealt with the players on disciplinary matters, leaving the trainer to keep an 
eye on them on a day-to-day basis with the secretary looking after administrative 
matters. As more secretary-managers and managers were appointed, they became 
more responsible for the players' supervision and welfare but kept their distance 
from them and identified more with the directors. It was Herbert Chapman, long 
before others, who realised that a closer relationship between manager and players 
could be beneficial. After 1945 there was a decline in deference and a few more 
managers began to realise that it was important to foster good relations with the 
players. Because of their lack of training however, ideas for handling footballers 
owed much to their life experience (many had been in the armed forces) and were 
grafted on to a quasi-military model. Managers needed to be strong, charismatic 
personalities to keep the players, young working-class men, in check. This culture 
has perpetuated itself, and passed down through the generations as players who have 
gone on to become managers have known little else about the job save what they 
experienced as a player. 
We shall now briefly look at how the role of the manager has developed since 
the Sixties. There have been signs that the manager has gradually moved up from the 
ranks of the NCO to the Officer class as some successful managers like Matt Bus by, 
business have also suggested that 'macho' qualities are a necessary part of the job. Independent, 6 
January 1999, p. 4 
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Alex Ferguson and Bobby Robson, have been awarded Knighthoods. At the same 
time, recent football managers share many similarities with their predecessors. 
During the last twenty years, much of the amateurism that has pervaded football 
management has been replaced by a commercially driven professionalism. In the 
process, the role of the manager has become more narrowly defined. During the 
1990s the game experienced unprecedented commercialisation. A number of football 
clubs adopted PLC status, while directors are now paid for their services. The 
establishment of the Premier League in 1992 heralded an age of television 
sponsorship, particularly by BSkyB. Following the Taylor Report, post-
Hillsborough, all-seater stadiums replaced those from the early twentieth century in 
order to attract newly affluent fans as the game increasingly, with much hyperbole, 
has presented itself as a branch of the entertainment industry. 
With this new affluence, the wages of players have escalated dramatically and 
this has placed a greater emphasis on management skills. It was probably during the 
Seventies and Eighties that managers reached the height of their powers, running the 
club from top to bottom. Since then however, there has been a move towards greater 
specialisation with tasks being split up and devolved to experts in various fields. 
Football clubs have gradually delegated their financial affairs, public relations and 
marketing, for example, to experts, leaving only the preparation of the team to the 
manager. Clubs now also employ a variety of assistants who help with players' 
fitness, diet and mental attitude. Specialist coaches and psychologists are 
commonplace at the bigger clubs and managers have been compelled to delegate 
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more.
7 During his long managerial career Jim Smith has noted how his job has 
changed, 
I used to be completely 'hands on' but that's not really possible in the Premiership. 
I've got a good coach and then there are your masseurs and your fitness coaches. At 
one time, your players just ran round a pitch, had a pie and chips and played. But 
because of the money involved in staying in the Premiership, we have to do 
everything possible to prepare players properly.8 
Because they have become expensive assets and are no longer tied to a club under the 
retain and transfer system, greater tolerance has been required of wayward players 
(and their agents). Thus, different approaches to man-management have emerged due 
to a growing shift in the balance of power towards the players. Any developments 
however, have merged with older notions and models of who is in charge. Moreover, 
whereas some managers have adopted subtler and more scientific methods to the 
management of footballers, others have continued to act like quasi N COs using their 
personalities to dominate players. 
In addition to developments in the technical role of managers, there has been a 
corresponding rise in their media profile, and, as a result, their perceived importance 
and status. Moreover, since the 1960s football has gradually overtaken cricket as the 
English sport that carries the most cultural significance and meaning.9 Saturation 
television coverage has been supplemented by an expansion in newspaper reporting 
as well as the internet, where there is a constant demand for news and gossip. Radio 
phone-ins also give fans the opportunity to vent their frustrations, much of it 
7Under Sven-Goran Eriksson, England have employed the Norwegian, Professor Willi Railo, 
regarded as the most eminent sports psychologist in Europe. Guardian (Sport), 21 May 2001, p. 14. 
8 Independent on Sunday (Section 2), 22 November 1998, p. 7 
9R. Holt and T. Mason, Sport in Britain J 945-2000 (Oxford, 2000), p. 171 
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directed towards the managers, all adding to the media frenzy. The institutionalised 
nature of the relationship between the manager and the media has been one of the 
recurring themes of this thesis, and through the medium of television this relationship 
has become closer still. 
The 'tabliodisation' or 'dumbing down' of the British media has created a 
need for instantaneous news and gossip, something that the press conferences of 
managers can deliver, no matter how inanely. It has created a cult of personality 
around managers where the ability to deliver sharp one-liners, give 'good interviews' 
and play 'verbal tennis' withjoumalists is seen as important as their tactical acumen. 
This has been further enhanced by their own charismatic, masculine personalities 
which appeals to many male working-class fans, as it is they who most identify with 
managers. And because of their own background, they are more likely to demand 
'passion' from managers rather than acknowledge the importance of training or 
qualifications for the job. A mystique, and a mystery, has continued to grow around 
them as no-one really knows what they do. Consequently, managers have become 
emblematic figureheads for their clubs and, as the media's first point of contact, it is 
unsurprising that they are identified with performances on the field. Frequent media 
appearances, therefore, either through interviews or as pundits, seemingly give them, 
as celebrities, an air of authority. The position of the manager however, has become 
increasingly paradoxical. On one hand, they are lauded by the media and fans alike as 
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saviours, or in some cases 'Messiahs', who can turn round the fortunes of their 
clubs; on the other, football managers have never been sacked more frequently. 10 
As the demands of the job have increased so has their fear of failure and 
stress levels. Not only are they under more pressure to succeed but managers are 
usually workaholics, addicted to the job. They have little time for a family life and 
any holidays can only be taken during the close season. Crewe's manager, Dario 
Gradi, claims that during the season he works between 70 and 80 hours, 7 days a 
week, and that in 2001 he did not take a day off. 11 It is this type of lifestyle that can 
affect their health. In 2001, for example, Liverpool manager Gerard Houllier was 
rushed to hospital during half-time in a game against Leeds where he had a major 
heart operation and took five months to recuperate. 12 
The job however, does have its compensations. As they have become part of 
the professional classes, top football managers have come to be paid salaries that 
compare with those of top executives. Alex Ferguson, for example, signed a contract 
for an annual salary worth £ 1.5 million in 1999. Other Premiership managers can also 
expect to earn in excess of £500,000 per year. In the lower divisions however, and 
reflecting football's meritocracy, salaries are considerably less, averaging between 
£40,000 and £100,000. In 1998 the highest paid manager in the Third Division earned 
10 In 2001-02 there were a total of 57 managers sacked out of the 92 League clubs. Observer Sports 
Magazine, 6 October 2002 
I I Observer Sports Magazine, 6 October 2002. Managers in general today have succumbed to a 'long 
hours' culture with 77 per cent exceeding their contracted hours, 54 per cent working in the evenings 
and 34 per cent working at weekends. Many also believe that their relationships plus their health have 
been put under strain as a result. Observer (Business), 4 October 1998, p. VIII 
120bserver Sports Magazine, 6 October 2002. For a game in the 2001-02 season, two managers, 
Sam Allardyce of Bolton and Dave Bassett of Leicester had their hearts monitored. During the match, 
Allardyce's beat rate increased from 46 per minute to 160 while Bassett's heart muscles at one stage 
contracted ominously. ibid. 
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£40,000 but still comparable with other professionals such as university 
professors. 13 
In order to meet greater competition and rising demands, clubs have cast their 
nets further to find the manager who will improve their fortunes. The Bosman ruling 
not only brought an influx of foreign players but now foreign managers and coaches 
are a feature of English football. This recent influx of foreign coaches has suggested a 
number of other ways in which the football manager's job and position has 
changed. 14 First, it has reflected the emergence of a knowledge-based economy and 
the subsequent increase in the global migration of human capital. As a result, it has 
highlighted the shortcomings of the culture of British football management. It is not 
13Guardian, 8 October 1998, p. 21, 5 May 1999, p. 32. Football managers salaries also compare 
favourably with senior politicians. The Prime Minister, for example, draws a salary of £ 163,418 
while other members of the cabinet are paid between £99,793 to £117,979. Guardian, 12 June 2001, 
p. 1. In 2000 over 110 business executives received salaries in excess of £ 1 million, earning around 
24 times more than the average manufacturing employee, although in football it is often the managers 
who are trying to maintain parity with the workers. Guardian, 22, p. 26, 23 August 2000, p. 27 
14Scottish football has also seen the rise of the foreign born manager. The question of who the first 
foreign manager was depends on the definition of a manager and what is meant by being foreign. For 
example, it can be argued that the Sunderland treasurer in the 1880s and 1890s, Samuel Tyzack was 
the first. He was born and brought up in Australia, although like other parts of the world it was under 
British colonial rule at the time. Using material from the Breedon Book of Football Managers there 
were, up to 1993, 16 managers born outside the British Isles. Note that managers from the Republic 
ofIreland have been excluded from this brief survey (not to mention those from Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland) due to the complex historical relationship between Britain and Ireland. Furthermore, 
some English managers were born outside these shores such as Jack Butler (Sri Lanka), Leslie 
McDowall (India), Charlie Mitten (Burma), Dario Gradi (Milan), Terry Butcher (Singapore) and 
Percy MacKrill, Frank Osbourne and Ed Stein (South Africa). (Stein was also the first black manager 
of a Football League club, although the first manager to come from the ethnic minorities seems to 
have been Frank Soo who managed Scunthorpe between 1959 and 1960). Others were also products 
of the Empire, particular South Africa such as Eddie Firmani, Gordon Hodgson and Peter Hauser. 
Firmani was connected as a player and manager with Charlton either side of South Africa's 
conversion to a republic in 1961. Earlier, Hodgson had won caps playing for England. The first 
manager from outside the British Isles and with no Imperial connection was Bert Trautmann whose 
circumstances admittedly, were very exceptional as he had been a German POW who went on to play 
for Manchester City. He was briefly manager of Stockport County from 1965 to 1966. Trautmann 
had been 'assimilated' into English football just as the next one was, the Uruguayan, Danny 
Bergera. Other managers that had been assimilated up to 1993 include Ossie Ardilles and Ivan Golac. 
The first foreign manager with no previous connection with English football therefore, was the 
Czech, Josef Venglos at Aston Villa in 1990. Later, foreign managers such as Gianluca Vialli, Ruud 
Guillit and Jan Molby have been assimilated as they played for English clubs. Some managers 
however, such as Arsene Wenger, Gerard Houllier, Jean Tigana, Claudio Ranieri and Christian Gross, 
have come into the English game with no previous experience. In Scotland, Celtic and Rangers have 
also hired 'non-assimilated' foreign coaches in Wim Jansen and Dick Advocaat respectively whilst in 
2002 the German, Bertie Vogts was appointed manager of the national team. 
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that England does not produce good, intelligent football managers, it is just that, as 
with its counterpart in business, the British way has been inefficient, and the number 
of competent managers is fewer. By contrast, modern foreign coaches have 
undergone an educational and screening process through the acquisition of 
professional qualifications. These have represented a licence, and have prevented 
clubs in Germany and Italy, for example, from employing who they liked as 
managers. In Britain it is the clubs who are allowed to decide who they want as 
manager. As a result, there seems to be a high level of wastage in terms of managers 
being hired and fired. 
This volatility of employment is not solely a characteristic of football 
managers as pressures on managers have increased across society and the economy. 
In addition to politicians, leading figures in the management of public institutions like 
the National Theatre, not to mention the Millennium Dome, have been placed under 
great scrutiny. Moreover, during the 1980s Thatcherite neo-liberal policies, in their 
quest to create competition, extended meritocratic ideals and the growing cult of 
managerial ism to the public sector as the performances of hospitals and schools were 
subjected to football-style league tables. 
Assessing the quality of English football management however, is 
problematic. It would be difficult to construct an argument that English football is in 
decline because of the failings of its management in the context of the current 
popularity and profitability of the Premier League. Even for the underachieving 
England team it is hard to blame previous managers without taking into account other 
mitigating factors such as how the priorities of the clubs have historically taken 
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precedence over those of the national team. It can be argued however, that there are 
deep-rooted factors behind the apparent failure of the national team, and that the lack 
of training and sub-standard education that English managers have received is one of 
the most important. In one sense therefore, the appointment of the Swede, Sven-
Goran Eriksson, as England manager echoes Malcolm X's notorious comment on the 
assassination of John F. Kennedy that 'the chickens have come home to roost':s 
Moreover, in contrast to the likes of Jimmy Hogan who exported British ideas on 
how to play football to Europe, Britain now exports few managers abroad. I6 The 
traditions of football management are also a reflection on the English education 
system that has traditionally been based on class lines. The education of the 
working-classes has been of a lower quality than that of other classes, and with 
football management becoming more demanding, it has required a greater level of 
human capital. 
English football has started to try and make up the gap between itself and its 
European competitors in terms of the training and quality of its managers and new 
managers will require an FA approved formal qualification by 2003. In this sense, 
football managers will be joining the ranks of other professions such as doctors, 
lawyers and teachers where qualifications are obtained and standards can be 
measured, guaranteeing a certain level of competence and a feeling of commitment to 
I SIt may be more than a coincidence that Eriksson's appointment was secured by the then FA's chief 
executive, Adam Crozier, who is Scottish by birth and had a background outside football, with the 
advertising company Saatchi and Saatchi. Thus, perhaps bringing a different perspective to English 
football. 
I6Two of the most recent exceptions have been Bobby Robson and Terry Venables (see Chapters 5 
and 6 for earlier examples). Others include John Toshack and Roy Hodgson. One ex-pat, Clive 
Charles who coaches in the USA, attributes his success to not beginning his coaching career in 
England. Perhaps the stunted development of US soccer can be partly attributed to their over-reliance 
on English coaches during the 1970s. When Saturday Comes, March 2000, pp. 22-23 
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the job. 17 Furthermore, it can be argued that there have been improvements in the 
quality of managers since 1945. On a national level, for example, the Butler 
Education Act of 1944 provided a secondary education for every child. Yet, it is still 
claimed that UK managers are the worst educated and trained in the developed 
world. I8 In 1997 only 24 per cent of managers and employers held degrees with 
nearly one fifth holding just GCSE grades D-G or no qualifications at all. In 
comparison, two-thirds of all professionals hold university degrees. I9 However, 
there has been an increasing awareness of the need to provide better training for 
football managers together with a growing input from academics not only on 
management but also about the governance of football, and especially in the area of 
sports science.2o This development has been echoed in other areas of public life. 
Even the government has established a Centre for Management and Policy Studies to 
train senior ministers and civil servants.21 
Nor is it just football where foreign managers and coaches have been 
employed that implies a certain deficiency in home-grown methods. In 2000, for 
example, there was not one British coach in Rugby League's Super League: all were 
either from Australia or New Zealand. The Rugby Football League also wanted to 
recruit an Australian as national coach?2 In addition, the RFL' s executive director, 
Greg McCallum is an Australian. Similarly, in Rugby Union the British Lions 
17 Guardian, 28 March 2000, p. 34 
I8Guardian (Jobs and Money), 20 May 2000, p. 33 
19 Observer (Business), 12 July 1998, p. I 
20There are at least three English football managers with degrees: Howard Wilkinson (PE), Steve 
Coppell (Economics), Lawrie Sanchez (Business Management). 
21Guardian (Jobs and Money), 6 May 2000, p. 29 
22Guardian, 14 July, p. 31; 16 August 2000, p. 28 
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appointed the New Zealander, Graham Henry, already in charge of Wales, as coach 
for the tour to Australia in 2001. Interestingly, the new breed of professional rugby 
union clubs have followed soccer by appointing famous players as coaches. Leicester 
appointed former player Dean Richards and at Newcastle, the former England fly-
half, Rob Andrew was initially the club's player-coach. But some clubs promoted 
foreign players as coaches such as the South African, Francois Pienaar at Saracens 
and Phillipe Saint-Andre of France at Gloucester.23 Again, rugby does not have any 
licensing system for its coaches and clubs are able to select who they want. 
This has also applied to cricket whose counties have also begun to employ 
foreign coaches. The New Zealander John Bracewell, for example, has enjoyed 
success at Gloucestershire. Furthermore, the former Glamorgan coach Duncan 
Fletcher of Zimbabwe was appointed England coach in 2000. Other sports have also 
looked abroad for greater expertise. Swimming, for example, has recruited the 
Australian Bill Sweetenham as its National Performance Director;24 Chris McSorley, 
the national team coach of the British ice hockey team is a Canadian; the national 
rowing coach Jurgen Grobler is a former product of the East German coaching 
structure; the Hungarian, Laszlo Nemeth coaches the English basketball team; and 
even the most socially exclusive of English sports, tennis, has hired a Frenchman, 
Patrice Hagelauer, as its Performance Director. 25 
23 Observer (Sport), 22 February 1998, p. 2 
240ne of his first tasks has been to throw out the sport's existing qualifications, impose new ones 
and make every coach re-sit the exams for these every four years. The Times (Sport), 19 June 2001, 
p. 5 
25 Guardian, 1 November 2000, p. 34 
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Some of the antediluvian attitudes of British sport have their source at an 
administrative level. British sports have traditionally been run by men from upper-
and middle-class backgrounds who, because Britain invented most modern sports, 
have tried to uphold their traditional voluntarist amateur ideals. Furthermore, the 
labyrinthine structure of many sporting bodies built on the committee system has 
meant that any change was slow. This has engendered a feeling that even if British 
was not best anymore on the field then it knew best off it. The persistence of this 
attitude has been exposed on an international level where British sports 
administrators have had little idea of the global changes in their sports and their 
impact on the domestic scene.26 Within FIF A, for example, British football officials 
are seen as arrogant and out of touch. This is partly a result of the home nations' 
permanent representation on the rules committee and also of an agreement in 1946 
that automatically gave them a vice-President.27 Because cricket was a game exported 
to the Empire, English administrators have been regarded by the International Cricket 
Council as embittered former masters with a 'chip on their shoulder'. Consequently, 
many sports have moved their international headquarters from Britain to other 
. 28 
countnes. 
Arguments over the quality of management can be extended to the coaching 
culture within English football and its impact on the development of young players. 
The question of who coaches young players is an important one for the future of the 
26Much of this next section is based on On The Line, BBC Radio 5 Live, 20 November 2000 
27Until 1946 British football had had a on-off relationship with FIF A. In 1928 all four nations 
withdrew over the issue of broken time payments to amateurs. As a result, it was not until 1950 that 
teams from Britain fIrst entered the World Cup. 
28For example, Track and Field Athletics has moved to Monaco; Fencing to Switzerland; Shooting 
to the USA; Motor Racing to Paris; and International Rugby to Ireland. 
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game. At the professional level, as we have seen, coaches tend to be former players 
who, even if qualified, do not have much of an educational background themselves.29 
English football therefore, has created a reproductive coaching culture that has 
stymied the progress of young footballers with its mistrust of intelligence and its 
commitment to the macho attitudes of 'getting stuck in'. Many managers and other 
figures in the game have pointed to the lack of 'natural talent' coming through as the 
main reason behind the falling standards of British footballers. It has been suggested 
that one reason for this decline was the disappearance of street football?O This is a 
fatuous and romanticised notion, mainly because even when street football remained 
feasible and popular, England teams have underperformed. Questions need to be 
directed at the footballing authorities asking why playing and coaching standards in 
Europe and other foreign countries have risen without a corresponding rise in Britain, 
rather than the harking back to supposedly better times. France had cited the same 
problem of a lack of street football as being responsible for a decline in its fortunes. 
Unlike England, once identified, the French Football Federation established a scheme 
for selecting and educating talented young players who were then based at a chateau 
in Clairefontaine.31 This apparent failure to raise standards in England has been 
supplemented by an historical resistance within the professional game itself that, 
partly due to the working-class background of its players and managers, has 
29See Parker, 'Big Time'. One exception to this rule is Steve Heighway, now in charge of 
Liverpool's successful youth development programme, who gained a degree from the University of 
Warwick. 
30For example, The Times, 3 February 1997, p. 33; Independent on Sunday (Sport), 21 January 2001 
31Guardian (Jobs and Money) 26 August 2000, p. 17; Guardian (Sport), 2 September 2000, p. 2. 
The English FA has recently announced plans to begin a similar scheme on a site near Burton-on-
Trent, Staffs. 
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displayed an anti-intellectualism together with a prejudice against working on 
technique and skills.32 
So what of the future for football management? How will the role of the 
manager change? Because of the game's present rampant commercialisation, it is 
likely that in terms of the structure of a club's organisation, the role of the manager 
will become increasingly specialised, and comparable to a head coach in European 
football clubs and American sports franchises. With clubs employing expert coaches, 
his actual tasks will probably be reduced to not much more than picking the team, 
co-ordinating the staff attached to the players and using his powers of motivation to 
inspire them. In England, managers will probably be better trained and qualified as 
clubs, especially those that are PLCs, will demand candidates with the evidence of 
proven ability. How many will actually be English remains to be seen. With a more 
narrowly defined role, clubs may feel that in an ever more frenetic search for the vital 
ingredient that makes for either success in Europe or survival in the Premier League, 
managers are more expendable. Yet they will probably remain authoritarian, at least 
in their outlook. Football clubs are still small businesses and the potential will still 
remain for a manager to bring success or failure through the force of his own 
personality. 
32L. Allison, 'Why are we so Crap?', paper given at University of Leicester CRSS/Warwick Centre 
for the Study of Sport in Society Seminar, 5 December 2000 
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Appendix 1 
Aston Villa Balance Sheet, 1878-79 
Credit 
Members' Subscriptions 
Season Tickets 
Donation (HH Hartshorne esq.) 
Gate Takings 
Loans from members 
Sale of Fixture Cards 
20-08-00 
0-12-06 
1-01-00 
42-17-10 
8-10-00 
0-2-00 
73-11-10 
Audited and found correct, July 15 1879 
WG Sothers, Wm. Jones, Auditors 
Debit 
Loss on summer season (including sports) 
Rent ofField 
Printing 
Bill Posting 
Advertising 
Loans returned 
Subscriptions 
Hire of Room for Committee 
Umpire's expenses 
Gate Keepers 
Entertaining Sneinton Wanders and 
Glasgow, Queens Park 
Ground Improvements 
Stationery 
Footballs and repairs 
Sundries 
Loan to Cricket Club 
Cash in hand of Secretary 
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11-12-04 
11-15-00 
9-06-07 
2-03-01 
1-05-06 
8-10-00 
1-00-06 
2-03-06 
1-06-02 
1-17-00 
2-16-00 
~-12-03 
5-03-10 
2-06-06 
1-07-03 
5-00-00 
1-06-02 
73-11-10 
Source: Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 178, Saturday Night, 24 June 1893, 'The Early Days of Aston 
Villa' 
Appendix 2 
Aston Villa Balance Sheet, 1879-80 
Credit 
Cash in hand, season 1878-79 
Members' Subscriptions 
Special 
Season Tickets 
Gate Takings 
Donations: -
T. Bagnall 
C. Brockwell 
J. Hinks 
JC. Holder 
F. Johnstone 
W. McGregor 
W. Margoschis 
TW.Peart 
W. Quinsey 
T. Salt 
J. Taylor 
6-11-11 
38-15-00 
2-11-06 
4-15-00 
173-01-04 
0-10-00 
0-10-06 
1-00-00 
2-02-00 
0-10-00 
1-01-00 
1-01-00 
1-01-00 
1-01-00 
0-10-06 
0-10-06 
235-11-09 
Audited and found correct June 26 1880 
F. Johnstone, W. McGregor, Auditors 
Debit 
Loss on contest 13 Sep. 1879 
Loss on contest 17 May 1880 
Rent of Field 
Ground Improvements 
Gate Keeper and Policemen 
Hire of Tent 
Brass Checks 
Entel1ainment of opposing teams and rurnual 
dinner 
Gate Money divided 
Cricket and Football Materials 
Expenses of Professional Cricketer 
Gratuities to disabled players 
Expenses of Team at out matches 
Expenses of Training for Cup ties 
Printing 
Bill Posting 
Advertising 
Stationery 
Postages and Telegran1s 
Subscriptions 
Hire of Committee Room 
Expenses arranging matches and attending 
Staff Association Meetings 
Sundries 
Cash in hand 
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16-00-09 
3-12-09 
20-00-00 
20-02-06 
3-17-00 
1-04-06 
1-05-00 
15-08-06 
37-13-00 
17-10-07 
2-00-00 
6-05-00 
16-16-04 
3-05-03 
18-08-06 
4-14-06 
6-17-06 
3-18-00 
8-13-06 
2-06-06 
2-17-00 
3-05-04 
0-06-06 
19-03-02 
235-11-09 
Source: Osbourne Newscuttings, p. 180, Saturday Night, 5 July 1893, 'The Early Days of Aston Villa' 
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Appendix 3 
Aston Villa Balance Sheet 1897 
Cr. Dr 
£-s-d £-s-d £-s-d £-s-d 
Gate Money 10001-08-07 Wages, Transfers and 3999-10-07 
Commission paid to 
and for players 
Members' 268-16-06 Players' Bonuses for 621-07-06 
Subscriptions winning matches 
Season Tickets 191-02-00 Match Expenses 
Rents 349-05-03 inc. travelling, training 1215-04-11 
and hotel expenses 
gatekeepers and 218-02-04 
Groundsmen 
1215-04-11 
Gate money paid away 1659-09-09 
Printing and similar 219-07-10 
expenses 
General Expenses 
Rent, Rates and taxes 472-15-11 
of ground 
Ground Maintenance 65-02-01 
Cost of Club house 148-08-05 
Secretary and 258-11-08 
Assistant's Salaries 
10935-02-01 10935-02-01 
Source: Sport Argus (Birmingham), 19 June 1897, p. 3 
Appendix 4 
Aston Villa Balance Sheet and Statement of Accounts, 1907 
Dr. 
Players' Wages and 
Transfers 
Match Expenses, viz -
Travelling, Training and 
Hotel Expenses 
Gate Keepers and Police 
Trainers' Wages 
Referees and Linesman 
Doctors' Fees 
Footballs, Jerseys, Boots, 
and Sundries 
Posting, Advertising and 
Printing inc. cost of 
Villa News 
Less of Villa News and 
Advertisements 
General Expenses viz 
Rents, Rates, Ta'(es, inc. 
Electric Light, Coal, 
Water and Insurance 
Ground Maintenance 
Secretary's and 
Assistant's Salaries 
Donations 
Postages and Telegrams 
Medals for Players, and 
Cups and Medals for 
Junior Organisations 
Audit Fee 
Association and League 
Fees 
Sundry Expenses and 
Petty Payments 
Balance, being excess of 
Income over Expenditure 
Income and Expenditure Account 
Cr. 
£-s-d 
1709-19-10 
695-08-08 
273-00-00 
133-05-05 
151-10-03 
84-03-00 
1010-09-09 
550-04-01 
736-02-01 
624-17-02 
474-18-08 
205-11-05 
44-18-05 
73-12-00 
26-05-00 
16-01-00 
30-09-05 
£-s-d i-sOd 
Gate Money 
6782-05-11 received 
Less paid 
away 
15692-08-04 
3328-18-01 
Rents (Sub-lets) 
Season Tickets and 
Members' 
Subscriptions 
Share Transfer Fees 
and Sundry Receipts 
Interest allowed by 
Bank 
Interest on Investment 
3047-07-02 
460-05-08 
2232-15-02 
1274-10-00 
£13797-03-11 
380 
i-sOd 
12363-10-03 
401-19-01 
839-09-06 
3-19-00 
40-05-08 
148-00-05 
£13797-03-11 
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Balance Sheet, 1907 
Liabilities Assets 
Registered Capital 10000-00-00 Sundry Debtors 277-03-0X 
called up viz. Cash at London City 
£5 per share on and Midland Bank 2558-06-00 
1953 Share of £5 Ground Fixtures, 
each Capital Fittings etc. Total cost 22376-01-09 
Sundry Creditors inc. additions 
Reserve Less Sales (Ll97) and 8294-03-03 
Revenue Account Depreciation 14081-18-06 
Balance brought 
forward from last Investment viz. 
account 10283-13-05 Birmingham 
Less Dividend paid Corporation 3 per cent 987-11-00 
30 June 1906:- Stock (£1000) cost 
488-5-0 Midland Railway 2 Y2 
Depreciation per cent. Perpetual 778-00-06 
written otT Ground Preference Stock 
and Transfer to (£ 1000) cost 
Reserve:- 4466-07-00 London & North 
3978-2-0 Western Railway 4 per 999-02-06 
5817-06-05 cent. Pref. Stock 
Add Excess of (£800) cost 
Income over Great Northern 
Expenditure for the 1274-10-02 Railway 4 per cent. 989-19-06 
12 months Pref. Stock (£820) 
cost 
Lancashire and 
Yorkshire Railway 3 1213-08-06 
percent. Debentures 
(1300) cost 
Sport and Play Ltd 10 10-00-00 
shares of £ 1 each cost 
7091-16-05 4978-02-00 
21895-10-02 21895-10-02 
Source: Aston Villa News and Record, 3 August 1907, p. 9 
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Appendix 5 
Aston Villa Balance Sheet and Statement of Accounts, 1914 
Income and Expenditure Account for the year ended 31 May 1914 
Dr. Cr. 
£-s-d £-s-d £-s-d 
Player's Wages and Gate Money 21478-00-11 
Transfers 6726-18-03 received 
Match Expenses viz:- Less paid 3278-12-08 
Travelling, Training, and away 
Hotel Expenses 1863-07-00 18199-08-03 
Footballs, Jerseys, Boots Rent (sub-lets) 272-09-02 
and Sundries 81-08-03 Season tickets 
Trainers' Wages 273-00-00 and members' 
Gatekeepers and Police 673-18-11 subscriptions 1360-03-05 
Referees and Linesmen 132-18-11 Share transfer 
Doctors' Fees and fees 3-16-00 
Medicine 89-14-04 Interest on 
3114-07-05 Investments, 
less charged 
by Bank 143-13-10 
Sales of Villa 
News and 
Advertisement 819-19-03 
Less cost of 632-04-06 
production 
187-14-09 
Printing, Advertising and 
Printing 484-05-04 
General Expenses viz:-
Rates and Taxes (including 
Light, Coal, Water, and 
Insurance) 716-15-09 
Ground Maintenance 948-13-04 
Postages and Telegrams 78-16-10 
Association and League 
Fees 18-14-00 
Sundry Expenses and Petty 
Payments 40-13-10 
Secretary's and Assistant's 
Salaries 611-15-08 
Law and Accountants' 
Charges 27-16-06 
Donations (including £ 100 
to Duke of Westminster's 
Olympic Fund) 228-13-00 
Cups, Shields, Medals, etc. 
presented to players and 
sundry associations, and 
souvenirs to honorary 
officials, directors, and 
secretary in 
commemoration of winning 391-19-03 
the English Cup 3063-18-02 
Balance being excess of 
Income over Expenditure 
for the Year 6777-16-03 
20167-05-05 20167-05-05 
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Balance Sheet 31 May 1914 
Liabilities Assets 
i-sod i-sod i-sod i-sod 
Registered Capital Sundry debtors 1484-12-02 
10000-00-00 Cash at London City 
Capital called up and Midland Bank 
viz.:- Ltd 5011-02-00 
£5 per share on Ground Fixtures, 
1953 shares of£5 Fittings, Materials, 
each 9765-00-00 Tools, Office 
Sundry creditors 333-11-03 Furniture etc. 
Reserve 4978-02-00 Total cost, including 
Revenue Account:- additions 27166-19-05 
Balance brought Less Sales and 
forward from last Depreciation 16326-14-06 
account 14617-09-05 10840-04-11 
Less Dividend paid Freehold Land 11669-12 -11 
19 June 1913 Investments viz:-
488-05-00 Sp0l1 and Play Ltd-
Depreciation 10 fully paid-up 
written off ground shares of £ 1 each 
2000-00-00 cost 10-00-00 
2488-05-00 Birnlingham 
12129-04-05 Corporation - £ 1 000 
Add excess of 3 % stock cost 987-11-00 
income over Midland Railway -
expenditure for the 67716-03 2 Yc % Perpetual 
year 18907 -00-08 Preference Stock 
(£1000) cost 778-00-06 
London and 
North-Western 
Railway - 4% Pref. 
Stock (£800) cost 999-02-06 
Great Northern 
Railway - 4% Pre£ 
Stock (£820) cost 989-19-06 
Lancashire and 
Yorkshire Railway -
3% Debenture Stock 1213-08-06 
(£1300) cost 4978-02-00 
33983-13-11 33983-13-11 
Source: Aston Villa News and Record, 8 August 1914, pp. 662-63 
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Appendix 6 
Handbill Advertisement for Football Match 
BIRMINGHAM AND DISTRICT 
FOOTBALL 
ASSOCIATION 
SILVER CHALLENGE CUP 
ASTON UNITY 
v 
ASTON VILLA 
Lower Grounds, Feb. 10 (3-15 p.m.) 1883 
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This will be probably one of the most keenly contested matches of the series. The "Villa" met and 
defeated in the prior rounds Sutton Coldfield (5 to 0). Derby Midland (4 to 1). and Small Heath Swifts 
(21 to 0). "Unity" beat Wellington (4 to 0) and All Saints, Darlaston (6 to 0), having the "bye" in the 
third round. 
A. Matthews 
ASTON UNITY 
Goal T. Mason 
ASTON VILLA 
Goal 
J .R. Benson, Capt. 
E. Rogers 
} Backs J. Simmonds 
A. Harvey 
} Backs 
H. Pallett 
H. Upton 
J. Lloyd 
J. Green 
F. Dyer 
A. Heilbom 
J. Wilson 
H. Coley 
} 
} Half-Backs 
} 
} Right 
} Centre,F orwards 
}Left 
C. Apperley 
D. Anderson 
E. Davis 
H. Vaughton 
Archie Hunter, Capt. 
A. Brown 
O. Whateley 
Andy Hunter 
} Half-Backs 
} Left 
} Centre 
Forwards 
} Right 
Umpire, Mr J. Ford Umpire, Mr. W.B. Mason 
Referee - Mr. C. Crump, President Band D.F. Association 
ADMISSION SIXPENCE 
Reserved Ground or Stands, 6d. extra. Carriages - 2 wheel. Is. 6d.; 4-wheel, 2s. 6d. 
Persons on Horseback not Admitted. 
Source: Albion News, Vol. 14 (18), December 2nd 1922, p. 112 
(It will be noted that Aston Unity played three half-backs and five forwards, whereas Aston Villa had 
only two half-backs with six forwards.) 
Appendix 7 
'Scottish Element in English Association Football' 
CLUB 
Aston Villa 
Everton 
Bolton Wanderers 
West Bromwich Albion 
Liverpool 
Blackburn Rovers 
Sheffield United 
Sheffield Wednesday 
Sunderland 
Wolverhampton Wanderers 
Notts. County 
Nottingham Forest 
Derby County 
Bury 
Preston North End 
Stoke 
Estimate - Division 1 - 16 Clubs 
176 Players 
97 ofthem English 
NUMBER OF ENGLISH PLAYERS 
8 
2 
1 
11 
6 
7 
10 
7 
2 
10 
6 
9 
6 
5 
5 
2 
Source: Liverpool Review, 23 October 1897, p. 6 
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.~ 
TB Adams 
W. AlIt 
W. Blakemore 
J.1. Tate 
W. AlIt 
S. Craddock 
TBAdams 
W. Blakemore 
Registered Office:-
Appendix 8 
Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club 
Season 1892-3 
PRESIDENT 
Sir Alfred Hickman, M.P. 
VICE PRESIDENT 
Sir William Plowden, KC.S.1. 
DIRECTORS 
A. Hollingsworth, Chairman 
M. Bray 
S. Craddock 
C. Crump 
G.W. Walker 
PLAYERS' COMMITTEE 
L. Johnson, Chairman 
C. Forder 
J.J. Tate 
FINANCE COMMITTEE 
G.W. Walker, Chairman 
M. Bray 
B.B. Nock 
SECRETARY 
J .H. Addenbrooke 
C. Forder 
L. Johnson 
B.B. Nook 
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7, High Street, Wolverhampton 
Molineux House, Wolverhampton 
Source: Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club 
Appendix 9 
Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club 
Rules for Players 
Name: Mr c.P. Shinton, 18 Wanderers Avenue, Wolverhampton 
Rules 
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Framed by the Directors for the guidance of Players and issued subject to the Rules, Regulations and 
Bye-laws of the Football Association. 
Season 1914-1915 
1. Each player will be provided with the necessary Football outfit for which he must account to the 
Secretary on May 1 st 1915 or at any other period as may be desired. Each player is required to take due 
care of his outfit and will be required to see that the stops on his boots are according to the regulations 
of the Football Association, and any player being sent off the field by the referee for any infringement 
of these regulations will be suspended for one week. 
2. Instructions for Training for each week during the Season will be posted in the Dressing Room on 
the Thursday previous to the Monday, on which day in each week the Training will commence. 
3. No player will be exempt from any of these instructions, except through inability (to substantiate 
which he must produce a certificate from the Club's Medical Adviser), or by special permission of the 
Team Committee, which will only be granted when the player follows bonafide weekly employment, 
in which case he must attend at Molineux Grounds at 7 p.m. on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday in 
each week, and train as instructed by the Trainer. It must be understood that the latter part of this rule 
will not apply when the Team is required to go into strict Training for any period fixed by the Directors, 
in which event every player named in the list, which will be posted in the Dressing Room, must be 
present for each day at the time detailed in the rota for the week or weeks fixed for such strict Training. 
4. Every player must start promptly and complete the work set for him to do each day which is specified 
on the weekly Training List. Any player not complying with this rule will not be allowed meals (when 
provided), will forfeit a day's wages, and be liable to suspension, as the Team Committee or Directors 
may determine. 
5. On each Training Day after the completion of the allotted work, every player must sign his name in 
the Training Book kept for the purpose in the Dressing Room. 
6. Any player who is chosen to play in any Match or elected on reserve, can only be excused from 
playing by producing on the day preceding, or morning of the Match, a certificate from Dr J.A. 
Wolverson, 6 Tettenhall Road, the appointed Medical Adviser to the Club. 
N.B.- When the Match is played away from home the certificate must be produced on the morning of 
the day preceding the Match. 
7. The players, while playing in all Matches, must obey all orders and instructions given to them by the 
Captain of the Team, and the Captain shall repOli any refusal to obey such orders or instructions, and 
any player offending will be dealt with as the Team Committee may determine. 
8. Players must respect the decisions of referees. All appeals against the decision of a referee must come 
through the Captain. This rule does not prevent players individually claiming for fouls, etc. 
9. The superintendance of the Reserve Team has been placed in the hands of Mr. Dallard, and all 
players in Reserve Team Matches must strictly obey his orders in all respects, both before and after the 
Matches. In case Mr. Dallard shall report any disobedience, the player offending will be dealt with as 
the Team Committee or Directors may determine. 
10. Except under special circumstances, players will not be written to either as Training, Playing in 
Matches, Times of Kick-off, Trains, etc. Each player must take notice from the List of Instructions as 
posted in the Dressing Room every Thursday afternoon, and if any player should fail to play in any 
Match for which he is selected as one ofthe team, he shall forfeit one week's wages and be further dealt 
with as the Directors may determine. 
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11. Wages will be paid after each Saturday's match. 
12. No one will be allowed in the Dressing Room excepting players and officials of the Club, either 
before or after Matches. 
J.H. ADDENBROOKE 
Secretary 
Source: Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club 
Appendix 10 
Details of the Court Case against William Sudell 
No. NAME Age TRADE Degree of Instruction 
10 William Sudell 44 Mill Manager Well. 
A58929 
Oflence as charged in the Indictment 
Embezzling and stealing a banker's cheque and order for the payment 
of the sum of £400, the property of John Phelps Goodair, his master, 
at Preston, 22nd Apri I 1892 
Second charge 
Embezzling and stealing a banker's cheque and order for the payment 
of the sum of £ 125 19s. 9d., at Preston, 21 st May 1890, and on the 
29th May 1890, a banker's cheque and order for the payment of the 
further sum of £ 135 12s. and on the 25th June 1890 a banker's cheque 
and order for the payment of the fUl1her sum of £20 I lOs. 5d., 
respectively the property of John Phelps Goodair, his said master. 
Third charge 
Unlawfully, wilfully, and with intent to defraud. omitting to enter in a 
certain book, to wit. a ledger, an order for the payment of£125 19s. 
9u .. for and on account of his said master at Preston, 21 st May 1890. 
When tried Before whom tried 
1895 H.W. Worsley 
10th April Taylor, Esq. Q.c. 
Chailman. 
Source: PRO HO 14011 61 
N amc and Address of Date of Warrant 
Committing Magistrate 
When rcceived into 
Custody 
J. Toulim Esq., Preston 1895 27th March 1895 
Verdict of the Jury 
Pleaded guilty of 
embezzlement 
Pleaded guilty of 
embezzlement 
Pleaded guilty of 
falsification of 
accounts 
Particulars of 
Previous 
Convictions in the 
Indictment 
27th March 
Sentence or Order of the 
Court 
3 years penal service 
N 
0 
10 
,)89 
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Appendix 11 
Financial Breakdown of Charlie Buchan's Transfer from Sunderland to Arsenal, 1925 
Sunderland 
July 11, 1925 Cash: Transfer Fee re: Buchan 2,000 
Sep 23 300 
Oct 2 100 
Oct 12 300 
Nov 20 300 
Nov 27 100 
Dec 3 100 
Dec 10 100 
Dec 29 100 
Jan 18, 1926 100 
Feb 11 100 
Feb 16 100 
March 23 100 
April 12 100 
3,900 
Source: Arsenal Ledger, Arsenal FC 
• RB 
• RH
• IR 
• OR
Appendix 12 
The WIM Formation 
-GK 
• CH 
• CF 
Source: Joy, Soccer Tactics, p. 54 
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• LB 
• LH 
• IL 
• OL 
Appendix 13 
HULL CITY A.F.C. 
SEASON 1939-40 
PLAYER'S TICKET 
Admit J. Curnow 
Official Entrance 
E. BLACKBURN, Secretary-Manager 
Bye Laws and Training Rules for Players. 
1939-40 Season. 
39:2 
1. All Players must report at the ground for Training at 10 a.m. and 2.30 p.m. daily as requested by the 
Trainer or Manager. 
2. Injured Players must report at the ground when able to do so for treatment as per instructions from 
the Trainer. All Players must obey the instructions of the Trainer and in all respects assist him in the 
discharge of his duties. On reporting each time players must sign the attendance book stating time of 
arrival. 
3. Players will be provided with the necessary outfits for training and playing (such outfits to be the 
property of the Club) and must not be taken away, except with the consent of the Trainer or Manager. 
Matchjerseys must not be used for Training purposes. Immediate report of any defect in outfits must be 
made to the Trainer so that prompt attention can be given to same. 
4. In cases of illness or accident notification of same must be made to the Trainer or Manager as soon as 
possible. Players are to note that they must Not visit the Club's Medical Officer without first obtaining 
permission to do so (cases of emergency excepted), and then only at such times as per arrangement with 
the Doctor. The Manager or Trainer will give permission when necessary. Players desiring the services 
of the Doctor in cases of emergency Must get in touch with him at once and advise the Trainer or 
Manager immediately. 
5. Players must Not bring friends in the Dressing Rooms or in the Saloon or other conveyance when 
travelling to away matches unless permission to do so has been obtained from a responsible Club 
Official. Players must Not stand about outside the Dressing Rooms on match days when not wanted to 
play, they must immediately go to the place appointed for that purpose and be available if wanted in 
case of emergency. All Players required to be in attendance for Home matches must be at the ground at 
least forty-five minutes prior to the time of kick-off, when travelling to Away matches they must report 
at the appointed place of departure at least 15 minutes before the time stated for leaving. 
6. Smoking is prohibited in the Dressing Rooms and Gambling of any description will Not be 
permitted on the Club premises. Players are also to note that certain games of Cards are forbidden 
when travelling to and from away matches, the Manager or (in his absence) the Trainer will give 
instructions regarding these of any other games. 
7. One season will be issued to each Player as a Complimentary and players are requested to see that 
same does not get in the hands of undesirable persons. 
8. The Captains as appointed shall have full control of all players on the field of play and players must 
respect instructions from them. 
9. Players must Not enter premises licensed for the sale of intoxicating drink after Monday in each 
week, nor attend any Dance after Tuesday in each week, unless in charge of a responsible official of 
the Club or with permission from the Manager or (in his absence) the Trainer. 
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10. Players must be in their places of residence not later than 10.45 p.m. on the Night prior to any 
match, unless in charge of a responsible official of the Club. 
11. Any Player absenting himself from Training without permission, or just cause or disregarding any 
of these Rules or Bye Laws will be dealt with as deemed necessary by the Board of Directors, and the 
Trainers have strict instructions to report any wilful damage to Club property, Breach of Rules, or 
unseemly conduct of any kind likely to prejudice the game of Football or interests in connection with 
same. 
12. Players are cautioned against the use of Foul or Offensive Language on or off the field of play, the 
use of bad language lowers the dignity of the individual and the prestige of the team. 
13. Players must Not ride Motor Cycles at any time, any player injured in such a way will forfeit all 
claims of wages from the Club. 
Players are particularly requested to make themselves conversant with these Rules or Bye Laws 
as they will be strictly adhered to, any breach of same will be dealt with by the Board of Directors 
who have power to inflict punishment in accordance with rules. 
At all times remember that you have a duty to fulfil both to the Directors of your Club and to the 
Public who pay admission to see good-class and wholehearted Football. Give of your best at all 
times, show grit and determination, if you lose go down showing a true spirit. 
Let your conduct at all times be honourable! 
and as true sportsmen. 
Source: Jack Curnow Collection 
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Appendix 14 
Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club (1923) Ltd. 
Season 1933-34 
PLAYER'S TICKET 
Name 
Rules 
Framed by the Directors for the guidance of Players and issued subject to the Rules, Regulations and 
Bye-laws of the Football Association, Limited. 
Frank C. Buckley 
Secretary-~anager 
Player's Instructions 
1. All professionals must report daily at 10 a.m. and will be under the orders of the Trainers for the 
remainder of the day. 
2. The Attendance Book must be signed every morning. Any player failing to sign will be automatically 
fined 5/- unless a good and sufficient reason is forthcoming to the Secretary-~anager. 
3. Special instructions will be posted in the dressing rooms from time to time. Players must make 
themselves conversant with them. 
4. At Home ~atches, players, whether selected to play or not, must report on ground at least 45 minutes 
before kick-off. 
5. At away matches the actual train departure time will be put on the team sheet. Players must be on the 
Station 15 minutes before train departure. 
6. The Club ~edical Officer is Dr J.H. Richmond, 6, Tettenhall Road. Surgery hours are 6 p.m. to 8 
p.m., and players must not visit him at any other time without instructions. 
7. In case of sickness or injury that prevents a player attending the Ground, notice must at once be sent 
to the Secretary-~anager. 
8. After all exercises, training or matches, players must expose any injuries, wounds, etc. (however 
slight) to the trainer for immediate treatment. Serious consequences often follow neglect of this 
precaution. 
9. Players are responsible for their training and playing kit, repairs and replacements necessary, must be 
pointed out to the trainers. Players must hang up their jerseys, etc., clean their boots and pumps 
immediately after use, and return to boot room. 
10. Players must provide their own "splits" and be responsible for their "cleanliness." 
11. Smoking is strictly forbidden on match days, and before training. 
12. Dancing after Wednesday night is strictly forbidden. 
13. ~otor cycling is also forbidden. 
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14. Players who wish to stay over-night after matches or visit their homes must make their request to 
the Secretary in time for the necessary arrangements to be made. 
15. No person, other than players of officials of the club will be allowed in the Dressing Rooms, either 
before or after matches or during training hours. 
16. Players are strictly forbidden to write, dictate or inspire any article to the press without first 
submitting such matter to the Directors through the Secretary. 
17. This card must be carried at all times and produced when asked for, it must on no account be 
allowed out of the player's possession or used by any other person. 
18. The Directors wish to point out the honourable place your Club occupies in the Game and request 
that every player assist in building up the tone of professional football generally. 
Everything possible will be done for your comfort and advancement and you are asked to "play the 
game" in the correct spirit and to conform to the rules and regulations as laid down. 
Frank C. Buckley 
Secretary-Manager 
Source: Wolverhampton Wanderers Football Club 
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Appendix 15a 
County rankings per capita production of football managers, 1880-1920 
C ou n Iy Popu lalion Managers Manager per Per C apila index 
Cleveland 573822 5 114764 5.28 
SI ral hc1yde 2397827 18 133213 4.55 
Gram pian 470596 3 156865 3.86 
Fife 326480 2 163240 3.71 
Yorkshire S 1301813 7 185973 3.26 
Tyne and Wear 1143245 6 190541 3.18 
Lancashire 1377600 7 196800 3.08 
Lolhian 744802 3 248267 2.44 
Cenlral Region 273078 273078 2.22 
Lincolnshire 554300 2 277150 2.19 
Norlhum berland 299905 299905 2.02 
SI aff ordsh ire 1012320 3 337440 1.80 
Wesl Midlands 2644634 7 377805 1.60 
Glam organ S 384633 384633 1.58 
Tayside 391529 391529 1.55 
Gwent 439684 439684 1.38 
Grealer M anchesler 2670000 6 445000 1.36 
D erbysh ire 911100 2 455550 1.33 
Durham 606800 606800 1.00 
Yorkshire N 666610 666610 0.91 
Sussex E 678300 678300 0.89 
Ham pshire 1456367 2 728184 0.83 
M erse y side 1513070 2 756535 0.80 
Cheshire 926293 926293 0.65 
Hertfordshire 954535 954535 0.64 
NOllinghamshire 982631 982631 0.62 
Kent 1486300 1486300 0.41 
London 6754500 3 2251500 0.27 
*Population figures for Appendix 15-16 are based on the 1981 census 
** The maps for Appendix 16 are based on the 1974 re-organisation of local government boundaries 
Source: Turner and White, Football Managers 
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Appendix 15b 
County rankings per capita production of football managers, 1921-1945 
C ou n ly Popu lalion Man agers Manager per Per C apila index 
Shetland 26716 26716 1 1.4 1 
Durham 606800 16 37925 8.04 
TyneandWear 1143245 17 67250 4.53 
Dumfries and Gallowa) 146159 2 73080 4.17 
Fife 326480 4 81620 3.73 
Slralhclyde 2397827 27 88808 3.43 
Tayside 391529 4 97882 3.11 
L an cash ire 1377600 14 98400 3.10 
Clwyd 395300 3 131767 2.31 
Cenlral Region 273078 2 136539 2.23 
N orlhum berland 299905 2 149953 2.03 
D erbysh ire 911100 5 182220 1.67 
Glam organ S 384633 2 192317 1.58 
N 01 t ingh am sh ire 982631 5 196526 1.55 
SI a rr ordsh ire 1012320 5 202464 1.51 
Yorkshire S 1301813 6 216969 1.40 
Ham psh ire 1456367 6 242728 1.26 
Lolhian 744802 3 248267 1.23 
Bedfordshire 504986 2 252493 1.21 
Wesl Midlands 2644634 10 264463 1.15 
Glam organ M 537866 2 268933 1.13 
Cleveland 573822 2 286911 1.06 
Grealer Manchester 2670000 9 296667 1.03 
M erseyside 1513070 5 302614 1.01 
Avon 909408 3 303136 1.01 
Glam organ W 366600 366600 0.83 
Cornwall 430506 430506 0.71 
Cheshire 926293 2 463147 0.66 
Gram pian 470596 470596 0.65 
Witt sh ire 518167 518167 0.59 
Lincolnshire 554300 554300 
0.55 
Sussex W 658562 658562 
0.46 
London 6754500 8 844313 
0.36 
Leiceslershire 863700 863700 
0.35 
Hertfordshire 954535 954535 
0.32 
Yorkshire W 2037510 2 1018755 
0.30 
Kenl 1486300 1486300 
0.21 
Essex 1491700 1491700 
0.20 
Source: Turner and White, Football Managers 
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Appendix 15c 
County rankings per capita production of football managers, 1946-1970 
County Popu lalion Managers Manager per Per C apila index 
Durham 
Fife 
TyneandWear 
Northum berland 
Yorkshire S 
Glam organ M 
Central Region 
Tayside 
Clwyd 
Lan c ash ire 
Borders 
Strathc1yde 
Staffordshire 
Cleveland 
Gram pian 
Cum bria 
Greater Manchester 
Not t ingh am shire 
Dumfries and Galloway 
Lothian 
Derbyshire 
M erseyside 
Lincolnshire 
Cheshire 
West Midlands 
Glam organ S 
Somerset 
Gwent 
Yorkshire N 
Avon 
Gwynedd 
London 
Hum berside 
Yorkshire W 
Essex 
Oyfed 
Berkshire 
Sussex E 
Glam organ W 
Shropshire 
Leicestershire 
Ham psh ire 
Surrey 
Gloucestershire 
Ox f ordsh ire 
Northam ptonshire 
Cam bridgeshire 
Dorset 
606800 
326480 
1143245 
299905 
1301813 
537866 
273078 
391529 
395300 
1377600 
99248 
2397827 
1012320 
573822 
470596 
483000 
2670000 
982631 
146159 
744802 
911100 
1513070 
554300 
926293 
2644634 
384633 
424988 
439684 
666610 
909408 
230468 
6754500 
847666 
2037510 
1491700 
335300 
675153 
678300 
366600 
375610 
863700 
20 
8 
24 
6 
23 
8 
4 
5 
5 
16 
24 
9 
5 
4 
4 
21 
7 
5 
6 
9 
3 
5 
14 
2 
2 
2 
3 
4 
24 
3 
7 
5 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
30340 
40810 
47635 
49984 
56601 
67233 
68270 
78306 
79060 
86100 
99248 
99909 
Hereford and Worcestershire 
1456367 
999393 
506100 
515079 
527532 
606000 
609100 
640,000 
693490 
112480 
114764 
117649 
120750 
127143 
140376 
146159 
148960 
151850 
168119 
184767 
185259 
188902 
192317 
212494 
219842 
222203 
227352 
230468 
281438 
282555 
291073 
298340 
335300 
337577 
339150 
366600 
375610 
431850 
485456 
499697 
506100 
515079 
527532 
606000 
609100 
640000 
693490 
743150 
954535 
973000 
N orf olk 
Kent 
Hertfordshire 
Devon 
1486300 
954535 
973000 
2 
Source: Turner and White, Football Managers 
5.71 
4.24 
3.64 
3.47 
3.06 
2.58 
2.54 
2.21 
2.19 
2.01 
1. 7 5 
1. 7 3 
1.54 
1.51 
1.47 
1.43 
1.36 
1.23 
1.19 
1.16 
1.14 
1.03 
0.94 
0.93 
0.92 
0.90 
0.82 
0.79 
0.78 
0.76 
0.75 
0.62 
0.61 
0.60 
0.58 
0.52 
0.51 
0.51 
0.47 
0.46 
0.40 
0.36 
0.35 
0.34 
0.34 
0.33 
0.29 
0.28 
0.27 
0.25 
0.23 
0.18 
0.18 
Appendices 
Appendix 15d 
County rankings per capita production of football managers, 1971-1993 
County Popu lation Managers Manager per Per C apila index 
Durham 606800 15 40453 3.94 
N Orlhum berland 299905 6 49984 3.19 
Y orksh ire S 1301813 23 56601 2.82 
SI ral hclyde 2397827 39 61483 2.59 
TyneandWear 1143245 17 67250 2.37 
Central Region 273078 4 68270 2.33 
M erseyside 1513070 21 72051 2.21 
Tayside 391529 5 78306 2.04 
Clwyd 395300 5 79060 2.02 
Lan cash ire 1377600 17 81035 1.97 
Lothian 744802 8 93100 1. 71 
Glam organ S 384633 4 96158 1.66 
Grealer Manchester 2670000 21 127143 1.25 
Glam organ M 537866 4 134467 1.19 
N ott ingh am sh ire 982631 7 140376 1.14 
SI aff ordsh ire 1012320 7 144617 1.10 
Cum bria 483000 3 161000 0.99 
Fife 326480 2 163240 0.98 
London 6754500 39 173192 0.92 
N orlham ptonshire 527532 3 175844 0.91 
West Midlands 2644634 15 176309 0.90 
Derbyshire 911100 5 182220 0.87 
Glam organ W 366600 2 183300 0.87 
Yorkshire W 2037510 11 185228 0.86 
Cheshire 926293 5 185259 0.86 
Buckingh am shire 564992 3 188331 0.85 
Cleveland 573822 3 191274 0.83 
Devon 973000 5 194600 0.82 
Gram pian 470596 2 235298 0.68 
Surrey 999393 4 249848 
0.64 
Bedf ordsh ire 504986 2 252493 
0.63 
Gloucestershire 506100 2 253050 
0.63 
Hum berside 847666 3 282555 
0.56 
Suffolk 596354 2 298177 
0.53 
Avon 909408 3 303136 
0.53 
Sussex E 678300 2 339150 
0.47 
N orf olk 693490 2 346745 
0.46 
Hampshire 1456367 4 364092 
0.44 
Somerset 424988 424988 
0.37 
Cornwall 430506 430506 
0.37 
Leicestershire 863700 2 
431850 0.37 
Gwen! 439684 
439684 0.36 
Hertfordshire 954535 2 
477268 0.33 
o xf ordsh ire 515079 
515079 0.31 
Wiltshire 518167 
518167 0.31 
Lincolnshire 554300 
554300 0.29 
Cam bridgeshire 606000 
606000 0.26 
Dorset 609100 
609100 0.26 
Essex 1491700 2 
745850 0.21 
Kent 1486300 2 
743150 0.21 
Source: Turner and White, Football Managers 
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Appendix 16a Appendices 
Per capita production of football managers, 1880-1920 
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Appendix 17 
THE LEEDS UNITED ASSOCIATION FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED 
and 
HORATIO STRATTON CARTER ESQ. 
Counterpart! 
AGREEMENT 
relating to the appointment of Manager 
Bromley & Walker 
Leeds 
1 st June 1955 
THIS AGREEMENT made the First day of June One thousand nine hundred and fifty five BETWEEN 
THE LEEDS UNITED ASSOCIATION FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED whose Registered Office is 
situated at Elland Road in the City of Leeds (hereinafter called ''the Company") ofthe one part and 
HORATIO STRATTON CARTER of 125 Otley Road in the said City of Leeds (hereinafter called "the 
Manager") of the other part 
WHEREBY it is agreed by and between the said parties hereto as follows:-
1. THE Company shall employ the Manager and the Manager shall serve the Company as Manager 
upon and subject to the following terms and conditions. 
2. THE engagement shall be for the period of three years commencing on the First day of June One 
thousand nine hundred and fifty five subject to the provision for detelmination hereinafter contained. 
During the continuance ofthis agreement the Manager of and on behalf of the Company and he shall do 
his utmost by lawful and legitimate means to promote develop and extend the interest welfare and 
business of the Company and he shall not either directly or indirectly engage or be concerned or 
interested in any other trade occupation or business of any kind whatsoever (except as a shareholder or 
debenture holder of any limited company not carrying on the business of a similar kind to the business 
of the Company). 
3. THE remuneration of the Manager shall be:-
a. A fixed salary at the rate of One thousand eight hundred and fifty pounds per annum payable by equal 
weekly instalments on the Thursday of each week the first payment to be made on the Second day of 
June One thousand nine hundred and fifty five; 
b. Reasonable motoring hotel travelling and out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the Manager in the 
execution of his duties to be paid weekly. 
4. THE Manager shall not draw accept or endorse any bill or other security for money on behalf of the 
Company or in any way pledge the credit of the Company unless he be previously authorised by the 
Board of Directors in any particular case. 
5. THE Manager shall at all times faithfully carry out all lawful instructions given to him from time to 
time by the Board of Directors in and for the conduct of the business of the Company. 
6. THE Manager shall subject to any orders or directors given to him by the Board of Directors during 
his employment hereunder be responsible for and have the control of the training and management of 
all the football players employed engaged or retained by the Company. 
7. THE Manager shall be responsible for all arrangements necessary for the travelling ofthe players 
playing in "away matches" and for their fitness on an"ival at the away grounds and for their safe and 
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speedy return to Leeds immediately after all and any such matches unless otherwise instructed by the 
Board of Directors. 
8. THE Manager shall not at any time divulge any information respecting the business of the Company 
to any person whatsoever other than the Board of Directors 
9. THE Company will require the Manager during the continuance of this agreement and by virtue of 
his employment as Manager to occupy the dwellinghouse known as 125 Otley Road in the City of 
Leeds or such other suitable residence as may be agreed upon between the parties without charge for 
the use and occupation thereof but nothing in this agreement shall be construed to create a tenancy 
between the Company and the Manager. 
10. THE employment of the Manager hereunder may be determined forthwith by the happening of any 
of the following events that is to say: 
a. If the Manager shall become insolvent or commit any act of bankruptcy; 
b. Be guilty of theft or any gross default in the conduct of his employment under the terms of the 
Agreement or misconduct; 
c. Be convicted by any Court for any criminal offence; 
d. Become negligent or become incapable of performing his duties hereunder by reason of permanent 
incapacity lunacy or habitual drunkenness or 
e. The breach or non-observance of any of the stipulations herein contained or any lawful and 
reasonable commands of the Directors of the Company. 
11. THE Manager shall be entitled to twenty one days holiday during the year or such longer period as 
the Board of Directors in their absolute discretion may give to him on full salary but all such holidays 
shall only be taken by the Manager during the period outside the football playing season and then only 
at such time or times as shall be convenient to the Company and be first mutually agreed upon. 
12. IN the case of the illness of the Manager or other cause incapacitating him from duly attending to 
his duties for a period or aggregate period exceeding thirteen weeks in any fifty tow consecutive weeks 
the Company shall be entitled forwith to determine the Manager's employment hereunder without 
notice. 
13. IN case of any dispute or difference arising between the parties hereto as to the construction of this 
Agreement or the rights duties or obligations of either party hereunder or any matter arising out of or 
concerning the same or the Manager's employment hereunder every such dispute and matter in 
difference shall be referred to a single Arbitrator to be appointed by the President for the time being of 
the Football Association. 
IN WITNESS whereof the Manager and the duly authorised Agent of the Company have hereunto set 
their respective hands the day and year first before written. 
SIGNED by the said Horatio Stratton Carter in the presence of:-
THIS AGREEMENT is made the twenty first day of August One thousand nine hundred and fifty seven 
BETWEEN the above named THE LEEDS UNITED ASSOCIATION FOOTBALL CLUB LIMITED 
(hereinafter called "the Company") of the one part and above named HORATIO STRATTON 
CARTER (hereinafter called "the Manager") of the other part and is supplemental to the above written 
agreement. 
WHEREAS the parties hereto desire to extend the provisions of the above written agreement in manner 
hereinafter appearing. 
HOW IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between the patties hereto as follow:-
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1. In the event of the football team of the Company holding at the end of the 1957/8 Association 
football season any of the positions specified in the first column of the Schedule hereto in the Football 
League First Division Championship Table for 1957/8 the Company shall be pay to the Manager as a 
bonus and by way of additional remuneration the sum specified in the second column of the said 
Schedule which is set opposite to the position specified in the said first column thereof which such 
football team shall hold. 
2. In the event of the football team of the Company qualifying for and playing in the sixth round of the 
competition for the Football Association Challenge Cup in the year 1958 and being defeated in such 
round the Company shall pay to the Manager as a bonus and by way of additional remuneration the sum 
of Five hundred pounds. 
3. In the event of the football team ofthe Company qualifying for and playing in the semi-final of the 
competition for the Football Association Challenge Cup in the year 1958 and being defeated in such 
round the Company shall pay to the Manager as a bonus and by way of additional remuneration the sum 
of Seven hundred and fifty pounds. 
4. In the event of the football team of the Company qualifying for and playing in the final of the 
competition for the Football Association Challenge Cup in the year 1958 and being defeated in such 
round the Company shall pay to the Manager as a bonus and by way of additional remuneration the sum 
of One thousand pounds. 
IN WITNESS whereofthe Manager and duly authorised Agent of the Company have hereunto set their 
respective hands the day and year first before written. 
THE SCHEDULE above referred to. 
Position of the Football League First Division 
Championship Table 
First 
Second 
Third 
Fourth 
Fifth 
Amount Payable (£) 
1,000 
750 
500 
250 
100 
SIGNED by the said Horatio Stratton Carter in the presence of:-
Source: Mrs P. Carter 
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